Federalist and Anti-Federalist Arguments + Democracy of the Constitution

What is Brutus’ objection to the Constitutional idea that “defects can be best amended when they are experienced?”

He objects that once people part with their power, they can rarely get it back except by force. Many instances throughout history have occurred in which the people have voluntarily increased the power of their rulers, but few in which rulers have willingly given up their authority.

What features of the Constitution does Brutus’ say will result in any powers reserved for the states being “absorbed” into the national government?

The Necessary and Proper Clause and Supremacy Clause, Brutus argues, give the national government “absolute and uncontrollable power” in legislative, executive, and judicial capacities.

He also argues that the power to tax is “the most important of any power that can be granted” because it connects to all other powers, and claims that the national legislature will use it to tax away all money from the states. The states, no longer being able to support their endeavors, will lose their reserved powers by losing the ability to exercise them.

Why does Brutus argue that a large republic will not succeed?

In a large republic, there are a thousand conflicting views on what “the public good” looks like, and they are impossible to represent through national policies. Thus, these policies become designed to please powerful individuals or regions instead of promoting general welfare. Additionally, because the republic is pulled in so many directions, beneficial legislation only happens by chance, or when crisis temporarily forces unity, not as a reliable, natural outcome.

The Greek and Roman empires serve as prime examples because when they expanded their territory, their free republics transformed into tyranny. Democracy requires the governed to come together to deliberate, which cannot happen in a large republic.

Finally, free republics depend on the support of their citizens to execute their laws. However, citizens in a republic this large are not likely to be acquainted with their rulers, much less have confidence in their laws. Thus, the government will be required to establish an armed force to execute the laws, which is the most dreaded outcome.

What is the central purpose of Miller’s Crisis of Freedom?

To show how the Federalists justified and then enforced the Sedition Act of 1798, and what that enforcement revealed about the government's willingness to use its power against political opposition

What does Miller say drove the passing of the Sedition Act?

Fear of French-style revolution.

Federalists reasoned that public opinion is the foundation of a republican government, and because the press shapes public opinion, the government has a responsibility to keep the press “favorable.”

How did Miller say the Sedition Act partly served party interests?

The law was aimed less at foreign agents than at the Republican party. However, the Act resembled oppressive measures taken in Britain against radicalism.

What were the caveats that got the Sedition Act past the First Amendment?

Malice and intent had to be proved, truth became a defense, and a jury determined whether or not the act was seditious. The Act also had a sunset date.

What Constitutional debates or issues does the Sedition Act bring up?

1. Limits on paper vs. in practice: rights depend on political culture and enforcement, not just text.

2. Federalism and the scope of federal power: Is this an instance of national law going too far?

3. Majority and faction: Madison's worry about factions is illustrated here, with a governing party using state power against its rivals.

4. Checks and balances: Congress, the President, and the courts largely cooperated rather than checking one another, and the corrective came instead from elections, state opposition, and public reaction (external constraints).

What is the central purpose of the West article from The Brookings Institute?

To argue that American federalism has shifted from healthy policy experimentation toward conflict, with states and cities trying to impose their policy views on people living outside their jurisdiction. The author blames this shift on extreme polarization.

Explain the immigration example given in the West article of leaders aiming their policies at people living elsewhere.

State governors of Florida and Texas bused migrants to NYC and DC to protest national policy and “sanctuary cities.” Author says this put innocent people in the middle of policy disputes and disrupted social services in the those places.

Explain the abortion example given in the West article of leaders aiming their policies at people living elsewhere.

After the Supreme Court reversed Roe v. Wade and returned the issue to the states, some states not only banned abortion but criminalized helping people obtain one. On the other hand, California passed a law allowing people to sue those who make or distribute assault weapons. Author says this demonstrates how states are turning on one another and restricting personal activity on a much broader scale than before.

How has conflict multiplied and threatened democracy in modern times because of federalism?

Conflict now runs in several directions: red vs. blue states, blue cities vs. red states, and states vs. their own cities. This threatens democracy as voters in swing states can have up to several times the vote that people in states like California or Texas do, and red governors ferociously gerrymander blue cities to lessen the value of their votes, or vice versa.

What is Dahl’s overall view on the democracy of the Constitution?

Dahl believes that the Constitution is substantially less democratic than Americans generally believe, both by contemporary democratic standards and when compared to other advanced democracies.

Why does Dahl argue that the Constitution is not designed as a modern democracy?

The Framers aimed to create a stable, non-monarchical republic that balanced power and protected liberty, but they were deeply skeptical of direct popular rule and “the mob.”

Additionally, key choices like Senate representation and protections for slavery weren’t democratic ideals, but political concessions necessary to secure ratification among diverse states.

While the Constitution’s ideas were revolutionary at the time of the founding, most other advanced democracies evolved into more majoritarian and representative systems, leaving behind the U.S. with ancient, undemocratic institutions like the Electoral College.

How did the Constitution fall short of democracy through tolerance of slavery?

The Framers neither abolished nor restricted slavery, granted it constitutional protection (the Fugitive Slave Clause), postponed ending the transatlantic slave trade for at least 20 years, and inflated slaveholding states' representation via the Three-Fifths Compromise.

How did the Constitution fall short of democracy through suffrage exclusions?

The Constitution left qualifications for voting entirely to the states, which at the time excluded women, African Americans, Indigenous peoples, and propertyless men.

How did the Constitution fall short of democracy through the election of the president?

The Framers deliberately insulated the presidential election from the popular vote, as they were afraid that the majority faction, being those without substantial property, would elect a leader who might strip the elites of their wealth. Or, more generally, they feared the majority faction would dominate government and tyrannize minorities. They did not realize that factions, or political parties, were inevitable, essential tools for citizen representation, and now we are left with the Electoral College, which stifles democracy to no benefit today.

How did the Constitution fall short of democracy through unequal representation in the Senate?

Granting each state two senators regardless of population directly violates the democratic standard of political equality—"one person, one vote.” This creates severe unequal representation where citizens of less populous states wield vastly disproportionate legislative leverage over citizens of populous states.

What are the two crucial realities Dahl mentions that the Framers failed to foresee?

The inevitability of political parties/factions and the shift toward democracy in public expectations and behavior, making tyrannical majority rule unlikely.

How does Dahl describe James Madison’s evolution of political beliefs?

In Federalist 10, Madison theorized that a large republic, combined with institutional checks and balances, would prevent any single faction or majority interest from dominating government. He believed a republic could and should operate without organized political parties.

But just a few years later, Madison himself became a leader of America’s first organized political party, the Democratic-Republicans, intending to take down the Federalists. This was because he realized that without a coordinated national opposition party, popular majorities could not effectively challenge executive power.

What were the conditions for the minority’s support of the Constitution outlined in their address?

They were 14 amendments virtually outlining the core protections later incorporated into the Bill of Rights. They included—almost verbatim—the same civil liberties, judicial protections, and reserved powers for the states.

Why did the minority of Pennsylvania argue that an extensive republic cannot remain free?

A unified central government cannot adequately represent local interests and diverse climates.

The lack of a Bill of Rights leaves personal liberties vulnerable to federal overreach.

Only despotic power has ever historically held together such an expansive empire, further cementing the idea that the central authority would have to rely on a standing army to enforce laws and taxes.

What is despotism?

The exercise of absolute power, especially in a cruel or oppressive way.

Why did the minority of Pennsylvania argue that the Constitution creates an all-consuming empire?

The “necessary and proper clause” and the supremacy clause gave the federal government and the Constitution the power to dismantle all state legislative, executive, and judicial authority.

By granting Congress unlimited “power of the purse,” the federal government could starve the states of tax revenue, leaving state legislatures powerless.

Because Congress could make any regulation imposing upon the “times, places, and manner of elections,” federal officials could indefinitely postpone elections and remain in power for life.

What is the central purpose of Federalist 16?

To argue that a national government must act directly on individual citizens, rather than on sovereign states, to prevent civil war and the dissolution of the Union

Federalist 16: Why does Hamilton claim that enforcing a confederation's laws would require military force against states, and that this would be both impractical and dangerous?

Hamilton argues that coercing a state would fail for several reasons. Offenders would band together, and a large state could recruit its neighbors. Foreign powers would exploit the split. The Union could never afford an army big enough to control the largest states. Even if it tried, the resulting war would probably dissolve the Union. He also warns that an enforcement system built on a standing army would "degenerate into a military despotism."

Anti-federalists feared a strong national government would become tyrannical, but Hamilton says the confederal model is the one that forces the government toward armies and coercion, because it has no other way to enforce its laws. Giving the national government direct authority over individuals, enforced through ordinary courts and law enforcement, avoids the need for a standing army against the states.

Federalist 16: Why does Hamilton think "compliant" states would imitate a delinquent state rather than punish it?

No state wants to be the only one bearing the cost of compliance, and no state wants to start a war over another's failure. There's also a problem of proof. When a state doesn't pay, it's nearly impossible to tell whether it wouldn't or couldn't, and the excuse of inability is always available. Trying to settle that question would invite favoritism, factionalism, and oppression by whatever majority controlled the national council.

Federalist 16: What is Hamilton’s distinction between a state's mere "non-compliance" and "direct and active resistance?” What role do courts and the people play as safeguards against state resistance?

Under a confederation, states can defeat a federal measure just by doing nothing or acting half-heartedly, and the neglect can be disguised so it alarms no one. If federal law operates directly on citizens, a state can only block it by openly acting unconstitutionally. In this scenario, evasion no longer works, as court judges who are not part of the conspiracy will declare state actions unconstitutional and void, and the people, who become “natural guardians of the Constitution,” will side with the national government.

What is the central purpose of Federalist 17?

To refute the Anti-Federalist fear that the proposed national government would inevitably usurp power from the individual state governments

Federalist 17: How does Hamilton argue that the federal government would not want to usurp state powers?

National leaders will naturally focus on macro-level responsibilities such as commerce, foreign relations, war, and national finance. Administrating private justice, agriculture, and local concerns offers little glory or utility to national officials.

Federalist 17: How does Hamilton argue that people will naturally side with the state in a conflict of power between the state and federal government?

He theorizes that human allegiance is primarily shaped by proximity and daily impact. Because state governments touch the daily personal lives of citizens, people will feel more loyal to their home state than to a distant central authority. Thus, state governments, having the power of the people on their side, are more likely to check federal encroachment than vice versa.

What is the central purpose of Federalist 10?

To demonstrate that a well-constructed, large commercial republic is the most effective safeguard against the dangers of factionalism and majority tyranny

Federalist 10: Why does Madison argue that governments must control for the effects of factions and not their causes? What are the only two ways he says their causes could be eliminated?

The two ways of eliminating the causes of factions are either unacceptable or impossible:

1. Destroying the freedom that allows factions to form

2. Giving every citizen the same opinions and interests (impossible because of differing cognitive abilities and unequal distribution of property—super elitist view)

How does Madison’s view of factions change from Federalist 10 to when he established the Democratic-Republican Party?

He always believed factions were inevitable, but early on in his career, he thought their effects needed to be controlled and eliminated if possible. Later, he realized that they are effective and necessary political tools for citizens in a democracy.

How does Madison argue that a large republic actually provides the strongest defense against tyranny, rather than leading to it, as the anti-federalists believed?

1. There is a greater pool of capable citizens to choose from, increasing the likelihood of good leaders

2. Difficult to coordinate a single faction to oppress the minority, as there are so many competing parties and geographical distance between members of the same party

What is the central idea of Federalist 15?

That the United States under the Articles of Confederation has reached the brink of national ruin due to the structural defect of legislating for states

Federalist 15: What effects of the confederation on the nation’s condition does Hamilton list?

1. Crushing national and foreign debts that cannot be paid

2. Foreign powers occupying American borders without fear of retaliation

3. A complete lack of international respect and economic leverage

4. No navy or standing defense, and the constant threat of interstate conflict

What is the central purpose of Federalist 39?

To demonstrate that the proposed Constitution establishes a government that is strictly republican and neither wholly "national" (consolidated/unitary) nor wholly "federal" (a confederation of sovereign states), but a combination of both

Federalist 39: How does Madison clearly define a republic?

A republic is a government that derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, not from a favored class or wealthy minority.

It is also one in which officials hold office either during prosperity or for a limited term.

Federalist 39: What are the federal aspects of the Constitution?

1. Ratification required assent of states as sovereign actors

2. Senate represents states as equal political entities

3. Enumerated powers of the federal government, reserving powers for the states

Federalist 39: What are the national aspects of the Constitution?

1. House is based on population

2. Federal government acts directly upon individual citizens

Federalist 39: What is the single aspect of the Constitution that Madison describes as neither wholly federal nor national?

The amendment process. A purely federal system would require unanimous state consent, and a purely national one would require a simple majority of the whole people. Instead, the Constitution requires supermajorities of the states.

What is the central purpose of Federalist 51?

Madison explains how the Constitution keeps the branches of government separate in practice. While the Articles of Confederation relied on written barriers, the federalist system outlined in the Constitution has parts that internally check one another.

Federalist 51: How is Madison’s saying that ambition must be made to counteract ambition relevant in Constitutional checks and balances?

Each branch of the government is given independence and the means to defend itself. Officeholders not only have the constitutional tools to resist encroachment of other branches, but also personal motive.

Federalist 51: How does the structure of the government compensate for unequal power among the three branches?

In a republic, the legislature has the most power. So, the natural fix is to divide legislative power into different chambers (House and Senate) with different modes of election and different roles. Additionally, the weak executive branch must be strengthened, with a qualified (can be overridden) veto over an absolute veto, which might be used timidly or abused.