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INA § 287(c)
An officer has the power to “search, without a warrant” a person and her personal effects if the person is “seeking admission to the United States” if the officer has reasonable cause to suspect that the search would disclose reason for denying admission.
intermediate zone
Area near the border in which the Fourth Amendment constraints law enforcement more than at the border itself, but less than the interior.
Historically, fixed checkpoints were permissible (United States v. Martinez Fuerte) whereas roving patrols still needed specific reasonable suspicion (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce).
The stability of this category may be diminishing.
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez (1985)
Sixteen-hour detention of a traveler seeing to enter the United States is permissible with reasonable suspicion of a crime (smuggling).
United States v. Ramsey (1977)
A routine search at an official border inspection post may occur without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
United States v. Martinez Fuerte (1976)
At fixed checkpoints, brief stops are allowed even without reasonable suspicion.
Martinez-Fuerte held that motorists at fixed checkpoints may be referred to secondary questioning largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, but a search during secondary questioning requires probable cause or consent.
United States v. Ortiz (1975)
Once a car and its riders have been held for secondary inspection at a fixed checkpoint, a search requires probable cause or consent.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975)
Roving patrols may conduct brief stops and questioning only with reasonable suspicion, and Mexican ancestry alone does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.
United States v. Montero-Camargo (9th Cir. 2000)
Border patrol agents stopped a pair of cars based on a tip and after observing the Hispanic-looking occupants of one car picking up a newspaper. Marijuana and a pistol were found in the second car.
Particularized suspicion must (1) be based on the totality of the circumstances and (2) must involve a reasonable suspicion that the particular person stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime.
The district court erred in relying on the Hispanic appearance of the ∆s, which is not an appropriate or relevant factor. The danger of stigmatic harm is pronounced in police stops. However, the Mexicali plates and U-turn gave rise to reasonable suspicion.
United States v. Manzo-Jurado (9th Cir. 2006)
Montero-Camargo does not control in an area sparsely populated with Hispanics, but particularized suspicion nonetheless was not met.
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984)
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible in removal proceedings. The Court noted that in a removal proceeding, the INS must show only identity and alienage; the burden then shifts to the respondent to prove the time, place, and manner of his entry.
Eight justices seemed to recognize that an egregious violation would mean applying the exclusionary rule in a removal proceeding.
Gonzales-Rivera v. INS (9th Cir. 1994)
Suppressed evidence from a vehicle stop based solely on the passengers’ Hispanic appearance.
Orhorhaghe v. INS (9th Cir. 1994)
Found investiating a noncitizen because of his “Nigerian-sounding name” was an egregious Fourth Amendment violation allowing application of the exclusionary rule.
Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo (2025)
Granted the government’s application for a stay of the district court’s temporary restraining order to stop ICE from relying on apparent race or ethnicity, speaking Spanish or accented English, presence at particular locations, type of work, or a combination thereof.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring, said that these factors can constitute at least reasonable suspicion of illegal presence in the United States, allowing brief stops and inquiry about immigration status.
The liberal Justices dissented.
8 USC § 1252(b)
A decision of deportability need only be based on “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.”
reasons for not applying the exclusionary rule to deportation hearings
(1) limited additional deterrent effect (already deterred by possibility of losing evidence in subsequent criminal prosecution)
(2) deportation often remains possible without the challenged evidence (government needs to establish only respondent’s identity and alienage)
(3) few aliens challenge the circumstances of their arrest
(4) existing INS procedures (regulations and training) already deter violations
(5) alternative remedies are available (declaratory relief against the agency)
(6) exclusion would interefere with enforcement of continuing violations of law
(7) exclusion would burden the system
(8) exclusion could result in suppression of lawfully obtained evidence
reasons for applying the exclusionary rule to deportation hearings
(1) the rule has a deterrent effect because deportation proceedings give officers a direct incentive to obtain admissible evidence
(2) the possibility that evidence will be excluded can influence decisions about whether to contest a case
(3) internal INS safeguards do not render exclusion unnecessary
(4) alternative remedies are unrealistic
(5) the majority exaggerates the costs and engages in speculation
(6) unlawful presence is not necessarily a continuing crime
Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey (9th Cir. 2008)
INS agents entered the residence of two noncitizens and arrested both in the home, without a warrant. The Circuit held that there was an egregious Fourth Amendment violation triggering the exclusionary rule.
Bybee, concurring, said that the Circuit’s approach of excluding if the agents violated the Fourth Amendment and “the agents committed the violations deliberately or by conduct a reasonable officer should have known would violate the Constitution” conflicted with SCOTUS precedent (Lopez-Mendoza).
Almeida-Amari v. Gonzales (2d Cir. 2006)
Almeida-Amaral was approached by a uniformed border patrol agent just as he entered the parking lot of a gas station. The agent instructed petitioner to stop and requested identification from him. Petitioner showed the officer his Brazilian passport, at which point he was arrested and taken into custody. He made a statement that he later sought to exclude.
Woodby v. INS (1966)
The government bears the burden of proving removability by clear and convincing evidence.
The Second Circuit reads Lopez-Mendoza to authorize exclusion for violations that are egregious either because the violation "transgress[ed] notions of fundamental fairness," or because the violation "undermine[d] the probative value of the evidence obtained."
The Second Circuit identifies two bases (nonexhaustive) for finding the stop fundamentally unfair: the characteristics and severity of the offending conduct (not just the validity of the stop) and if the stop is based on race or some other grossly improper characterization. Egregiousness is a higher bar than a violation. Because Almeida-Amaral did not show egregiousness, he loses on suppression.
8 C.F.R. § 1240.48(b)
INS regulation stating that an admission of deportability (as on Form I-213) from an unrepresented, unaccompanied respondent under 16 years of age may not be accepted by an IJ.
8 USC § 1225(a) (INA § 235(a))
(a) Inspection
(1) An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.
(2) Stowaways
An arriving alien who is a stowaway is not eligible to apply for admission or to be admitted and shall be ordered removed upon inspection by an immigration officer. Upon such inspection if the alien indicates an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview under subsection (b)(1)(B). A stowaway may apply for asylum only if the stowaway is found to have a credible fear of persecution under subsection (b)(1)(B). In no case may a stowaway be considered an applicant for admission or eligible for a hearing under section 1229a of this title.
(3) Inspection
All aliens (including alien crewmen) who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States shall be inspected by immigration officers.
(4) Withdrawal of application for admission
An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and at any time, be permitted to withdraw the application for admission and depart immediately from the United States.
(5) Statements
An applicant for admission may be required to state under oath any information sought by an immigration officer regarding the purposes and intentions of the applicant in seeking admission to the United States, including the applicant’s intended length of stay and whether the applicant intends to remain permanently or become a United States citizen, and whether the applicant is inadmissible.
8 USC § 1225(b)(1)(A) (INA § 235(b)(1)(A))
(b) Inspection of applicants for admission
(1) Inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled
(A) Screening
If an immigration officer determines that an alien who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title, the officer shall order the alien removed without further review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution.
If the alien is inadmissible and claims asylum or persecution, the officer shall refer the alien to an interview by an asylum officer.
The A.G. can designate any alien not admitted or paroled and has not shown that he has been physically present in the U.S. continuously for two years prior to date of determination of inadmissibility.
8 USC § 1225(b)(1)(B) (INA § 235(b)(1)(B))
An asylum officer shall interview aliens. If the officer determines that the alien has a credible fear of persecution, the alien shall b detained for further consideration of his application for asylum. If he does not have a credible fear of persecution, the officer shall order him removed without further hearing or review, but upon the alien’s request, he can get an opportunity to be heard and questioned by the IJ.
Any alien subject to the procedures under this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.
The Attorney General shall provide information concerning the asylum interview described in this subparagraph to aliens who may be eligible.
8 USC § 1225(b)(1)(C) (INA § 235(b)(1)(C))
Except as provided in subparagraph (B)(iii)(III), a removal order entered in accordance with subparagraph (A)(i) or (B)(iii)(I) is not subject to administrative appeal, except that the Attorney General shall provide by regulation for prompt review of such an order against an alien who claims under oath to have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, to have been admitted as a refugee, or to have been granted asylum.
Boumediene v. Bush (2008)
Aliens designated enemy combatants and detained at Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus under the Suspension Clause, and that the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)’s limited Court of Appeals review is not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas. The Military Commission Act of 2006 (MCA) § 7, which stripped habeas jurisdiction, was an unconstitutional suspension. The Court did not decide whether detention was authorized or that the writ must issue.
Although Cuba retains de jure sovereignty, the U.S. has de facto sovereignty at Guantanamo, and the Constitution’s extraterritorial reach turns on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism. Allowing the political branches to decide where the Constitution applies would let them “switch the Constitution on or off at will,” a separation-of-powers problem rooted in habeas’s role as a check on executive detention. An adequate substitute must give a meaningful opportunity to challenge detention as legally erroneous and the power to order release, with scope of review depending on the rigor of prior proceedings.
Raices v. Mullin (D.C. Cir. 2026)
Proclamation 10888 and DHS’s implementing Guidance (which suspended entry of those crossing the southern border outside ports of entry, subjected them to new summary removal procedures without asylum or other protection screening, and gave only indiviuals who spontaneously manifest fear a CAT-Only assessment) are unlawful to the extent they circumvent the INA’s removal procedures. Section 1182(f) authorizes suspending only “entry,” not removal, and § 1185(a) confers no power over removal procedures. The Proclamation and Guidance also violate the statutory right to apply for asylum (§ 1158(a)), the mandatory withholding-of-removal bar (§ 1231(b)(3)(A)), and the regulatory CAT procedures. The court affirmed summary judgment and class certification as clarified.
The INA distinguishes entry from removal in its text and structure (“removal” appears nowhere in § 1182(f)), and the Executive already has removal tools under §§ 1229a and 1225(b)(1), so the entry power is not “toothless.” The “entry fiction” does not let the Executive ignore statutes. Asylum discretion must be individualized, the right to apply is distinct from eligibility, and any categorical bar would require notice-and-comment regulation, not proclamation.
Stanford Daily v. Rubio (N.D. Cal. 2026)
The clause of the INA’s Deportation Provision (8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(C)(iii), 1227(a)(4)(C)(i))) creating an the exception to nondeportability for lawful beliefs, statements, or associations where the Sec’y of State “personally determines” that a person’s presence “would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest,” and the provision authorizing the Sec’y or a consular officer to revoke a visa “in his discretion” (8 U.S.C. § 1201(i)) are unconstitutional as applied to protected speech, violating the First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s vagueness doctrine. Lawfully present noncitizens have First and Fifth Amendment rights to the same extent as citizens in this context, and the government’s “reduced rights” theory was unsupported. The court granted declaratory relief, denied injunctive relief on the Deportation Provision under § 1252(f)(1) (only the Supreme Court may enjoin Part IV of the INA), and did not reach particularized injunctive relief on the Revocation Provision.
Because the government conceded the provisions are viewpoint- and content-based and plaintiffs brought a “hybrid” (not overbreadth) challenge, strict scrutiny governs rather than Moody’s overbreadth test. The Deportation Provision’s clause is not narrowly tailored or least restrictive, since the INA has speech-neutral alternatives, and the government did not brief tailoring. Both provisions are void for vagueness: they give no fair notice (undefined terms, an exception that swallows the speech protection, shifting unpublished foreign policy) and invite discriminatory enforcement, as in the record of revocations targeting government critics, and the Foreign Affairs Manual does not cure the Revocation Provision’s vagueness.
Zadvydas v. Davis (2001)
After an IJ orders a noncitizen removed (deported), the government has a 90-day “removal period” to actually send them out of the country (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)). Section 1231(a)(6) says noncitizens who are inadmissible, removable on specified grounds, or found to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply “may be detained beyond the removal period.” Zadvydas and Ma were LPRs with serious criminal records who had been ordered removed. No country would take them. Both were detained past 90 days with no end in sight.
Section 1231(a)(6) implicitly limits detention to the period reasonably necessary to remove the person. Six months is presumptively reasonable. After that, if the detainee shows good reason to believe removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government must rebut the showing or release the person.
Reasoning: Indefinite detention of someone who has been admitted to the U.S. raises a serious Due Process problem. Civil detention is justified only to prevent flight or protect the community. The flight rationale collapses when removal is impossible, and dangerousness alone, without special safeguards, is not enough. Under the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Court read “may be detained” to include a reasonable time limit rather than reach the constitutional question. Congress’s immigration power remains subject to constitutional limits.
Demore v. Kim (2003)
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) says the A.G. “shall take into custody” any noncitizen who is deportable because of certain crimes (including aggravated felonies and controlled-substance offenses) “when the alien is released” from criminal custody. Release is allowed only for witness-protection purposes. This is mandatory detention during removal proceedings, which are the hearings that decide whether a person will be deported. Detainees get no individualized bond hearing. Kim, a South Korean LPR since childhood, was convicted of burglary and petty theft and detained under § 1226(c). He conceded he was deportable but argued that Due Process entitled him to a hearing on whether he was dangerous or a flight risk.
The Court held that mandatory detention of deportable criminal noncitizens for the brief period needed to complete removal proceedings is constitutional, even without a bond hearing. Detention during deportation proceedings is a long-recognized, valid part of the process. The Court distinguished Zadvydas because that detention was potentially indefinite, while § 1226(c) detention has a definite endpoint (the Court cited an average of roughly a month and a half, about four months with an appeal). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence added that Due Process could require an individualized hearing if detention became unreasonably prolonged.
INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca (1987)
A 10% chance of being tortured or killed is sufficient for a well-founded fear.
The § 241(b)(3) [formerly 243(h)] "clear probability" standard of proof that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened to trigger mandatory witholding of deportation (nonrefoulement) does not govern asylum applications under § 208(a), which authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to a "refugee," who, under § 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, is unable or unwilling to return to his home country because of persecution or "a well founded fear" thereof on account of particular factors.
The plain meaning of the statutory language indicates a congressional intent that the proof standards under 88 208(a) and 243(h) should differ: the standard for asylum is lower.
particular social group (PSG)
One ground for aslum/refugee status, with three elements: (1) immutability, (2) particularity, (3) anti-circularity (cannot be defined by fact of persecution)
Matter of K-E-S-G- (BIA 2025)
PSG defined solely by a noncitizen's sex or sex plus nationality (such as "Salvadoran women") is overbroad and fails the particularity requirement, making it significantly harder for survivors of gender-based violence to qualify for asylum.
Matter of S-S-F-M (AG 2025)
Overruled Matter of A-R-C-G- and reinstated the restrictive standards of Matter of A-B- I and A-B- II, focused on domestic violence as private conduct, and reiterated that a PSG must exist independently of the persecution itself.
Matter of Kasinga (BIA 1996)
Held that people who refused to be subjected to female general mutilation are a PSG.
Asylum is ___.
discretionary
INA §