lecture 9 International Institutions and War II - Collective Security and the UN

Flashcards reviewing Lecture 9 on international collective security institutions, alliances, UN Security Council voting rules, peacekeeping versus peace-enforcement operations, historical UN successes, and UN failures.

Condition under which alliances influence crisis bargaining

Alliances influence crisis bargaining by changing war costs and expected outcomes only when the alliance commitment is credible.

Effect of an expected third-party ally (State C) joining State A on the bargaining range

It shifts the expected war outcome in favor of State A from $p$ to $p_C$, moving the bargaining range boundaries to $p_C - a_C$ and $p_C + b_C$.

Primary functional distinction between alliances and collective security organizations

Alliances form to cooperate against a common foe based on shared interests, whereas collective security organizations form to prevent war regardless of the perpetrator or victim.

Core principle of collective security

An attack on one member state is considered a threat to all member states.

Collective security organization

A broad-based institution that promotes peace and security among its members, such as the League of Nations, United Nations, Organization of American States, African Union, and OSCE.

Expanded scope of modern collective security organizations

Beyond preventing interstate wars, they have expanded their mandates to address civil wars and genocide.

Three primary mechanisms by which collective security organizations promote peace

1. Making war less attractive through large-scale outside intervention; 2. Helping resolve commitment problems by enforcing agreements; 3. Strengthening cease-fires with neutral observers and peacekeepers.

Two central operational challenges faced by collective security organizations

Collective action problems and joint decision-making problems.

Three main causes of joint decision-making problems in collective security

Disagreements among member states regarding which acts constitute a threat, which states are aggressors, and how to respond.

Cause of collective action problems in collective security operations

International peace and security is a public good, creating an incentive for member states to free-ride and shift enforcement costs onto others.

Institutional solution designed into the UN and League of Nations to address decision-making dilemmas

Granting decision-making authority to the strongest world powers to determine threats and responses.

League Council structure and membership

It consisted of $10$ nonpermanent members elected to $3\text{-year}$ terms and $5$ permanent members (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and later Germany).

League Council voting rule

Decisions required unanimity among all $15$ members, effectively giving every member state veto power.

United Nations Security Council structure

Consists of $10$ nonpermanent members elected to $2\text{-year}$ terms and $5$ permanent members ($P5$).

Five permanent members ($P5$) of the UN Security Council

United States, Britain, France, Russia (formerly Soviet Union), and China (formerly Taiwan).

UN Security Council voting rule

Decisions require majority support including the explicit consent of all $P5$ members, giving only the $P5$ veto power.

Advantages of concentrating power in a few strong states within international institutions

Reduces agreement costs, enables quicker crisis response, and ensures all enforcement actions have the consent of major powers.

Disadvantage of granting veto power exclusively to powerful states in the UN

Policy bias, as powerful member states and their geopolitical allies are shielded from Security Council action.

Two conditions required for collective security to succeed in practice

When powerful member states agree on the necessity of collective action and when at least some members are willing to pay the enforcement costs.

Deadliest war recorded in historical battle-related death statistics

World War II, which caused over $15,000,000$ battle-related deaths.

Fundamental obligation accepted by UN member states regarding dispute resolution

Member countries agree not to use force in settling their disputes with one another.

Two types of military operations authorized by the UN Security Council

Peace-enforcement operations and peacekeeping operations.

Peace-enforcement operation

A military operation in which force is used to make and/or enforce peace among warring parties who have NOT agreed to stop fighting.

Key military and political characteristics of UN peace-enforcement operations

Forces are heavily armed, target perceived aggressors, and rely heavily on central participation from $P5$ members.

Three major historical examples of UN peace-enforcement operations

Interventions in North Korea ($1950$), the Persian Gulf War ($1991$), and Libya ($2011$).

Peacekeeping operation

An operation deploying troops and neutral observers to monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement after parties have agreed to end fighting.

Key operational characteristics of UN peacekeeping missions

Forces are lightly armed, maintain an impartial stance, and draw primarily on non-$P5$ troop contributors.

Main reason for UN Security Council inactivity during its first five decades

Cold War gridlock, during which frequent vetoes by the United States and the Soviet Union blocked resolutions.

Top national contributor of personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations as of January 2021

Bangladesh, contributing $6,711$ personnel.

Highest-ranking $P5$ country in terms of peacekeeping personnel contributions as of January 2021

China, ranking $9\text{th}$ overall with $2,465$ personnel.

First UN peacekeeping mission

UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization), established in $1948$ to supervise the ceasefire between Israel and neighboring Arab states.

UN Security Council response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait

Passed a resolution authorizing force to remove Iraqi troops, leading to a US-led coalition liberating Kuwait in the Persian Gulf War.

Largest troop contributor to the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War coalition

United States, contributing $540,000$ troops out of the total coalition force.

Primary national self-interest driving US intervention in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War

Preventing Iraq from gaining possession of the region's oil reserves.

Human cost of the 1992 conflict following Bosnia's declaration of independence

Approximately $300,000$ people killed, the majority of whom were civilians.

Seven states created following the breakup of Yugoslavia

Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia.

Ratko Mladic

Bosnian Serb commander found guilty of genocide for leading forces that besieged Sarajevo and carried out the Srebrenica massacre.

Casualties and demographic impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide

An estimated $800,000$ people killed, representing $75\text{\%}$ of the Tutsi population.

Humanitarian impact of government-backed militia violence in Sudan beginning in 2003

Over $400,000$ deaths and $3,000,000$ displaced refugees.

Context in which UN intervention is statistically most likely to succeed

When intervention costs are relatively low, primarily in post-conflict peacekeeping settings (e.g., El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone).

Virginia Page Fortna (2004) empirical finding on peacekeeping

Peacekeeping after civil wars makes a statistically significant contribution to increasing the durability and stability of peace.

Three key contributions the UN provides to enhance international peace despite structural limitations

1. Impartiality that facilitates peacekeeping; 2. Institutional support that builds international consensus, lowering intervention costs; 3. Established procedures that facilitate rapid crisis decision-making.

Public good in the context of international relations

A non-excludable, non-rivalrous benefit—such as international peace and security—that states are tempted to free-ride on.

Free-rider problem in collective security

The tendency of member states to shirk paying military or financial costs for enforcing global peace while still enjoying security benefits.

Policy bias in international institutions

The systemic favoring of powerful states' strategic interests, such as $P5$ members shielding themselves and their allies from Security Council enforcement.