CH2: Economic principles for subsidiarity in the EU

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17 Terms

1
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What is subsidiarity, and why does it matter for European integration?

• Definition: in non-exclusive competences, act at EU level only if Member States cannot sufficiently achieve the objective and the EU can do better (Art. 5(3) TEU).

• Purpose: allocate tasks efficiently while keeping decisions close to citizens (Art. 1 TEU) and protecting national autonomy.

• Trade-off: pooling sovereignty reduces domestic discretion but provides influence over partners and collective benefits.

• Brexit and Catalonia illustrate demands for autonomy; more autonomy does not automatically mean more effective control.

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What is the legal framework for EU intervention and its main competence categories?

• Conferral (Art. 5(1) TEU): EU can act only within powers given by the Treaties.

• Subsidiarity (Art. 5(3) TEU): non-exclusive competence + national insufficiency (necessity) + EU added value through scale/effects.

• Proportionality (Art. 5(4) TEU): EU action must not exceed what is necessary.

• Exclusive: customs union, euro-area monetary policy, common commercial policy;
shared: internal market, environment, energy;
supporting: culture, education, tourism.

• Commission justifies proposals through impact assessments scrutinised by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board; Art. 352 TFEU provides a flexibility route.

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How do Musgrave(1959) and Oates help explain subsidiarity economically?

• Musgrave (1959): governments perform allocation of resources, redistribution of income, and macroeconomic stabilisation.

• These functions need not all be performed at the same government level; the EU splits them across Union and Member States.

• Oates (1972/1999): which functions and instruments best centralised and which best left to decentralised levels of government

• Federalism theory balances locally tailored provision against scale and cross-border coordination; full centralisation is not optimal.

• Caution: the EU lacks a fully fledged federal government and its fiscal capacities differ from those of federations.

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What are public goods, and why can they justify common EU action?

• Samuelson (1954): pure public goods are non-rival (one person’s use does not reduce another’s) and non-excludable.

• Public goods may be local, national or international according to the geographical reach of benefits.

• Local provision can underprovide benefits that spill across borders and cannot adequately manage some redistributive problems.

• Central coordination can internalise externalities, reduce duplication/administration and improve efficiency or equity.

• However, many real services are impure public goods, so the appropriate government level is case-specific.

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What are the main economic benefits and costs of centralisation?

• Benefits: internalise cross-border externalities, exploit economies of scale, save administrative costs, coordinate decisions and potentially reduce fiscal distress.

• Costs: one-size-fits-all policies disregard heterogeneous preferences and local information; additional bureaucracy, weak accountability and responsiveness.

• Example: with MC=2, efficient provision is XA=4 for MVA=6−XA, but XB=2 for MVB=(6−XB)/2.

• A uniform quantity necessarily overprovides in one country and underprovides in the other.

• Conclusion: compare gains of common action against preference-mismatch and organisational costs.

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What criteria economically justify moving a competence beyond the national level?

• Positive externalities: national action benefits neighbours, so acting alone can underprovide a common benefit (e.g. fiscal demand spillovers).

• Negative externalities: beggar-thy-neighbour actions impose costs abroad (e.g. air/water pollution or trade protection).

• Economies of scale/indivisibilities: large fixed costs make joint supply cheaper (e.g. fighter jet or particle accelerator).

• Other factors: common legal standards, macroeconomic insurance and bargaining power (the latter derives largely from scale/externalities).

• Pelkmans: these criteria warrant assessment of cooperation, not automatic full centralisation; the internal market provides a particularly strong rationale.

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What does the local-preference graph show about welfare losses from uniform EU policy?

• Regions i and j have different marginal values D_i and D_j; with decentralisation, each chooses Q_di or Q_dj where local MV=MC.

• Central authority uses average demand and imposes Q_daverage on both.

• For lower-demand region i, Q_daverage exceeds Q_di: excessive provision where MC>MV (welfare loss B ).

• For higher-demand region j, Q_daverage falls below Q_dj: foregone beneficial units where MV>MC (welfare loss A).

• Uniformity is inefficient when preferences differ, absent offsetting scale economies or cross-border spillovers.

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How do economies of scale alter the centralisation-versus-decentralisation conclusion?

• Common provision can lower marginal cost per person relative to separate regional provision.

• lowered centralised MC generates a cost saving S, But a uniform quantity still creates preference-mismatch deadweight losses

• Centralisation advantageous, when: additional benefits, including S, > the losses and administrative/political costs.

• Example: jointly funding high-fixed-cost defence projects may be efficient even if countries have different preferences.

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How do demand-side and production-side externalities affect optimal provision?

• Demand-side positive spillovers: centralisation prevents underinvestment relative to the jointly optimal level — gain area G

• Demand-side negative spillovers: a centralisation causes over-provision — loss area L

• Production-side:  MC + external costs(centralised, loss L) and MC + external benefits (centralised, gain G), both compared against the decentralised MC

• Key: compare joint and local costs/benefits carefully—externalities support coordination, not necessarily identical EU-wide quantities.

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What is the preferred-policy paradox, and why does it matter for centralisation?

• Three countries have 100 voters each; in each, 45 prefer a different local sectoral policy Z1/Z2/Z3, 40 support common X and 15 support Y.

• Nationally, each Z is first (45%) and X second (40%).

• Across 300 EU voters, X pools 40% of votes; each Z has only 15%, while Y also has 15%.

• Thus X has the largest aggregate support despite not being first choice in any country.

• Hence: centralisation changes policy rankings, issues of preference representation; X has a plurality, not an absolute majority.

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What is the five-step subsidiarity test?

• 1. Scope: determine whether the proposed measure falls in shared/non-exclusive competence.

• 2. Need to act in common: establish scale economies, externalities or other reasons for collective action.

• 3. Credibility: ask whether voluntary Member-State cooperation could reliably achieve the same goal.

• 4. Assignment: if steps 1–2 are satisfied but credible voluntary cooperation is not feasible, assign action to EU level.

• 5. Minimise centralisation costs (slides); Pelkmans specifies proportionate allocation of implementation, monitoring and enforcement.

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What do the subsidies and tax-competition games teach about subsidiarity?

• Subsidy game: subsidising is dominant for each country; Nash equilibrium (−1,−1), although mutual restraint (0,0) is Pareto superior: a prisoners’ dilemma and rationale for coordination.

• Tax-haven game: A always prefers low taxes, others always prefer high taxes; equilibrium is (low,high) with payoffs (5,15).

• The second equilibrium is Pareto efficient among listed outcomes: forced harmonisation to (high,high) changes payoffs to (2,20), harming A.

• Lesson: competition is not universally inefficient; neither EU coordination nor national competition can be assumed optimal without incentive analysis.

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What are the practical limits of the subsidiarity test?

• MS competition can be desirable even if EU action more effective, or undesirable even if national action is efficient.

• EU policy-making can add extra costs

• Political side-payments may secure consent even when the particular policy is not independently efficient.

• The test makes trade-offs explicit; rather than yes/no verdict.

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How does the EU actually operate through spending and regulation?

• Spending: 2025 EU budget about €199.4bn, roughly 2% of Member States’ combined budgets (€7,524bn), too small for broad federal-style stabilisation.

• Historically CAP dominated spending (>70% in 1985, 24.6% in 2024); structural/cohesion spending is another major item (~30%).

• Regulation: Treaties, directives, regulations, decisions and soft law; the EU is an important regulatory rather than large fiscal state.

• Slides cite Draghi’s comparison of ~13,000 EU legislative acts since 2019 against ~3,000 in the US; number of acts says nothing about regulatory quality.

• Subsidiarity asks whether these spending priorities and legislative interventions match genuine EU-wide needs.

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How do cross-border spillovers affect EU roles in networks, research, the environment and standards?

• Trans-European networks: cross-border interoperability and missing links justify common action, although some networks benefit only a few states.

• Research: knowledge spillovers can cause underinvestment, but innovation races and EU administration may create costs.

• Environment: pollution may cross borders; solutions depend on pollutant type and cooperation credibility, not every issue needs identical EU rules.

• Standardisation: shared technical requirements can support the single market and reduce fragmentation, but optimal regulation/administration varies.

• Assess the geographical scale and type of externality before choosing EU regulation, funding, coordination or national action.

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Why is redistribution and macroeconomic stabilisation largely national in the EU?

• Musgrave assigns equity and stabilisation central roles in government, but EU competences and capacities remain limited.

• Personal taxes, social insurance and welfare redistribution largely stay with Member States owing to heterogeneous preferences and institutional differences.

• CAP and cohesion funds redistribute resources, but cohesion chiefly supports catch-up growth rather than permanent interpersonal redistribution.

• In EMU, monetary policy is centralised while fiscal stabilisation remains mostly national under common fiscal constraints.

• The small EU budget cannot act like a large federal countercyclical fiscal budget; coordination of national policies remains central.

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What are the chapter’s final lessons on subsidiarity and Brexit?

• Subsidiarity balances local preference matching and democratic control against cross-border externalities, economies of scale and collective bargaining power.

• The single market constrains national discretion: beggar-thy-neighbour rules can undermine free movement (Dassonville, 1974).

• Brexit regained formal UK regulatory autonomy but exporters must still comply with EU market rules without voting on them.

• Negotiating alone also reduces collective leverage; control regained in one dimension can mean influence lost in another.

• Bottom line: apply the five-step test, assess political/economic costs, and avoid assuming either full centralisation or decentralisation is always best.