Week 6 - Federalism and Democracy (not finished)

Belgian Independence and its history

• Belgian independence 1830

  • French dominant language, gradually a Flemish movement emerged to gain representation

  • Wanted Flemish language in schools, courts, etc.

  • 1870s this advanced but French still dominant

• Post WWI: heightened demand of attention for language

  • Split country into 3 areas: french, dutch and bilingual brussels

  • Linguistic boundaries reset on a census for every 10 years based on linguistic distribution changes

• Post WWII

  • War and occupation created defensibility for Belgian state

  • Shift in industrialization of Flemish part, economically stronger than French part (remains to this day)

• 1990s

  • Unstable governments, avg govt last one year only

  • Federal system introduced as a solution to this (1970-1993)

  • Not born as a federation, becomes one incrementally in 5 major reform movements

  • Creates longer lasting governments, but they are much harder to form (now famous for this) because of complexity of the federation

• 1995: establishing elections for central govt but also regional parliaments fully democratized in their own right (begins complexity of Belgian federation)

  • Federal govt with regional, linguistic based lines

• 3 linguistic regions, 3 regional govts, 6 governments in Belgium

  • 5 structures dealing with different issues, and the government

  • Both regions fighting over who gets to own and run the Brussels capital

Federalism, Democracy and Parties

• Federal democracy generally studied form the national standpoint - aiming to capture the central state

• Nation-states seen as divided into cleavage groups which form parties and compete

• Centre-periphery cleavage leads to integration, nationalizations, perhaps homogenization

• But we are paying more attention now to subunit party organization - why?

  • States have decentralized substantially in recent decades

  • The centre-periphery cleavage has resurfaced in the form of SNRPs: stateless nationalist and regionalist parties 

    • Not prepared to organize at the level of central institutional structures, only organizing their own subunit and representing their own regional/linguistic group, no interest in running the state, raise their own grievances

  • State-wide parties are ‘territorialized’ - adapting strategically to the changing multi-level environment

    • Placed in relation to specific territories in the broader state, all parties adapt to stateless nationalist and regionalist parties

The Belgian Case

• Belgian party system:

  • Postwar challenges came from the SNRPs - interest in putting pressure on the political system

  • 1960s/70s: Christian Democrats responded by splitting into two separate unilingual parties to compete in the regions - only appealing to either Flemish or Willonian, no interest in being nationally Belgian

    • Restructure to compete with these parties at their level

  • 1970s: Liberal and Socialist parties follow thei lead

  • These ‘regional’ parties began to promote federalization, parties driving this agenda in response to SNRP challenges

  • SNRPs remained as promoters of autonomy for their region, and remain coalition brokers in a system where there are always multiple parties forming coalitions

• Overall, Belgian parties participated in the decentralization of the state and system

The Belgian case pt. 2

• “Two party systems capture the competition for power within each language group, after which the winners on both sides need to find a compromise between positions that have been voiced while mobilizing the votes of their own language group only” (Deschouwer and Reuchamps)

  • The need to compete within these communities is of greater importance than competing nationally

  • Operate as two distinct parties, weak capacity for federal decision making

  • Either Purely Flemish or purely Wallonian, making decisions after this is difficult - joint decision trap

  • So distinct they cannot operate together, they start from scratch so they can cooperate together

• Effects:

  • Weak capacity for federal decision-making - joint decision trap

  • The need to cooperate comes after the election, and so the incentives are to take strong stands during elections and resist compromise

  • Lack of clarity as to the relationship between one’s vote and the formation of government

Belgium: Role of Intergovernmental Relations

• Belgium’s elections and intergovernmental relations (IGRs)

  • Regional parliaments were first elected in 1995.

  • When federal and regional elections were held together, IGRs were less important.

  • From 2003, elections were staggered. Each election required parties to rebuild coalitions, so IGRs helped create cooperation between levels of government.

  • Simultaneous elections have returned, reducing the need for IGRs, though federal elections can still fall out of sync.

• The role of parties

  • Flemish Christian Democrats and regionalists prefer staggered elections to give regional issues more attention.

  • Belgium is often described as a partitocracy: political parties have great influence.

  • But parties are organized by region, not as federal parties, making it harder for them to build and sustain a federal government

Belgian New Government

• Three Flemish parties: 1) NVA (Conservative Nationalist - New Flemish Alliance), 2) Christian Democrats (EPP, centre-right), 3) Vooruit (left)

• Also, two French parties: Les Engages (centrist), Reformist Movement (centre-right)

  • Complexity of governments, coalitions not forming based on ideological similarity

  • Must come together to resolve their attachments to their regions, different wants/needs for these regions

• After just seven months following the election!

  • Impressive in comparison to:

• Compared to 2010-11: 541 days

• 2018-20: 652 days (494 from the 2019 federal election)

  • Nature of party and election system, why Belgians stay together because resolving the Brussels problem is probably unlikely - cannot cut Brussels in half