1/22
Vocabulary flashcards covering core definitions, syntactic specifications, and security games from Modern Cryptography lecture slides.
Name | Mastery | Learn | Test | Matching | Spaced | Call with Kai | Chat |
|---|
No analytics yet
Send a link to your students to track their progress
Cryptology
The overarching field that comprises both cryptography and cryptanalysis.
Cryptography
The practice of protecting the confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of data.
Cryptanalysis
The study and practice of breaking cryptographic protections.
Steganography
The practice of concealing the existence of data, dating back to at least 440\,BC.
Insecure Channel
A communication channel where the adversary carries the message and can read, reorder, replay, drop existing messages, or create new messages.
Cryptographic Protocol
A set of message exchanges that leverages or augments a channel's security properties to protect data in transit.
Kerckhoff's Desideratum
The cryptographic principle stating that a system should be secure even if everything about it is public knowledge, except for a secret key.
Private Key Encryption Scheme
A triple of algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec) where \text{Gen} : \begin{mathbb}N\text{\}end{mathbb} \rightarrow K, Enc:K×M→C, and Dec:K×C→M, satisfying Deck(Enck(m))=m for all k×K and m×M.
PrivK-eav Game
A security experiment PrivKA,⊤eav(n) testing encryption indistinguishability against a passive eavesdropping adversary A.
PrivK-cpa Game
A security experiment PrivKA,⊤cpa(n) testing encryption security against an adversary A with access to a chosen-plaintext encryption oracle.
PrivK-cca Game
A security experiment PrivKA,⊤cca(n) testing encryption security against an adversary A with access to both an encryption oracle and a decryption oracle (for any ciphertext except the challenge ciphertext c∗).
Public Key Encryption Scheme
A triple of algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec) where \text{Gen} : \begin{mathbb}N\text{\}end{mathbb} \rightarrow PK \times SK, Enc:PK×M→C, and Dec:SK×C→M, with Decsk(Encpk(m))=m holding with all but negligible probability.
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
A triple of algorithms (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) where Vrfyk(Mack(m),m)=1 for all keys k×K and messages m×M.
Mac-forge Game
A security experiment Mac-forgeA,⊤(n) where an adversary queries a MAC oracle for messages mi and attempts to forge a valid tag t for an unqueried message m.
Digital Signature Scheme
A triple of algorithms (Gen,Sign,Vrfy) where \text{Gen} : \begin{mathbb}N\text{\}end{mathbb} \rightarrow PK \times SK, \text{Sign} : SK \times M \rightarrow \begin{mathcal}\text{S}\text{\}end{mathcal}, and \text{Vrfy} : PK \times M \times \begin{mathcal}\text{S}\text{\}end{mathcal} \rightarrow \begin{matrix}0, 1\text{\}end{matrix}, satisfying Vrfypk(m,Signsk(m))=1.
Secure Hash Function
A pair of algorithms (Gen,H) with Gen:→S and H:S×M→T where the message space size exceeds the image size (∣M∣>∣T∣).
Hash-coll Game
A security experiment Hash-collA(n) where an adversary A attempts to find two distinct inputs m=m′ such that Hs(m)=Hs(m′).
Key Exchange Scheme
An algorithm \text{Run} : \begin{mathbb}N\text{\}end{mathbb} \rightarrow T \times K producing a transcript space T and shared key space K so both parties agree on a secret key via interaction.
Perfect Secrecy
A security definition where an adversary learns no information about the plaintext from the ciphertext, formally expressed as Pr[PrivKAeav(n)=1]=21 or Pr[M=m | C=c]=Pr[M=m].
Vernam Cipher (One-Time Pad)
A perfectly secret encryption scheme over M = C = K = \begin{matrix}0, 1\text{\}end{matrix}^n defined by Enck(m)=m⨁k and Deck(c)=c⨁k.
Negligible Function
A function f that grows slower than the reciprocal of any polynomial: \forall \text{poly}(\times) : \begin{mathcal}\text{E}\text{\}end{mathcal} n_0 : \forall n > n_0 : f(n) < \frac{1}{\text{poly}(n)}.
Efficient Algorithm
An algorithm A(x) that completes execution in time bounded by at most poly(∣x∣).
Pseudorandom Function (PRF)
A keyed function F : \begin{matrix}0, 1\text{\}end{matrix}^n \times \begin{matrix}0, 1\text{\}end{matrix}^n \rightarrow \begin{matrix}0, 1\text{\}end{matrix}^n that cannot be distinguished from a truly random function by any efficient adversary with non-negligible probability.