Lesson 3: Institutions, Interdependence, Identity

PWAD250 Midterm Review

Liberal institutionalism

Kenneth Oye and Robert Keohane: institutions solve the cheating problem, making cooperation possible under anarchy. Third image

Liberal institutionalism's basic view

Take realist assumptions; cheating is the problem; but IR is not a constant state of war

The cheating problem

Under anarchy, any agreement can be broken (defection), so states hesitate to cooperate even when it would benefit everyone

Four conditions affecting cooperation

Mutual interests, shadow of the future, numbers, issue areas

Shadow of the future

How much states value future interactions; a long shadow (repeated play) favors cooperation

Numbers (condition for cooperation)

More players make cooperation harder because free-riding becomes easier

Issue areas (condition for cooperation)

Cooperation is easier on economics/trade than on security

When is cooperation relevant?

When mutual benefit exists (CC > DD) and there is a temptation to defect (DC > CD)

Prisoner's Dilemma payoffs

CC 3,3; CD 1,4; DC 4,1; DD 2,2. Both cooperating beats both defecting, but each is tempted to defect

Chicken payoffs

CC 3,3; CD 2,4; DC 4,2; DD 1,1. Mutual defection is the worst outcome for both

Stag Hunt payoffs

CC 4,4; CD 1,3; DC 3,1; DD 2,2. Mutual cooperation is best, but defecting is safer without trust

Institutions (definition)

Rules and norms that outline acceptable and unacceptable state behavior (e.g., UN, WTO, IAEA; Genocide Convention; nuclear taboo)

Four ways institutions work

Alter payoffs (issue linkage), increase the shadow of the future (reciprocity/tit-for-tat), define rules of the game, monitor (detect and inform)

Absolute gains

Am I better off than before? Liberals say states care about this

Relative gains

Am I better off compared to my rival? Realists say states care about this because gains can become military power

Realist critique #1 of liberal institutionalism

Relative gains: even if cheating is solved, states won't cooperate if others gain more (Grieco)

Realist critique #2 of liberal institutionalism

Issue area: institutions mostly cover economics; security institutions are intentionally uncommon

"The False Promise of International Institutions"

Mearsheimer's realist critique of liberal institutionalism

Evidence for liberal institutionalism (review day)

NATO persisted after the Soviet Union fell, even though the realist reason for it was gone

Oye (1985) central argument

Cooperation under anarchy depends on mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of players; states can strategically change these

Keohane (1984) central argument

Even with realist assumptions (egoistic, rational states), cooperation is explainable; institutions fill the gap where bargaining without authority fails

Democratic peace theory

Michael Doyle: democracies do not fight one another. Second image; explicitly dyadic

Dyadic vs. monadic democratic peace

Dyadic: democracies don't fight each other (the course's version). Monadic: democracies are peaceful in general (weak evidence)

DPT evidence (Russett, 1946 to 1986)

0 wars between democratic pairs vs. 32 among other pairs

DPT normative logic

Democracy, then externalization of peaceful norms, then trust and respect between democracies, then peace

DPT institutional logic

Democracy, then accountability (public constraint, group constraint, slow mobilization, information, war fighting), then peace

Realist critique of DPT normative logic (Rosato)

Do democratic leaders really externalize peaceful norms? What about US interventions against elected governments in Latin America?

Realist critique of DPT institutional logic (Rosato)

Are leaders really constrained? Nationalism can make publics support war (about 90% backed invading Afghanistan after 9/11)

Empirical vs. logical critique

Empirical: the evidence doesn't match the claim. Logical: the reasoning itself is flawed

Walt's DPT critiques

Democratizing states may be more war-prone (Snyder/Mansfield); definitions and few pre-1945 democracies (Gowa/Spiro); post-1945 peace from shared Soviet threat (Gowa)

Owen (1994) central argument

Liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to avoid war with each other and push them toward war with illiberal states

Economic interdependence theory

Copeland: war is less likely the more states depend on each other economically. Second image (could be third)

Economic interdependence logic

Trade raises the opportunity cost of war; pro-trade domestic groups oppose conflict (capitalist peace); leaders avoid those costs

Economic interdependence examples (slides)

Angela Merkel and Russia; US leaders and China

Realist critique of economic interdependence

Relative gains; interdependence creates vulnerability to coercion; states have traded and still gone to war

Copeland's trade expectations theory

Expectations of future trade matter, not current levels: optimism favors peace, fear of being cut off can push toward war

Constructivism basics

Shares realist/liberal assumptions but takes an ideational approach; ideas give meaning to material factors; problematizes rather than assumes interests

Ideas constructivism

Judith Goldstein: ideas matter for foreign policy. First or second image depending on who drives the idea

How Goldstein and Keohane define ideas

Beliefs held by individuals

World views

Ideas that define the universe of choices (capitalism, religion)

Principled beliefs

Ideas about right and wrong (human rights, nuclear taboo)

Causal beliefs

Ideas about cause-and-effect relationships (environment, trade)

When ideas especially matter

As roadmaps (Keynesianism), focal points (Europe's internal market), and institutions (sovereignty)

Where ideas come from

Shocks (WWII, Great Depression), non-state actors (epistemic communities, IOs), individuals (Gorbachev)

Which ideas get chosen

Successful ones (economic openness), sponsored ones (human rights), and those that win a political process

Identities constructivism

Alexander Wendt: identities shape interests, which shape behavior. Third image

"Anarchy is what states make of it"

Alexander Wendt (1992): self-help is not built into anarchy; it is created through interaction

Wendt's Argument #1

Anarchy does not necessarily imply a self-help world; anarchy alone predicts nothing; you need to know identities

Wendt's Argument #2

Interaction (discourse and practice) is the source of identities: behavior, identity, interests, behavior

Hobbesian culture of anarchy

States as enemies; Europe 1000 to 1648 (slides)

Lockean culture of anarchy

States as rivals; Europe 1800 to 1945 (slides)

Kantian culture of anarchy

States as friends; Europe 1945 to present (slides)

How cultures of anarchy change

Through changes in practice and discourse; factors: dissatisfaction, interaction, self-conscious effort

Realist critique of identities constructivism (unconfirmed in slides)

Better at describing the past than predicting (Walt); identities may be epiphenomenal, just reflecting material power

Epiphenomenal

Realist term for institutions or norms that merely reflect underlying power rather than causing anything