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12 Terms

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non-reductive physicalism

  1. psychological states are functional roles - (causal) between mental states, inputs, outputs, and other mental sttaes

  2. psychological states are not reducible to physical processes, but multiply realizable


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importance of functionalism and cognitive science

aim was to uncover inner intentional states that explain our cognitive capacities

shrugs off behaviorist approach

instead of mental states are behaviors → mental states cause behaviors

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psychofunctionalism

  • views psychological explanation as akin to giving a functional analysis of mental capacities

  • aims to vindicate our belief-desire psychology by viewing the mind in mechanistic causal terms that work in virtue of their representational features, as a matter of manipulating mental symbols

  • views mind as computational process in which beliefs are understood as computational relations to mental representations

  • hopes to mechanize the process of reasoning


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descartes on mechanizing the mind

  • he sees thinking or reasoning as the manipulation of symbols in a meaningful way

  • machines, he says, can’t realize these things in any meaningful way


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fodor says turing shows that there are representative mechanisms in the purely mechanical

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turing and multiple realizability

  • turing’s ‘universal machine’ is like the multiple realizability concept

  • same algorithm, multiply realized by numerous hardware types


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suggestion: the mind manipulates symbols in a way that preserves meaning

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Fodor

  • you connect the causal properties of a symbol with its semantic properties via syntax (higher order physical properties), feature of its shape


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fodor ai overview

  • The problem: Thoughts have meaning, but physical causes respond only to a symbol's form, not its content. So how can meaning make a difference to behavior?

  • Fodor's bridge: Syntax is a physical property (shape), so it drives causal role. Formal relations like derivability can mirror semantic relations like entailment, so shape-driven processes end up respecting meaning (within Gödelian limits).

  • The upshot: The mind is a "syntactic engine driving a semantic engine," so thought content matters causally, but only indirectly, via syntax.


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Computational Representational Theory of Mind

Organism A has

belief → mental representation

where → is a computational relational attitude


mental representations have both:

  1. syntactic properties (causally driven)

  2. semantic properties (represent the world)


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fodor on maintaining meaning

manipulate syntactic properties of symbols to preserve semantics

mind computer is sensitive to syntax only, but preserves semantics through it

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