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non-reductive physicalism
psychological states are functional roles - (causal) between mental states, inputs, outputs, and other mental sttaes
psychological states are not reducible to physical processes, but multiply realizable
importance of functionalism and cognitive science
aim was to uncover inner intentional states that explain our cognitive capacities
shrugs off behaviorist approach
instead of mental states are behaviors → mental states cause behaviors
psychofunctionalism
views psychological explanation as akin to giving a functional analysis of mental capacities
aims to vindicate our belief-desire psychology by viewing the mind in mechanistic causal terms that work in virtue of their representational features, as a matter of manipulating mental symbols
views mind as computational process in which beliefs are understood as computational relations to mental representations
hopes to mechanize the process of reasoning
descartes on mechanizing the mind
he sees thinking or reasoning as the manipulation of symbols in a meaningful way
machines, he says, can’t realize these things in any meaningful way
fodor says turing shows that there are representative mechanisms in the purely mechanical
turing and multiple realizability
turing’s ‘universal machine’ is like the multiple realizability concept
same algorithm, multiply realized by numerous hardware types
suggestion: the mind manipulates symbols in a way that preserves meaning
Fodor
you connect the causal properties of a symbol with its semantic properties via syntax (higher order physical properties), feature of its shape
fodor ai overview
The problem: Thoughts have meaning, but physical causes respond only to a symbol's form, not its content. So how can meaning make a difference to behavior?
Fodor's bridge: Syntax is a physical property (shape), so it drives causal role. Formal relations like derivability can mirror semantic relations like entailment, so shape-driven processes end up respecting meaning (within Gödelian limits).
The upshot: The mind is a "syntactic engine driving a semantic engine," so thought content matters causally, but only indirectly, via syntax.
Computational Representational Theory of Mind
Organism A has
belief → mental representation
where → is a computational relational attitude
mental representations have both:
syntactic properties (causally driven)
semantic properties (represent the world)
fodor on maintaining meaning
manipulate syntactic properties of symbols to preserve semantics
mind computer is sensitive to syntax only, but preserves semantics through it