1/280
Looks like no tags are added yet.
Theory of mind
The cognitive ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs intentions and knowledge to other people and understand that their perspectives may differ from our own
What does theory of mind allow individuals to understand
It allows individuals to infer what other people believe know intend and think even when those mental states differ from their own
Why is theory of mind called a theory
Other peoples mental states cannot be directly observed so individuals must make theoretical inferences about their beliefs intentions and knowledge based on available information
Is theory of mind a scientific theory
No it is a cognitive ability possessed by individuals rather than a scientific explanation developed by a researcher
Why is theory of mind considered a cognitive phenomenon
It involves mental processes used to understand and infer the beliefs intentions knowledge and perspectives of other people
Main function of theory of mind in social interactions
It guides expectations about other people and helps individuals predict how they are likely to behave
Typical age when theory of mind begins developing
Theory of mind usually begins developing during preschool years at approximately four to five years old
Importance of studying theory of mind in childhood
Understanding how theory of mind develops helps explain how children begin recognizing that other people have independent beliefs intentions knowledge and perspectives
Why are animal studies useful for investigating theory of mind
Mental state understanding in higher primates may be observable through their responses to situations allowing researchers to develop methods that can also be applied to human children
Purpose of studying theory of mind in higher primates
To investigate whether apes understand the mental states of others and whether their cognitive abilities resemble those of humans
Premack and Woodruff 1978
A seminal study investigating whether chimpanzees possess theory of mind by examining whether a chimpanzee could identify solutions to problems experienced by a human actor
Research question of Premack and Woodruff 1978
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind
Participant in Premack and Woodruff 1978
One fourteen year old adult female chimpanzee named Sarah
Aim of Premack and Woodruff 1978
To investigate whether a chimpanzee could recognize another individuals problem understand their intention and select an appropriate solution
Method of Premack and Woodruff 1978
Sarah watched videotaped scenes of a human actor struggling with different problems and selected from several photographs the one representing a solution
Examples of problems shown in Premack and Woodruff 1978
The human actor attempted to reach an inaccessible bundle of bananas or escape from a locked cage
Photograph choices in Premack and Woodruff 1978
Sarah was shown several photographs including possible solutions such as a stick to reach inaccessible bananas or a key to open a lock
Task in Premack and Woodruff 1978
After watching each videotaped problem Sarah had to choose the photograph that represented an appropriate solution to the actors difficulty
Findings of Premack and Woodruff 1978
Sarah consistently selected the correct photographs representing solutions to the problems experienced by the human actor
Conclusion of Premack and Woodruff 1978
The researchers argued that Sarah understood the actors problems and intentions and selected solutions based on her understanding of the actors mental state
How Premack and Woodruff interpreted Sarahs performance
They believed Sarah recognized the videotape as representing a problem inferred what the actor intended to achieve and selected a solution consistent with that intention
Significance of Premack and Woodruff 1978
The study provided early evidence suggesting that chimpanzees may possess theory of mind and understand the intentions of others
Criticism of Premack and Woodruff 1978
Sarah may have selected correct photographs through learned associations between familiar objects rather than understanding the actors mental states
Alternative explanation for Sarah choosing a key
Sarah may have associated keys with locked doors based on previous experience rather than understanding that the actor intended to open the door
Difference between associative learning and theory of mind
Associative learning involves connecting objects or situations based on previous experience whereas theory of mind involves inferring another individuals beliefs intentions or knowledge
Why Sarahs performance did not conclusively demonstrate theory of mind
Correctly matching familiar objects to problems does not necessarily prove that a chimpanzee understands the psychological states underlying another persons behaviour
Povinelli and Eddy 1996
A study investigating whether chimpanzees understood human visual attention by examining whether they begged from humans who could see them
Aim of Povinelli and Eddy 1996
To investigate whether chimpanzees understood differences in human visual access and could use this information to predict who was able to see them
Method of Povinelli and Eddy 1996
Chimpanzees were presented with humans facing them and humans with buckets over their heads and their begging behaviour was observed
Findings of Povinelli and Eddy 1996
Chimpanzees begged from humans facing them and humans with buckets over their heads with equal probability
Conclusion of Povinelli and Eddy 1996
The findings suggested that chimpanzees did not understand or appropriately respond to differences in human visual access in this situation
Significance of Povinelli and Eddy 1996
The study provided evidence challenging the claim that chimpanzees understand the mental states of other individuals
Limitation of Povinelli and Eddy 1996
The findings concern a particular test of visual attention and do not independently establish that chimpanzees lack every aspect of theory of mind
Problem with testing theory of mind using familiar situations
Chimpanzees may respond through learned associations based on previous experiences rather than understanding another individuals intentions
Research paradigm used to address the associative learning problem
Researchers examine how primates respond when an actor makes unsuccessful attempts to achieve a goal in novel situations with which the primate has no prior experience
Why novel situations are useful in theory of mind research
They reduce the likelihood that chimpanzees can rely on familiar object associations and provide a stronger test of whether they understand the actors underlying intention
Call and Tomasello 2008
A review of ten studies using unsuccessful attempts in novel situations to investigate whether chimpanzees understand the goals and intentions of others
Aim of Call and Tomasello 2008
To evaluate evidence from studies investigating whether chimpanzees understand other individuals goals and intentions
Method of Call and Tomasello 2008
Researchers reviewed ten studies using a paradigm involving actors unsuccessful attempts to achieve goals in novel situations
Conclusion of Call and Tomasello 2008 regarding intentions
Chimpanzees like humans understand the goals and intentions underlying the actions of others
Significance of Call and Tomasello 2008
The review provided evidence that chimpanzees possess at least some aspects of theory of mind particularly the ability to understand intentions
Buttelmann et al 2007
A study using the rational imitation paradigm to investigate whether chimpanzees understand the intentions underlying unusual human actions
Aim of Buttelmann et al 2007
To investigate whether chimpanzees distinguish between unusual actions caused by physical constraints and unusual actions chosen without any apparent constraint
Participants in Buttelmann et al 2007
Six chimpanzees
Rational imitation paradigm
A research method in which an individual observes a role model performing an unusual action and researchers examine whether the individual copies the exact action or adapts it according to the role models apparent constraints and intentions
Apparatus in Buttelmann et al 2007
An interesting apparatus that produced light or sound when switched on
Basic procedure in Buttelmann et al 2007
A human demonstrated how to operate the apparatus using an unusual body part and the chimpanzee was then given an opportunity to operate it
Unusual actions in Buttelmann et al 2007
The human operated the apparatus using a body part such as their leg or head rather than their hands
Physical constraint condition in Buttelmann et al 2007
The human used an unusual body part because both hands were occupied by holding a heavy bucket
Unconstrained condition in Buttelmann et al 2007
The human used an unusual body part despite having no physical constraint preventing them from using their hands
Purpose of the physical constraint condition
To investigate whether chimpanzees recognize that the human uses an unusual action because they cannot conveniently use their hands
Purpose of the unconstrained condition
To investigate whether chimpanzees recognize that the human deliberately chooses an unusual action despite having the option to use their hands
Findings of Buttelmann et al 2007 in the constrained condition
Chimpanzees used their hands to operate the apparatus when the human used an unusual body part because their hands were occupied
Interpretation of findings in the constrained condition
Chimpanzees appeared to understand that the human used an unusual body part because of a physical constraint and therefore achieved the same goal using their more accessible hands
Findings of Buttelmann et al 2007 in the unconstrained condition
When the human had no physical constraint and deliberately used an unusual body part chimpanzees imitated the unusual action and used the same body part
Interpretation of findings in the unconstrained condition
Chimpanzees appeared to recognize that the unusual action was a deliberate choice rather than a response to a physical constraint and therefore copied it
Overall conclusion of Buttelmann et al 2007
Chimpanzees distinguish between actions caused by physical constraints and actions chosen deliberately suggesting that they understand the intentions underlying human behaviour
Why is the rational imitation paradigm important
It tests whether chimpanzees understand the reason behind an action rather than simply copying the physical movement they observe
Evidence for understanding intentions in rational imitation
Chimpanzees adapted their behaviour when the human was physically constrained but copied the unusual action when the human had no apparent constraint
Difference between understanding goals and understanding false beliefs
Understanding goals involves recognizing what another individual is trying to achieve whereas understanding false beliefs involves recognizing that another individual can hold an inaccurate belief about reality
False belief
A belief held by an individual that does not match the actual state of reality
Evidence about chimpanzees understanding false beliefs in Call and Tomasello 2008
The ten studies reviewed did not provide experimental evidence demonstrating that chimpanzees understand false beliefs
Main limitation of chimpanzee theory of mind identified by Call and Tomasello 2008
Chimpanzees demonstrated understanding of goals and intentions but there was no experimental evidence in the reviewed studies that they understood false beliefs
Overall conclusion of Call and Tomasello 2008 about chimpanzee theory of mind
Chimpanzees possess theory of mind because they can understand the goals and intentions of others but their abilities are less developed than those of human children mainly because of limited evidence for false belief understanding
Comparison between chimpanzee and human theory of mind
Both chimpanzees and humans demonstrate understanding of goals and intentions but human children develop a more advanced theory of mind that includes understanding false beliefs
Overall evaluation of evidence for theory of mind in chimpanzees
Premack and Woodruff initially provided evidence for mental state understanding but associative learning offered an alternative explanation while later research using novel situations and rational imitation provided stronger evidence that chimpanzees understand intentions
Does a chimpanzee have a theory of mind
Evidence suggests that chimpanzees possess some aspects of theory of mind because they understand the goals and intentions of others but their understanding appears less developed than that of human children because experimental evidence for false belief understanding is lacking
Theory of mind in human children
The development of the cognitive ability to understand other peoples mental states including their intentions beliefs knowledge and perspectives
Two major components of theory of mind examined in human children
Understanding the intentions of others and understanding that other people can hold false beliefs
Understanding intentions
The ability to recognize what another individual is trying to achieve even when their actions are unsuccessful or differ from their intended outcome
Understanding false beliefs
The ability to recognize that another person can hold a belief that is different from reality and act according to that incorrect belief
Similarity between research on chimpanzees and pre verbal human children
Both use experimental procedures that examine how individuals respond to another persons actions and whether they understand the intentions underlying those actions
Meltzoff 1995
An experimental study investigating whether infants imitate what an adult actually accomplishes or what the adult intends to accomplish
Aim of Meltzoff 1995
To establish the earliest pre verbal age at which children can understand another individuals intentions by examining whether they reproduce an intended action even when the adult fails to complete it
Research question of Meltzoff 1995
Can infants understand an adults intention and reproduce the intended action even when the adult does not successfully complete it
Connection between Meltzoff 1995 and Buttelmann et al 2007
Both studies investigated understanding intentions by examining whether an observer reproduces an intended action rather than simply copying the exact movements performed by a model
Participants in Meltzoff 1995
Infants including children as young as eighteen months old
Experimental design of Meltzoff 1995
Infants were divided into a control group that observed an adult successfully complete an action and an experimental group that observed an adult attempt but fail to complete the same action
Control group in Meltzoff 1995
Children observed an adult successfully using a small rectangular wooden block to push a slightly recessed rectangular button in a wooden box which activated a buzzer
Target action in Meltzoff 1995
Using a small rectangular wooden block to push a recessed rectangular button in a wooden box and activate a buzzer
Experimental group in Meltzoff 1995
Children observed an adult attempting the target action but failing because the adult repeatedly missed the button and did not activate the buzzer
Difference between the control and experimental conditions in Meltzoff 1995
The adult successfully pushed the button in the control condition but missed the button and failed to activate the buzzer in the experimental condition while the other movements and actions remained the same
What happened after the demonstration in Meltzoff 1995
Infants were given access to the test objects and researchers observed whether they reproduced the target action
Dependent variable in Meltzoff 1995
The number of successfully completed imitation acts performed by infants after observing the adult demonstration
Findings of Meltzoff 1995
There was no difference in the number of successfully completed imitation acts between the control and experimental groups
Findings for infants in the experimental group in Meltzoff 1995
Infants who observed the unsuccessful attempt directly performed the intended target action without first going through a period of trial and error
Comparison between the two groups in Meltzoff 1995
Infants who observed the failed attempt performed the intended action just as successfully as infants who observed the adult complete the action
Interpretation of Meltzoff 1995
Infants understood what the adult intended to achieve rather than simply reproducing the movements that the adult actually completed
Conclusion of Meltzoff 1995
Children as young as eighteen months can infer another individuals intentions and reproduce an intended action even when the adult fails to complete it
Significance of Meltzoff 1995
The findings suggest that understanding intentions develops before the typical preschool age associated with more advanced theory of mind abilities
Evidence that infants read intentions in Meltzoff 1995
Infants who observed an adult miss the button still directly performed the intended action rather than copying the unsuccessful movements
Alternative explanation of Meltzoff 1995
Infants might have responded to the physical pattern of movements they observed rather than psychologically interpreting the adults intention
Question about the interpretation of Meltzoff 1995
Whether infants understood the adults psychological intention or simply reproduced a familiar pattern of movements
Follow up replication of Meltzoff 1995
Researchers repeated the experiment using an inanimate mechanical device that closely mimicked the human actors movements in both successful and unsuccessful conditions
Purpose of the mechanical device condition
To determine whether infants responded to the physical movements alone or interpreted the actions as expressions of a human intention
Mechanical device condition
An inanimate device reproduced the same movements as the human actor including both completed and failed attempts at the target action
Findings of the mechanical device replication
Infants were much less likely to produce the target action after observing the mechanical device than after observing a human actor
Specific finding of the mechanical device replication
Infants were six times more likely to produce the target action after observing a human attempt than after observing the same demonstration by a machine
Interpretation of the mechanical device replication
Infants did not interpret the mechanical devices movements as expressing an intention in the same way they interpreted the human actors movements
Conclusion of the Meltzoff replication
Infants psychologically interpret human actions as expressions of intentions rather than responding only to the physical pattern of movements