Ch. 5 - Causation in Fact

1. The Chapter 5 inquiry is _______________: whether the defendant’s actionable conduct caused the plaintiff’s harm.

factual causation [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

2. A plaintiff generally must establish both _______________ and __________________________; the latter is treated in Chapter 6.

factual causation | proximate cause / scope of liability [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

3. The Latin phrase sine qua non means _______________ and expresses the ordinary but-for inquiry.

without which not [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

4. A _____________ asks what would have occurred had the defendant acted without the challenged wrongdoing.

counterfactual [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

5. A ________________ is a condition in whose absence the event would not have occurred.

necessary condition [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

6. The presence of negligent conduct and injury at the same time does not itself establish _________.

causation [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

7. Under the ordinary but-for rule, conduct is a factual cause if the harm would not have occurred _________________.

without that conduct [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

8. The defendant’s negligent act need not be the _________ cause of injury.

sole [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

9. The relevant comparison is between the actual outcome and what would have happened had the defendant acted _____________.

non-negligently [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

10. The causation analysis identifies: (1) the _________, (2) the challenged ______________, and (3) a lawful _____________.

injury | wrongful conduct | counterfactual [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

11. Plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the defendant’s _________ and the particular _________ claimed.

breach | harm [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

12. Relevant facts in the railroad-crossing case included the train’s _________, its _______________, and whether the automobile could have _______________.

speed | stopping distance | cleared the track [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

13. The train was traveling _________ although the railroad’s safety limit was _________.

37 mph | 25 mph [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

14. Where the harm would have happened despite the defendant’s negligence, the ordinary but-for requirement is ____________.

not satisfied [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

15. A mere assertion that the victim _________ have escaped at a lower speed is not enough without probative facts.

might [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

16. A separate exception for multiple independently sufficient causes is covered in _________.

Section 3 [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

17. Step 1: identify the _________ claimed.

injury [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

18. Step 2: identify the precise _______________ alleged to be wrongful.

action or inaction [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

19. Step 3: imagine the defendant acting __________ instead.

reasonably [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

20. Step 4: ask whether the same injury would ________________.

still have occurred [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

21. If the answer to Step 4 is no, the conduct passes the ordinary _________ test.

but-for [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

22. The ______________ of the defendant’s conduct—not simply the defendant’s physical presence—must be tested for causation.

wrongful feature [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

23. The causal inquiry is distinct from whether the defendant _____________ in the first place.

breached a duty [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

24. In __________________________ (La. 1962), the railroad exceeded its speed limit, but the plaintiff failed to show that the excess speed caused the collision.

Perkins v. Texas and New Orleans R. Co. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

25. The injured passenger in Perkins was _____________, and the negligent automobile driver was ___________.

Tanner Perkins | Joe Foreman [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

26. The Perkins court held that the record made the accident appear almost certain to have occurred even at the ___________.

lawful speed [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

27. Perkins emphasizes that evidence of _________ does not substitute for proof of _________.

breach | causation [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

28. Perkins rejected an escape theory resting on pure __________.

conjecture [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

H1. A train violates a 30-mph safety limit by traveling 45 mph. A car stalls on the tracks, and engineering evidence establishes the collision would have happened at 30 mph. Is breach established? Is factual causation established?

The speed violation is evidence of breach; the causal question is whether the excess speed changed the outcome. If the collision was unavoidable at 30 mph, but-for causation as to the speed violation is not established. Compare Perkins. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

H2. An employee leaves a ladder in a hallway in violation of safety policy. Another employee trips on a loose floor tile two feet away. Is the policy violation the factual cause of the fall?

Not merely because there was a violation. Identify the particular wrongful conduct and substitute a properly stored ladder; if the fall on the tile would still have occurred, the ladder breach is not a but-for cause. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

H3. A driver negligently fails to signal and a cyclist is struck. Security footage shows the cyclist could not see the signal and would have crossed regardless. What issue is central?

Failure to signal may be breach, but causation requires showing that signaling would have altered events. If the cyclist could not observe it and the crash would still occur, but-for causation is missing. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

29. In an ordinary single-cause case, _______________ asks whether the harm would have occurred without the challenged act; _____________ asks whether the harm falls within the legally relevant scope.

but-for causation | proximate cause [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

30. A defendant may be negligent but not liable if _______________ is absent; both breach and causation are required for a completed negligence claim.

factual causation [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

31. In a negligence case, the _________ ordinarily bears the burden of proving causation by a ______________________.

plaintiff | preponderance of the evidence [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

32. In Perkins, the plaintiff sought wrongful-death damages, but the railroad avoided liability because _______________ was not proved.

factual causation [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

33. The Restatement (Third) § _________ states the ordinary _________________ rule (discussed again in Section 4).

26 | but-for factual-cause [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

34. Perkins is a _________ decision; it should not be presented as a statewide rule controlling every jurisdiction’s causation evidence.

Louisiana [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 337–340]

35. Section 2 asks when a factfinder may infer _________ from __________________.

causation | circumstantial evidence [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

36. A legally acceptable inference must rest on evidence rather than ___________.

speculation [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

37. The expression post hoc ergo propter hoc describes the faulty inference that because event A _________ event B, A _________ B.

preceded | caused [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

38. The evidentiary distinction is between proof of a causal ___________ and proof of a mere ___________.

probability | possibility [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

39. A _________________ derives from the ordinary course of events and the case’s supporting facts.

reasonable inference [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

40. A defendant’s negligence and a subsequent injury are not enough by themselves; there must be a probative ___________.

causal link [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

41. The mere possibility that harm would have occurred without negligence does not always destroy an otherwise supported inference of _________.

causation [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

42. But a mere possibility that negligence caused an injury is ordinarily ___________ proof.

insufficient [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

43. Inference evidence may include temporal facts, the nature of the hazard, a ________________, and credible ______________.

mechanism of injury | expert testimony [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

44. Where causes of a medical condition are beyond lay understanding, specialized _____________ may be necessary.

expert evidence [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

45. The persuasive force of circumstantial proof depends on the strength of the connection between the identified _________ and the harm that ___________.

risk | materialized [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

46. Relevant medical proof may include controlled studies comparing _________ and _________ groups.

exposed | unexposed [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

47. Informed-consent causation may ask what the patient would have done had the relevant risk been _________.

disclosed [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

48. Evidence that an injury followed a negligent act does not establish the proposition ____________________.

post hoc ergo propter hoc [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

49. In some medical questions, competing hypotheses and lack of credible epidemiological evidence limit causal _________.

inference [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

50. Ask whether the full record makes defendant’s misconduct a _________, rather than only a possible, cause.

probable [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

51. In informed-consent cases, jurisdictions may employ an _________ or __________ decision test.

objective | subjective [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

52. Under an objective informed-consent inquiry, ask what a __________________________ would have decided if fully informed.

reasonable patient in the circumstances [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

53. Under a subjective inquiry, ask what __________________ would have decided if informed.

this particular patient [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

54. “Relative incidence” compares the frequency of an outcome in _________ and _________ populations.

exposed | unexposed [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

55. In __________________________ (La. 1885), an unlit, unrailed stairway supported an inference linking the hazardous condition to the plaintiff’s fall.

Reynolds v. Texas Pacific Railroad Co. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

56. In ______________ (N.Y. App. Div. 1929), an unlit stairway and a death did not supply enough evidence of a causal connection.

Wolf v. Kaufmann [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

57. In ________________________ (Miss. 1939), a hotel guest’s cut was actionable but expert evidence failed to establish that the cut caused subsequent skin cancer.

Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

58. In __________________________ (Wash. Ct. App. 2017), circumstantial evidence concerning stairs and a ramp supported sending the causation issue to the jury.

Mehlert v. Baseball of Seattle, Inc. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

59. Reynolds permits an inference where negligence substantially increases the chance of the ______________ that occurred.

type of accident [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

60. Wolf warns that evidence of a dangerous condition must be connected to ____________________.

the mechanism of the fall [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

61. Kramer rejected an expert’s roughly _______________ possibility of cancer as proof that trauma probably caused cancer.

one-in-one-hundred [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

62. The Kramer result affirmed liability for the original _________ but removed recovery for the speculative _________ injury.

cut | cancer [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

H4. A patron slips on unlit stairs immediately after walking from bright sunlight. There is testimony she missed a step because she could not see it. Contrast with a case where no one knows why she fell.

The first presents affirmative circumstantial evidence of a link between darkness and fall (Reynolds-like). The second may be speculative without more facts (Wolf-like); negligence does not prove causation. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

H5. Two doctors testify: one says a superficial cut can cause cancer in 1% of cases; another denies that relationship. The plaintiff developed cancer at the cut location. Is proof sufficient?

The temporal and spatial connection alone is insufficient to show probability under Kramer. Expert testimony suggesting mere possibility does not establish the more-likely-than-not causal link to cancer. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

H6. A patient says she would have declined a procedure if informed of a risk; a reasonable patient might have accepted it. Can causation differ across jurisdictions?

Yes. An objective approach asks what a reasonable patient would do; a subjective approach asks what this patient would do. The textbook notes both approaches. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

63. The Reynolds and Wolf outcomes differ on the strength of the ______________, not on whether an unlit stair is capable of creating danger.

causal inference [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

64. Unlike direct eyewitness proof, circumstantial proof requires the factfinder to infer a cause from _______________.

surrounding facts [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

65. The _________ bears the ordinary burden to show factual causation; a factfinder may not fill an evidentiary gap by _________.

plaintiff | guesswork [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

66. In Kramer, the court distinguished compensation for the original __________ from additional recovery for alleged _________.

laceration | cancer [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

67. The general but-for principle of Restatement (Third) § _________ still requires sufficient _________, even when the evidence is circumstantial.

26 | proof [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

68. The notes contrast judicial inferences in _________ and _________ and identify both objective and subjective informed-consent approaches.

Louisiana | New York [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 340–344]

69. __________ causes are separate necessary causal contributions which combine to create one injury.

Concurrent [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

70. _____________ causes occur when multiple independent causal forces are each sufficient to produce the same harm at the same time.

Overdetermined [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

71. __________ causes involve a sequence in which one harm-producing event precedes a later one.

Successive [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

72. A cause is _________ when removal of it would prevent the harm.

necessary [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

73. A cause is __________ when, in the actual circumstances and with background conditions, it can produce the harm without the other competing cause.

sufficient [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

74. The simultaneous two-fire problem is a classic example of ____________________.

multiple sufficient causes [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

75. If two defendants’ negligent acts are both necessary for the same injury, ordinary _________ causation can be satisfied for both.

but-for [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

76. If either of two fires would independently destroy the property, naive but-for analysis would deny liability to _________ even though each fire was independently sufficient.

both [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

77. Restatement (Third) § 27 supplies the ____________________ rule.

multiple sufficient causes [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

78. For § 27, there must be ____________, each independently able to cause the same ____________ at the same time.

multiple acts | physical harm [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

79. Concurrent causes need not be ___________________; their combination can be enough to cause injury.

independently sufficient [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

80. Relevant factors in fire cases include whether fires _________, whether each could have caused the destruction _________, and when the injury occurred.

merged | alone [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

81. For successive causes, determine the victim’s probable condition and expected future _________________ in the absence of defendant’s act.

life or property loss [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

82. Some jurisdictions limit the overdetermination rule when the competing sufficient cause was _________ rather than human.

natural [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

83. A later fire that sweeps over already-destroyed property but causes no additional harm may fail because there is no __________.

new damage [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

84. Concurrent-cause checklist: eliminate defendant A’s act, then determine whether the harm would still _________; repeat for B.

occur [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

85. Overdetermination checklist: ask whether each competing act was ___________________ to cause the identical harm at the relevant time.

independently sufficient [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

86. The Restatement’s notes discuss multiple sufficient ___________ involving several actors whose aggregate conduct exceeds a threshold.

causal sets [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

87. The chapter’s toxin example involves doses of _______________ units and a death threshold of _________ units.

2, 3, 3, 4, and 5 | 12 [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

88. Under § 27 comment f, a contribution can be causal if it is necessary to at least ____________________.

one sufficient causal set [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

89. In _____________ (N.Y. App. Div. 1966), an unlit truck blocking a road and the car driver’s negligence could both cause the passenger’s injury.

Hill v. Edmonds [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

90. In __________________________ (Minn. 1920), a negligently ignited fire combined with another independently sufficient fire.

Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M. Ry. Co. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

91. In ______________ (Mass. 1902), either of two motorcycles could have frightened the horse, so both drivers were causal actors.

Corey v. Havener [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

92. In __________________________ (N.H. 1932), electrocution during a fall required valuation of the victim’s likely future absent electrical injury.

Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co. [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

93. Hill recognizes that two negligent acts can each be a ____________ of the same indivisible injury even if neither alone would have caused it.

factual cause [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]

94. Anderson rejected the claim that an independently sufficient second fire necessarily relieves the defendant of _________.

liability [Assigned reading: Textbook pp. 345–349]