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RS § 45 - Option Contracts
Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of it.
The offeror’s duty of performance under any option contract so created is conditional on completion or tender of the invited performance in accordance with the terms of the offer.
RS § 90 - Promissory Estoppel
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.
UCC § 2-207 - Additional Terms
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, UNLESS acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplemental terms incorporated under any other provisions of this act.
RS § 19 - Mutual Assent
The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act.
The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.
The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though he does not in fact assent. In such cases a resulting contract may be voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or other invalidating cause.
RS § 33 - Offer
Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.
The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.
The fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance.
RS § 71 - Consideration
To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.
A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.
The performance may consist of:
An act other than a promise, or
A forbearance, or
The creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation
The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other person.
RS § 86 - Past Consideration
A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.
A promise is not binding under subsection (1)
(a) If the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons the promisor has not been unjustly enriched; or
(b) to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the benefit.
RS § 201 - Ambiguity
Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.
Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them if at the time the agreement was made.
(a) That party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
Except as stated in this section, neither party is bound by the meaning attached by the other, even though the result may be a failure of mutual assent.
RS § 203 - Vagueness
In the interpretations of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, the following standards of preference are generally applicable:
An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect;
Express terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course of dealings, and usage of trade. Course of performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage of trade. Course of dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade.
Express terms in K > Course of Performance > Course of Dealing > Usage of Trade
Specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language
Separately negotiated or added terms are given greater weight than standardized terms or other terms not separately negotiated.
What is the threshold choice-of-law framework in contract legal analysis?
First, identify whether the contract is for the sale of goods (governed by UCC Article 2) or for services, real estate, or intangible rights (governed by Common Law). UCC § 2-102 applies to transactions in goods.
UCC § 2-105: Definition of “Goods”
All things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale, other than money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities, and things in action.
The Predominant Factor / Purpose Test. Courts evaluate:
(1) Contract language
(2) Business nature of the supplier
(3) Intrinsic worth of goods vs. services; and
(4) The primary objective of the contract (e.g., Pass v. Shelby Aviation)
What test is used by minority jurisdictions for hybrid contracts?
The Gravamen Test. It applies the UCC to the goods portion of the dispute if the flaw/breach arose directly out of the goods, while applying common law to service-based issues.
UCC § 2-104: Definition of “Merchant”
A person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction.
UCC § 1-103(b): Supplementary General Principles of Law
Unless displaced by particular provisions of the UCC, the principles of law and equity (including estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, mistake, capacity) supplement UCC provisions.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1: Definition of Contract
A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.
Pass v. Shelby Aviation
Applying the predominant factor test, a contract for airplane inspection and part replacement was primarily a service contract; thus, common law governed rather than UCC Article 2 warranties.
Anthony Pools v. Sheehan
Illustrates the Gravamen test—where a swimming pool construction contract caused injury due to a defective diving board (a good), UCC Article 2 warranty rules applied to the defective good.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17: Requirement of a Bargain
The formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24: Definition of Offer
An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.
What is the Objective Test of Mutual Assent?
Intent is measured by outward objective manifestations (words and conduct as reasonably understood by the offeree), NOT secret subjective unexpressed intentions (Restatement § 21).
Lucy v. Zehmer
A contract written on a restaurant receipt to sell a farm was binding because Zehmer's objective outward acts reasonably indicated serious contractual intent, regardless of his subjective claim that he was jesting.
General Rule on Advertisements as Offers
Advertisements, circulars, price quotes, and catalog listings are generally invitations to bargain/negotiate, NOT offers, because they lack specific offerees and quantity terms.
Exception to Advertisement Rule: Specific/Definite Advertisements
An advertisement IS an offer if it is clear, definite, explicit, leaves nothing open for negotiation, and specifies who can accept and how (e.g., “First come, first served”).
Lefkowitz v. Minneapolis Surplus Store
An ad offering “3 Fur coats... 1st come 1st served $1 each” was a binding offer because it was clear, explicit, definite, and left no room for negotiation.
Leonard v. Pepsico
A commercial featuring a Harrier Jet for 7 million Pepsi Points was not an offer because an objective reasonable person would understand it as humorous exaggeration/puffery, not a serious legal offer.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26: Preliminary Negotiations
A manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent.
Lonergan v. Scolnick
Form letters and price quotes indicating property description and asking for quick action were preliminary negotiations, not an offer, because further assent from the seller was contemplated.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27: Written Memorial Contemplated
Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and execute a written memorial thereof.
UCC § 2-204: Formation in General
A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract, even if terms are left open.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 36: Methods of Terminating Power of Acceptance
Power of acceptance may be terminated by:
(1) Rejection/counter-offer
(2) Lapse of time
(3) Revocation by offeror
(4) Death or incapacity of offeror or offeree
General Rule on Revocation of Offers
An offeror may revoke an unaccepted offer at any time prior to acceptance, provided notice of revocation is communicated to the offeree before acceptance occurs.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 43: Indirect Revocation
An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeror takes definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract and the offeree acquires reliable information to that effect.
Dickinson v. Dodds
An offer to sell real estate was validly revoked indirectly when the offeree learned from a reliable third party that the offeror had sold the property to someone else.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 25: Definition of Option Contract
An option contract is a promise which meets the requirements for the formation of a contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(1): Common Law Option Requirements
An offer is binding as an option contract if it is in writing and signed by the offeror, recites a purported consideration for the making of the offer, and proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time.
UCC § 2-205: Firm Offers (Merchant Exception)
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is NOT revocable for lack of consideration during the time stated, or if no time stated, for a reasonable time (max 3 months).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45: Option Contract Created by Part Performance of Unilateral Contract
Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when the offeree begins the invited performance.
Petterson v. Pattberg
Historical traditional rule—offeror revoked unilateral offer to discount mortgage right before offeree handed over cash at door. (Modern rule under R2C § 45 protects offeree upon beginning performance).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(2): Promissory Estoppel Option Contract
An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such action is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice (e.g., subcontractor bids).
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.
Subcontractor's bid induced reasonable reliance by general contractor in calculating main bid; subcontractor's offer became an irrevocable option contract under promissory estoppel (§ 87(2)).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 50: Definition of Acceptance
Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 30: Form of Acceptance Invited
An offer may invite or require acceptance to be made by an affirmative answer in words, or by the performing or refraining from performing a specified act.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 32: Acceptance in Case of Doubt
In case of doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses.
What is the Common Law Mirror Image Rule?
An acceptance must be an absolute, unconditional, precise mirror image of the offer. Any variation, addition, or qualification acts as a rejection and counter-offer (Restatement § 59).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 39: Counter-Offers
A counter-offer is an offer made by an offeree to his offeror relating to the same matter as the original offer and proposing a substituted bargain. It terminates the offeree's power of acceptance.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63: The Mailbox Rule
Unless the offer provides otherwise:
(a) An acceptance sent by a authorized medium takes effect upon DISPATCH
(b) Acceptance under an option contract takes effect upon RECEIPT
Exceptions / Specific Applications of the Mailbox Rule
1. Rejection sent first, then acceptance: Race rule—whichever arrives first governs.
2. Acceptance sent first, then rejection: Acceptance is effective on dispatch unless seller receives rejection first and relies on it.
Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green
Acceptance by commencement of performance (loading trucks with roofing material and driving to site) was effective within a reasonable time before homeowner attempted revocation.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69: Acceptance by Silence
Silence is NOT acceptance except:
(1) Offeree takes benefit of offered services with opportunity to reject
(2) Offeror gave reason to understand silence is assent
(3) Prior dealings make it reasonable
UCC § 2-206(1)(b): Acceptance by Shipment of Goods
An order inviting prompt shipment can be accepted by a prompt promise to ship OR by prompt shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods. Shipment of non-conforming goods is an acceptance AND breach unless offered as an accommodation.
What is a Clickwrap Agreement and is it enforceable?
A digital contract where users must click 'I Agree' to terms presented on screen. Enforceable because it provides explicit notice and requires affirmative manifestation of assent.
What is a Browsewrap Agreement and when is it enforceable?
A website terms notice posted via hyperlink. Enforceable ONLY if the user had actual knowledge or reasonable conspicuous constructive notice of the terms and manifested assent (e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble).
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.
Submerged hyperlink to license terms located below the download button failed to provide reasonable notice; users downloading software were not bound by mandatory arbitration clause.
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc.
Hyperlink at bottom of page without requiring user to take affirmative action or giving explicit notice did not create enforceable browsewrap contract.
What is a Shrinkwrap / Rolling Contract?
A transaction where goods arrive in a box containing written terms inside, providing buyer the right to review terms and return goods within a window if unsatisfied.
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.
Rejecting ProCD—in consumer transactions under UCC § 2-207, terms sent in box are proposed additional terms requiring express assent, not automatic binding conditions.
UCC § 2-207(1): Expression of Acceptance / Confirmation
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even if it states terms additional to or different from those offered, UNLESS acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional/different terms.
What happens to Additional Terms between NON-MERCHANTS under UCC § 2-207(2)?
Between non-merchants (or where one party is a non-merchant), additional terms are treated merely as proposals for addition to the contract and do NOT become part of contract unless expressly agreed.
What happens to Additional Terms BETWEEN MERCHANTS under UCC § 2-207(2)?
Additional terms automatically become part of the contract UNLESS:
(a) Offer expressly limits acceptance to offer's terms
(b) They materially alter it; or
(c) Notification of objection is given within reasonable time
What constitutes a 'Material Alteration' under UCC § 2-207 Comment 4?
A term that results in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness (e.g., disclaimer of implied warranties, clause negating standard warranties, arbitration clause in some jurisdictions).
How are 'Different Terms' treated under UCC § 2-207? (Knock-Out Rule)
Majority Rule: The Knock-Out Rule—conflicting terms knock each other out, and the gap is filled by standard UCC gap-filler provisions. Minority Rule: Treat different terms like additional terms under § 2-207(2).
What is UCC § 2-207(3): Contract Created by Conduct?
Where writings fail to establish a contract but parties perform as if a contract exists, the contract consists of terms on which writings agree, together with any supplementary UCC gap-fillers.
UCC Gap-Fillers: Price (§ 2-305)
If parties intend to conclude a contract but leave price open, the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery.
UCC Gap-Fillers: Place of Delivery (§ 2-308)
Unless agreed otherwise, the place for delivery of goods is the seller's place of business (or seller's residence if no business).
UCC Gap-Fillers: Time of Performance (§ 2-309)
The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under a contract if not provided shall be a reasonable time.
UCC Gap-Fillers: Time & Place of Payment (§ 2-310)
Unless agreed otherwise, payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the goods.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213: Parol Evidence Rule (PER)
A binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope. A partially integrated agreement discharges prior inconsistent terms.
What is a Completely Integrated Agreement?
A writing intended by parties as a final AND complete/exclusive expression of all terms of their agreement. CANNOT be contradicted or supplemented by prior/contemporaneous parol evidence.
What is a Partially Integrated Agreement?
A writing intended as final but NOT exclusive/complete. CANNOT be contradicted by prior evidence, but CAN be supplemented by consistent additional terms.
Classical Four-Corners Test for Integration
Courts look solely within the four corners of the writing. If it appears complete on its face, it is completely integrated. Collateral agreement test: oral term must not contradict and must be one parties wouldn't naturally include in writing.
Modern Intent Standard for Integration (Masterson v. Sine / Restatement § 216)
Courts examine surrounding circumstances and intent. Consistent additional terms are admissible UNLESS the court finds the writing was intended as complete or the terms would certainly/naturally have been included.
Masterson v. Sine
Oral agreement that an option to repurchase land was personal to the family was admissible because non-statutory deeds standardly omit collateral personal reservation terms.
UCC § 2-202: Parol Evidence Rule under UCC
Written terms may NOT be contradicted by evidence of prior agreement/contemporaneous oral agreement, but MAY be explained/supplemented by Course of Performance, Course of Dealing, or Usage of Trade.
Hierarchy of Interpretive Evidence (UCC § 1-303)
1. Express Terms of the Contract
2. Course of Performance (repeated occasions under THIS contract)
3. Course of Dealing (prior sequence of conduct between parties)
4. Usage of Trade (vocation/industry practice)
Exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule (Evidence ALWAYS Admissible)
PER does NOT bar evidence offered to show:
(1) Formation defenses (fraud, duress, mistake, illegality)
(2) Conditions precedent to effectiveness
(3) Ambiguity/interpretation
(4) Post-formation modifications
Plain Meaning Rule vs. Traynor Contextual Approach (Ambiguity)
Plain Meaning (NY Rule - Greenfield): If text is clear on face, extrinsic evidence barred.
Contextual Approach (CA Rule - Pacific Gas): Extrinsic evidence provisionally admitted to determine if language is reasonably susceptible to offered interpretation.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.
Traynor Rule—rational interpretation requires court to consider extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances to determine if language ('indemnify against all loss') was ambiguous.
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp.
What is “chicken”? Buyer failed to meet burden of showing that 'chicken' meant exclusively young stewing chickens rather than larger fowl, looking to trade usage, context, and price.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201: Rules on Interpretation / Ambiguity
(1) Where parties attach same meaning, interpreted according to that meaning
(2) Where parties attach different meanings, interpreted according to A's meaning if B knew/had reason to know of A's meaning.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71: Requirement of Exchange / Bargain
To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for. It is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and given by the promisee in exchange.
What constitutes Legal Detriment for Consideration?
Refraining from doing something one has a legal right to do, or doing something one is not legally obligated to do, regardless of actual physical/financial benefit to promisor.
Hamer v. Sidway
Nephew's forbearance from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards/billiards until age 21 constituted valid legal detriment/consideration for uncle's $5,000 promise.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79: Adequacy of Consideration
If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of equivalence in the values exchanged or mutuality of obligation ('Peppercorn Rule'). Courts do not inquire into adequacy.
Gratuitous Conditional Gifts vs. Consideration
A promise to give a gift subject to a condition (e.g., 'walk to the store and buy a coat on my credit') lacks consideration if the condition is merely a vehicle to enable the gift (Kirksey v. Kirksey).
Kirksey v. Kirksey
Brother-in-law's invitation to widow to move 60 miles to live on his land was a gratuitous conditional gift, not a bargained-for contract; her move was merely a condition to receive the gift.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 77: Illusory Promises
A promise is illusory and lacks consideration if by its terms the promisor reserves a choice of alternative performances without bound obligation (e.g., 'I will buy if I feel like it').
Implied Duty of Good Faith Saving Illusory Promises (Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon)
An exclusive dealing agency contract is NOT illusory because law implies a duty to use reasonable efforts/good faith to promote and market goods (UCC § 2-306(2)).
Past Consideration Rule
A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously conferred is generally NOT bargained-for consideration, because past performance was not induced by the present promise.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86: Moral Obligation / Material Benefit Rule
A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice (e.g., saving promisor's life/property).
Webb v. McGowin
Employee saved employer from death by falling with a heavy block, crippling himself. Employer's subsequent promise to pay biweekly pension was enforceable under moral obligation/material benefit doctrine.
Mills v. Wyman
Good Samaritan cared for adult son taken ill abroad. Father's subsequent promise to pay expenses was unenforceable because past care conferred no direct material benefit on father.
Pre-Existing Duty Rule (Common Law)
Performance of a legal duty or contractual duty already owed to a promisor is NOT valid consideration to support a contract modification (Alaska Packers' Association v. Domenico).
Exceptions to Pre-Existing Duty Rule: Restatement § 89
A modification of an executory contract is binding without consideration if fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by parties when contract was made.
UCC § 2-209(1): Modification without Consideration
An agreement modifying a contract for the sale of goods needs NO consideration to be binding, provided it is made in GOOD FAITH.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90: Promissory Estoppel
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co.
Employee retired in reliance on board's promise of $200/month lifelong pension. Retirement constituted detrimental reliance enforcing promise under promissory estoppel (§ 90).
Ricketts v. Scothorn
Grandfather gave granddaughter note for $2,000 so she wouldn't have to work. Her quitting work in reliance estopped grandfather's estate from asserting lack of consideration.
UCC § 2-313: Express Warranties
Created by seller by any affirmation of fact or promise, description of goods, or sample/model which becomes part of the basis of the bargain. Formal words ('warranty/guarantee') not required; puffery excluded.
UCC § 2-314: Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Goods must be fit for ordinary purposes.