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Explain substance dualism

It is a dualist theory, and therefore claims that mental states and processes are a distinct type of phenomenon which are essentially non-physical in nature, not being reducible or supervenient on the physical.  Specifically, it is theory that the mind and body are two ontologically distinct substances, the mind possessing mental properties (such as doubt and joy) and the body posssesing physical properties (such as mass and extension). The two are independent of each other, not depending on each other or anything else to exist (except God, in Descartes’ case).  

Explain the difference between substance & property dualism

Both are dualist theories, so they agree that there are at least some mental properties (like doubt and worry) which are non reducible to and not supervenient on physical properties (like mass and extension). Substance dualism claims that the mind and body are ontologically distinct and independent of each other, the mind being a separate mental substance possessing mental properties (like doubt and joy) and the body being a physical substance possessing physical properties (like mass and extension). However, property dualism claims that the only substances that exist are physical, which have physical properties and sometimes have mental properties. The differences are that substance dualism claims that the mind is a separate substance containing properties which property dualism denies, while also disagreeing with property dualism that mental properties belong to physical substances. 

Explain Descartes’ indivisibility argument

Descartes indivisibility argument seeks to deductively prove a priori that the mind and body are ontologically distinct substances. It relies on the claim of Leibniz’s law: that iff all the properties of two things are the same, then they are identical (one thing). From this it follows that if two things have at least 1 differing property, then they are distinct. With this in mind,  Descartes argues that the mind and body do not share the property of divisibility: the body can be divided into smaller parts, like into arms, legs and a head, but the mind cannot be divided as it is a whole entity without constituent parts. Since the mind and body, then, have at least 1 differing property, it follows from Leibniz’ law that they are two distinct things, proving substance dualism’s claim that the mind and body are ontologically distinct. 

Explain Descartes’ conceivability argument

Descartes’ conceivability argument seeks to deductively prove a priori that minds and bodies exists as ontologically distinct substances. It relies on the concept of metaphysical possibility. If something is metaphysically possible, then it may be physically impossible, but is logically possible and may be the case in another possible world. Descartes claims that what is conceivable is metaphysically possible; and since he can conceive of his mind (which he has the clear and distinct perception of being a thinking, unextended thing) existing without the body (which has the essence of being an extended, unthinking thing), then it is metaphysically possible for the mind to exist without the extended body. If it is metaphysically possible for x to exist without y, then x and y are not identical - from this it follows that the mind and body are distinct. 

Explain Descartes’ conceivability argument and explain the criticism that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the real world

Descartes’ conceivability argument seeks to deductively prove a priori that minds and bodies exists as ontologically distinct substances. It relies on the concept of metaphysical possibility. If something is metaphysically possible, then it may be physically impossible, but is logically possible and may be the case in another possible world. Descartes claims that what is conceivable is metaphysically possible; and since he can conceive of his mind (which he has the clear and distinct perception of being a thinking, unextended thing) existing without the body (which has the essence of being an extended, unthinking thing), then it is metaphysically possible for the mind to exist without the extended body. If it is metaphysically possible for x to exist without y, then x and y are not identical - from this it follows that the mind and body are distinct. 

However, Descartes’ argument fails to make establish empirically substantive claims because what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the world. Metaphysical possibility does not entail physical possibility, so although it might be the case that in some possible world minds are distinct from bodies, it might be that in our world - or indeed other possible worlds - this is either not the case or is physically impossible as consciousness relies on or is reducible to physical structures. Furthermore, it is metaphysically possible that physicalism is true, and therefore what Descartes establishes in his argument is very limited. This demonstrates that what Descartes establishes has little empirical value, and thus that a priori reasoning cannot be used to make significant empirical claims about our universe.  

Explain Descartes’ conceivability argument and explain the criticism that mind without body

Descartes’ conceivability argument seeks to deductively prove a priori that minds and bodies exists as ontologically distinct substances. It relies on the concept of metaphysical possibility. If something is metaphysically possible, then it may be physically impossible, but is logically possible and may be the case in another possible world. Descartes claims that what is conceivable is metaphysically possible; and since he can conceive of his mind (which he has the clear and distinct perception of being a thinking, unextended thing) existing without the body (which has the essence of being an extended, unthinking thing), then it is metaphysically possible for the mind to exist without the extended body. If it is metaphysically possible for x to exist without y, then x and y are not identical - from this it follows that the mind and body are distinct. 

However, it has been argued that Descartes argument relies on the false premise that mind without body is conceivable. This is because, as critics have pointed out, that any supposed thought of one’s mind existing without their body already implies the existence of the body. For example, when one conceives of one’s mind floating above their body, this implies the existence of eyes; and the reference to moving about in the world is only possible if one has an extended body, for something cannot be said to be or moving anywhere without occupying physical space in relation to other extended things. Hume also points out that he has no conception of the self other than in terms of perceptions, and therefore the notion of conceiving of one’s independent mind is false. Therefore, the basis that Descartes uses to establish metaphysical possibility is false, and so the argument cannot establish that the mind and body are distinct. 

Explain the p-zombies argument, and then explain the criticism that p-zombies are not conceivable

Property dualism is the theory that only the only substances are physical ones, but that these substances can possess both physical properties (like mass) and sometimes mental properties (like doubt) which are not supervenient on or reducible to physical properties. The P-zombies argument supports this by concluding that physicalism - the theory that everything is reducible to physical properties - is false. It rests on the concept of a “philosophical zombie”- something which is in every way physically identical to a human but has no qualia (phenomenal experiences of mental states). Chalmers argues that such a thing is conceivable; and if it is conceivable, he says, then it is metaphysically possible. If they are metaphysically possible, he concludes, then the qualia that the zombie lacks cannot be physical as it is physically identical to humans yet lacks qualia. Physicalism claims that everything is physical, so physicalism is false. This supports property dualism as, if physicalism is false, then there must be mental - as well as physical - properties which are distinct from physical properties, as property dualism claims.  

  

However, some argue that, contrary to the first claim, P-zombies are not conceivable. Some say that, although it doesn’t seem contradictory, imagining a being who acts in every way like us and is physically identical to us entails that that being also has a consciousness. If they have this behaviour, it is necessary that they have a consciousness, since, like how health depends on the functioning of organs, behaviour depends on consciousness. Alternatively, a physicalist would say that p zombies are inconceivable because, once we develop a better understanding of consciousness and qualia (understand that they are physical), then P zombies become contradictory: conceiving of one is conceiving of a being which is physically identical but not physically identical (since it lacks physical consciousness). Either way, P Zombies are not conceivable, and so the argument rests on false premise and is therefore unsound, meaning physicalism is not disproved.  

Explain the p-zombies argument, and then explain the criticism that conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility

Property dualism is the theory that only the only substances are physical ones, but that these substances can possess both physical properties (like mass) and sometimes mental properties (like doubt) which are not supervenient on or reducible to physical properties. The P-zombies argument supports this by concluding that physicalism - the theory that everything is reducible to physical properties - is false. It rests on the concept of a “philosophical zombie”- something which is in every way physically identical to a human but has no qualia (phenomenal experiences of mental states). Chalmers argues that such a thing is conceivable; and if it is conceivable, he says, then it is metaphysically possible. If they are metaphysically possible, he concludes, then the qualia that the zombie lacks cannot be physical as it is physically identical to humans yet lacks qualia. Physicalism claims that everything is physical, so physicalism is false. This supports property dualism as, if physicalism is false, then there must be mental - as well as physical - properties which are distinct from physical properties, as property dualism claims.  

However, the argument has been criticised for wrongly assuming that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. We may be able to conceive of a human which is physically identical but without qualia, but this does not mean that it is metaphysically possible. To demonstrate this, we might be able to conceive of a world where water is H3O, not H2O- the transparent liquid we are used to would just have a different chemical composition. But since water is H2O, then what we are conceiving of is not water- it is something else with the same appearance. We can conceive of it, yet it is not metaphysically possible. Similarly, if qualia are 1Qq111⁶ ⁵necessary properties of some physical things, then it is not metaphysically possible for the same physical thing to have different qualia. Therefore, the fact that p-zombies are conceivable does not entail their metaphysical possibility, so the argument rests on a false premise and is therefore unsound.  

Explain the Mary/ knowledge argument in favour of property dualism, then explain the criticism that Mary only gains acquaintance knowledge

Property dualism is the theory that only the only substances are physical ones, but that these substances can contain both physical properties (like mass) and sometimes mental properties (like doubt) which are not supervenient on or reducible to physical properties. The Mary argument supports this by concluding that physicalism - the theory that everything is reducible to physical properties - is false. It describes a scenario where Mary has been locked in a room with no colour for her entire life, and experiences everything through a black and white TV. Through this, she gains all possible knowledge about the physical facts of colour; yet she still does not know what it feels like to see colour, so what it feels like to see colour cannot be a physical fact. Physicalism claims that all facts are physical facts, so physicalism is false. This supports property dualism because it shows that the qualia of seeing colour cannot be physical, and so it must instead be a mental property as property dualism claims, proving that there are at least some mental properties that are blah. 

  

A criticism is that the knowledge Mary gains is that of acquaintance (knowing of something through familiarity), not propositional knowledge (knowing that something is true or false). If Mary knows every physical fact about colour, then this is concerned with propositional knowledge. To conclude, then, that Mary was missing some facts about colour (which the argument claims are mental, not physical), she must have gained new propositional knowledge. However, upon seeing colour, she arguably does not learn anything new about colours; she only becomes familiar with them, and so her new knowledge is concerned with acquaintance, not proposition. Therefore, Mary did not learn any new facts, so the conclusion that some facts are not physical does not follow, meaning physicalism has not been disproved.  

Explain the Mary/ knowledge argument in favour of property dualism, then explain the criticism that Mary gain ability knowledge

Property dualism is the theory that only the only substances are physical ones, but that these substances can contain both physical properties (like mass) and sometimes mental properties (like doubt) which are not supervenient on or reducible to physical properties. The Mary argument supports this by concluding that physicalism - the theory that everything is reducible to physical properties - is false. It describes a scenario where Mary has been locked in a room with no colour for her entire life, and experiences everything through a black and white TV. Through this, she gains all possible knowledge about the physical facts of colour; yet she still does not know what it feels like to see colour, so what it feels like to see colour cannot be a physical fact. Physicalism claims that all facts are physical facts, so physicalism is false. This supports property dualism because it shows that the qualia of seeing colour cannot be physical, and so it must instead be a mental property as property dualism claims, proving that there are at least some mental properties that are blah. 

A criticism is that the knowledge Mary gains is that of ability (knowing how to do something), not propositional knowledge (knowing that something is true or false). If Mary knows every physical fact about colour, then this is concerned with propositional knowledge. To conclude, then, that Mary was missing some facts about colour (which the argument claims are mental, not physical), she must have gained new propositional knowledge. However, upon seeing colour, she arguably does not learn anything new about colours; she just gains the ability to recognise and remember them upon seeing them, so her knowledge is concerned with ability, not facts. Therefore, Mary did not learn any new facts, so the conclusion that some facts are not physical does not follow, meaning physicalism has not been disproved.  

Explain the Mary/ knowledge argument in favour of property dualism, then explain the criticism that Mary learns the same fact through a different way of knowing  

Property dualism is the theory that only the only substances are physical ones, but that these substances can contain both physical properties (like mass) and sometimes mental properties (like doubt) which are not supervenient on or reducible to physical properties. The Mary argument supports this by concluding that physicalism - the theory that everything is reducible to physical properties - is false. It describes a scenario where Mary has been locked in a room with no colour for her entire life, and experiences everything through a black and white TV. Through this, she gains all possible knowledge about the physical facts of colour; yet she still does not know what it feels like to see colour, so what it feels like to see colour cannot be a physical fact. Physicalism claims that all facts are physical facts, so physicalism is false. This supports property dualism because it shows that the qualia of seeing colour cannot be physical, and so it must instead be a mental property as property dualism claims, proving that there are at least some mental properties that are blah. 

A criticism is that, although Mary gains new knowledge in some sense, this does not mean that there are non-physical facts. This is because, upon experiencing colour for the first time, she learns the same facts that she learned through the TV, just in a different way: through a subjective, first-person perspective, as opposed to a third-person perspective. This allows her to have new phenomenal concepts concerning colour, which describe the same facts about it which she knew before seeing them. Before, she knew everything about colour through physical terms (like how it is received by the brain), but now she knows it through phenomenal, subjective terms. Therefore, Mary does not actually learn any new facts, so the conclusion that some facts are not physical does not follow, meaning physicalism has not been proven false.  

Explain the dualist issue of other minds

Dualism is the view that there are at least some mental properties that are not reducible to or supervenient on physical properties. Consequently, our own mental states are known through private introspection and not empirical data. Since I cannot introspect into others, there is epistemological asymmetry in the way I know my own mental states versus how I know of others’. All can know of others is their behaviour, but I cannot know that these behaviours are caused by mental states because the relationship between a mental state and a behaviour is contingent and I cannot empirically verify the existence of something non-physical. Therefore, I cannot know that others have mental states. 

Explain the argument from analogy as a response to the dualist other minds

Mill approaches the problem with an argument from analogy whereby perceived similarities are used to infer to some further similarity that has yet to be observed. He appeals to personal experiences to conclude that other people do have the same mental experiences as he does. He observes the law-like connection between occurrences in his body and occurrences in his mind: whenever he steps on a nail, for example, it leads to pain and behaviour like shouting. Since he knows that other people at least have similar bodies, and exhibit the same behaviour, he infers that, since bodies are “the antecedent condition to feelings”, they probably share the same mental experiences in these scenarios.  

Explain Gilbert Ryle’s argument that dualism makes a category mistake as a response to the problem of other minds

Dualism is the view that there are at least some mental properties that are not reducible to or supervenient on physical states. This leads to the inability to know of others’ mental states as one cannot introspect into others and non-physical entities cannot be known of through empirical data. A category mistake is a type of logical or linguistic error, occurring when a person mistakenly places a concept into a logical category or type where it does not belong (or treats it as if it possesses properties it cannot have). However, Ryle argues that this problem occurs because dualism makes a mistake in assuming that the mind is its own distinct entity. He says that dualism makes a ‘category mistake’ in doing so, whereby the mind is incorrectly placed into a logical category by treating “mind” and “matter” as competing or parallel ingredients of human existence, dualists are making a linguistic semantic error. The mind and body are not two parallel entities interacting with one another; the “mind” is simply a description of the body’s behavioural dispositions and capabilities. For substance dualism, because the mind is entirely private, you can never truly prove that other people have minds. Ryle’s critique bypasses this issue: because mental states are expressed through observable behaviour, we can directly know and understand the minds of others by watching what they do. Once we come to understand the true linguistic use of the term ‘mind’ referring to publicly observable physical behaviours and not a separate ghostly substance, the problem of other minds vanishes as we cannot doubt the existence of bodily behaviours. Ryle therefore thinks the problem of other minds can be solved by correcting a linguistic error. 

Explain the conceptual problem of causation for interactionist dualism from the Princess of Bohemia

Interactionism claims that the mind, a non-extended being, interacts with the body. A mental act or volition causes physical actions to occur in the body; conversely, physical states in the body cause certain mental states in the mind. However, Elizabeth points out that, conceptually, interaction between two objects requires physical contact between their surfaces: for example, to push an apple off a table my hands must make physical contact with the apple’s surface. However, an unextended entity does not have surfaces, so could not interact with something physical.  Since the mind, according to dualism, is an unextended entity, it follows that the mind cannot interact with anything physical, and therefore cannot interact with the body.  Therefore, interactionism is false. 

Explain why the empirical problem of interaction is a problem for interactionist dualism

Interactionism claims that the mind interacts with the body. Mental acts or volitions cause physical actions to occur in the body and vice versa. However, the empirical problem of the conservation of energy as an a posteriori deductive argument attempts to show that, due to the laws of physics, causal interaction between mind and body is impossible. This is because the universe is a closed system, and in any closed system energy must be conserved. But as causal interaction between mind and body in the universe would involve a gain  energy (against conservation), this therefore cannot be possible without breaking the laws of physics (it is physically impossible). Thus, interactionism must be false. 

Explain the epiphenomenalist account of mind

Epiphenomenalism is a form of property dualism (the theory that there are only physical substances, but that these substances may contain both physical and sometimes mental properties which are not reducible to or supervenient on physical properties) which states that mental states are by-products of the brain. This means that there is a one-way causal relationship between physical brain activity and the mind: brain activity causes mental states as a by-product, and these mental states have no causal influence on the physical states (they are causally inert). Thus, the conviction that our mental states cause physical actions is false, as physical actions are purely caused by physiological brain activity of which mental states are a separate by-product. 

Explain epiphenomenalism and how it is challenged by the phenomenology of mental life

Epiphenomenalism is a dualist theory, so claims this mental states are ontologically distinct and reliable to physical states. It is a form of property dualism, so states that the only substances that exist are physical substances may possess no moral properties. Specifically, it claims that mental states are by-products if physical brain state and have no causal influence on the physical body; they are causally inert. Thus, there is a one-way causal relationship between physical brain events and mental states: brain event x causes mental state y (e.g. happiness), but happiness has no other causal role.

However, the phenomenology of our mental life - the way in which our mental states interact - suggests that the epiphenomenalist claim that mental states are causally inert is fake. Upon introspection into my own mind, it is evident that mental states have causal influence on other mental states: my pain, for example, causes the further mental state of sadness. Furthermore, it seems evident that mental states do in fact have causal influence on the physical body. For instance, the mental state of pain seems to cause screaming or the frantic movement of limbs. Therefore, the evidence of introspection strongly suggests that mental states have causal powers (both on other mental states, and the body), contradicting the epiphenomenalist claim that mental states are causally inert.

Explain how epiphenomenalism is challenged by natural selection/evolution

Epiphenomenalism claims that mental states are a bi-product of physical brain activity, and have no causal influence on physical actions- they are causally inert. However, this leads to the question of why we have mental states at all if they are causally redundant. If we accept the principle of natural selection - that characteristics are present due to their advantages for survival - then it would follow that our mental states are present due to their practical uses. But if, as epiphenomenalism claims, mental states are causally inert, then they cannot be there for any strategic advantage, contrary to the principle of evolution which we accept as true. This suggests that the epiphenomenalist claim about mental states being causally inert is false. 

Explain how multiple realisability is a problem for hard behaviourism

Hard behaviourism claims that all propositions about what we call mental states can be analytically reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily movements/behaviours. For example, the statement “I am happy” is reducible to “I am smiling”.  However, the issue of multiple realisability shows that mental states can be realised in multiple different behaviours, and vice versa. For example, being happy may be realised by smiling, jumping in the air, or having a straight face; smiling may be realised by being happy, or even being sad. This is a problem for behaviourism as it undermines the claim that mental states are reducible to behaviours, since smooth translation from mental states to behaviours cannot occur if a mental state is not tied to any one behaviour. Therefore, hard behaviourism is false. 

Explain why circularity is a problem for hard behaviourism

Hard behaviourism claims that all propositions about what we call mental states can be analytically reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily movements / behaviours. The issue of circularity shows that such a reduction is not possible because to have a complete behavioural analysis of mental states, we must be able to eliminate any reference to mental-state terminology. However, whether a specific mental state manifests as a behaviour depends on the other mental states a person has e.g whether wanting a beer manifests as having one depends on that person knowing that they have to drive home or not. This belief about having to drive home later must also be reduced to behaviours, but to do so would re-introduce mental-state terminology as this behaviour would also depend on other beliefs. Consequently, the reduction cannot be reduced without circularity as it necessarily re-introduced mental-state terminology instead of reducing it, which is a problem for behaviourism as it undermines its claim that mental states are reducible without loss of meaning to physical behaviours; clearly, this is false as mental-state language is a necessary part of analysing mental states.  

Explain the difference between soft and hard behaviourism

Hard behaviourism claims that all propositions about what we call mental states can be analytically reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily movements / behaviours. For example, the statement “I am happy” is reducible to “I am smiling”. Soft behaviourism agrees that mental states can be analysed in terms of physical behaviours, but instead claims that they are analysed in terms of hypothetical dispositions to behave rather than current, momentary behaviours. Therefore, "Tom is happy" is not reducible to "Tom is smiling", but is reducible to "Tom is disposed to smiling". The list of potential behaviours which are reducible to mental states are potentially endless, contrary to the claim of hard behaviorism which claims that certain types of behaviour are certain mental states.  

Explain why the distinctness of mental states from behaviour is an issue for behaviourism

Philosophical behaviourism claims that all propositions about what we call mental states can be analytically reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions about physical behaviours. Hilary Putnam uses the thought experiment of “super Spartans”, who have trained themselves to suppress any outward signs of the pain they endure. If philosophical behaviorism were correct, then it would follow that the super Spartans don’t experience pain as mental states are not separate from behaviours; but since we know that they do experience pain, the behaviourist claim must be false. He pushes the objection further with the idea of “X-worlders”, super-Spartans who have ceased talk of pain altogether, and are not even disposed to pain behaviour. This shows that even the soft behaviourist claim that mental states are reducible to behavioural dispositions is false, since X worlders, despite feeling pain, lack any such disposition. Therefore, the two are not reducible, meaning behaviourism is false. 

Explain why the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states is a problem for philosophical behaviourism

Philosophical behaviourism claims that all propositions about what we call mental states can be analytically reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions about physical behaviours. This means that mental states are understood in terms of behaviours. However, the asymmetry between how I know my own mental states and how I know others shows that this is false. For example, I know that I am feeling pain through direct and infallible introspection, but my knowledge that others are in pain is inferred indirectly and fallibly through their outward behaviours, like screaming or swearing. If behaviourism were true, the way I know my own mental states would be through the same way I know of others (behaviours) but clearly this is false as I do not need to look at my bodily movements to know I am in pain. Furthermore, this would mean that others have more direct access to my mental states than me as they can more easily see my behaviours, which is absurd as others are often mistaken about my feelings, and I do not need to ask them about my own mental states. Therefore, the behaviourist claim that mental states are understood purely in terms of behaviour must be false. 

Explain the mind-brain type identity theory

It is the physicalist account of mind which claims that mental states are identical to specific types of brain states/ neurological activity. The mental state of doubt, for example, is actually the firing of neuron x, and worry is the firing of neuron y. This makes mental states ontologically reducible to these brain events, meaning the entity to which we refer when talking about mental states is a type of brain event (as known from empirical investigation). However, mental-state language has a distinct meaning from brain-state language as mental and brain states are not analytically reducible (even though they happen to be referring to  the same entity).  

Explain how the issue of multiple realisability challenges mind-brain type identity theory

MBTIT claims that mental states are ontologically reducible to specific types of mental states. The mental state of doubt, for example, is in fact the firing of neuron x, and worry is the firing of neuron y. However, the issue of multiple realisability shows that such a reduction may not be possible. If MBTIT were true, it would seem that beings with different brains could not share our mental states, as these mental states are identical only to specific types of brain activity present in our brains. Yet evidence suggests that beings with different brains (like animals) do share our mental states (like pain), meaning mental states are multiply realisable in various forms of brain activity. Thus, MBTIT’s claim concerning the reducability of mental states to specific types of brain states is false. 

Explain Eliminative Materialism

It is the physicalist account of mind which states that some or all common-sense (“folk-psychological”) mental states do not exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken. Thus, the theory does not claim there is a reduction between mental states and brain states, for mental states do not exist. We should abandon the language of folk psychology (the common language to predict, explain and describe mental states) as folk psychology is not an empirically robust theory; it lacks explanatory power, is inaccurate and is primitive. It will be entirely replaced by the discoveries of neuroscience, so, like any other outdated scientific theory, we should discard it.  

Explain the issue that Eliminative Materialism is a self-refuting theory

EM is the physicalist account of mind which states that some or all comon-sense "folk psychological" mental states do not exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken. Thus. Mental state concepts such as "beliefs" do not exist. However, if this is true, then EM logically negates itself. This is because to adopt EM one must believe that it is true (they must have a mental state concerning EM). However, if EM is true then such a belief does not exist, and therefore it is not possible to believe in EM, meaning it refutes itself. 

Explain the functionalist account of mental states

Functionalism claims that mental states are defined and understood as functional entities, rather than entities composed of a specific material. In other words, mental states are defined by what they do and not what they are (much like how a tin-opener is defined by its function of opening tins and not by its material composition). Specifically, functionalists argue that the essential or defining role of mental states is the causal role they play in relation to inputs and outputs, such as environmental effects on the body, other mental states, and bodily behaviour. For example, pain is understood as the entity which is prompted by the input of stepping on a nail and causes the output screaming. If two mental states have identical inputs and outputs, they are identical. This way of understanding mental states means that functionalism embraces multiple realisability: any being which has the functional entity acting between inputs and outputs is minded according to functionalism, since functionalism would not define the mind by neurological distinctions. 

Explain how the inverted qualia objection challenges functionalism

Functionalists argue that mental states are understood in terms of their functional role in relation to inputs and outputs, not any specific ontology. Therefore, if functionalism is correct then a functional duplicate of me (with identical inputs and outputs) must have identical mental states to me. However, it is conceivable that two functionally identical beings could have inverted qualia - e.g in terms of colour experience in which x, upon seeing a tomato experiences the colour qualia that y would experience when seeing a banana and vice versa). If this is conceivable, it is metaphysically possible, so this scenario is metaphysically possible. If it is metaphysically possible, then phenomenal properties are not reducible to functional properties, therefore phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is an incomplete account of mind.  

Explain how the possibility of a functional duplicate without qualia challenges a functionalist account of mental states

Functionalists argue that mental states are understood in terms of their functional role in relation to inputs and outputs, not any specific ontology. However, Ned Block’s objection concerning a functional duplicate with no qualia shows this approach to be excessively liberal.  This is because, if functionalism were true, then any system which is a functional duplicate of me (same inputs and outputs) must have identical mental states. However, it is conceivable that a functional duplicate of a human exists but lacks qualia. To show this, Block uses the example of the population of China connected via radios to a body to realise the same inputs and outputs as a human: if the body steps on a nail, the population of china will prompt screaming. By a functionalist account, it must be that the China mind has the same mental states as a human; but intuition suggests that this being lacks the qualitative nature of mental states (qualia), showing that mental states cannot be explained in terms of functional properties and thus that functionalism is false.  

Explain what it means to claim that mental states have “qualia”

Qualia are defined as the phenomenal properties of mental states that are intrinsic, non-intentional, and introspectively accessible. Therefore, to claim that mental states have qualia is to argue that conscious experiences (mental states) possess phenomenal properties, meaning there is a subjective, internal feeling of “what is it like” to experience them (such as the experience of the sting of a burn). Furthermore, this phenomenal property of mental states is understood as being:

• Intrinsic: A quale is self-contained and does not depend on its relation to anything else (such as what caused it, or how it makes you behave).

• Non-intentional: They are not about or directed at anything. Unlike a belief (which points to a fact in the world), a quale is pure, non-representational sensation.

• Introspectively accessible: They are private, subjective, and can only be directly known by an individual turning their attention inward to their own mind.

Ultimately, to claim mental states have qualia to argue that mind possesses a private, qualitative character that cannot be fully captured by physical or functional descriptions alone.

Outline why the conceptual interaction problem is an issue for interactionist dualists

P1. Physical things only move when pushed or contacted by other physical things.

P2. Substance (interactionist) dualism claims the mind is a non-physical thing that interacts with the physical body.

P3. If the mind is non-physical, it cannot interact with the physical body (from P1)

P4. But the mind can move the body, our "mental events" seem to move the body.

C1. Therefore, mental events cannot be physical.

C2. Therefore, interactionist substance dualism must be false.

Outline the conceptual interaction problem as articulated by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia

P1. Bodies interact with another by exerting force.

P2. Force requires extension.

P3. If the mind is un-extended, then it cannot exert force.

P4. If dualism is true, the mind is un-extended and cannot exert force.

P5. The mind can exert force on bodies.

C. Dualism is false.

For the essay:

He claims that there must be some third entity which unites the mind and the body, in which this union allows the two substances to interact. Since Descartes says so little about this notion of a "union", it is not a particularly useful defense of dualism.

One of his responses suggests that there may be a locus of interaction between the mind and the body in the pineal gland, but many would content that this physiological solution is unsatisfactory, as it does not explain how the union occurs.

Another claim is that we should not think about all causation in the way we think about causation between physical bodies; mental causation may function very differently. This may be true, but it still gives us no indication of how the mind and the body might interact. So, Descartes' response fails as a defense of dualism.

Explain the empirical interaction problem of interactionist dualism

Outline Mill’s argument from analogy

P1. I know that when I stub my toe I experience pain so I often yelp in agony.

P2. I know that when I have seen other people stub their toe I have also seen them yelp in agony.

P3. By analogy, other people yelping in agony must mean that they are also in pain.

P4. There are many other similarities between my and other people's behaviour.

C. From these similarities, I can know by analogy that other minds exist.

Outline the abductive argument from analogy

P1. Behaviour A has a mental cause

P2. Behaviour B has a mental cause.

P3. Behaviour C has a mental cause (and so on).

P4. Many behaviours have mental causes.

P5. I have seen other people exhibit the same types of behaviour.

P6. Those behaviours must also have mental causes.

C. Hence, other minds exist.

Explain a possible response to the category mistake

1. Mental states possess unique properties like qualia (subjective experiences, like the redness of a rose) and intentionality (thoughts about something). Physical behaviours do not possess these properties. Therefore, the mind is a distinct category of reality, so dualism does not commit a logical error.

2. Mental states are fundamentally private and accessible via introspection, whereas behaviour is public. If I can claim to know my own mind without observing my behaviour, the mind cannot simply be a way of describing physical actions.

3. The burden of proof to dent the possibility of a “non-physical substance” lies with the physicalist. They must demonstrate the incoherence of “non-physical substance” rather than it just being unproven.