Comparative Politics

Parliamentary Systems

A type of democratic governance where the executive branch derives its legitimacy from the legislature (parliament) and is accountable to it. In this system, the head of government is typically a prime minister, who is selected from the majority party or coalition in parliament. The Head of State is typically ceremonial. Examples include UK, Australia, Germany and Canada, among others.

Presidential Systems

A type of democratic governance where the executive branch exists independently of the legislature. In this system, the head of government is typically a president, elected by the public, who holds significant powers and responsibilities, often including veto authority over legislation. It combines the head of state and head of government in the presidency. Usually a fixed term. Examples include US, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.

Semi-presidential systems

A hybrid system of governance that combines elements of presidential and parliamentary systems. In a semi-presidential system, there is both a president and a prime minister, where the president typically has significant powers and is elected by the public, while the prime minister is accountable to the legislature. Executive power is shared between a prime minister and a directly elected president. Examples include France, Russia, and Portugal.

Pros/Cons of Parliamentary systems

Pros: reduce conflict between legislature and executive; conflicts resolve quickly by vote of no confidence/new prime minister; may facilitate coalition of government through negotiation

Cons: if large majority, can make unchecked decisions

Pros/Cons of Presidential systems

Pros: facilitates accountability through a person; strong, decisive government

Cons: presidents can’t be removed by the legislature; lacks flexibility; gridlock if president and legislature disagree

Pros/Cons of Semi-presidential systems

Pros: shared executive government

Cons: accountability confused; legislature and president may disagree

How does Schumpeter define democracy? What are the 4 defining attributes?

Institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote

Free and fair elections: the legislature (at least a significant part of it) is elected by the people, while the head of the government can be elected by the people or selected by the majority in parliament

Universal participation/suffrage: the adult population enjoys the right to vote and to run for office without exclusions. Some exclusions (foreign residents, the incarcerated) remain, variation in age of enrolment

Civil liberties: protection of human rights of citizens, no censorship of critical voices, and freedom of association

Responsible government: once elected, civilian authorities can adopt policies unconstrained by the monarch, military officers, foreign governments, religious authorities, or other unelected powers. Key role though of the judiciary

Majoritarian

• Facilitates a majority rule

• disproportional electoral system for the election of legislators

• discourages voters from supporting smaller parties

• makes it easier for the largest party to win a majority of seats in the parliament or congress

• E.g. UK and other Westminster Democracies

Consensus

• designed to protect minorities (promoting decision-making by consensus)

• designed to protect the power of partisan and regional minorities and

• embraces coalition governments to favour national agreements

• E.g. many continental European countries

Majoritarian v Consensus

Authority

The competence to make binding decisions that are regarded as legitimate - has been dispersed from the central state upward and downward

Decentralisation

Shift of authority from central to regional/local governments

Federalism

Government functions are shared between central and regional governments

Powers divided and shared, and constitutionally protected - the centre cannot alter it unilaterally

E.g. US, Germany, Australia, India

Unitary

Central government may share authority, but central government can change the system unilaterally.

The centre may devolve power but can reclaim it unilaterally

E.g. France, UK, Denmark

Confederation

Central government is constituted by sovereign units that may unilaterally change their association

Rare

The EU is sometimes described this way

Authoritarian regimes

Regimes that have no turnover in power of the executive. They do not have meaningful elections and the government only represents the preferences of an elite and privileged part of the population. Tend to be classified as totalitarian or ‘milder’ forms of authoritarianism.

Totalitarian regimes exercise considerable power over their citizens by using the party and secret police and aim to repress and fully indoctrinate their citizens

Closed Autocracies

Countries without elections

Electoral Autocracies

Competitive authoritarianism characterised by meaningful competition and even while the playing field is not fair, the outcome of elections is uncertain.

In hegemonic authoritarian regimes democratic institutions only exist on paper

Personalist dictatorship

Leaders exercise power with little restraint. The legislature (where it exists) acts as a rubber stamp on executive decisions

Single-party regimes

Policymaking control and political offices are in the hands of a single party (e.g. China, Laos, Vietnam)

They can be very democratic within the party. Opposition parties (if not banned) face institutional disadvantages and/or constant threats and harrassment

Military regimes

Military officers (not democratically elected) exercise political power and control over policy and the security forces

Absolute monarchies

Systems where a person of royal descent inherits the position of head of state and has significant political power. Often a very strong religious underpinning to regime legitimacy

How do Little & Meng approach ‘democratic backsliding’?

• deliberately simple and ‘quasi-minimalist’

• define democracy narrowly: free and fair elections in which losers accept the result

• track objective, countable indicators rather than expert rating

  • Vote share of incumbent leaders and ruling parties (how dominant are those in power?)

  • De jure limits on the executive - term limits and constraints, attempts to evade them

  • Press freedom proxies - journalists jailed and journalists killed

• compare the trend in these objective measures with the trend in expert-coded indices

What do Little & Meng find? What are two possible explanations for the gap?

The objective indicators show little global decline over the past decade:

• incumbents are no more dominant (if anything, less); term limits and executive constraints have become more common, rarely evaded; the media picture is mixed

• clashes with the steady decline reported by expert-coded measures

• ‘the common claim that we are in a period of massive global democratic decline is not clearly supported by empirical evidence’

Two possible explanations:

• coder bias - experts may be swayed by a prevailing “backsliding” narrative

• subtle manipulation - modern autocratisation is incremental and hard to observe

Legislature

• an assembly with the authority to make law for a political unit

• defining feature is its relationship to the executive:

  • Parliaments sit in fused-powers systems - the executive is selected by, and responsible to, the legislature

  • Congresses sit in separation-of-powers systems - the two branches are elected and survive independently

• Legislatures exist even in non-democracies, but their powers vary enormously

Principal and agents

• A principal delegates a task to an agent who acts on their behalf

• However, agents have their own interests and more information, so they may pursue goals that are different from, or in tension with the interests of a principal

• Principals use oversight, incentives and rules to hold agents to account

What do legislatures do? Three core roles

• Linkage & representation (agent of citizens):

  • A conduit to government, a forum for debate, a source of legitimacy

  • delegate vs trustee models of the representative

• Oversight & control (principal over the executive):

  • Question time, inquiries and committees - plus control of the budget

• Policy-making (legislature as legislator): tools run from weak to strong

  • Consultation → delay → veto → amendment → initiation

  • ‘negative’ powers (delay, veto) vs ‘positive’ powers (amend, initiate)

Chambers

• most legislatures are unicameral (one chamber) or bicameral (two)

• Historically the two chambers were to give distinct interests a voice - estates and aristocracies, later territorial units

  • lower house: represents the population as a whole

  • upper house: represents territory or social groups (US states, German Länder)

• Originates from medieval assemblies called by monarchs to approve taxes → e.g. England’s Lords and Commons became two houses; French ancient regime - First (clergy), Second (nobles), Third (commoners)

• According to Lijphart, the strength varies: symmetric vs asymmetric bicameralism - how much power the upper house really holds

• Trend: unitary states are often unicameral (e.g. Denmark; NZ abolished its upper house in 1950); federations tend to be bicameral

Australia - ‘Washminster’

• Westminster responsible government + Washington-style federalism and a strong elected Senate

  • Senate: 76 senators - 12 per state (equal) + 2 per territory; elected by proportional representation (STV)

  • Powerful & near-symmetric: can amend or block most bills - even supply, which triggered the 1975 dismissal

UK House of Lords

• unelected and asymmetric - a revising chamber, not a rival

• life peers + bishops: the 1999 and 2026 Acts removed the hereditary peers

• limited by the Parliament Acts (1911, 1949): it can delay, not veto, and cannot block money bills (Salisbury convention)

Committees

• where the detailed work happens → scrutinise and amend bills, run inquiries and oversee the executive

• permanent & specialised (mirroring ministries) → strong; ad hoc → weak

• order matters: bills sent to committee before plenary → more influence

• can have standing and select committees, committees of inquiry, and joint committees of both houses

• Australia has an active Senate committee system - a key check when the government lacks a Senate majority

• Powerful US congressional committees (‘transformative’) vs weaker committees in ‘arena’ parliaments

Fused-power systems

• Voters elect and may choose not to re-elect members of the legislature

• members of the legislature elect and may dismiss the executive branch through a vote of censure or no-confidence vote (restrictions may apply)

• the executive branch can dissolve the legislature (restrictions generally apply) and call for new elections. This results in dissolution of the executive branch as well

Separation-of-powers systems

• Voters elect, and may choose not to re-elect, members of the legislature

• voters elect, and may choose not to re-elect, the executive branch (president)

• the executive cannot dissolve the legislature. The legislature can remove the executive only in case of legal wrongdoing

What are the two forms of autonomy that drive legislative power?

Institutional autonomy and member autonomy

Institutional autonomy

Independence of the legislature from the executive

Member autonomy

Independence of individual legislators from their political parties

Under which political system is institutional autonomy greatest?

Separation-of-powers systems

How does the power to hire and fire the executive affect legislative autonomy?

It can reduce policy autonomy by making legislators dependent on the executive

How does the electoral and party system affect member autonomy?

Candidate-centred systems increase autonomy. Party-centred PR systems reduce autonomy through party discipline

What determines member autonomy in candidate-centred systems?

Single-member distrcits encourage independent legislators

How does central party control of lists and funding affect legislators?

It increases party discipline and reduces member autonomy

How do institutional autonomy and member autonomy interact across political systems?

• institutional autonomy and member autonomy are separate dimensions

• a legislature can be institutionally strong but have members who are heavily controlled by their parties

Multilevel governance

The dispersion of authority within and beyond national states

Decentralisation

The shift of authority (fiscal, political, administrative) from the centre to regional or local governments within a country

Self-rule

The extent to which a regional government exercises authority in its territory

Shared-rule

The extent to which a regional government co-exercises authority within the country as a whole

Devolution

The process of granting legislative autonomy to one or several regions within an overall unitary framework

Home rule

The region has extensive self-rule so that it exercises some key functions of a sovereign state

What has happened to authority since WWII?

Authority has dispersed both upwards and downwards

Why is multilevel governance a continuum, not a binary?

Even unitary states have elected regions and strong local governments

What is the difference between self-rule and shared rule?

Self-rule is authority exercised within a region. Shared rule is authority co-exercised across the whole country

What are the two logics driving authority dispersion?

Functional logic and identity logic

What is the functional logic of decentralisation?

Distributing authority to achieve an efficient scale for delivering public goods

What factors drive the identity logic of decentralisation?

Ethno-territorial identity, democracy, interdependence, affluence, and peace

What are the three measured trends in multilevel governance?

Rising authority, differentiated governance and scaling up

What is differentiated governance? Give examples

Some regions receive special powers. Examples include Scotland, Québec and the Basque Country

What do scaling up and recent constitutional changes demonstrates?

Scaling up creates fewer, larger regional and metropolitan units. Belgium became federal in 1995, while the UK devolved powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Functional logic

• the practical and administrative benefits of distributing authority

• different levels of government are better suited to making decisions about different types of public goods

  • some issues are best managed locally because local governments understand their communities and needs

  • other issues require coordination across regions or the entire country

  • distributing authority can therefore improve efficiency, responsiveness and service delivery

• Example:

  • local government manages rubbish collection, local roads and community facilities because these services are best organised locally

  • national government manages defence because it requires coordination across the entire country

  • regional governments might manage transport or healthcare where services are best coordinated across a larger geographical area

• *Authority should sit at the level of government best equipped to deliver the relevant public good

Identity logic

• the political and cultural demands for recognition, representation, and self-determination

• groups with distinct ethnic, linguistic, cultural or territorial identities may demand greater control over their own affairs

  • distinct communities may want to preserve their language and culture

  • regions may demand autonomy because they feel politically or culturally different from the national majority

  • decentralisation can accommodate these demands and reduce political conflict

  • it can also strengthen democracy by allowing communities to exercise greater control over decisions affecting them

• Examples:

  • Scotland has distinct national and political identities and has its own devolved Parliament

  • Québec has a distinct French-speaking identity and exercises special powers within Canada

  • The Basque Country has distinct linguistic and cultural traditions and enjoys substantial autonomy within Spain

• *Communities should have the authority to govern matters important to their distinct identity and interests

Functional logic + self-rule?

A region manages its own public services because local decision-making is more efficient and responsive

Functional logic + shared-rule?

Regions participate in national decision-making because certain issues require coordination across the country

Identity logic + self-rule?

A region receives autonomy because its population wants to protect its distinct cultural, linguistic or political identity

Identity logic + shared-rule?

A region wants representation in national institutions so its distinct interests are considered in decisions affecting the entire country

Why did Sartori reject treating political regimes purely as continuous scales of democracy degreeism?

Sartori argued that political regimes are ‘bounded wholes’ with distinct qualitative logic. Measuring degrees of freedom or democracy without categorial bounds blur the structural distinctions between different regime types

How does a monothetic typology differ from a polythetic typology in political regime classification?

In a monothetic typology, possessing a specific set of unique features is a necessary and sufficient for assignment to a category. In a polythetic typology, cases in a category share a high degree of similarity across features, but no single feature is strictly necessary or sufficient

What methodological trade-off arises when increasing the number of classification characteristics in a regime typology?

Increasing characteristics yields a more finely differentiated typology, but fewer real-world cases fit each category, limiting the empirical reach and generalisability of statements about each type

How does Loewenstein define autocracy from a positive (rather than negative) conceptual framework?

Loewenstein defines autocracy as a regime of ‘concentrated exercise of political power’, contrasting it with constitutionalism which is defined by the ‘shared exercise of political power’ and institutional checks on executive authority

What were Linz’s four core criteria for distinguishing authoritarian regimes from totalitarian regimes?

1. Degree of political pluralism (limited vs absent)

2. Limitation of rule (predictable norms vs arbitrary power)

3. Ideologisation (mentalities vs binding elaborate ideology)

4. Mobilisation (low/passive hs high/mandatory state mobilisation)

What major empirical gap led Linz and Stepan to revise Linz’s original tripartite regime typology?

The original tripartite scheme (democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism) failed to account for post-communist transitions, post-totalitarian dynamics, sultanism, and the rise of widespread autocratic electoral and party regimes

What flaw occurred when Linz and Stepan operationalised their ‘totalitarian’ regime type using Freedom House scores?

By defining totalitarianism solely as achieving the worst Freedom House civil liberties score (7), they empirically classified fragile or collapsed states (such as Somalia and Sudan) as totalitarian, despite those states lacking high ideologisation or mobilisation

Why does using Freedom House data to classify discrete regime types create severe coding distortions in non-democratic states like Monaco?

Freedom House measures rights and civil liberties, not political regime structures. Monaco, a non-democracy, receives high freedom scores due to civil liberties, causing autocratic translation algorithms to misclassify it as a ‘consolidated democracy’

How are political regimes categorised under Dahl’s two classic dimensions of polyarchy?

Dahl maps regimes along Contestation/Competition and Inclusiveness/Participation into four types:

1. Closed Hegemonies (low/low)

2. Inclusive Hegemonies (high inclusiveness, low contestation)

3. Competitive Oligarchies (high contestation, low inclusiveness)

4. Polyarchies/Democracies (high/high)

How does Levitsky and Way’s ‘competitive authoritarianism’ differ structurally from ‘hegemonic authoritarianism’?

In competitive authoritarianism, formal democratic institutions exist and opposition competition is meaningful, making electoral outcomes uncertain despite an uneven playing field. In hegemonic authoritarianism, democratic institutions exist only on paper and competition is nominal

What is Snyder’s primary critique of regime typologies that exhibit a ‘democracy bias’?

Democracy-biased typologies define autocracies solely by the absence of democratic features, lumping fundamentally distinct autocratic regime forms (e.g. military junta, single-party personalist) into a single residual category like ‘closed autocracy’

How does Kailitz define an ‘ideocracy’ and how does it bridge Linz’s typoligy with modern autocracy typologies?

An ideocracy is an autocracy legitimised by a totalitarian ideology claiming to fulfil historical, natural, or divine laws towards a utopian future. It bridges Linz’s totalitarian type with Geddes’s structural categories by isolating ideological legitimation from non-ideocratic single-party regimes

How does Bermeo define democratic backsliding?

‘the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy’

Why does applying population weights to global democracy indices generate a substantially more pessimistic trend than unweighted averages?

Population weighting makes global trends highly sensitive to trajectory shifts in the world’s most populous countries - specifically India and China - rather than reflecting changes across the majority of sovereign states

How does Stepan contrast ‘coming-together’ federalism with ‘holding together’ federalism?

‘Coming-together’ federalism occurs when previously sovereign units voluntarily pool authority to build a unified state (e.g. the US). ‘Holding-together’ federalism occurs when a unitary state devolves constitutional power to distinct regions to prevent state breakup (e.g. India, Belgium)

Why is genuine federalism structural and rare under authoritarian regimes?

Autocrats fear establishing autonomous regional power centres that political opponents could capture, and federalism requires an independent judiciary to enforce constitutional bargains - an institution incompatible with autocratic power concentration

What structural regime risk does ethnofederalism pose in autocratic or transitioning states?

Ethnofederalism institutionalises ethnic identities within defined administrative boundaries, equipping regional nationalist elites with state capacity and administrative apparatuses that accelerate state breakup when central control weakens (e.g. the USSR and Yugoslavia)

What core trade-off defines the ‘accommodation vs fuelling’ debate regarding subnational power devolution?

Granting regional autonomy can accommodate minority demands and reduce secessionist pressures by providing institutional self-rule; conversely, it can fule speatism by legitimising subnational identity, providing state resources, and creating a launchpad for independence

How does supranational integration differ structurally from traditional intergovernmental cooperation?

In intergovernmental cooperation, states retain absolute veto power. In supranational integration, states pool or delegate sovereignty to independent common institutions whose binding decisions can be passed by majority voting and enforced by supranational courts

How do intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik) and neofunctionalism (Haas) differ in explaining European integration?

Intergovernmentalism asserts that integration is driven by national state executives negotiating interstate bargains based on domestic economic interests. Neofunctionalism argues that integration creates functional ‘spillovers’ where initial sector cooperation forces further institutional integration driven by supranational bodies

Why is the EU frequently characterised by political scientists as a ‘regulatory state’?

The EU operates on a small budget (~1% of EU GDP) and lacks direct taxation or military power; its authority is exercised primarily through rulemaking, market regulation, and setting standards across the single market

Which two legal principles established by the Court of Justice of the EU underpin the supranational authority of European law over national law?

1. Direct effect: EU legal provisions confer rights that individuals can enforce directly in national courts

2. Supremacy: EU law takes legal precedence over conflicting national statutes or constitutional provisions

How did the Brexit outcome challenge the core teleological assumption of neofunctionalist integration theories?

Brexit demonstrated that supranational integration is not irreversible and that member states retain the sovereign capacity to exit the union, contradicting neofunctionalist claims of an inevitable trajectory toward ‘ever closing union’

What transnational political cleavage, as described by Hooghe and Marks, was central to driving Brexit voting behaviour?

A transnational identity divide cutting across traditional left-right economic lines, pitting cosmopolitan integrationists against national sovereignty defenders representing the ‘losers of globalisation’

How did Viktor Orbán’s regime in Hungary execute democratic backsliding through executive aggrandisement?

Fidesz used its supermajority to draft a new constitution, alter electoral boundaries to favour incumbents, pack judicial and electoral monitoring bodies, and capture media outlets, systematically tilting the playing field while maintaining regular elections

What distinguishes the GWF classification of single-party autocracies from Kailitz’s classification of idiocracies?

GWF groups all party-dominated regimes together based on organisation structure. Kailitz separates ideocracies into a distinct category based on their specific claim to totalitarian, future-oriented ideology (e.g. North Korea or USSR), keeping non-ideocratic party regimes separate

How does Wallace Oates’s concept of ‘laboratories of democracy’ apply to federal systems?

Decentralised subnational units can experiment with distinct public policies tailored to regional preferences without risking the entire nation; successful policy innovation can then be adopted at the national level

What structural features distinguish the EU supranational union from historical multinational empires like the Habsburg Empire?

The EU is a voluntary union of equal sovereign states with constitutional exit rights and shared governance; the Habsburg Empire was held together by dynastic succession, hierarchical imperial rule, and lacked a voluntary exit mechanism

What specific historical oversight in autocracy typologies does Kailitz identify regarding dependent territories?

Regime typologies and datasets historically exclude colonial regimes and dependent territories from political regime classifications, ignoring a primary historical form of non-democratic rule

How doe Levitsky and Way define ‘revolutionary autocracies’ and how does their durability compare to standard autocracies?

Revolutionary autocracies emerge from violent social revolutions that destroy old state structures and create cohesive ruling parties, loyal security apparatuses, and elite unity, making them exceptionally durable against breakdown

How does the strategic model of leader backsliding explain why autocrats prefer subtle violations over blatant military coups?

Subtle violations (e.g. regulatory pressure, judicial packing, media buyout) lower domestic and international opposition costs by obscuring the regime shift, allowing autocrats to maintain democratic facades while insulating themselves in power

In Milan Svolik’s empirical analysis of democratic breakdowns, how has the primary mechanism of breakdown shifted since the 1970s?

Democratic breakdowns driven by traditional military coups dropped from ~50% in the 1970s to a minority, while executive takeovers (incumbents dismantling democracy from within) grew to ~90% of breakdowns

Why is the classification of Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro central to debates on hybrid regime typologies?

Venezuela transitioned incrementally from a democracy into competitive authoritarianism under Chávez, and ultimately collapsed into full authoritarianism under Maduro through step-by-step institutional erosion rather than a single sudden regime event

What is the primary operational weakness of using ‘launching organisation’ as the sole classification criterion in Magaloni, Chu, and Min’s typology?

Categorising autocracies by their launching organisation (e.g. military coup) can miscode regimes whose power structure subsequently personalises or transitions into a party-dominated regime without a formal structural failure

How does James Madison’s concept of a ‘compound republic’ relate to federalism in democratic systems?

A compound republic divides power between two distinct levels of government (federal and state), which then subdivide authority among internal branches, creating a vertical system of checks and balances to prevent tyranny

Why is the presence of an independent judicial umpire considered a mandatory prerequisite for stable federalism in democracies?

Federal systems require an independent court to neutrally resolve territorial jurisdictional conflicts and prevent the central government or regional units from violating the constitutional distribution of power

What is the primary conceptual challenge when attempting to classify ‘hybrid regimes’ along a simple democracy-autocracy continuum?

Hybrid regimes combine stable democratic procedures (e.g. competitive elections) with autocratic practices (e.g. state resource abuse), making them distinct regime forms rather than temporary transition points