Chapter 8: Explaining Tastes: The Importance of Altruism and Other Non-egoistic Behaviour

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Main microeconomic assumption

People are rational

  • Ie consumers want to maximise utility, have clear preferences, have perfect info


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2 definitions of rationality

  1. Present aim standard

  2. Self-interest standard


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Present aim standard rationality

Rational if you efficiently pursue whatever goals/preferences you currently have, regardless of whether they make sense.

  • Ie goal = selfdestructive behaviour → pursue it in the most efficient way

  • Aims are not questioned (even if rly stupid)


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Self-interest standard rationality

Rational if acts align with their own narrow material interests.

  • Ignores motives like altruism


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Which standard does traditional rational choice theory vs economists IRL use?

  1. Traditional rational choice theory: present-aim standard (preferences aren’t questioned)

  2. Economists: self-interest standard


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Criticism of present-aim standard

Any behaviour can be explained by inventing a preference for it, making the model unfalsifiable

  • Model explains everything → explains nothing


<p>Any behaviour can be explained by inventing a preference for it, making the model unfalsifiable</p><ul><li><p>Model explains everything → explains nothing</p></li></ul><p></p>
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Why is self-interest an incomplete model of behaviour?

People have other motives / preferences:

  1. Altruism

  2. Public spirit

  3. Fairness


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Why does the self-interest model predict abt voting for elections + why?

People won’t vote

  • Bc has an opportunity cost (time + effort)

  • + probability of one vote changing the election outcome is v small.

  • → expected material benefit is virtually zero.


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Why do people vote despite this?

Voting can provide utility (regardless of outcome)

  • Eg if preference for public spirit

  • → incorporate non-self-interested preferences into the rational choice model


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What determines whether Mary votes?

Whether the utility benefit of voting exceeds its opportunity cost.


<table style="min-width: 50px;"><colgroup><col style="min-width: 25px;"><col style="min-width: 25px;"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1"><p>What determines whether Mary votes?</p></td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1"><p>Whether the utility benefit of voting exceeds its opportunity cost.</p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p>
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Can monetary incentives can influence behaviour even when people have non-self-interested preferences?

Yes

  • Australia = higher voter turnout → don’t vote = pay a fine


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Altruism

Valuing another person's wellbeing, even at a personal cost

  • Getting satisfaction from improving someone else's wellbeing


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How does the rational choice model incorporate altruism

Allows people to care about other people's income.

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How are altruistic preferences represented?

Indifference curves over own income and another person's income.

<p>Indifference curves over own income and another person's income.</p>
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What is the optimal income transfer condition?

MRS = 1, equal to the absolute slope of the budget constraint.

When will an altruistic person give money?

When their MRS exceeds the cost of transferring money.

What is a corner solution in the giving example?

Giving nothing because the person doesn't value transferring money enough.


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If Franny values both her own income and Zooey's income, what do her indifference curves look like?

  1. Downward sloping (-ve slope): she is willing to sacrifice her own income to increase Zooey's.

  2. Diminishing MRS: the more income she has, the more she is willing to give up to help Zooey.


<ol><li><p>Downward sloping (-ve slope): she is willing to sacrifice her own income to increase Zooey's.</p></li><li><p>Diminishing MRS: the more income she has, the more she is willing to give up to help Zooey.</p></li></ol><p></p>
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Franny example:

  • Franny initially has €50,000.

  • Zooey has €10,000.

  • Franny values both her own income and Zooey's income


Should Franny give some of her income to Zooey?

First draw budget constraint (slope -1)

  • Slope = -1 = costs Franny $1 to give Zooey an additional $1


Optimal point is when BC is tangent to IC (slope of MRS = slope of IC = 1 (in this eg)


  1. If MRS > 1 → willing to sacrifice more than €1 for Zooey's extra €1 → give money.

  • Franny keeps all her income = point A = MRS>1

  1. If MRS = 1 → optimal transfer (point C)

  2. If MRS < 1 (slope of BC)→ doesn't want to give money.


Franny gives €19,000, leaving herself €31,000.


NOTE: Corner solution: If Franny initially has less money than Zooey, she may give nothing because her MRS is below 1 (cant give negative money)


What is a corner solution in the giving example?

Giving nothing because the person doesn't value transferring money enough.


<p>First draw budget constraint (slope -1)</p><ul><li><p>Slope = -1 = costs Franny $1 to give Zooey an additional $1</p></li></ul><p></p><p>Optimal point is when BC is tangent to IC (slope of MRS = slope of IC = 1 (in this eg)</p><p></p><ol><li><p>If MRS &gt; 1 → willing to sacrifice more than €1 for Zooey's extra €1 → give money.</p></li></ol><ul><li><p>Franny keeps all her income = point A = MRS&gt;1</p></li></ul><ol start="2"><li><p>If MRS = 1 → optimal transfer (point C)</p></li><li><p>If MRS &lt; 1 (slope of BC)→ doesn't want to give money.</p></li></ol><p></p><p>Franny gives €19,000, leaving herself €31,000.</p><p></p><p>NOTE: Corner solution: If Franny initially has less money than Zooey, she may give nothing because her MRS is below 1 (cant give negative money)</p><p></p><table style="min-width: 50px;"><colgroup><col style="min-width: 25px;"><col style="min-width: 25px;"></colgroup><tbody><tr><td colspan="1" rowspan="1"><p>What is a corner solution in the giving example?</p></td><td colspan="1" rowspan="1"><p>Giving nothing because the person doesn't value transferring money enough.</p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p>
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<p></p>



<p></p>
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When will an altruistic person give money?

MRS > cost of transferring money

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What is the ultimatum game?

One person proposes a split; the other accepts or rejects it. Rejection means neither receives anything.

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What does the self-interest model predict in the ultimatum game?

  1. Allocator will propose an unfair split ($90 vs $10)

  2. Reciever will accept bc a small amt is better than nothing


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<p>Why might someone reject an unfair offer?</p>

Why might someone reject an unfair offer?

The disutility of unfairness outweighs the small material / financial gain

  • Rejecting gives greater utility (despite lower material wealth)

  • Cares abt final wealth AND fairness of split


<p>The disutility of unfairness outweighs the small material / financial gain</p><ul><li><p>Rejecting gives greater utility (despite lower material wealth)</p></li><li><p>Cares abt final wealth AND fairness of split</p></li></ul><p></p>
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How does fairness affect the allocator?

They may offer a fairer split to avoid rejection

  • So both allocator + reciever benefit


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Limits of fairness in the ultimatum game?

People are less likely to reject unfair offers when the absolute financial gain is very large

  • Eg is split is $9000 vs $1000 → unfair split, but large absolute gain


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<p>What does this graph show?</p>

What does this graph show?

People care abt FAIRNESS

<p>People care abt <strong>FAIRNESS</strong></p>
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Does the rational choice model mean that people are selfish?

Not necessarily

  • Can explain a wide range of behaviours as long as we account for people's preferences


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What problem does the ultimatum game show?

Commitment / signalling

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