Ethics Midterm Exam

Accordi g to William’s, an internal reason statement is true only if

The agent has some element in his motivational set (S) that would be served by the action

In the Graeter’s Icecream example, why does William’s thinkt he simplest (subhumean) model of internal reason is too restrictive

Because a person can aquire a new desire (to walk to graeters) through instrucmental reasoning from an existing desire and belief, even through that new desire wasn’t already in S

What does the Gin/petrol example primarly show

That a desire dependent on false belief does not give the agent a genuine reason to act on it, even though the false belief still explains the action

Owen Wingrave’s family he has a reason to join the army, despite his having no relevant motivation at all. Williams uses this case primarly to…

illustrate an ordinary-language external reason claim, and set up his argument that such a claim cannot, by itself, explain Owen’s action

Williams argues that the “acquiring a new motivation” move (on behalf of external reasons) fails because

there is no exisitng motivation for the agent to deliberate from in order to reach an entirely new one; and if the new motivation could be reached from the agent’s actual S after all, it would just be an internal reason

In Scanlon’s own example, he coes to value personal honor after

comng to admire a friend who took the idea seriously, and gradually coming to share the friend’s reaction

In Scanlon’s discussion, Mr O’Brien is someone who

Ha sa genuine concern (for being a gracious host) but poor judgment about how to act on it, so that he has an internal reason he cannot recognize

William’s revised proposition has two horns: A desire fails to give you a reason either because the desire itself depends on a false belief, or because your belief that this stuff would satisfy the desire is false. He illustrates both horns using the Gin and Petrol case, described two different ways, those ways are…

Described as “the desire to drink what’s in the bottle,” the desire itself depends on the false belief that the bottle contains gin. described as “the desire to drink gin,” the belief that this stuff would satisfy the desire is false.

In our own words explain why Williams thinks an external reason statement cannot, by itself, explain an agent’s action. Then explain his further argument that merely coming to believe such a statement cannot manufacture a brand-new motivation either (Owen Wingrave example may be useful).

William’s thinks that an external reason statement cannot, by itself, explain an agent’s actions because he believes that an agent’s actions require a desire or reason from their subjective motivational set, which is internal, not external. External motivations, by themselves do not have any connection to the agent and without an internal connection to the agent action, external motivations cannot explain the actions. Owen’s family argued that Owen had an external reason to join the army, but this external reason alone could not explain how Owen ended up joining the army. Williams goes on to explain how Owen’s coming to believe that he has an external reason to join the army does not manufacture new motivation to actually joint he army. The motivation to join the army comes from Owen’s arriving at the belief through sound deliberation.

Scanlon argues that William’s “sound deliberation route” test needs revising: instead of asking what the agent, with his actual deficiences of imagination or sensitivity, could reach by deliberating from his own S, we should ask what a nondefective version of that agent would reach. Using the contrast between Mr. O’Brien and his son (who lacks even O’brien’s basic capacity to see anything to be said for hospitality), explain why Scanlon thinks the orgional, unrevised test gives the wrong answer in at least one of these cases. Then say whether yout hinkt his revision still counts as genuienly intetrlist view, or whether it has effectively conceded the externalist;s main point

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Smith calls it the “objectivity” of moral judgement, that in ordinary practice, we treat moral questions as:

questions with correct answers made true independently of anyone’s opinion, discoverable through open-minded argument

As Smith uses the terms, the practicality requirement differs from rationalism in that:

Rationalism is the stronger claim, entailing the practicality requirement but not the reverse

Smith’s color-blind analogy is meant to suggest that:

just as lacking color experience can block full masterly of color concepts, lacking moral motivation can block full grasp of moral concepts.

The Humean “belief-desire model” holds that

beliefs aim to represent how the world is, desires aim at how it should be, and the two are always separate “distinct existences”

State the practicality requirement in your own words

If someone judges that it is morally right to do X in C circumstances, than either that person is motivated to do X or they are practically irrational.

In chapter 1 (1.1) Smith opens by distinguishing questions in normative ethics from questions in meta-ethics. In one or two sentences, state the difference, and give one example of each

The difference between normative ethics and meta0-ethics is the types of questions they set out to answer. Normative ethics asks questions about what we ought to do and which actions are right and wrong. For example, “is it moral to lue when doing so to protect someone from physical or metnal harm?” Meta-ethics asks questions about more judgements themselves. For example, “Are moral claims objectively true?”

State Brink’s amorlaist challenge: what is it supposed to show, and about which of Smith’s claims?

Someone who makes genuine moral judgements understands that an action is morally required but is unmotivated to act. It is supposed ot show the way in which motivation and moral judgement are connected. It is offered as a counter qrgument to Smith’s Moral Internalism Practicallity Requirement.

Maria sincerely judges that she should apologize to her sister. She feels no pull whatsoever to do it – and by her own account this isn’t weakness of will, and there’s no competing reason at work; she simply doesn’t care anymore. Does Maria’s case count as a counterexample to the practicality requirement, or not? Explain in two to three sentences.

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Smith’s chapter turns on three claims: (1) moral judgements express beliefs about objective facts; (2) sincerely judging that you should φ means, other things equal, being motivated to φ (practicality); and (3) motivation always requires a distinct desire plus belief, where belief and desire can always be pulled apart (the Humean picture). In three to four sentences, explain why these three claims cannot all be true at once.

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Foot’s central point against Kant is that being “categorcial” (binding regardless of desire) is not byitself, enough to show a requirement is a requirent of reason, because:

Etiquette rules are equally categorical, yet no one thinks breaking them makes you irrational

Smith’s first reply to Foot’s institutional model of morality is that it fails, because a morally good person’s concern for honestly or for her friends must be:

direct and non-derivative, not merely a matter or complying with a reconginzed rule

Smith’s “expectation argument” for rationalusm claims that we expect rational agents to converge on the same moral verdict because:

being rational, independent of any agent’s particular desires, must be sufficient to align her with morality

The difference between Smith’s P1 and P2 (the strong vs. Weak Humean claims) is that:

P1 is the strong claim that the reason is constitutied by desire and belief; P2 is weaker

The Gin and Petrol Case in Smith’s (4.2) is meant to show that

an agent can have both the relevent desire and belief, yet have no normative reason to act

The Besire proposal (4.7) holds that

The belief that an act is right is the desire to preform it, as one unitary state

Who is the author of “The Moral Problem”

Thomas Scanlon

George is stand on someone’s foot, causing pain, but he has no desire at all to move - if anything, he would rather keep standing there. According to 4.2 does George have a motivating reason to get off? Does George have a normative reason to get off?

George does noit have a motivating reason to get off said person’s foot. However, George does have a normative reason to get off of said person’s foot because he has a moral requirement not to cause “needless” pain which is what he is doing by standing on the foot.

State the besire proposal, and explain Smith’s reply to it (his weakness-of-will point).

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In your own words, explain the direction-of-fit metaphor as it applies to desire and belief.

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Explain the difference between a motivating reason and a normative reason. Give one example that illustrates the contrast. 

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William’s argues that believing “at will” is impossible mainly because

beliefs “aim at truth” or purport to represent reality

Bennett introduces the credamites - a community who can decide to believe - in order to

offer a counterexample to William’a argument that no -one can believe at will

On Bennett’s propsed test, an activity counts as voluntary if it can be

Done immediately, as a basic action, in response to practical reasons

A content-related reason for believing that p is a consideration that bears on

whether P is in fact true

Finding a constitutive reason for a belief convincing

just is believing - there is no further step

In the example of calling your friend to check they made it home safely through a storm, wanting to sleep is:

an extrinsic reason that prompts an investigation, whose result can supply a constitutive reason

“Evaluative control” over a belief is…

Controlling the belief by directly answering the very question it turns on

“Managerial control” over a belief is best described as

indirect - you act on yourself through soe process to try to produce the belief

According to Hieronymi, even the Credamites do not really “believe at will” because

bringing yourself to believe, however quickly remains distinct from the believing it processes

Hieronymi’s example involving an upcoming wednesday exam and the fact that “today is friday” is used to show that

the same consideration can provide both a constitutive and an extrsinic reasonf or the same belief, at once