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Pierson v. Post
Property of wild animals is acquired by occupancy only
Wild animals = farae natural
Ratione soli — in England, this privilege conferred exclusive privilege to hunt game (like deer and rabbits) on their land (doesn’t apply to foxes)
First possession
Keeble v. Hickeringill
Builds on Pierson to show how the law recognizes property shy of literal possession
Here, property is the opportunity to possess, so Hickeringill commits a tort when he maliciously interferes with Keeble’s opportunity
Normally, measure would be duck lost, but unknowable, so Keeble sues for compensation for the intrusion caused by the sounds of gunfire
Right to compete” is protected, but tortious interference with another’s property is not
school teacher example
Popov v. Hayashi
Courts must make the most just decision that they can given the evidence they have
Lone Star Gas Co. v Murchison
Stored gas is the property of those that reinjected it, even if it under the surface of someone else’s land, as long as there was no intent to abandon
Gas is like personal property, not a wild animal that you lose once it wanders off your property
Rule of capture only applies to natural gas in its natural state but does not necessarily extend to stored gas
Johnson v. M’Intosh
The root of all chains of title in US real property
Conquest creates a new root of title, undoing any prior claims based on first possession
Labor alone does not create property. The person performing the labor must have the privilege of having their labor recognized and be performing a kind of labor that courts recognize
“Natives only had ‘right of occupancy’” — extinguished by conquest (went from European countries that conquered the Native Americans —to the U.S. states — to the federal government — then some given back to the states
5. “Chain of title” is common when courts have conflicting claims to a piece of property — see which grantor had the better claim to title
6. Court is a partner in nation-building — deference to broad ideas of intent
McGirt v. Oklahoma
Federalism — significance of the root of title belonging to the federal gov — Indigenous people have rights upon which states cannot encroach
Private transfers of title do not change the political sovereign of land
Gorsuch applies the same rule as Marshall and reaches the same conclusion but does so while recognizing the sovereignty of the Native Americans.
The role of the courts. Gorsuch’s view that courts should not save the political bodies from themselves is a much more modern view (and probably held by a majority of the federal judiciary at this point) hold Congress to its word
International News Service v. AP
Both parties are competitors for local news (INS does not have reporters in some locations (in harm’s way), while AP does)
The property interest here is the “hotness” of the news and the labor that went into gathering it
Explores what counts as labor for the purpose of creating property
Armory v. Delamirie
1. Finder, then converter finder wins (possession of a jewel)
2. Person who possesses the jewel (goldsmith) is in better position to produce the jewel (they have the burden) so unless they do, assume highest possible value of it (for trover)
Clark v. Maloney
1. Finder 1 (finds logs) vs. Finder 2 (finds them floating in the river later)
2. Finder 1 has superior title (prior possessor)
3. Also, Finder 1 did not show an intent to abandon (so losing the logs alone doesn’t mean that they lose title)
Anderson v. Gouldberg
1. Anderson took logs from logs that wasn’t his (C1). Defendant took the logs because they thought it was from their land, but it wasn’t (C2)
2. Prior converter (C1) wins
Edward v. Sims
1. Sets accession against the ad coelum rule the majority takes a title theory of ad coelum; the dissent prefers a possession theory (an owner has only what he has tried to and can possess)
2. Least cost avoidance and ex ante bargaining Edwards knew the cave and could have surveyed and negotiated first. Once the value is known, the parties sit in a bilateral monopoly
Weatherbee v. Green
Connections arise from ownership of related assets (rule of increase) or labor that transforms the asset (Weatherbee)
Rule: a good-faith converter whose labor destroys the identity of the chattel, or vastly increases its value, takes title and owes the owner the value of the raw material
Mens rea matters — the struct rule (the owner recovers the improved thing) is reserved for willful or reckless conversion to discourage opportunism
Why this rule— the court will not punish an innocent converter, tracing is hard and fact-intensive, and forfeiting a good is waste no rule satisfies every case
Remedies: replevin asks for the thing or its value; trespass measures the harm to the owner
Scott v. Anderson-Tully Co
The fence and blue paint claimed ownership, along with giving out hunting licenses, having no one from Scott’s crossing the property line
Howard v. Kunto
Adverse possession can occur through summer period (whatever is normal for the type of property)
Continuous, uninterrupted possession requires only the degree of occupancy and use that the average owner would make of that particular type of property
Tacking can apply with privity when buying a summer house from someone else, even though the deed doesn’t overlap with any of the land that is used — just requires “reasonable connection” between the successive occupants
trover
(also called an actino for conversion)
allows someone to recover the monetary value of personal property that another person wrongfully converted (excercised unauthorized control over)
Moore v. Regents of the University of California
Court says: statute (CA Health & Safety Code) “eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ for purposes of conversion law”
Fiduciary duty between doctor and patient (shifts risk to the stronger/more knowledgeable party)
Abandonment happens when there is an objective manifestation of intent not to own the property anymore
Policy concerns about recognizing property interest (better fit to Legislature)
Midler v. Ford Motor Company
Property interest here is Midler’s personhood Ford tried to appropriate Midler herself (not just a singer that sounds like her), which is like pirating her identity
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v Illinois
1. State sold the submerged lands to the railroad, then changed their mind and said they never had the right to sell in the first place
2. Majority says: “at best, you can license waterways; you can’t give away to a private company, and even if you could, it’s always revokable”
3. Public trust doctrine some property, such as navigable water, is so imbued with the public interest that it cannot be permanently privatized
Oregon v. ex rel Throton v. Hay
1. Custom applies to allow the public to utilize beaches in Oregon
2. Custom: ancient, uninterrupted, peaceable, reasonable, and obligatory use with visible boundaries that is not repugnant to other law/custom can create a public right to use property such that the TO cannot exclude the public from the land
Intel v. Hamidi
For a disruption to chattel be a trespass, requires damage to the property
Otherwise, no remedy for non-injury trespass because of administrability issues
(Different from trespass to land, where you get nominal damages even without injury)
Parties asserting a right to exclude must define the scope of the property they seek to protect
In CA, the internet is governed by analogy to personal property (majority), not real property (dissent)
Borg v. Wiley
Certain actions are forcible as a matter of law here, landlord exercising a right of entry (self-help)
Protects tenants from overzealous landlords (which may make sense given economic power)
Increases risk to property from tenant malfeasance/neglect — raises landlords’ costs, incentivizes rigorous tenant screening, potentially increases costs on all tenants
No self-help available for land —> judicial remedies only
Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
You can repossess chattel (with self-help) if you have a security interest, but must be peaceful
Baker v. Howard County Hunt
No adequate remedy at law (rabbits are non-fungible because of experiments, issue is repeated trespass, damages don’t compensate Baker for the special purpose of his farm: research)
The repeated trespasses must be a single course of action (even though by different people)
Even though generally, reputable dogs are immune from trespass, owners can still be liable if the owner takes a dog where he knows it will probably damage the property of others and permits it to stray beyond his control
Note, there are easements that allow entry onto another’s land when necessary (one is right to retrieve), so owner does have right to retrieve their dog if it wanders onto another’s land
Olwell v. Nye & Nissan
1. Egg washer case
2. They asked for reasonable value of def’s use of the machine for restitution, the profits which injured to def. as a result of its wrongful use of the machine
3. If they had brought conversion + restitution, you can only win on one (and equity follows the law, so if they can resolve in law, they will)
4. But waived their right in tort to proceed in equity
Pile v. Pedrick
Can’t put windows in party walls
Rules incentivizing talking to neighbor
Harsh remedy here — tear down of building
Def. was least cost avoider — but probably should have just kept the building and paid for permanent trespass (which gives an easement, for use not title)
Golden Press v. Rylands
Plaintiffs knew that were building and didn’t do anything for a while (least cost avoidance); doesn’t affect pl’s enjoyment of the land (only $55 in land, no harm as to use); won’t let def. trespass to chip off the encroachment
“Where the encroachment is unintentional and slight and does not impact use, no injunction if removal causes grave hardship”
Test of when the strict rule (in Pile) doesn’t apply: good faith, balance of equity, easy to compensate, no interference with use
Producers Lumber & Supply CO. v. Olney Building Co
The minute the house was built — belonged to pl.
Should we have made pl. accept the house? — we want to discourage private ordering; it’s up to pl. to get what they want (Even if the metrics are the same, it’s a matter of taste, and the court doesn’t want to get involved in this + pretty hard to make someone pay for what they didn’t ask for)
If we allow improver to keep the value improved (like accession), would pay the value of the lot (but paying for the parcel is not preferable because it’s non fungible)
Wood v. Leadbitter
Ticket creates a right against the person who make the promise (lets you go on your land) but it is not a property right against the world it is also revokable (if it’s not with a grant)
You are allowed to revoke a license and remove someone in the moment, then deal with refund later in contract
ProCD Inc v. Zeidenberg
Price discrimination — general public pays $150 and much more expensive for businesses — allows better access for general public + reflects the price each group is willing to pay (all about avoiding secondary arbitrage)
This license might be preempted by copyright if it exists (but only for software, not for public records)
This case creates common law for shrink-wrap licenses says licensee can’t revoke and validates shrink-wrap licenses
Allen v. Hyatt Regency-Nashville Hotel
Is a bailment created? — matters that there is security, gate attendant, covered lot
Bailment requires party to accept car and use reasonable care (which is non-waivable)
Can’t contract out of negligence— standard is to use reasonable standard of care (objective)— You can contract for increased standard of care, but not decreased standard (court won’t enforce)
It’s a bailment because it looks like a bailment (even though the ticket says they’re not responsible) — but garages can limit their liability for sign (ex: “only liable for $8,000)
Pocono Springs Civic Association v. MacKenzie
Homeowners have title in fee simple and homeowners association via easement (in rem contract attached to property)
Court says you cannot abandon real property
If you stop paying taxes, municipality has privilege to foreclose but this is different — but state doesn’t want to because it has negative value (and once owner dies, they can collect unpaid taxes (even through their kid’s college fund))
seller doesn’t have fiduciary duty to buyer
Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co
Court says they will not be a party to the waste
People can do idiosyncratic things during their lifetime, but after death, the costs/consequences won’t be borne by you; it will be given to others
During lifetime, “shame” is a factor that isn’t relevant after death
Brokaw v. Fairchild
Life tenant — someone who has the right to possess and use real property during the duration of a person’s life (usually their own life); they have a present possessory interest, but they don’t own the property forever
If all the interests the comprise the fee consent, then you can act as a holder and tear down the house (but you can’t if they don’t) — but they didn’t consent so can’t do this (would have been ameloirative waste)
Mountain Brow Lodge v. Toscano
Habendum clause — clause saying that the property is restricted for the use and benefit of the second party, and if it fails to be used by the second party (or is sold/transferred), it recerts to the first party, their successors, heirs, or assigns
Family tried to get quiet title against the Lodge, saying that the conditions in the deed were void as restraints on alienation
Court says it’s just a use clause, and in context, it’s a fee simple subject to condition
Symphony Space v. Pergola Properties
lease-back —> sale (Broadwest to Symphony) + loan agreement (seller financed transaction) + lease agreement (Symphony promises Broadway possession of commercial spaces) + option agreement
violate RAP — option to buy in over 21 years
Not close enough to suggest an option appurtenant (sale over whole building but lease is for commercial space alone) also they don’t want to reconfigure documents for equitable remedies because this deal is to get out of taxes (been avoiding for a while)
Delfino v. Vealencis
Competing interests, but parties that possess get a little more weight
Partition in kind is default (don’t want to force a sale) unless:
a. It’s impracticable or inequitable can be when physical attributes of the land make it that way, or there’s many owners
b. Interest of the owners would be better promoted by a partition by sale (considers all tenants, but especially the ones in possession) (burden is on party requesting a partition by sale)
Partition in kind, then plaintiff sold land def still owes plaintiff money for decreased value (even though the amount of land she owns went way down)
Gillmor v. Gillmor
Consumptive use — can only feed so many cattle (and def admits he would have sued to enjoin if pl. tried to graze her cattle)
Ouster has to show they actually prevented other party’s use of the land (ex: changing the locks on a house they both own, but other co-tenant has right to get a locksmith)
Contribution if one party uses up a resource
Note: if one cotenant doesn’t pay taxes, others can get it back through contribution but not paying their share isn’t an option (foreclosure otherwise; partition is probably what you need to do)
Harms v. Sprague
If mortgage transfers title (tittle theory), then JT is severed and creates TIC (and William’s assign gets his share)
If mortgage is only a lien (lien theory), then JT is preserved and then survivor gets the whole thing
If mortgage vaporized (which it does if it’s a lien only and that person died)— can still go in contract law
Kunstammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon
The law of the jurisdiction where the transfer occurred governs the question of who owns the property (the good faith purchaser exception is wider in Europe than in the US)
Strong-arm thieves transfer void title, meaning that even a good faith purchaser for value will not become the true owner
also, is $450 for a painting enough to be a GFP?
Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry
Under 2-403, cheaters and deceivers transfer voidable title, meaning that a good faith purchaser for value will become the true owner
Here, with voidable title, GFP is defense to replevin
a. Least cost avoider is the merchant, so GFP will apply to protect the downstream (innocent) purchaser
Hood v. Webster
Back in GFP review often turns on who has BOP for good faith
Here, looked at first recording (burden of proof is on the party who claimed under unrecorded conveyance)
Mugaas v. Smith
Adverse possession was not recorded in the land records so defs didn’t know about it
Adverse possessor doesn’t have to record in land records
a. Should go talk to neighbors before buying; if they say they don’t claim the land, then try to later, you could use estoppel
Pardine v. Jane
Independent coneyance theory — Tenant’s obligation to pay rent and landlord’s obligation to provide quiet enjoyment are independent, meaning that one can exist without the other — So, one not performing doesn’t mean the other one gets out of too
(unless LL didn’t have possession to give tenant or if LL created the interruption)
Landlord only delivers right of possession, not actual possession
Tenants remain liable for the rent even if circumstances beyond landlord’s control prevent tenants from quietly enjoying the property
Sutton v. Temple
Does lease for “eddish” mean that grass is fit for consumption? Or does it just mean that tenant gets right to possess grass (like for a picnic)?
Tenant should have inspected/tested the grass first
Overall — tenants remain liable for the rent even if the property does not meet their needs such that they cannot enjoy the property
Smith v. Marrable
Lease of a furnished house means that there must be furniture for sleeping
Different from Sutton because:
a. Mixed lease
b. Renting of furnished apartment means furniture to sleep is expected (doesn’t apply to leasing land for eddish)
c. Lease for land could be for anything (doesn’t apply as much for chattle) we only know what’s in contract and we don’t want to presume anything
i. Eddish is a general word for grass
Blackett v. Olanoff
Tenants have an implied warranty of quiet enjoyment — if it’s interrupted, tenants can plead constructive eviction
Court says the tenant is responsible for what they cause and what they allow (nonfeasance is the same as misfeasance)
This problem is what makes it difficult to maintain a cultural district
Javins v. First National Realty Corp
This is one of the most famous rent strikes when landlord was allowing building to deteriorate (then was going to transfer to LLC and abandon)
This court— abrogates with habitability
What is the floor of habitability? — the code
a. This is all tenants are entitled to, even if they want more
b. You cannot contract out of warranty of habitatability (this is mandatory (but landlords will still include waivers in their lease because tenant may not know it’s unenforceable)
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo Association
looking to see if the CC&R violates because unreasonabl
Majority opinion — taking presumption that they know what’s best for them (unless it’s obviously unreasonable); wants categorical approach (otherwise costs go up; may lead to unrestrictive CC&Rs)
40 West 67th Street v. Pullman
There is a history of co-ops evicting people for discrimination, so RAPL 711(1) in place — which says you need complete evidence to the court to show termination is appropriate
This court says, statute fits into common law business judgment rule needs competent evidence (in statute) — this is the vote with the business judgment rule
Rothko v. Reis
Trustees are fiduciaries of trust beneficiaries. They must not only avoid conflicts of interest, but also the appearance of conflicts — They must act like what settlor would want, but if there’s a blurry line between what settlor would do, then act in beneficiary’s best interest — Trustees are generally jointly and severally liable (and no fidicuariy duty exists between them)
Trustees are liable for mismanaging assets
Need 1:1 entity identity for self-dealing (which this isn’t technically), but still conflict of interest (red flags raised)
Here, there was no trust in the will, but court uses constructive trust as an equitable remedy in order to sort things out
Fiduciary owes care, prudence, and loyalty (depends on reasonableness, hiring an outside counsel doesn’t releive of burden)
Wilber v. Owens
If conditions change such that it is no longer possible to carry out a donor’s intent, courts may use cy pres to reform the trust to best accomplish the settlor’s intent
Use interpretation (but not bound just by the document, not contracts)
Trusts are immortal as long as there’s money in it, so issues like this come up a lot
Timmer v. Gray
Equitable principle: unjust enrichment because Maggert acted in good faith
When FmHA got possession, it was in title only (not physical possession)
Why they can’t rely on GFP — $75 is not the value of the repaired disc (also duty to inspect)
mechanics lien
Murray v. Financial Development Corp
When bank bids on foreclosure, first they use credit bidding (then usually turns around and sells it quickly) (so bank is in better position when there’s debt because don’t need to put up as much cash; also has more knowledge)
Bank must market property or risk not doing their due diligence (what happened here) —> Low price itself supports lack of due diligence; The next sale itself isn’t the problem, but goes to the low price they got
Bank had “like a fiduciary duty” when selling foreclosure —> Need to get fair and reasonable price after effort, BUT don’t need to get fair market value though (this almost never happens in foreclosure)
The problem here is that they left so much equity on the table —> should have advertised better / postponed again
Jost v. Dairyland Power
Elements for nusiance —> impairment of quiet enjoyment + injury
Jury awards damages but answered no if there’s substantial injury (and said that there is a continuing nuisance)
Judge can overturn if there is no evidence supporting jury
Tangible injury — loss of crop + land quality
Def. wants nuisance to be about social utility and due care (court rejects)
Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company
Elements: unreasonable + interference with enjoyment + substantial and significant injury
Alleged injuries: property value iminution + marketability; loss of quiet enjoyment; sleeplessness, nervous (personal injury)
Dust alone is not a trespass
Tries to keep nuisance and trespass separate
Foreseeability is not an element
Need to look if the state has a statute
Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co
Applying a stricter rule because this is a populous area
Legislature made statute about nusicance with public health, so populous area gets a “thumb on the scale”
Statute “public nuisances dangerous to public health” allows the closing of the feedlot, but developer has to buy the quiet enjoyment (this is a forced sale)
A “taking” — if public brought the claim, would have to pay for the taking —> In equity, going to do the same thing; make developer pay acting in the public interest
“Coming into nusiance”
Schwab v. Timmons
1. No easement by necessity — wasn’t landlocked when owned by the common owner
2. No easement by implication— could use a staircase, also water is an entry point
3. Policy against hidden encumbrances — want to rely on records
4. Disfavor forced sales
5. What they have to do now: negotiate with property owners (going to be a high price now because lawsuit failed and no other option) or build a staircase
Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings
1. Asks if you need to pay for easements
2. Here, we knew it was hostile because failed negotiations
3. Permission is the only thing that definitely breaks continuous use and interrupts claim (not like adverse possession where you can go there a couple times a year and break exclusivity)
4. They should have given permission, then gotten an injuction—> If they violate an injunction, then contempt of court — this creates a path into public law
5. ∆ says: no injunction for a competed act —> Court says — act was completed in bad faith; court maintains equitable power
6. Court says you don’t have to pay for easement (like you don’t have to pay for adverse possession; and there’s a statute that says the title is good against all with an easement)
Holbrook v. Taylor
If they had permission to use the driveway, this would just be a license — But they improved (roadway, house) — Then servient tenant closed it off
π argues: prescriptive easement and easement by estoppel
Prescriptive easement fails because they had permission
Court says: “you watched this be built” (Rylands) — you can’t come into equity now
Estoppel works
Fontainebleau Hotel v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five
1. There was once a statute saying you can’t cast a shadow over another hotel, but Fontainebleau got rid of it before this suit
2. Sic uterea says you can’t use your property to injure another, but doesn’t mean you don’t have to deal with neighbors
3. Fontainebleau says they waited too long and also at some earlier point, Fontainebleau won so they built it (so estoppel by judgment doesn’t apply)
4. Court says ancient lights rights — for legislature, not rescuing them on this
Penn Bowling v. Hot Shoppes
The threat of easement termination comes through the court here (not one of the ways we listed previously)
Court says: Penn has to cut down to only be on the right (dominant) parcel
a. Misuse isn’t the problem here, it’s about what parcels are served
b. If this can’t be resolved (no way to not serve the 3rd parcl), then court can terminate the easement
Tulk v. Moxhay
Series of conveyances and it got forgotten
But court says, “not being in writing doesn’t mean we don’t enforce because then using statute of frauds for doing fraud” — this would harm original owner and other people in the area counting on subsequent purchasers following covenant
Once there is a covenant (in the recording chain of title), it binds all the way down
Neponsit Property Owners Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank
1. Clause creates an agency relationship - so the POA can step into can homeowner’s shoes as an agent for horizontal privity
2. Court says — payment alone doesn’t touch and concern the land BUT payment that is altering ownership (maintaining common areas) DOES touch and concern the land
Sandborn v. McClean
Part of a common plan — as parcels are sold, subject to the negative reciprocal easement
∆ says increased value because a corner parcel with a gas station is more valuable than a house — court say they don’t need to tear down, but it does have to be repurposed to fit with covenant (because covenants also about quiet enjoyment)
Implied — no longer recorded, but ∆s still had duty to inspect
Bolotin v. Ringe
Looks at factors with enforcing / not enforcing covenants other than economic benefits
This lot is the boundary between commercial and residential spaces — letting one more lot become commercial could overall lead to changed character
Need to preserve the residential character by preserving the buffer zone —> Don’t want to look at case by case basis
Peckham v. Milroy
Is Peckham injured? noisy, less parking, parents are on his land
But is this different than a family with a lot of kids? no, but this is a business
Can one neighbor sue another for taking up too much street parking? no, just something you have to deal with
∆ says: convenant abandoned, laches, equitable estoppel, public policy —> all fail
(public policy says no statutes prohibiting day care, but doesn’t prohibit private contracts prohibiting)
Shelly v. Kramer
1. Here, sheriffs showed up to forcibly evict the Shelley family
2. Court says this is also state action
3. Says private agreements are valid in the deed when no state action
Barrows v. Jackson
Looks at who can get damages
Jus terri problem — technically no equal protection issue with π
BUT court enforcing would mean that they are a party in enforcing discrimination against 14th amendment
So, says you can’t look to court to enforce these damages when they would be made a party in the discrimmination
Euclid v. Amber Reality
This is a facial claim (not as applied) — saying “it’s unconstitutional in general”, not “as applied to me”
Deferential, rational basis of review
Can’t do a covenant effectively, so moving into public law
police power —> allowed this zoning (right at same time as racially restrictive covenants struck down)
Harbison v. City of Buffalo
Says “under the police power, rights of property are impaired . . . because their free exercise is believed to be detrimental to public interests”
retroctive banning of non-nuisances is probably prohibited, but preemptive prohibitions of uses and amortization (if reasonable — considers length of time, social harm to continuance of use, private injury to the owner with discontinuance) are allowed
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
PUDs —> “excess children”, central air, noncumulative
NAACP says unconstituional with no affordable housing, this is how race and class interact
Economic class is not a protected class
Court uses high scruitiny
Court says:decisions must be made on a broader basis (including would-be residents) — needs to give low/moderate income classes “their fair share”
Requires municipality to rezone —> fails, so then builders remedy —> then state-level council on affordable housing
City of Ladue v. Horn
Family”: “One or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption, occupying a dwelling unit as an individual housekeeping organization” (other definitions —> nuns, group home, foster children —> also successfully evicted)
Evicted because city says this is single-family housing an unmarried couple living together (often better for taxes)
Court said not a family — municipality is allowed to have a preference
Process: neighbors can sue then city can evict
Standard of review: