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30 Terms

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Jordan’s “East Bankers”

East Bankers are Jordanians from tribes on the east side of the Jordan River and support the Hashemite monarchy. In mid‑2010, their National Veterans Committee made a petition condemning corruption and neoliberal economic policies and calling for the disenfranchisement of Jordan’s Palestinian population, and that Jordan wouldn't include the West Bank. In January 2011, 36 tribal leaders sent another petition to the king, about “excessive spending” by his Palestinian wife as a symbol of regime corruption. Their pressure pushed King Abdullah toward limited reforms rather than a regime change.


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Druze

A small Shia religious minority in Syria (3.2% of the population). They are concentrated in the province of Sweida/Jabal Druze, where Druze militias have controlled local territory for years. In the post-Assad period, disputes with Sunni Bedouins over land and grazing erupted into violence in mid‑2025, killing 2,000 people, mostly Druze. The Druze are wary of Assad and Sunni Islamist groups and favor federalism, which has been denied to them. Their self‑defense and fear of sectarian domination persisted from the 2011 uprising into the new Syrian order.

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Bashir al-Assad

Syria’s president in July 2000 after the constitution was amended to lower the presidential age from 40 to 34. Like his father, he relied on the Alawite (Shia) minority, giving loyalists and family members key positions in the security and economy. When protests began in 2011 in places like Daraa and Homs, he responded with fire, mass arrests, bombs, and chemical weapons, turning a peaceful uprising into a civil war; by 2015, his regime controlled 20% of Syrian territory. Iran on the ground and Russia in the air helped him gain control of 70–75% of the country. Assad’s regime fell on December 8, 2024, when Ahmed al‑Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham seized Aleppo and then Damascus, ending half a century of Assad family rule

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Prince Mohammed bin Salman

Saudis crown prince and de facto ruler, whose rise coincided with the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings and with Saudi anger at U.S. policies for the withdrawal from Iraq and the nuclear negotiations with Iran. He sees Iran as a threat and pushed for an assertive Saudi role across the region, including backing the March 2011 Arab League vote for a Libya no‑fly zone out of distaste for Qaddafi. In March 2015, he launched Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen, leading a Saudi‑UAE coalition to reverse the Houthi takeover of Sanaa, and said the war would last 6 weeks. MBS’s policies are how the Gulf monarchies tried to reverse the outcomes of the Arab uprisings.

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Darfur

Darfur is a region in western Sudan where the Janjaweed militias, rebranded as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), carried out genocide and war crimes between 2003 and 2008, killing 300,000 people. Occurred under Omar al‑Bashir’s Islamist regime and led to his indictment by the International Criminal Court in 2009. In 2013, Bashir transformed the Janjaweed into the RSF and gave command to Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, who used Darfur’s Jebel Amer gold mines to finance his forces. The legacy of the Darfur war shaped the power of the RSF during Sudan’s Arab Spring‑inspired uprising in 2018–2019 and their role in the June 3, 2019 massacre and the current civil war. Darfur shows that unresolved conflicts and militias became obstacles to democratization in the Arab Spring 2.0.

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Houthis

The Houthis are a Zaydi Shi’a movement from northern Yemen. They fought six wars against President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government between 2004 and 2010 and opposed the Saudi‑backed transition that moved power from Saleh to Hadi after the 2011 uprising. The transitional government’s proposal to divide the unified Zaydi north into three provinces and block it from access to the Red Sea, combined with IMF‑pressured fuel subsidy cuts in 2014, pushed the Houthis to organize mass protests and then seize Sanaa in late 2014. Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened in March 2015, treating them as an Iranian proxy; Iran did become their main arms supplier, but the Houthis are independent. Since 2017, they have built a de facto state where about 70% of Yemen’s population lives, and by the mid‑2020s they are strong enough to blockade Red Sea shipping and demand war reparations from Saudi Arabia

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King Abdullah (Jordan)

King Abdullah II is the monarch of Jordan, ruling a “limited constitutional monarchy” in which he can appoint and dismiss governments and dissolve parliament. During the 2011 Arab uprisings, he faced protests over corruption, rising prices, and demands to move toward a true constitutional monarchy; in June 2011 he promised a transition, created a Constitutional Court and an independent electoral commission, dismissed some ministers and expanded subsidies. When fuel subsidies were removed in 2012, renewed protests forced him to restore them temporarily, and when he tried to cut them again later that year, protesters even called for the end of the monarchy.

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Omar Hassan al-Bashir

Omar al-Bashir ruled Sudan from 1989 to 2019, inaugurating an Islamist regime that hosted Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s and aligned with military and Islamist elites. He oversaw the Darfur genocide and other war crimes between 2003 and 2008, for which he was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2009. The effects of the uprisings hit Sudan in September 2013, when protests over fuel and food prices were crushed, and again in December 2018 when bread price sparked countrywide demonstrations led by the Sudanese Professionals Association. Under pressure from the SPA/FFC coalition and mass sit‑ins, and facing fissures among the SAF, NISS and RSF, Bashir was forced out by his own generals in April 2019 after 30 years in power

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Rapid Support Forces (Sudan)

The RSF is a Sudanese paramilitary force formed in 2013 out of the Janjaweed militias that carried out genocide and war crimes in Darfur from 2003 to 2008. Its fighters were recruited from the Rizeigat Arab tribe and led by General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. During Sudan’s 2018–2019 uprising, the RSF cooperated with the army to topple Bashir, but then led the June 3, 2019 massacre in Khartoum that killed 128 protesters. After the second coup in October 2021, Hemedti became Burhan’s deputy on the Sovereign Council, but disputes over integrating the RSF into the army triggered Sudan’s civil war. RSF is a driver of the humanitarian disaster, armed and backed by the UAE with drones, weapons, and foreign mercenaries.

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Kurds

Syrian Kurds are an ethnic minority concentrated in the north and northeast, mostly Sunni Muslims, whose uprisings date back to 2004 and whose areas were given special autonomy under the French mandate as “Jabal Druze.” During the 2011–2024 Syrian war, they established an autonomous region known as Rojava (North and East Syria), based on “democratic confederalism” and a system of co‑chairmanships, multiethnic councils, and roles for women. The Kurdish‑led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by U.S. air power and funding, became the main ground partner in Operation Inherent Resolve and destroyed the ISIS caliphate by 2019. This put them at odds with Turkey, which saw them as an extension of the PKK, and resented Kurdish dominance.

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Alawites

Alawites are a minority Shi’a sect making up 12.8% of Syria’s population, concentrated in the coastal region around Latakia and Tartus. Under Hafez and Bashar al‑Assad, more than 90% of key military and security commands were held by Alawites, and “Alawite shadow commanders” were embedded in units to prevent abandonment. Alawites, along with Christians and other minorities, feared that a compromise with the 2011 Sunni‑led uprising would invite a Sunni revolution and their own destruction, so they stuck with Assad. After Assad’s fall, former regime figures from the Alawite community fled abroad, while sectarian violence on the coast in March 2025 killed over 1,600 people, mostly Alawites. The Arab uprisings in Syria became mixed with sectarian fears that shape efforts to build an inclusive state.

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Ahmed al-Sharaa

Ahmed al-Sharaa, known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, is a former jihadist who became Syria’s interim president after leading Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS) to victory over Assad in 2024. He was in Iraq around 2003, joined the insurgents who formed al-Qaeda in Iraq, and entered Syria in late 2011 with money from Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi to create the Nusra Front, which made itself known by suicide bombings in 2012 and was based in Idlib. In 2016, he broke with al-Qaeda, rebranded his group as HTS in 2017, and shifted toward “nationalist”, reconciling with local Christians and adopting tactics to win Turkish and Gulf support. After HTS took Aleppo in November 2024 and Assad fell, al‑Sharaa announced a caretaker government on March 29, 2025, with an interim constitution that keeps a strong presidency, centralizes power, and declares Islamic law the source of national law; he also appointed minorities to cabinet.

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Berbers

Berbers (Amazigh) are the Indigenous inhabitants of North Africa, including parts of Morocco and Algeria. During the 2011 Arab uprisings, Berber activists in Morocco participated in the February 20 Movement, a protest wave demanding a shift from monarchy to a parliamentary system and a new constitution approved by the people. One demand was recognition of Berber linguistic rights and reform. Backed by Saudi financial support, King Mohammed VI offered political concessions and endorsed a constitutional amendment recognizing standardized Berber as an official language.

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ISIS

ISIS is a jihadist organization that came from Al Qaeda in Iraq and expanded into Syria as the Assad regime’s crackdown turned protests into war. By 2014, it dominated 30,000 square miles across Syria and Iraq, imposing a “Taliban‑style” theocracy with religious courts, looting, kidnappings, and violence; it threatened the Assad regime, Kurds and minorities, the Iraqi government, Iran, and Western interests. The U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve began in 2014, partnering with the Kurdish‑led SDF, with U.S. air and logistical support, and destroyed the ISIS territorial caliphate by 2019. After its defeat, ISIS left behind a legacy of radicalism and sleeper cells in Yemen, and U.S., Russia, Iran, and regional states are concerned.

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Hezbollah

Hezbollah is an Iran‑backed Shi’a movement and militia based in Lebanon that gained political and military power after the civil war and from 2005 onward. The UN‑mandated Special Tribunal for Lebanon indicted and convicted Hezbollah members for the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and other anti‑Syrian politicians and journalists. After Syrian forces withdrew, Hezbollah joined the Lebanese government, secured cabinet posts and used its arms to maintain influence, even as sanctions and the global financial crisis reduced Gulf tourism and remittances. During the Syrian uprising from 2011 onward, Hezbollah sent fighters to support Assad, tying Lebanon’s fate to Syria and Iran; after 2024, it joined Iran in retaliatory strikes that drew massive Israeli attacks, killing thousands and displacing a million Lebanese. The current government, and President banned Hezbollah’s military activities and vowed to disarm.

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Trucial states

TBA

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Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed

Is the ruler of Abu Dhabi and, since 2022, president of the UAE, but he has led the country since 2014. He has 2 enemies: Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, believing the Arab world is “not ready” for democracy because free elections would bring Islamists to power. After the 2011 uprisings, he worked with Saudi Arabia to roll back Islamist gains: plotting with Bandar bin Sultan to remove Egypt’s President Morsi, financing the Tamarod movement, backing Khalifa Hifter in Libya in violation of UN embargoes, and joining the blockade of Qatar. In Yemen, he intervened with Saudi Arabia in 2015 but then separated by backing southern separatists and taking control of ports and islands around Bab el‑Mandeb, and in Sudan he backed Hemedti’s RSF, using Red Crescent cover and Chinese drones to supply weapons and intelligence.

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Ali Abdullah Saleh

Became president of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) in 1978 and of unified Yemen in 1990, ruling until he was ousted in 2012. His rule was marked by nepotism, placing relatives in top military and economic posts, and corruption, with about 30% of state revenues never reaching the treasury; by 2010, parliament was moving to eliminate term limits so he could stay and groom his son. The “Pink Revolution” that began in late January 2011, inspired by events in Egypt, protested these plans and, with a fragmented security apparatus and multiple insurgencies, pushed Yemen into crisis. Saudi Arabia and the GCC brokered a November 2011 deal, backed by the U.S., that replaced Saleh with his vice‑president Hadi and threatened him with asset freezes and travel bans if he didn’t comply; protesters felt their uprising had been hijacked. Saleh later allied with the Houthis against Hadi, then tried to switch back toward the Saudi‑backed side in 2017, but the Houthis killed him, allowing them to consolidate control over northern Yemen.

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In both Yemen and Syria mobilization against longtime authoritarian ruler evolved into a sectarian Sunni-Shi’a war? How so? What are some key differences in the two cases?

In Syria, the 2011 peaceful protests against Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian rule were met with a brutal military crackdown, which turned the uprising into an armed insurgency. Assad's Alawite-dominated regime framed the conflict as a struggle against "Sunni terrorism" and released jihadists from prison, who were joined by remnants of the Islamic State in Iraq. As the war escalated, regional Sunni states (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait) funneled arms and money to rebel groups, while Iran and Hezbollah deployed forces to back Assad, transforming a pro-democracy mobilization into a sectarian proxy war to displace the Shi'a. In Yemen, the 2011 "Pink Revolution" protests focused on Saleh's corruption and succession plans. Sectarianization occurred later (since late 2014) after the Saudi/GCC transition plan failed and the National Dialogue deadlocked over a federal plan that marginalized the Zaydi Shi'a north. Prompted by fuel subsidy cuts, the Houthis seized Sanaa in late 2014, leading to a Saudi-led intervention in 2015. The difference is that Syria's regime was an Alawite minority ruling a Sunni majority, whereas Yemen's Houthis were a marginalized Zaydi Shi'a group challenging a weak state. Syria's conflict drew in multiple foreign militaries (Russia, Iran, Turkey, US), while Yemen's external dimension was dominated by the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis.

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Why did Saudi Arabia intervene in Bahrain in 2011? Why did Saudi Arabia intervene in Yemen in 2015?

Saudi Arabia intervened in Bahrain on March 15, 2011, under the GCC's "Peninsula Shield" after the Sunni Al-Khalifa monarchy faced protests from its majority Shi'a population demanding constitutional reforms and free elections. Riyadh viewed any regime change in Bahrain as an unacceptable threat to the Saudi monarchy that could empower Iran-allied Shi'a groups on its border. The intervention was officially justified as a response to Iranian aggression. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia intervened in March 2015 once the Houthis captured Sanaa and pushed south. Riyadh launched Operation Decisive Storm to restore President Hadi's government and prevent the Houthis from establishing a Hezbollah-like, Iranian-backed hold on its southern border. This intervention was due to the rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who was determined to resist Iran and establish his regional leadership.

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Why was R2P invoked in response to the civil war in Libya but not in Syria?

In Libya, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League voted in March 2011 to support a UN-mandated no-fly zone, which provided regional and diplomatic cover for the Western-led military intervention (Operation Unified Protector) under the Responsibility to Protect. In Syria, R2P was not invoked due to major military and political obstacles. Syria possessed air defense, and analysts warned that establishing safe havens or no-fly zones would carry high risks of escalation and direct Iranian intervention. Politically, Russia consistently vetoed UN Security Council resolutions. Vladimir Putin was furious over how the UN resolution in Libya had been used to topple Qaddafi and was determined to prevent a similar Western-led intervention against Assad.

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In 2019, both in Algeria and in Sudan, somewhat like in 2013 in Egypt, the military stood in the way of protesters on the path to democratic changes. But in Algeria, the military prevailed while in Sudan it didn’t, at least not initially. What explains the failure of the Sudanese Armed Forces to prevail? Have the protesters in Sudan been successful in ending authoritarian rule?

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) failed to prevail initially because Bashir had fragmented coercive power among the SAF, the NISS secret police, and the RSF paramilitary. During the April 2019 sit-in, army conscripts and junior officers defected to defend protesters from NISS attacks, forcing the military leadership to cooperate to oust Bashir to avoid an internal civil war. Following the RSF's June 3, 2019 massacre, intense international condemnation and mediation by the US, UK, AU, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE forced the military to negotiate a power-sharing deal. However, Sudanese protesters have not successfully ended authoritarian rule; the SAF and RSF launched a second coup in October 2021, and their subsequent rivalry over military integration plunged the country into a devastating civil war. In Algeria, the military-political elite ("the System") remained cohesive and managed Bouteflika's ouster in March 2019. The military ignored the Hirak protests and pressed forward with its own top-down political roadmap. Because the Hirak was decentralized and leaderless, it lacked a negotiating representative, and the restrained response of Algerian security forces (avoided public massacres) prevented international intervention or mediation.

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The new Syrian government—formally in power since March of 2025--enjoys the support of Turkey, the Gulf countries, and the Trump administration, while its potential opponents (Russia and Iran) are more preoccupied with their own concerns (the ongoing war with Ukraine for Russia, and the devastating blow to Iran’s military command structures in June 2025 and February 2026). What are the political, military, and economic difficulties that the new Syrian government is likely to experience in the months to come?

The caretaker government under Ahmed al-Shara faces a fractured national identity and broken social trust. Regimes founded by fractured rebel coalitions are historically short-lived and highly vulnerable to defections and new rebellions. The interim constitution concentrates power in a strong presidency and establishes Islamic law as the source of legislation, which, combined with recent sectarian massacres on the coast and in Sweida, has heightened fears among Alawites, Druze, and Kurds. Al-Shara remains on U.N. sanctions lists, and balancing loyalty to HTS's foreign fighters with seeking international recognition is a major diplomatic hurdle. Militarily, the country is awash in weapons, making the disarmament and integration of various militias an enormous challenge. Although the Kurdish-led SDF agreed to merge by the end of 2025, bringing them and other independent armed groups under central control remains highly unstable. The government must also contain a potential resurgence of ISIS, manage continuing Turkish and Russian military bases, and cope with Israel extending its security perimeter and establishing buffer zones. Economically, Syria's economy is completely shattered, with more than 90% of the population living below the poverty line and unemployment ranging from 25% to 53%. The Syrian pound has collapsed from 50 per dollar before the war to 15,000, and critical infrastructure, including water treatment and health facilities, is destroyed. The IMF estimates that reconstruction will take at least 20 years, a task made difficult because half of all university-educated Syrians have fled the country and foreign donors remain wary of HTS's terrorist designation.

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The outcomes of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt, Libya and Yemen have all been influenced by external factors. Explain how foreign actors shaped the outcomes in each of the three cases?

In Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE actively worked to undermine the democratic transition. Following Morsi's election, Saudi intelligence chief Bandar bin Sultan and UAE's MBZ plotted with Egyptian generals, promising El-Sisi $20 billion in economic aid if Morsi were deposed. They financed the Tamarod movement, waged a massive media campaign demonizing the Brotherhood, and provided $46 billion in financial aid to stabilize Sisi's military-backed regime. In Libya, Saudi Arabia backed the Arab League's call for a no-fly zone in 2011, providing the regional diplomatic cover necessary for NATO's military intervention. After Qaddafi's fall, foreign intervention continued to fuel the civil war, with the UAE violating UN arms embargoes to supply Khalifa Hifter, while Qatar supported rival Islamist-aligned factions. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the GCC, with U.S. backing, engineered the November 2011 transition plan that replaced Saleh with Hadi. When the Houthis seized Sanaa, Saudi Arabia and the UAE launched a military intervention in 2015, backed by U.S., French, and British weapons, intelligence, and mid-air refueling. This intervention, countered by Iranian and Hezbollah military and financial support to the Houthis, locked Yemen into a destructive, multi-sided war.

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Sunni-Shia rivalry has a long history in the Persian Gulf but has varied in intensity. What recent events helped re-kindle this rivalry and in what way?

Two major waves that rekindled this rivalry. The first was the 1979 Iranian Revolution, where Iran's backing of Shi'a political drives in the Gulf, Syria, and Yemen prompted reactive Sunni chauvinism via Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Deobandi networks, politicizing sectarian divides in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The second wave was the U.S. occupation of Iraq, which sparked a brutal Sunni-Shia civil war starting in 2005–2006 and allowed Iran-aligned parties to embed themselves in Iraqi politics. The 2011 Arab uprisings, differences were politicized in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. Saudi Arabia viewed the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and Obama's 2013 nuclear outreach to Iran as responsible for allowing Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus to fall under Iran, prompting Saudi-Iranian competition.

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How was the Syrian war internationalized? Identify at least 4 foreign actors involved in the Syrian civil war from 2011 and 2024 and explain their interests

The Syrian civil war became internationalized as external powers intervened to support rival sides. Iran intervened to protect its vital strategic ally, deploying its own Revolutionary Guard and Quds Force, organizing Afghan and Pakistani militias, and sending Hezbollah fighters to ensure Assad did not fall. Russia sought to preserve its naval base at Tartus and airbase at Hmeimim, its only stopover points in the eastern Mediterranean and intervened with a decisive air campaign in 2015 while blocking UN resolutions. Turkey backed Sunni opposition groups to empower the Sunni majority, but its interest was preventing Kurdish autonomy and separatism near its southern border, leading to direct military operations in 2016. Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait) put billions in financial and military aid to rebel groups to counter Iranian influence and for sectarian reasons, their tolerance of private funding empowered Islamist factions.

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Why did the uprisings in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Sudan lead to civil wars while the protests in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria did not?

Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Sudan all suffered from weak state institutions, fragmented security apparatuses, and heavy foreign intervention. Yemen was a fragile, newly unified state vulnerable to northern Houthi and southern separatist movements, whose military split during the 2011 uprising. Syria's regime, built on an Alawite minority, used sectarianized violence to crush protests, driving an armed insurgency that brought foreign proxy intervention. Sudan's coercive power was fragmented by Bashir among the SAF, NISS, and RSF, leading to a failed transition and eventual civil war between rival generals. Libya's state collapsed under NATO's military intervention, leaving a vacuum filled by rival armed groups backed by competing external patrons. In contrast, in Egypt and Tunisia, cohesive national militaries steered the transitions rather than split into warring factions, resulting in regime change with limited violence and minimal external military involvement. In Algeria, the military-political elite ("the System") remained unified, and security forces used restrained, discreet repression to manage the Hirak protests. This cohesion, combined with Algeria's anti-imperialist stance, kept foreign intervention at bay and prevented a civil war.

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How did well-to-do monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait deal with the protests in their respective countries in 2011? Ho did less well-to-do monarchies such as Jordan, Morocco and Oman deal with the protests in 2011?

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait used their immense oil wealth to distribute financial benefits and co-opt their populations. Saudi Arabia launched $130 billion in new public expenditures (one-fifth of its GDP) to create 60,000 government jobs, raise the minimum wage, construct housing, and relieve citizen debts, while using force to suppress Shi'a protests in the Eastern Province. Kuwait's emir granted each citizen 1,000 dinars and a year of free food in January 2011. Jordan, Morocco, and Oman relied on limited political concessions, constitutional reforms, and cash infusions from their wealthier Gulf neighbors. Jordan's King Abdullah created a Constitutional Court and an independent electoral commission, restored subsidies, and promised a transition to a constitutional monarchy, while security forces blocked protesters from occupying public squares. Morocco's king approved a new constitution that recognized the Berber language and welcomed opposition parties; he still kept absolute executive power. Wealthy Gulf monarchies provided critical cash infusions to Jordan, Morocco, and Oman to shore up these regimes and help them resist Western pressure to compromise.

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What explains unilateral actions on the part of Saudi Arabia or the U.A.E. (or both) in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Sudan?


These unilateral actions are explained by an intense fear of Iranian expansion, an obsession with eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood, and a deep distrust of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration. Saudi and Emirati leaders were alarmed by the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, the 2013 nuclear negotiations with Iran, and Washington's refusal to intervene militarily in Syria, concluding that the U.S. had become a liability. Utilizing their vast oil wealth, they acted independently to protect regional authoritarian stability. They intervened directly in Bahrain and Yemen, financed Sisi's coup in Egypt, armed Khalifa Hifter in Libya, and backed rival military factions in Sudan to secure strategic maritime routes and resources.

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The interests of Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. overlapped in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Bahrain. Why did their objectives diverge in Yemen and Sudan?

In Yemen, Saudi Arabia's primary objective is a unified, stable Yemen under a government friendly to Riyadh, leading it to support the internationally recognized government (Hadi/PLC). The UAE, however, seeks to secure strategic maritime trade routes and ports around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Horn of Africa, leading it to back the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and southern separatists. Saudi Arabia is willing to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah party as a military ally, whereas the UAE views the Brotherhood as an threat and has actively worked to weaken Islah. In Sudan, while both Gulf monarchies initially provided $3 billion to the Transitional Military Council to bolster their influence, their objectives diverged as they aligned with rival generals to control Sudan's gold, energy, and logistics gateways. Saudi Arabia supports General Burhan and the regular SAF, whereas the UAE backs General Hemedti and the RSF. The UAE also views the RSF as a bulwark against Islamist political movements in the region, which the Emirati royal family considers it a threat to its authority.