PHIL 384 Midterm 2

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54 Terms

1
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 What four components jointly make up utilitarianism? Explain each component

  • Consequentialism: only consequences matter, not the intrinsic nature of the act itself 

  • Welfarism: only welfare, happiness, pleasure, and pain in the consequences matter (liberty, autonomy, truth do not matter intrinsically)

  • Sum-total: focus on sum total of welfare rather than just distribution

  • Maximization: choosing actions that maximize total sum of welfare


2
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What point does Sandel make in using the Philip Morris and the Ford Pinto cases in his discussion of cost-benefit analysis?

  • Philip Morris Case: Shows that purely financial math can lead to absurd and inhumane conclusions—like counting the early deaths of smokers as a "benefit" because it saves the government money on pensions and healthcare for the elderly.

  • Ford Pinto Case: Shows how dangerous it is to place a dollar value on human life—Ford decided it was cheaper to pay off wrongful death lawsuits than to fix a faulty fuel tank, prioritizing corporate profit over human lives.


3
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 How do we use the value of a statistical life to determine whether to invest in a road safety Improvement?


We compare the cost of the public work against the expected number of lives saved multiplied by the value of a statistical life (13.7M in the US). For example, if 10 lives are expected to be saved, its 130M and the project is 100M, it will be done.

4
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 Provide two arguments in support of rule utilitarianism. Provide one argument against rule Utilitarianism.


Arguments in support: 

  • There are long-term benefits to abiding by rules of justice such as securing trust

  • Rules of justice guarantee stability bc people care about liberty and respect for human dignity 

  • Rules embody wisdom 

Argument against:

  • Rules can conflict, or fall into “rule worship” where you striclty where to rules even when it’d be better to break them


5
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What does Mill respond to the objection that utilitarianism is a ‘philosophy of the swine’? How does he defend utilitarianism against this objection? Is this a plausible defense?

  • Mills response: quality of pleasure matters, not just its quantity. Higher, intellectual, and more pleasures are inherently more valuable than lower physical animal pleasures (like pushpin or being a satisfied pig) 

  • Plausible?: yes, but may lean towards elitism


6
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explain act and rule utilitarianism

Act Utilitarianism judges each individual action on a case-by-case basis. The right choice is simply the specific action that creates the most happiness or least pain right then and there. Judges actions by general moral rules (like "do not lie"). You follow a rule if having everyone always follow it leads to the most overall happiness in the long run, even if breaking it in one specific instance might seem to help.

7
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How does Nozick’s experience machine pose a challenge to hedonic utilitarianism?

This machine challenges hedonic utilitarianism (which says only pleasure and the absence of pain matter) bc if we only cared about the feeling of pleasure, we would eagerly choose to plug into a machine that makes us feel exactly how we want to feel instead of choosing to live life normally. But we resist this because we care about the experience being real. We want to actually do things and achieve things in reality, not just have the sensation of doing them.

8
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 How is Scanlon’s example of Jones and the World Cup transmission a critique of utilitarianism?

In the example, Jones a technician suffers in extreme pain for 15 minutes because a tower fell on him, while millions of others are spared from missing the broadcast of the world cup transmission. Utilitarians would say the benefit of the millions watching outweighs Jones suffering. This serves as a critique bc it highlights the aggregation problem: ther are certain severe costs and harms to an individual that are so great they can never be outweighed by a massive number of trivial benefit given to others

9
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what is effective altruism?

uses evidence and reason to figure out how to benefit others as much as possible, and then takes action on that basis. AKA what action gives better bang per buck

10
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what is the connection between effective altruism and impartiality

impartiality dictates that every individual's welfare and life count equally, regardless of arbitrary factors like geography, relationship, or time


11
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Utilitarianism faces the objection that it is too demanding. How might one explain this objection by appealing to the demands of Effective Altruism. You should address (i) the moral status of charitable giving and (ii) career choice.


Utilitarianism is said to leave no room for leisure time or personal autonomy in choosing a life plan, as one is always supposed to maximize overall utility. Affective altruism shows this by treating charitable giving not as an option but a strict moral obligation to support causes with the highest expected impact. It dictates career choices by prescribing that people take lucrative jobs such as banking to “earn to give” rather than pursuing careers that align with their personal preferences

12
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What is the impartiality requirement of utilitarianism? How do Effective Altruists abide by this criterion? Why might this seem counterintuitive?


Utilitarianism demands that we treat everyone on Earth as equally important, pushing people to focus strictly on saving the maximum number of lives globally—even when it goes against our natural instinct to help our family, friends, or community first.

13
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what is dominant strategy?

one best choice for you that doesn’t depend on what the other player does. You could pick it without even thinking about them


14
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what is Nash equilibrium?

each player’s choice is the best reply to the other’s actual choice. Your best choice can depend on theirs, and the equilibrium is where those dependencies line up so nobody wants to move

15
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draw a matrix of a 2 person game showing smith’s invisible hand

16
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draw a matrix of a 2 person game with a solution that is socially desirable

17
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draw a matrix of a 2 person game with a solution that is socially undesirable

18
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explain the prisoners’ dilemma, draw he matrix, and how the solution is suboptimal

In the Prisoner's Dilemma, two suspects are interrogated and can choose to either rat (confess/defect) or not rat (cooperate). Whatever the other person chooses, ratting always results in a shorter personal sentence (0 years instead of 1 year, or 10 years instead of 20 years).

Because both individuals follow this incentive, they will both choose to rat, resulting in 10 years in prison each. This equilibrium solution is suboptimal because if both had chosen not to rat, they would have received only 1 year each. Thus, individual rational self-interest fails to lead to the collectively optimal outcome

19
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A public goods game is an n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma. Explain.

A public goods game is an nn-person Prisoner's Dilemma because while the best outcome for the group occurs when everyone contributes to a shared pool, every individual has a selfish incentive to contribute nothing and free-ride off the contributions of others.

20
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What four motivations might lead to cooperation in a repeated Public Goods game? Explain each Motivation.

  1. Altruism: they identify with the common good 

  2. Reciprocity: by contributing you’re invitnig others to contribute, benefitting you in the long run 

  3. Social norms: i abide by a social norm that one should act in the interest of the common good  

  4. Inequality aversion: by contributing you expect to increase social equality


21
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What two reasons could be offered for decreasing contributions at later stages of a public goods game with a fixed number of runs?

  1. Reciprocity: when they see a lack of cooperation/free-riding, it makes people decrease their contributions 

  2. Backward induction: cooperation tapers off toward the end 


22
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Are all nash equilibria dominant strategies and are all dominant strategies nash equilibria?

dominant strategies will always give Nash equilibrium, but Nash equilibria will not always give a dominant strategy, it is where deviation does not improve outcomes

23
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Show the matrix for the farmer’s dilemma and how it’s a coordination game with 2 Nash equilibria and one equilibrium preferred by both

24
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what are all the game theories and their solution concept?

  • invisible hand game: Nash equilibria w dominant strategies

  • prisoners’ dilemma: Nash equilibria w dominant strategies

  • Coordination games: Equally good coordinates outcomes (driving left, right), one optimal and one suboptimal coordinated outcome (crop specialization 2 w glut) and battle of sexes. solution: Nash equilibria w/o dominant strategies

  • Game of conflict: chicken, hawk-dove (ex: climate change). solution: Nash equilibria w/o dominant strategies


25
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Explain the game that is known as the battle of sexes. What are the Nash Equilibria in pure strategies? Explain your answer.

26
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2 programmers have different preferred programming languages, and their project will progress poorly unless they work in the same language. Show the matrix for this game and show how it is a coordination game with two Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) with one equilibrium preferred by one player and the other by the other player.


27
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Explain why the Game of Chicken and the Hawk-Dove game are

represented by a single matrix. What strategies in one game map onto what strategies in the other game? Why might it lead to a disastrous situation?

28
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Explain how climate change can be represented as a Hawk-Dove game andshow what can be done to avoid that disaster will ensue.

To avert this outcome, global governance must shift the payoff matrix through enforceable international agreements,carbon border tariffs, and subsidized clean technology—effectively penalizing non-cooperative "Hawk" behavior so that mutual "Dove" cooperation becomes the most rational economic strategy for every country.

29
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If climate change negotiations between the US and China are a hawk-dove game, there are two types of interventions that would make <restrict emissions, restrict emissions> into a Nash Equilibrium. Explain. Name one concrete policy intervention as an example of each type of intervention.

To make ⟨Restrict,Restrict⟩ a Nash Equilibrium, you must eliminate the incentive to free-ride by either penalizing defection (e.g., using Carbon Border Tariffs to tax carbon-intensive imports) or rewarding cooperation (e.g., using a Joint Clean-Tech Treaty to share green tech subsidies only when both restrict emissions).

30
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explain gerrymandering

The practice of intentionally drawing political district boundaries to favor one political party or dilute the voting power of a specific group

31
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what is cracking

separate everyone into small packets. Make sure opponent has minority in majority of districts

32
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what is packing

put everybody in fewer districts. Goal is put majority of one party in just few district 

33
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explain median voter theorem

typically states that in a majority-rule, two-party system with single-peaked preferences along a one-dimensional spectrum, candidates will tend to moderate their positions to appeal to the voter right in the middle (the median voter) to win over 50% of the vote.

34
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explain Condorcet jury theorem

It states that if a group of individuals (like a jury or an electorate) each vote independently and have a better-than-50% chance of making the correct decision, then adding more voters increases the probability that the majority will make the correct choice, approaching 100% as the group grows.

Objections: voters depend on each other

35
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Explain why MA, a state with 35-40% GOP voters, has no congressional seats in the House

In Massachusetts, the minority party voters (Republicans) are spread roughly evenly across all the congressional districts rather than concentrated in specific areas. Because Republicans do not form a majority in any single district despite making up 30%–40% of the overall state population, Democrats win all nine House seats

36
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The distribution of rural and urban voters in NC explains to some extent why Republicans can elect more representatives than Democrats, even if the state- wide vote is roughly 50-50. Explain.

Democrats tend to be heavily concentrated in urban areas (cities), where they win elections by very large margins (winning "big" in a few districts). Republican voters are spread out more evenly across rural areas, allowing them to win smaller majorities across a larger number of individual districts (winning "small" in many districts). Even when statewide popular votes are split 50-50, this geographic sorting naturally leads to Republicans winning more total seats in the U.S. House.

37
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Explain how Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act affects the issue of drawing congressional districts

 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (1982) traditionally requires state legislatures to draw "majority-minority districts"—districts where minority voters constitute a majority so they have the opportunity to elect representatives of their choice (such as NC's 1st Congressional District).Redistricting efforts to crack or dilute minority voters (e.g., removing Black voters from a district to lower their voting power) have historically faced legal challenges under Section 2. However, as noted in the presentation regarding rulings like Louisiana v. Callais, it has become increasingly difficult in court to invoke Section 2 to mandate or protect majority-minority districts.

38
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How might one argue that the Free and Fair Election clauses in the NC Constitution affect gerrymandering?


Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the North Carolina Constitution mandate that elections must be frequent and free. Opponents of gerrymandering argue under these clauses that a governing political party cannot use partisan district lines to entrench itself in power permanently, as partisan gerrymandering prevents elections from truly being "free" and competitive.

39
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What is the Independent State Legislature Doctrine and what is the relevance for Gerrymandering?

Derived from Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution (the Elections Clause), this legal theory posits that state legislatures have sole and exclusive authority over setting the rules for federal elections and drawing congressional districts, free from interference or judicial oversight by state courts. If accepted, this doctrine would block state courts (like the NC Supreme Court) from reviewing, invalidating, or replacing legislative-drawn district maps on the grounds of partisan gerrymandering. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has not fully endorsed this theory, maintaining that election laws remain subject to normal state constitutional processes and court oversight.

40
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How does the Golden Rule provide an inspiration for impartiality in personal morality and in policy making?

The Golden Rule ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you") forces people to step outside their own perspective to evaluate fairness. For personal mortality, it requires you to ask “would I want this action done to me?” if yes proceed, if no refrain. In policymaking, it requires that policymakers ask “if this policy were applied to me would I still approve of it?”

41
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How does Dworkin’s card-game analogy provide an explanation of the appeal of Rawls’ veil of ignorance?

Dworkin’s card-game analogy shows that to create genuinely fair rules for any group, you must remove self-interest.

  • In a card game, players cannot negotiate fair rules after seeing their hands because everyone will push for rules that favor their specific cards.

  • To make fair rules, players must agree on them before looking at their hands.

Rawls' Veil of Ignorance applies this exact appeal to society: people in the "Original Position" design principles of justice without knowing their "cards" (their natural talents, wealth, social standing, aspirations, or conception of the good),ensuring no one can tailor principles to favor themselves.

42
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What is the role of Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer? How does his theory lead to utilitarianism?

  • Role of the Impartial Observer (IO): The IO is an unbiased decision-maker who evaluates societal principles while assuming an equal chance (1/N1/N) of becoming any person in that society.

  • Path to Utilitarianism: Because the IO views every position as equally likely, they evaluate social setups strictly by calculating expected utility. To maximize their own expected outcome, the IO chooses the system that maximizes total or average happiness/welfare across all individuals. This leads directly to utilitarianism (and practically supports laissez-faire economic structures)


43
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Explain Rawls’ critique that Harsanyi treats interpersonal welfare allocations like intertemporal welfare allocations.

Rawls argues that Harsanyi conflates two fundamentally different concepts:

  • Intertemporal allocation (within a single life): It is rational for one person to suffer a temporary loss today (e.g.,spending time/money on college in their 20s) to gain a greater benefit for themselves in the future.

  • Interpersonal allocation (between different people): Harsanyi applies this same logic across separate individuals—justifying making Person A suffer if it creates a larger net payoff for Persons B and C.

Rawls insists this is a mistake: you cannot treat a group of distinct individuals as if they were a single person balancing their own calendar.

44
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What does Rawls mean by the ‘separateness of persons’? How does this feature in his critique of utilitarianism?

  • Definition: The "separateness of persons" means every individual possesses an independent life and moral worth. A person's dignity and well-being matter in their own right and cannot be subsumed into a collective total.

  • Role in Critique of Utilitarianism: Rawls uses this concept to attack utilitarianism for treating people merely as containers for utility. Because utilitarianism aggregates happiness across society, it permits sacrificing or impoverishing vulnerable individuals if doing so increases total net utility. Rawls argues this violates the basic respect owed to each distinct individual.


45
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Why do people in the Original Position choose the Difference Principle rather than strict equal division?

While people behind the Veil of Ignorance initially lean toward equal division (since they don't know who they will be),they adopt the Difference Principle due to Maximin decision-making (maximizing the minimum position):

  • Rational Incentive: A strictly equal division might result in a smaller total economy where the baseline for everyone is low.

  • The Rule: Under the Difference Principle, economic inequalities are permitted if and only if those inequalities make everyone—especially the worst-off person—better off than they would be under strict equality (e.g.,incentives that spur productivity and grow the economic pie for all).


46
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What is the driving idea about the nature of political actors in Public Choice?

Public Choice Theory applies economic principles to political science. Its driving idea is that political actors (voters, politicians, and bureaucrats) are driven by self-interest—just like consumers and firms in a market economy. Politicians seek to maximize voters to win re-election. Bureaucrats seek to maximize their budget and influence. Voters seek policies that personally benefit them.

47
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Why, according to Anthony Downs, is it rational for voters to not inform themselves about politics and to refrain from voting?

Downs introduced the concepts of Rational Ignorance and the Paradox of Voting:

  • Rational Ignorance: Acquiring political information takes time and effort. Because an individual voter’s single vote has virtually zero chance of changing the outcome of an election, the marginal benefit of becoming informed is near zero, making it rational to stay uninformed.

  • Refraining from Voting: The expected benefit of voting is calculated as p⋅B−Cp⋅B−C (where pp is the probability of casting the decisive vote, BB is the policy benefit, and CC is the cost of voting). Since p≈0p≈0,the costs of voting outweigh the benefits, making abstention the strictly rational choice purely in terms of outcome.


48
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How does the Condorcet Jury Theorem show that a democracy with relatively poorly informed voters may still lead to good results?

The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that if a group is deciding between two choices (one correct, one incorrect) via majority rule, and each voter has a probability p>0.5p>0.5 of choosing the correct answer (even slightly better than a coin flip):

  • As the number of voters (NN) grows large, the probability that the majority vote yields the correct decision approaches 100% (1.0).

  • Even if individual voters are relatively poorly informed, aggregation across a large population filters out individual noise and errors.


49
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What motivates people to vote, even though the chance of their vote making a difference is minimal?

civic duty (feeling a moral or social responsibility to participate), expressive voting (expressing political identity ,solidarity, or ideology), and social norms/reputation (avoiding social stigma or gaining approval from peers)

50
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What is the median voter theorem? Why is elite polarization inconsistent with the prediction of the median voter theorem?

  • Median Voter Theorem (MVT): In a majority-rule election along a single left-right spectrum with single-peaked voter preferences, candidates/parties will converge toward the policy preference of the median voter to maximize their chance of winning.

  • Inconsistency with Elite Polarization: MVT predicts that both major parties will adopt moderate, middle-of-the-road platforms. In contrast, elite polarization occurs when politicians and parties move far toward the extremes (left and right), leaving the median space empty. MVT fails to account for primary elections, donor influences, or non-single-peaked preferences.


51
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What is the difference between implicit and explicit logrolling?

  • Explicit Logrolling: A formal agreement where Lawmaker A explicitly agrees to vote "yes" on Lawmaker B's bill in direct exchange for Lawmaker B voting "yes" on Lawmaker A's bill.

  • Implicit Logrolling: Bundling multiple unrelated policies into a single omnibus bill so that different lawmakers support the entire package to get their preferred provision passed.


52
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Illustrate how Condorcet Pairwise Majority Voting can lead to a cycle.

A Condorcet cycle (or the Voting Paradox) occurs when collective preferences become intransitive (A>B>C>AA>B>C>A).

Example Profile (3 Voters, 3 Options: X, Y, Z):

  • Voter 1: X>Y>ZX>Y>Z

  • Voter 2: Y>Z>XY>Z>X

  • Voter 3: Z>X>YZ>X>Y

Pairwise Head-to-Head Contests:

  1. XX vs. YY: Voter 1 and Voter 3 prefer XX over YY →→ XX beats YY (2 to 1).

  2. YY vs. ZZ: Voter 1 and Voter 2 prefer YY over ZZ →→ YY beats ZZ (2 to 1).

  3. ZZ vs. XX: Voter 2 and Voter 3 prefer ZZ over XX →→ ZZ beats XX (2 to 1).

Result: X≻Y≻Z≻XX≻Y≻Z≻X. A majority cycle exists, so there is no stable Condorcet winner.

53
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Explain how the Borda Count does not respect the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).

The Principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) states that if option AA is preferred to option BB,introducing or dropping a third option CC should not reverse the relative ranking between AA and BB.

54
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Name and explain each of the five requirements in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. What does Arrow’s Theorem show?

  • Unrestricted Domain (Universal Domain): The voting system must handle all possible rational individual preference orderings.

  • Non-Dictatorship: No single individual's preferences automatically determine the social outcome regardless of everyone else's votes.

  • Pareto Efficiency (Unanimity): If every individual strictly prefers alternative AA over BB, the collective social choice must rank AA above BB.

  • Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): The social ranking between AA and BB depends solely on individuals' rankings of AA and BB, not on how they rank candidate CC.

  • Transitivity (Social Rationality): The social outcome must produce a consistent, non-cyclical ranking (A≻BA≻B and B≻C⟹A≻CB≻C⟹A≻C).

It proves mathematically that no ranked-choice voting system with 3 or more alternatives can simultaneously satisfy all 5 reasonable fairness criteria. Any democratic system must trade off at least one of these conditions.