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Polyarchy
Dahl, argued for the rule of the many, large range of social groups compete and exercise power over legislation, e.g. many groups victorious in different policy areas
New haven
Dahl, looked at policy conflict resolution in city hall, found that different groups in different policy areas eventually triuphed - thus there is polyarchy in New Haven
Voting
Dahl, large number of voters exerts enough pressure on government to be responsive to wide range of groups - formal equality of the vote is enough to render market inequalities acceptable
Downs-hotelling model
If voters are perfectly informed along a single dimension, political parties are vote-maximising, and all agents are rational then only a small fraction of the ideological landscape will be captured by candidates - only median of left-right ideological space
Rational voter assumptions
Downs-hotelling, voters prefers points closer to their ideal, preferences are single-peaked, all citizens vote and voters are perfectly informed
Rational politicians
Downs-hotelling, aim to maximise probability of winning election, two candidates, perfectly informed
Simple model
shows that the median voter is the NE for a party regardless of other parties strategies, even in polarised countries politicians will converge on the median
implication
only those representing the median position will have clout with policymakers, however median voter theorem suggests this will be the condorcet winner