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Vocabulary practice flashcards covering key definitions, theories, mechanisms, and theorists for Week 3: Self, Identity and Society in Introduction to Social Psychology.
“I” vs “Me” (James)
James's (1890) two components of self: the “I” is the self-as-knower (continuity, distinctness, volition); the “Me” is the self-as-known (the empirical self that can be known as an object).
The social self (Mead)
Mead's (1934) claim that the self is a social structure arising only through social experience – it does not exist at birth and develops through interaction.
Play stage
Mead's first stage of self-development: the child imitates one role at a time (e.g., playing doctor), taking the perspective of a specific “other.”
Game stage
Mead's second stage: the child holds all participants' roles in mind simultaneously to coordinate with them (e.g., a sports team), leading to the “generalised other.”
Generalised other
The internalised sense of the attitudes and expectations of the whole community, formed through the Game stage.
Theory of mind
The cognitive ability to attribute mental states (beliefs, intentions, desires, emotions) to oneself and others; e.g., understanding that what you know isn't necessarily known by someone else.
Looking glass self (Cooley)
Cooley's (1902) idea that we come to know ourselves by internalising how we think others perceive us; a meta-perspective on ourselves.
Collectivism / individualism (Triandis)
Two cultural orientations: collectivist cultures emphasise group ties and social definitions of self; individualist cultures emphasise the personal, separate self.
Allocentric / idiocentric self-definitions
Allocentric: defining yourself in social terms (“my family thinks I am kind”), more common in collectivist cultures. Idiocentric: defining yourself in personal terms (“I am kind”), more common in individualist cultures.
Independence / interdependence (Markus & Kitayama)
A related cultural distinction: an independent self-construal sees the self as separate from others; an interdependent self-construal sees the self as fundamentally connected to others.
Dialogical self
The idea that the self can occupy different positions through inner dialogue; we can “talk to ourselves” from multiple internal viewpoints.
Possible selves
Markus & Nurius's (1986) concept: hypothetical versions of the self – what we could, would like to, or fear becoming – that guide and motivate future behaviour.
Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins)
Higgins's (1987) theory that behaviour is motivated by reducing the gap between how we actually are and how we ought or wish to be.
Actual self
How we really are, or think we are, right now.
Ideal self
How we would like to be.
Ought self
How we think we should be (duty/obligation-based).
Dejected emotions
Emotions like disappointment or shame that follow a discrepancy between the actual and ideal self.
Agitated emotions
Emotions like guilt or anxiety that follow a discrepancy between the actual and ought self.
Future self continuity
Hershfield's (2019) concept: how psychologically connected we feel to our future self. Feeling disconnected favours short-term decisions; feeling connected favours patient, long-term ones (e.g., saving for retirement).
Self-esteem
One's overall positive or negative attitude toward oneself (Rosenberg, 1965).
Social comparison theory (Festinger)
Festinger's (1954) idea that we evaluate our own abilities and opinions by comparing ourselves to other people, since objective standards are often unavailable.
Upward comparison
Comparing yourself to someone better off or more successful (e.g., a silver medallist comparing themselves to the gold medallist).
Downward comparison
Comparing yourself to someone worse off (e.g., a bronze medallist comparing themselves to a fourth-place finisher).
Downward comparison theory (Wills)
Wills's (1981) theory that people generally compare upward, but shift to downward comparisons specifically when self-esteem is under threat, in order to restore it.
Self-assessment
A motivation (Trope, 1986) to seek new information to discover who we really are – strongest on peripheral (less central) self-dimensions.
Self-verification
A motivation (Swann, 1988) to seek information that confirms what we already believe about ourselves – strongest on central self-dimensions.
Self-enhancement
A motivation (Kunda, 1990) to build and promote a favourable self-image – applies to both central and peripheral dimensions.
Self-enhancement triad (Sedikides & Gregg)
Three linked biases: overestimating one's own strengths (better-than-average effect), overestimating control over events, and unrealistic optimism.
Mnemic neglect
The preferential forgetting of negative self-relevant feedback (and better recall of positive feedback) – appears specifically when information is relevant to the self.
Self-handicapping/sabotaging
Acting in ways that paradoxically hinder one's own performance, to protect self-image (Jones & Berglas, 1978).
Discounting
A self-handicapping strategy: manufacturing a convenient excuse in advance (e.g., “I didn't sleep at all”), so failure doesn't reflect on one's ability.
Augmenting
A self-handicapping strategy: creating an unfavourable condition (e.g., low effort) so that any success looks even more impressive.
Social identity (Tajfel)
“That part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p.225).
Social categorisation (SIT step 1)
The first step of Social Identity Theory: categorising the world and the people in it into groups.
Social identification (SIT step 2)
The second step: identifying with certain social groups as categories we belong to.
Intergroup comparison (SIT step 3)
The third step: comparing “us” (the ingroup) with “them” (the outgroup).
Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner)
A theory explaining how social categories act as cognitive tools that segment the social world and define our own place within it, moving us along an interpersonal–intergroup continuum.
Fleeting vs chronic accessibility
A category can be mentally accessible either fleetingly (primed by the immediate situation) or chronically (used so often it's always ready to apply).
Comparative fit
Determined by the meta-contrast ratio: how distinct a social category appears relative to the immediate comparison context (e.g., man vs women at a party).
Normative fit
Whether a person's behaviour matches the stereotypical expectations associated with a social category.
De-personalisation
A cognitive redefinition of the self: shifting from unique, individual attributes to shared social-category membership and its associated stereotypes.
SIDE model
Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (Reicher et al., 1995): crowd behaviour reflects a shift from personal to social identity, not a loss of self – and is rational/moral from the group's own perspective.
Deindividuation
An experiential state (triggered by factors like anonymity) involving loss of self-awareness and atypical or anti-social behaviour. NOT the same as de-personalisation.
Conscientisation (Freire)
The process by which a marginalised group becomes aware of the conditions and causes of its exclusion, and how to take action to address it.
System justification
The tendency to defend and rationalise the existing social system – less likely when the system is seen as under threat, inescapable, necessary, or when personal control is low.
Social identity complexity (SIC)
Roccas & Brewer's (2002) concept: how much a person's multiple identities overlap. High SIC (non-overlapping identities, e.g., gay and Catholic) is linked to lower prejudice and warmer outgroup attitudes.
Albert Bandura
Social psychologist (1925–2021) known for social learning theory — people learn by observing models (live, verbal, symbolic).
Gustave Le Bon
Crowd psychology theorist (1841–1931) known for the “group mind” view of crowds that the SIDE model directly challenges.