1/23
Looks like no tags are added yet.
Terrorism
There are over 250 definitions of terrorism, which tend to emphasize the actor, target, action, political purpose, and psychological mechanism.
“Political violence or its threat intended to influence an audience beyond immediate victims.”
Differences emerge over the inclusion of state/nonstate actors, whether targets must be noncombatants, whether violence must be lethal, if violence aims to instill fear in a wider audience, and whether objectives must be political.
Critical Terrorism Studies
An approach examining state violence, contested labels, power, and assumptions and exclusions shaping terrorism scholarship.
State Terrorism
A form of violence in which state representatives deliberately threaten or use violence against individuals whom the state has a duty to protect, with the purpose. of inducing extreme fear in a target audience.
The difference between state terrorism and other forms of repression/violence is its instrumentality; the victim is harmed to send a message to others.
Narcoterrorism
Originally coined in 1983 by Peruvian President Belaunde Terry.
“A contested term linking drug trafficking and terrorism” with two general camps:
1) Criminal organizations using terrorist tactics to secure or expand their illicit businesses
2) Insurgents, terrorists, or governments involved in drug trafficking to achieve their political goals
Treating this form of terrorism as a tactic allows scholars to examine the intimidation of officials and civilians without assuming cartels and terrorist groups have identical goals.
Insurgency
A political-military strategy that focuses on gaining the support of the local population (winning hearts and minds) and building a “shadow government” to rival the state through the provision of services and alternative governance.
Use irregular/asymmetric/guerrilla warfare tactics to wear down a stronger conventional military through an attrition strategy.
Can overlap with terrorism.
Criminal Insurgency
A term that is increasingly used to to categorize Mexican cartels, their relationship with the state, and their violent practices.
Four Levels of Criminal Insurgency
1) Local Insurgency - groups try to create areas of impunity to maximize profit
2) Battle for a Parallel State - groups fight for control over specific areas
3) Combating the State - groups directly target the state to intimidate or retaliate against the government
4) Criminal Insurgency - the state implodes and is incapable of responding to the cartels
Three Phases of Criminal Insurgency
1) Aggressive Competitor - groups take criminal activities to a professional level through high levels of drug-related profit (ex: Medellin Cartel)
2) Subtle Co-Opter - groups operate as an underground network rather than hierarchy, making countermeasures difficult (ex: Cali Cartel and many current Mexican Cartels)
3) Criminal State Successor - groups successfully challenge the state for territorial control and pose a threat to its sovereignty (yet to be seen, but a hybrid between phases 2 and 3 is becoming visible in Mexico)
Mexico as a Case of Criminal Insurgency
Some argue that Mexico does not yet fulfill this term, claiming that it lacks political objectives and does not attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of the public.
Bunker argues that Mexico fulfills this criteria for its use of zones of impunity and extreme violence to exert control over citizens and state institutions. Since these groups have territorial ambitions, coercive capabilities, and alternative governance structures associated with insurgency, they may require a COIN response as opposed to be treated as a law enforcement issue.
Colombia and COIN
Despite publicly-available FARC documents that openly stated that their goal was to take power over Colombia, these signs were ignored by the government in favor of temporary military operations. The government would often go into FARC-dominated areas, drive out members, and withdraw, allowing members to simply leave and return.
The government created a Rapid Deployment Force (FUDRA); created a whole of government strategy, the Democratic Security Policy; and employed “village soldiers” in conjunction with the military to combat the insurgency. It also received U.S. assistance in cutting off FARC logistics and decapitating leadership, eventually defeating much of the group, though BACRIM (criminal bands) continue to operate and engage in drug trafficking.
Shining Path and COIN
The government of Peru originally militarily defeated the Shining Path in 1994, but later reduced its focus on local security in favor of counter-drug and intelligence operations. By 2006-2007, the group had reorganized and made a comeback, aligning with drug traffickers while maintaining its Marxist ideology and continuing attacks against the military.
The government responded with Plan VRAE in the 2010s, an interagency effort to reduce poverty and increase access to education and healthcare while engaging in security countermeasures. At the time of writing, the success of the plan was uncertain.
Mexico and COIN
The one-party PRI government had long accommodated drug trafficking in Mexico, with officials either ignoring traffickers or making mutually-beneficial deals with them. After the country’s transition to democracy in 2000, groups began to compete for trafficking routes and influence, becoming increasingly violent.
Under President Calderon, the government declared war on the cartels in 2006. Since then, Mexico has been in a state of open warfare with DTOs. They have engaged in corrupt relationships with Mexican law enforcement and killed over 28,000 using torture, beheadings, use of IEDs, and assassinations of reporters.
In 2010, the Calderon administration also announced a social component to its strategy, recognizing economic incentives as a reason for cartel popularity. At the time of writing, the success of the plan was uncertain.
Brazil and COIN
In Rio de Janeiro, the slums (favelas) saw large upticks in gang activity, causing thousands of murders and widespread shootouts with the policy. In advance of the 2016 Olympics, the military police began establishing community police units (Permanent Police Units, UPPs), which would work with local community leaders to provide security and address socioeconomic grievances.
This is seen as a successful case of COIN, where crime has dropped as much as 85% in UPP-led communities.
Knights Templar
Arguably the most politicized cartel in Mexico, uses “narco-evangelicalism” and “social banditry” to portray the group as religiously-motivated heroes fighting an unjust system.
Provides social services to cultivate acceptance and loyalty among the public, including low-interest loans and running rehab centers.
Convergence Hypothesis
Argues that violent nonstate actors can evolve over time by adopting one another’s characteristics (terrorism, insurgency, criminality), motives, and methods, ultimately becoming hybrid organizations that combine profit-seeking with political objectives, territorial control, and terrorist tactics.
Kleinschmidt & Palma argue that this hypothesis is difficult to empirically identify and is often conflated with hybrid tactics or the expansion of criminal activity. Convergence tends to be localized where it does occur, either in response to internal fragmentation or external pressures.
Sinaloa & Convergence Theory
This organization has remained primarily profit-driven, adapting to changing drug markets and political circumstances without fundamentally transforming. Although splinter groups have adopted paramilitary methods, expanded into other illicit markets, and used terrorist tactics to intimidate citizens or challenge authorities, it does not necessarily demonstrate convergence.
FARC & Convergence Theory
This organization originated as a political and socioeconomic insurgency that later expanded into drug trafficking (1982 benchmark) to increase its revenues. It prevents a stronger case for convergence but still did not displace the group’s original political objectives.
Mutually Hurting Stalemate
Also known as “ripeness theory,” which occurs when both sides perceive continued fighting as costly and victory as unattainable.
This was seen in El Salvador in 1989, when the FMLN tried to take over the capital of San Salvador and could not produce a popular uprising, nor could the government defeat them. The FMLN entered into peace negotiations with the government in 1992 and became a political party.
Peace Negotiations vs Military Solutions to Narcoterrorism
Both peace agreements and military operations have been successfully used by governments against insurgencies in Latin America.
Peace negotiations are a complex and controversial decision for the government, which may see entering into such arrangements as legitimizing insurgent demands or as acknowledgement that they cannot militarily defeat the insurgency. At the same time, military solutions do not address the root causes that lead to insurgency in the first place, while negotiations can allow for peaceful integration of insurgent demands as legitimate political parties.
Successful Peace Negotiations with Insurgencies
Governments must first consider whether insurgent groups can be trusted to honor peace negotiations
In 1999, Colombia attempted to negotiate with FARC under President Pastrana, only for the group to use its newfound territory to strengthen and resume attacks. However, FARC successfully reentered negotiations and signed a ceasefire with the government in 2016.
Other groups, like AUC and EPL, demonstrate that splinter factions may reject agreements and continue operations even if the majority of the group agrees to peace.
Civil-military negotiations are also important, where countries ruled by secure civilian leaders are more likely to successfully negotiate than governments with civil-military tensions.
Governments must also consider the legitimacy implications of entering into negotiations with an insurgent group. The presence of international mediators (i.e., the UN or a third government) can build trust and monitor compliance.
Operation Condor
A U.S.-backed Cold War assassination campaign by right-wing dictatorships against left-wing dissidents in South America between 1975-1983.
Involved Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, with estimates of at least 60,000 deaths.
Benchmark Event
Significant events that can be used to assess organizational change over time and what drove those changes.
Sinaloa
One of the largest DTOs in Mexico today. Its history, according to Kleinschmidt & Palma, included four “benchmark events:”
1) Aggregation from family enterprises into a large organization in the 1930s following the Mexican Revolution and drug prohibitions in the U.S.
2) Centralization into the Guadalajara Cartel in the 1970s due to Operation Condor and Nixon’s War on Drugs
3) Decentralization due to the loss of state protection in the 1990s/shift to democracy
4) Greatly increased violence since the 2000s, seeing infighting and conflict with other cartels and the state since the end of the PRI
Like the Knight’s Templar, provides social services to local communities including building schools, hospitals, and social infrastructure.
CJNG
One of the largest cartels in Mexico today, succeeding Sinaloa as the strongest cartel with the highest military capacity. Formed as an offshoot of Sinaloa and the Milenio Cartel.