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Key terms and cases from my OneNote notes and Tutorial 4 (consent). 38 cards. 'Added' notes are from outside the notes.
Consent under the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009: what is the baseline definition, and how do ss.13–14 fit in?
• s.12: consent means FREE AGREEMENT. Always start here; it is the baseline. • s.13(2): a NON-EXHAUSTIVE list of circumstances where there is NO free agreement: (a) B is incapable because of ALCOHOL or other substances; (b) B submits because of VIOLENCE or THREATS of violence (against B or anyone else); (c) B is unlawfully DETAINED; (d) B is mistaken, because of A's DECEPTION, about the NATURE or PURPOSE of the conduct; (e) A IMPERSONATES someone known personally to B; (f) only someone other than B gives agreement. • s.14: a person is INCAPABLE of consenting while ASLEEP or UNCONSCIOUS. If none of ss.13–14 fits, go back to s.12 (Van der Schyff).
Scope and withdrawal of consent (s.15): prior consent, stealthing and withdrawing during sex
• s.15(2): consent to one act does NOT by itself mean consent to ANY OTHER act. This is relevant to 'STEALTHING' (removing a condom without agreement). • s.15(3): consent may be WITHDRAWN at any time BEFORE the conduct, or DURING continuing conduct. • s.15(4): if the conduct takes place or continues AFTER withdrawal, it is WITHOUT consent. • PRIOR consent does not count (GW v HM Advocate 2019): consent must exist AT THE TIME. Any relationship context is irrelevant. • Criticism: this is a PROTECTIONIST rule that arguably undermines sexual AUTONOMY (e.g. a couple who agree to sex while one is asleep). The answer given is that people who act this way simply take the risk of committing an offence.
Mens rea as to non-consent: the reasonable belief test (s.16)
Every offence needs LACK OF REASONABLE BELIEF in consent. • s.16: in deciding whether a belief was REASONABLE, regard is had to whether A took STEPS to find out if B consented, and what those steps were. • The test is OBJECTIVE. An HONEST but UNREASONABLE mistake does NOT excuse; it would have under the old common law (added: Meek v HMA 1983). • PROOF: no separate body of corroborated evidence is needed. Lack of reasonable belief can be INFERRED from the same facts that prove lack of consent (Graham 2017; Maqsood 2019). • If a s.13 or s.14 circumstance is proved and A was AWARE of it, A cannot claim a reasonable belief (Maqsood). • It is a LIVE issue only where there is an evidential basis for a reasonable MISUNDERSTANDING (Nyiam 2022; LW 2023).
What makes conduct 'sexual'? (s.60(2))
Conduct is sexual if a REASONABLE PERSON would, in all the circumstances, consider it to be sexual. The test is OBJECTIVE. • The accused's MOTIVE (e.g. a 'joke' or 'entertainment') and their INTOXICATION are IRRELEVANT. It is a false choice to say conduct was either 'sexual' or 'drink-fuelled' (Ferguson 2022; PF v Harper 2025). • However, ALL the circumstances must still be taken into account (Kennedy v PF 2025).
Sexual offences against YOUNG children (under 13): structure and mental element
Underlying principle: a child under 13 is INCAPABLE of consenting. • Modified versions of the adult offences, with no mention of consent: – rape of a young child (s.18); – assault by penetration (s.19); – sexual assault (s.20); – causing a young child to participate in or be present during sexual activity (ss.21–22), to look at a sexual image (s.23), or to see or hear an indecent communication (s.24); – sexual exposure (s.25); – voyeurism (s.26). • The child's 'CONSENT' is IRRELEVANT, and the prosecution need not prove lack of consent or reasonable belief. • STRICT LIABILITY as to AGE: under s.27 there is NO defence of mistake as to the child's age, even where the accused is also a child (compare R v G).
Sexual offences against OLDER children (13–15): structure
Underlying principle: older children may be CAPABLE of consent but must be PROTECTED from EXPLOITATION. • The offences apply IRRESPECTIVE of the child's consent. If there is NO consent, charge the ordinary ss.1–9 offences, e.g. rape (there is no separate 'rape of an older child'). • The accused must be 16 or OLDER. The offences are: – intercourse with an older child (s.28); – penetrative and other sexual activity (ss.29–30); – causing participation or presence (ss.31–32); – indecent communication (s.34); – sexual exposure (s.35); – voyeurism (s.36). • s.37: OLDER CHILDREN ENGAGING IN SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH EACH OTHER. This covers penile penetration and oral–genital contact. Both children commit the offence, so if B consents, B also offends. This sits uneasily with the age-proximity defence.
Defences to offences against older children (s.39)
Interaction with older law: what did the 2009 Act abolish, and what survives?
ABOLISHED (common law): rape; clandestine injury to women; lewd, indecent or libidinous practice or behaviour; and sodomy. Several statutory offences on underage and homosexual conduct were also abolished. SURVIVING: • INCEST: Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 ss.1–2 (s.2 covers step-parents). – Prohibited relations include parent and child (including adoptive), grandparent and grandchild, siblings, aunt or uncle and niece or nephew. – Defences: no reason to suspect the relationship; did not consent; validly married. • Common law PUBLIC INDECENCY (Webster v Dominick 2005, replacing 'shameless indecency' from Watt v Annan). It now mainly catches conduct not covered by the 2009 Act.
Tutorial 4: consent scenarios 1–3 (asleep, very drunk, consent given earlier)
(1) Man has sex with his ASLEEP cohabiting partner, as they 'often' do. There is NO consent: s.14 (asleep), and PRIOR consent does not count (s.15(3)–(4); GW). A course of past behaviour cannot give him a reasonable belief. (2) Sex with a VERY DRUNK woman. Under s.13(2)(a) there is no consent only if she LACKS CAPACITY because of alcohol. This is highly contextual: being drunk, vomiting or having memory loss does not automatically mean incapacity (R v Bree [2008] QB 131). Apparent participation while incapacitated is NOT free agreement (DC v DG and DR 2018). See HMA v MMI [2022] on intoxication short of incapacity. Reasonable belief: Maqsood and Nyiam (your notes say 'Max and Niam'). (3) A and B agree at 6pm, then have sex at midnight when B is very drunk but says just before that she wants to. EARLIER consent is irrelevant (GW). The question is whether B had CAPACITY at midnight and whether A REASONABLY believed she consented then. Her statement at midnight may count if she still had capacity.
Tutorial 4: deception scenarios 4, 5 and 8 (lies, impersonation, stealthing)
(4) Lies about being a FAMOUS RICH FOOTBALLER and promises to date her. Deception about wealth or intentions is COLLATERAL, not about the 'NATURE or PURPOSE' of the act, so s.13(2)(d) probably does NOT apply and consent likely remains valid (R (Monica) v DPP [2019]; added: R v Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971, where a lie about a vasectomy did not vitiate consent). Your notes say there is 'no free agreement under s.13(2)(d)'; that conflicts with Monica, so check the answer from the tutorial. (5) She believes he is a FORMER ACQUAINTANCE. There is NO consent under s.13(2)(e) (IMPERSONATING someone known personally to B). This covers identity, not broader lies (e.g. politics, as in Monica). (8) Consent on condition he wears a CONDOM, but he does not ('stealthing'). There is no consent to that act: s.15(2) and s.13(2)(d). Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22; on withdrawal before ejaculation, R (F) v DPP [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin). Scottish courts take the same approach.
Tutorial 4: pressure and withdrawal scenarios 6, 7 and 9
(6) He goes to a FORMER ABUSIVE partner's house. There is no express threat, but she fears violence. Under s.13(2)(b) (violence or threat of violence) the threat need NOT immediately precede the act; only a CAUSAL link is needed, i.e. she took part because of the feared violence. Agreement is not free if it arises only from very pressing circumstances (HM Adv v SM 2019). Otherwise use s.12. (7) A manager threatens to SACK a junior employee in financial difficulty. This is not a threat of violence, so s.13(2)(b) does not apply. But the s.13 list is NON-EXHAUSTIVE, so argue NO FREE AGREEMENT under s.12 because of serious coercion. (9) Consent is given, sex becomes ROUGH, she asks him to stop, and he continues. Consent is WITHDRAWN (s.15(3)–(4)). Everything after withdrawal is without consent, and he can no longer reasonably believe she consents. s.15(2) is also relevant, because consent to sex is not consent to rough sex.
CASE: Van der Schyff v HM Advocate 2015 SCL 783
Issue: If the jury rejects the claim that the complainer was ASLEEP (s.14), can there still be a conviction? Facts: A heavily intoxicated complainer fell asleep at a party and woke to find the accused had undressed her and digitally penetrated her. The jury convicted, but only after deleting all references to her being asleep. He appealed: if she was not asleep, there could be no conviction. Held: APPEAL REFUSED. It was open to the jury to find no consent, and no reasonable belief in consent, under the GENERAL s.12 'free agreement' provision. s.14 not applying does not displace s.12.
CASE: GW v HM Advocate 2019 JC 109
Issue: Can PRIOR consent (given before the complainer fell asleep or became unconscious) be a defence? Facts: Added: the accused claimed that his partner had previously agreed to sexual activity while she was asleep. Held: NO. Under the 2009 Act consent must exist AT THE TIME of the conduct. Because of s.14 and s.15(3)–(4), a sleeping or unconscious person cannot consent, and earlier agreement is irrelevant. The relationship context is irrelevant.
CASE: Maqsood v HM Advocate 2019 JC 45
Issue: Must lack of REASONABLE BELIEF in consent be proved SEPARATELY by corroborated evidence? Facts: Rape of a woman allegedly too intoxicated to consent. She could walk and talk, so he said he reasonably believed she consented. The trial judge directed that lack of reasonable belief had to be formally proved by corroborated evidence as a separate element. Held: The direction was WRONG. Lack of reasonable belief can be INFERRED from the same facts that establish lack of consent. But the misdirection was to the accused's ADVANTAGE (it made the Crown's task harder), so the appeal was REFUSED. Also, if a s.13 or s.14 circumstance is proved and the accused was aware of it, there can be no reasonable belief.
CASE: Nyiam v HM Advocate 2022 JC 57
Issue: Must the jury be directed on reasonable belief whenever the complainer is said to have been too INTOXICATED to consent? Facts: He was convicted of raping two complainers who were intoxicated. He said they were WILLING participants. The jury deleted references to the complainers being asleep or unconscious, and he appealed, saying the judge should have directed on reasonable belief. Held: APPEAL REFUSED. Reasonable belief is NOT automatically a live issue just because incapacity through intoxication (rather than sleep) is alleged. There must be evidence of a reasonable MISUNDERSTANDING. Simply asserting that they were active, willing participants leaves no room for it.
CASE: LW v HM Advocate 2023 SCCR 214
Issue: When does reasonable belief become a live issue with a SLEEPING complainer? Facts: The complainer was asleep. The accused's position was relevant to whether he knew she was asleep. Held: It confirmed Maqsood and Nyiam. But if the accused's claim is that he DID NOT KNOW she was asleep (rather than that she was definitely awake and consenting), there may be a LIVE issue, and the jury must decide whether any belief was REASONABLE. Here he had not taken steps to check, and he was CONVICTED. Proving that she was awake is not proof that she consented.
CASE: Ferguson v HM Advocate 2022 SCCR 26
Issue: Is the accused's INTOXICATION relevant to whether touching was 'SEXUAL' under s.60(2)? Facts: In a nightclub, the accused touched one complainer's buttocks and suddenly and forcefully digitally penetrated another complainer's anus and vagina. Lack of consent and reasonable belief were accepted. Held: NO further guidance to the jury was needed. It is WRONG to consider the accused's intoxication in deciding whether conduct is sexual, and wrong to treat conduct as EITHER 'sexual' OR 'drink-fuelled'. The test is what a reasonable person would think.
CASE: PF v Harper (Steven) 2025 SC (SAC) 21 and Kennedy v PF 2025 JC 128
Issue: Can MOTIVE (a 'joke' or 'entertainment') stop touching from being sexual? Facts: • HARPER: he grabbed a woman's buttocks at a bar, saying he thought she was his friend and it was a joke. The sheriff convicted him of assault but held it was NOT sexual. • KENNEDY: a male stripper touched two women who had made clear they did not want to be touched. His aim was entertainment. Held: • Harper: the sheriff was WRONG. The test is OBJECTIVE, so intoxication and motive are irrelevant; touching the buttocks is objectively sexual. • Kennedy: it followed Harper (an entertainment motive does not make conduct non-sexual), but QUALIFIED it: ALL the circumstances must be considered under s.60.
CASE: R v G [2008] UKHL 37, [2009] 1 AC 92
Issue: Is STRICT LIABILITY as to age in the rape of a child under 13 compatible with Art 6 ECHR (fair trial)? Facts: A 15-year-old boy (added: your notes say 13) had sex with a 12-year-old girl. He said he believed she was 15 and that she had consented. He was convicted of rape of a child under 13 (Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.5). Held: Conviction UPHELD. Strict liability as to age is COMPATIBLE with Art 6, which concerns procedural fairness, not the content of the substantive law. This is the English comparator for s.27 of the 2009 Act (no defence of mistake as to age).
CASE: AB v HM Advocate [2017] UKSC 25
Issue: Was it lawful to deny the REASONABLE BELIEF AS TO AGE defence (s.39(2)(a)(i)) to anyone previously CHARGED with a relevant sexual offence? Facts: Added: AB, aged 20, was charged with sexual activity with a 14-year-old. He had previously been charged (not convicted) with a similar offence, so the defence of reasonable belief that she was 16 was barred. Held: The bar was INCOMPATIBLE with ART 8 ECHR (private life). Relying on a mere CHARGE meant disclosing his past criminal history without adequate safeguards, and the restriction was not sufficiently clear or justified. It could not be read down, so that part of the provision is not law. The point of the bar was to stop people who had already been warned from pleading ignorance.
CASE: Stübing v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 24
Issue: Does criminalising consensual INCEST between adult siblings breach ART 8 ECHR? Facts: A brother and sister, who grew up apart, had a consensual sexual relationship and children. The brother was convicted under German law. Held: NO violation. Whether to criminalise this involves questions of MORALITY, on which there is no European consensus, so states have a WIDE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION.
CASE: Watt v Annan 1978 JC 84 and Webster v Dominick 2005 1 JC 65
Issue: What is the common law offence covering public sexual indecency? Facts: • WATT: a private members' club showed a pornographic film night, prosecuted as SHAMELESS INDECENCY. • WEBSTER: added: indecent exposure (to children), where the court reconsidered the old offence. Held: • Watt (historic): shameless indecency could cover a quasi-public screening. • Webster: shameless indecency was ABOLISHED as such and replaced with PUBLIC INDECENCY, i.e. conduct that causes PUBLIC OFFENCE. It previously covered shameless sexual conduct, indecent exposure and obscene displays. Now it mainly catches conduct (e.g. unintended exposure) outside the 2009 Act.
Theft: what are the actus reus and mens rea?
ACTUS REUS: APPROPRIATION of property BELONGING TO ANOTHER, WITHOUT CONSENT. This breaks down into: • appropriation; • of CORPOREAL, MOVEABLE property; • belonging to another; • without consent. MENS REA: INTENTION TO DEPRIVE the owner of their property (and possibly DISHONESTY). History: Hume defined it as the 'felonious taking and carrying away of the property of another, for lucre'. APPROPRIATION gradually replaced 'taking and carrying away' (John Smith 1838; George Brown 1839; Black v Carmichael 1992).
Appropriation: what counts?
No 'taking and carrying away' is needed, only APPROPRIATION, i.e. assuming CONTROL or possession, or DEPRIVING the owner of USE. • Finding property and keeping it (John Smith 1838). • Keeping property that was voluntarily handed over (George Brown 1839: watches given for repair). • IMMOBILISING property, e.g. wheel-clamping (Black v Carmichael 1992). Appropriation can occur even where POSSESSION was obtained WITH the owner's consent, but the APPROPRIATION itself must be NON-CONSENSUAL.
Which property can be stolen? (corporeal, moveable, belonging to another)
• It must be CORPOREAL, so not INFORMATION (Mackenzies 1913; Grant v Allan 1988). But in Scotland ELECTRICITY can be stolen. • It must be MOVEABLE, so not heritable property (land). • It must be CAPABLE OF BEING OWNED: – not living adults (but stealing a CHILD from a custodian is PLAGIUM: Hamilton v Wilson 1994); – DEAD BODIES can be stolen before burial but not after; after burial the crime is VIOLATION OF SEPULCHRES (Dewar 1945); – WILD ANIMALS are not owned until caught or controlled (Scott v Everitt 1853; Valentine v Kennedy 1985). • You cannot steal your OWN property in Scotland (contrast England: Theft Act 1968 s.5; R v Turner (No 2)). • ABANDONED property: ownerless property belongs to the CROWN, so it can still be stolen. But see the mens rea point in Kane v Friel 1997 and Butler v Richardson 2013.
Mens rea of theft: must the intention be to deprive PERMANENTLY?
Historically, yes: an intention to deprive PERMANENTLY. Now TEMPORARY, CONDITIONAL or INDEFINITE deprivation can suffice: • Milne v Tudhope 1981 and Kidston v Annan 1984: keeping property to force payment, i.e. deprivation for a NEFARIOUS PURPOSE (originally linked to CLANDESTINE taking). • Black v Carmichael 1992: temporary deprivation as a means to an end. Lord Hope spoke only of temporary deprivation, so the clandestine and nefarious requirements look unnecessary. • Fowler v O'Brien 1994: INDEFINITE deprivation (no idea when the owner would get it back) suffices. There is little clarity on the 'exceptional circumstances'. DISHONESTY: you must know (or believe) that the property belongs to someone else and that you have no consent (Kane v Friel; Butler v Richardson; Mackenzie v Maclean). A genuine belief in the owner's CONSENT means no theft, and the jury must be directed on it (Lauder 2016).
Housebreaking and opening lockfast places
Entering another's house without permission is NOT a crime in itself. It becomes criminal with INTENT TO STEAL: housebreaking with intent to steal, or, if goods are taken, THEFT BY HOUSEBREAKING (an aggravation). • The intent to steal must be clear from the FACTS (Mason v Jessop 1990). Housebreaking with intent to RAPE is NOT a recognised crime (HMA v Forbes 1994). • HOUSEBREAKING means OVERCOMING THE SECURITY of a building. It need not be a house (John Fraser 1831). Disconnecting an ALARM can be an attempt (Burns v Allan 1987). Whether smashing an external security light counts depends on CONTEXT (Heywood v Reid 1996). • OPENING LOCKFAST PLACES means breaking into locked places OTHER than buildings, e.g. CARS and SAFES. The Crown need not specify what was to be stolen (McLeod v Mason 1981). • Both can aggravate theft: theft by housebreaking, or theft by opening a lockfast place.
CASE: Black v Carmichael 1992 SLT 897
Issue: Is WHEEL-CLAMPING a car and demanding a fee for release THEFT (and extortion)? Facts: Two men clamped cars parked on private land and demanded £45 for release. They argued it was not theft because nothing was carried away. Held: It was THEFT. 'Taking and carrying away' is not required, only APPROPRIATION, and IMMOBILISING the car deprived the owner of its use. TEMPORARY deprivation as a means to an end was sufficient mens rea. It was also EXTORTION, because the only legitimate way to enforce a debt is due LEGAL PROCESS (Lord Hope).
CASE: John Smith (1838) 2 Swin 28 and George Brown (1839) 2 Swin 394
Issue: Does theft require 'taking' property directly from the owner? Facts: • SMITH: the accused FOUND property on the street and kept it. • BROWN: WATCHES were handed to the accused for REPAIR, and he kept them. Held: Both were guilty of THEFT. The property need not be taken directly from the owner (Smith), and an initial voluntary handover does not prevent a later APPROPRIATION (Brown). These cases mark the move from 'taking' to 'appropriation'.
CASE: HM Advocate v Mackenzies (1913) 7 Adam 189 and Grant v Allan 1988 SLT 11
Issue: Can INFORMATION be stolen? Facts: • MACKENZIES: the accused took a book of secret chemical FORMULAE, copied it and sold the copies for profit. • GRANT: an employee took copies of confidential employer information he was not entitled to, intending to sell them. Held: • Mackenzies: the charge was relevant only so far as it concerned theft of the BOOK (corporeal), not the formulae. • Grant: NOT a crime. Information is not corporeal, and the employer was not deprived of it.
CASE: Dewar v HM Advocate 1945 JC 5
Issue: Can a crematorium manager steal coffins and items delivered for cremation? Facts: The manager of a crematorium removed COFFINS and lids delivered with bodies for cremation and kept or reused them. (Your notes describe him as 'removing bodies to reuse coffins'; check the facts.) Held: THEFT. The coffins had not been abandoned; they were delivered for a specific purpose (to be cremated). The case is also cited for the rule that a body may be stolen BEFORE burial, but after burial the crime is VIOLATION OF SEPULCHRES.
CASE: Kane v Friel 1997 JC 69 and Butler v Richardson 2013 SCL 734
Issue: Is it theft to take property you believe has been ABANDONED? Facts: • KANE: two brothers took copper wire from a scrapyard or derelict site and sold it, believing it was abandoned. • BUTLER: added: a similar situation of items taken in the belief that they had been abandoned. Held: Technically ownerless property belongs to the CROWN, so it is still 'property of another'. But MENS REA requires the accused to KNOW or BELIEVE the property belongs to someone else. A genuine belief that it was abandoned may negate the dishonest intention. Butler CONFIRMED Kane. Check the outcomes on the facts.
CASE: Milne v Tudhope 1981 SLT (Notes) 42 and Kidston v Annan 1984 SLT 279
Issue: Is it theft to keep or remove someone's property TEMPORARILY to force them to PAY? Facts: Both were payment disputes. • MILNE: a builder REMOVED items he had installed during house repairs to put pressure on the owner to pay. • KIDSTON: a repairer KEPT a television until he was paid for work the owner had not authorised. Held: THEFT. Permanent deprivation is not always needed. Deprivation for a NEFARIOUS PURPOSE (to induce payment), especially where the taking is CLANDESTINE, is sufficient mens rea.
CASE: Fowler v O'Brien 1994 SCCR 112
Issue: Is an intention to deprive the owner INDEFINITELY sufficient for theft? Facts: The accused took a BICYCLE and used it without the owner's permission. It was unclear when, if ever, the owner would get it back. Held: THEFT. Intention to deprive permanently is NOT required, and taking INDEFINITELY sufficed. In practice this is very close to permanent deprivation.
CASE: Lauder v HM Advocate 2016 SCL 459
Issue: Is it theft if the accused believed the owner CONSENTED? Facts: An employee of a clothing company sold its items on his PERSONAL eBay account. He said he had EXPRESS permission from the owner, as a way of recouping unpaid OVERTIME. The trial judge directed only on intention to deprive, not on dishonesty. Held: MISDIRECTION. Taking property in the full BELIEF that the owner consents is NOT theft. Where such a belief is in issue, even if mistaken, the jury must be specifically directed on it. In effect, mens rea requires that the accused knew they did not have the owner's consent.
CASE: MacLeod v Kerr 1965 SC 253 (civil)
Issue: Is obtaining goods by a FRAUDULENTLY induced transfer theft? Facts: Kerr sold his car to 'Galloway', who paid with a STOLEN cheque, and Galloway sold it on to Gibson. Kerr sought to recover the car. Held: Kerr INTENDED to transfer ownership, so even though the transfer was induced by FRAUD it was not theft. Galloway got a voidable title, and Gibson, who bought in good faith before it was avoided, got GOOD TITLE. The criminal-law lesson: appropriation for theft must be WITHOUT the owner's consent; a consensual (if fraudulently induced) transfer is fraud, not theft.
CASE: Mason v Jessop 1990 SCCR 387 and HM Advocate v Forbes 1994 JC 71
Issue: What intention must accompany housebreaking? Facts: • MASON: the accused broke into a CHURCH and was found inside drinking. • FORBES: the accused was charged with housebreaking with intent to RAPE. Held: • Mason: CONVICTION QUASHED. Intention to STEAL was not proved on the facts. • Forbes: housebreaking with intent to rape is NOT a crime known to the law of Scotland. Only housebreaking with intent to STEAL is. (Your notes list Forbes without the outcome.)
CASE: McLeod v Mason 1981 SCCR 75
Issue: In opening a lockfast place with intent to steal, must the Crown specify WHAT was to be stolen? Facts: The accused broke into a CAR. Held: NO. It did not matter what he intended to steal. Intention to steal SOMETHING could be INFERRED from the circumstanc