1/197
Get that money pleighboi
UCC
Sale of goods (pay special attention to whether someone is a merchant - expert piano player buying rare piano counts as a merchant)
special knowledge of goods being bought.
Goods are all things moveable at time of identification (if the earth gets flipped, it falls off)
Is this person a merchant, and is the deal within their specialty?
Offer
An offer is a manifestation of willigness to bargain that leads the other person to reasonably believe their assent will conclude the deal. It is not an offer if the offeree knows or has reason to believe that further assent is needed.
Offer Objective Theory
The outward manifestation and conduct of the parties determine the contract formation (Lucy v. Zehmer). Jokes, hyperbole, or vague statements are not offers (Kolodziej v. Mason: smartass law student)
Preliminary Negotiations
Discussions that do not constitute an offer because the recipient knows or has reason to know that the person making the communication does not intend to conclude a bargain without a further manifestation of assent.
Written Contract to Follow
A binding oral contract can exist even if the parties plan to write it up later, but not if either party intended to be bound only by a signed writing (Continental Lab v. Scott Paper)
Statement of Opinion
A statement of belief (i think this car is a great deal) is not considered to be an offer, promise, or warranty because a reasonable listener would not treat it as a commitment or rely on it.
An opinion can be treated as a fact when the speaker has special expertise or superior knowledge and the listener reasonably relies on it
Indefiniteness
Essential terms such as parties, subject matter, price, quantity, and time must be reasonably certian. The terms are too indefinite to enforce if a court cannot tell what the parties agreed to or cannot figure out an appropriate remedy.
UCC 2-204(3): a contract does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended to contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for a remedy (eg. we will determine the lease rate next year based on the average california rental rates for townhomes)
Volker v. Santa Fe
No offer where the offeree knew another person’s approval was still needed (buyer/lesee knew other brother’s consent needed before contract finalized so represents a preliminary negotiation)
Options Contract
Under common law, an option contract is an agreement in which the offeror promises not to revoke an offer in return for the offeree providing consideration (eg. a $100 fee is given to keep a real estate offer irrevocable for 30 days).
an offer is binding as an option contract if the offeror should reasonably expect it to induce substantial action or forbearance by the offeree before acceptance
The mailbox rule does not apply, so acceptance must be received within the option period
How do Options Contracts and Firm Offers Intertwine with the Mailbox Rule
The mailbox rule does not apply to an options contract and UCC firm offers. The acceptance must be received within the option period to be effective.
UCC 2-205: Firm Offer
A merchant’s signed written offer that promises to stay open is irrevocable without consideration, for the stated time (or a reasonable time), for a maximum of three months.
If on the offeree’s form, the assurance must be signed separately
The mailbox rule does not apply here, so acceptance must be received
Unilateral Contracts (Irrevocable Offers)
Once the offeree starts performing, the offeror can no longer revoke (Brooklyn Bridge Hypothetical)
Advertisements
Advertisements are usually an invitation to bargain, but are not offers, since they go to the general public (fulfilling offer would be impossible). An advertisement is an offer if it is clear, definite, and explicit, leaving nothing open for negotiation (Lefkowitz v. Minneapolis Surplus Store).
The advertiser can change an offer before acceptance but cannot add new conditions after acceptance
Bait and Switch: advertising a product the seller does not intend to sell
Unilateral Contract
A promise for performance
Bilateral Contracts
A promise for a promise
Express Contract
Formed by offer and acceptance. Explicit.
Implied-in-Fact Contract
Contract inferred from the conduct and circumstances of all parties, requires all contract elements, including a meeting of the minds (Stepp v. Freeman)
Implied-in-law
Not a true contract but rather a court-imposed fix for unfairness after the fact
Meyer v. Uber Technologies
Online terms bind users who have reasonable notice of them. A clean screen, visible without scrolling, with the hyperlink next to the sign-up button, is enough.
Acceptance
Assent to the offer’s terms, made in the manner in which the offer invites or requires. The offeror is master of the offer and can set the method. (Beard Implement v. Krusa: if a signature is required, no contract until signed).
UCC 2-206: Offer and Acceptance
Any reasonable manner works to accept unless the offer clearly says otherwise.
If the offer does not specify, any reasonable medium is fine, and an offer to buy goods can be accepted by a prompt promise to ship or by prompt shipment. Shipping nonconforming goods is both an acceptance and a breach, unless the seller promptly notifies the buyer that the shipment is only an accommodation.
If acceptance is by beginning of performance, the offeree must notify the offeror within a reasonable time or the offeror may treat the offer as lapsed.
Acceptance by Performance
At least part of what was requested must be performed or tendered.
Acceptance by promise
The offeree must complete every act needed to make the promise.
Acceptance Modification
A contract can be modified after acceptance, but only if both parties agree
Silence As Acceptance
Silence generally is not acceptance unless:
the offeree takes the benefit of services, with a chance to reject and reason to know payment was expected (Day v. Caton: building a wall)
the offeror said or led the offeree to believe silence would work, and the offeree intends to accept.
Prior dealings make it reasonable to expect the offeree to speak up if rejecting.
An offeree who acts inconsistently with the offeror’s ownership of offered property is bound by the offered terms (unless manifestly unreasonable)
Terminating Power of Acceptance
An offeree’s power of acceptance may be terminated by:
rejection or counter offer
revocation by the offeror
lapse of time
death/incapacitation of the offeror or offeree: does not terminate if death happens after K agreed to
Restatement §48: non-occurrence of a condition in the offer
Rejection (Restatement §38)
Ends the power to accept, unless the offeree says they are only considering it. A counteroffer is also a rejection. A mere inquiry about terms or a request for better terms is not.
Revocation
The offer must communicate that they no longer wish to deal either directly or indirectly (from a credible 3rd party source). (Dickinson v. Dodds: revocation was effective because the offeree learned from another source that the property had been sold)
Lapse of Time
Performance must happen within a reasonable time. Loring v. City of Boston: A reward offer was dead after four years because the police officer and general public, whom the offer was aimed at, had presumably forgotten about the offer.
Princess Cruise Lines v. GE
GE’s final offer rejected the original and changed terms, so it was a counteroffer that was later accepted. The jury wrongly relied on Princess’ contract as final agreement when the GE offer should have been the final agreement based on common law.
Mailbox Rule: Restatement §63
Acceptance is effective when sent, not when received. It also applies to fax and email. It does not apply to option contracts or firm offers.
Acceptance is effective on dispatch even if it is lost in the mail, as long as it was properly addressed and sent by a reasonable medium. Revocations and rejections are effective only when received;
if an offeree sends a rejection and then an acceptance, whichever the offeror receives first controls (Restatement §40)
International Sales: acceptance is effective when received, but the offeror cannot revoke once acceptance has been sent.
Mirror Image Rule
Common Law: Acceptance must match the offer exactly. Adding or deleting terms makes it a counteroffer
Last Shot Principle: under the common law approach, the last form sent before performance controls, because each reply is a counteroffer that is accepted when the other side performs.
UCC2-207 abandons this rule (see Battle of the Forms)
Consideration
The bargained-for exchange: each party promises to do or not do something (forbearance) because of what they get from the other.
Restatement §71: the performance or return promise must be sought by the promisor in exchange for the promise and given by the promisee in exchange for it.
It need not benefit the promisor; it only needs to be what the promisor bargained for (Forbearance - Hammer v. Sidway)
A promise to make a gift lacks consideration (altruism is not consideration)
Failure of consideration: the promisor never actually got what they bargained for.
Courts do not weigh on the adequacy of consideration
Nominal Consideration
When the consideration is so small that it can’t reasonably be considered a bargain. A promise such as $600 for a promise of one cent is a gift and not a bargain (Schnell v. Nell).
1464-Eight v. Joppich
A promise to pay $10 is valid consideration even if never paid (A written contract is enforceable even if consideration is never paid or delivered).
Consideration does not have to be delivered for it to count as consideration,.
Forbearance to Sue (Restatement §74)
Giving up a claim is consideration only if the claim was objectively doubtful, or if the person honestly believed it might be valid. A signed written release is consideration if bargained for.
Illusory Promises
They look real but are not (I’ll buy you a coat if I feel like it). Promisor maintains unlimited right to decide whether they will perform or not which shows no real commitment.
Alternative Promises
A promise to do A or B is consideration only if each alternative would itself be consideration. (Can choose between two or more distinct actions to satisfy K). Reasonable efforts promises (good faith attempts to reach a goal) are also real consideration
Wood v. Lucy
Manager’s promise to use reasonable efforts to benefit Lucy can be implied/proven from the exclusive relationship and the profit-sharing deal.
Plaintiff’s promise to pay defendant half of profits and revenues and to account monthly shows intention to bring profits and revenues into existence. The plaintiff’s duties to Lucy and the fact that her benefits relied entirely on the plaintiff’s work, shows that there was value to the promise.
UCC 2-306: Output
Quantity is what is actually produced or needed in good faith, not unreasonably disproportionate to estimates or past levels. Exclusive dealing means best efforts.
Morin Building v. Baystone
When a contract says the work must satisfy someone, a reasonable person standard applies. Rejecting work over aesthetic whim fails.
The plaintiff’s work must be subjected to a reasonable person standard. Contract was too ambiguous about artistic effect and decision as to acceptability and circumstances didn’t lend itself for GM to reject work of plaintiff based on aesthetic whim
No reasonable person could expect finish/material of wall to be uniform considering the material itself was defined as being impossible to be uniform.
Hayes v. Plantation Steel
The promise must come before the act. Hayes retired before knowing of the pension promise so no consideration.
Mills v. Wyman
Moral obligation alone is not consideration. (Dad offers to cover son’s medical expenses but reneges)
Webb v. McGowin
Moral obligation plus a material benefit received (his life being saved) can support a promise
Restatement §86: Material Benefit Rule
A promise made because of a benefit received is binding to the extent needed to prevent injustice. Not binding if the benefit was a gift or promise disproportionate to the benefit.
Past Consideration
A promise made after the fact in return for something the promisee already did was not bargained for, so generally there is no consideration (Mills v. Wyman is exception because material benefit received without anything being given back so past consideration can be utilized to make the exchange equitable for both parties)
Pre-Existing Duty Rule
A promise of extra pay for work already owed has no new consideration (Harris v. Watson & Stilk v. Myrick: crew already had to cover for missing sailors)
Exceptions: a modification is binding if it is fair and equirable because of the circumstances the parties did not anticipate when the contract was made and new or different performance by the other party can be consideration
Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery
The architect already had to keep working, and his demand for extra commission was made in bad faith so no consideration
UCC 2-209: Modification, Rescission, and Waiver
Modifications of goods contracts need no new consideration but must be made in good faith. Extorting a modification is invalid.
2-209(2): if a signed agreement says it can be modified only by a signed writing, that requirement must be followed (but on a merchant’s form it must be separately signed by the other party)
2-209(3): a modification that brings the contract with the Statute of Frauds must satisfy it
2-209(4): a failed modification can still operate as a waiver
2-209(5): a waiver of an executory term can be retracted with reasonable notice unless the other party has materially changed position in reliance
UCC 2-207 (1): Battle of the Forms
K is based on writings if reply is a definite and timely expression of acceptance (or written confirmation) is an acceptance even with additional or different terms, unless the acceptance is expressly condition on the offeror agreeing to the new terms.
2-207 (2): If it is an acceptance, extra terms are proposals. Between merchants they become part of the contract unless: 1) the offer limits acceptance to its own terms, 2) they materially alter the deal, 3) the offeror objects (within a reasonable time). Between non-merchants, extra terms are only proposals.
2-207 (3): if the writings do not form a contract but both parties perform, a contract exists (based on their conduct). Its terms are those on which the writings agree, plus UCC gap fillers.
Material alternation: a term materially alters the deal if including it without express awareness would cause surprise or hardship.
Different Terms: Majority rule is to knock out conflicting terms and fill the gap with UCC gap filler. Minority Rule is to let the offeror’s terms control or treat different terms like additional terms.
Commerce & Industry v. Bayer
No enforceable arbitration clause, because the parties did not agree to it in writing. Where terms conflict and parties perform, only the agreed terms survive
Northrop v. Litronic
Mirror image rule: acceptance is valid even if additional terms are stated, unless acceptance is conditional on assent to additional terms. Additional terms not valid until both parties agree to them however. Be aware that this conflicts with common law where any discrepancies between contracts mean that no contract has been formed
UCC 2-207 Gap Filler: Conflicting terms are both dropped and gap filler is applied. Gap filler applied by judge made 5 to 6 months a reasonable amount of time for the circuit boards to be returned under warranty (Due to complexity of testing boards)
Under UCC 2-207: contact formed when seller sends a sales acknowledgement, not when buyer sends money.
Promissory Estoppel
Elements are a promise, foreseeable reliance, actual reliance and injustice unless enforced.
Restatement §90: a promise the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial characters, and which does induce it, is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.
Universal Computer v. Medical Services
A principal can be bound by a promise from an agent with apparent authority.
Universal relied on Gebert’s promise to its detriment as bid was not delivered on time due to Blue Shield’s failure to perform.
Dixon v. Wells Fargo
Wells Fargo’s promise to consider the Dixons for a loan modification if they defaulted and provided financial information was sufficiently specific to induce reliance
The Dixon’s reasonably relied on this promise by ceasing payments and submitting financial information, which left them vurlnerable to foreclosure
Enforcing the promise would not impose substantive requirements on Wells Fargo’s lending practices but would ensure fair dealing.
Branco v. Delta Roofing
A contract may be formed between a general contractor and subcontractor based on the general contractor’s reliance on the subscontractor’s bid
Branco relied on Delta’s bid in formulating its general contractor bid and Delta acknowledged this reliance. Delta’s refusal to perform caused Branco to incur additional costs, resulting in damages.
Walker v. Keith
Indefiniteness: terms in the lessor and lesee agreement were not valid because it was too vague linguistically. The terms did not specify either an agreed rental price or an agreed method by which it could be determined with certainty (eg. future rent rates will be determined based on average rent prices for townhomes in California)
Rego v. Decker
Purchase options agreement was sufficiently definite to warrant specific performance of contract because the terms could be reasonably interpreted and gaps could be filled to reflect both parties’ reasonable expectations.
Restatement §213: Parole Evidence Rule
A binding integrated agreement discharges inconsistent prior agreements. A completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements within its scope. Evidence of earlier deals can supplement a partly integrated writing but typically can’t contradict it (unless issues like misrepresentation or fraud exist aka Avoidance Doctrines)
UCC 2-202: Parole or Extrinsic Evidence
A writing intended as the final expression cannot be contradicted by prior or contemporaneous agreements. A final contract can be explained or supplemented (supported but not contradicted) by course of dealing, usage of trade, course of performance, and consistent additional terms (unless the writing is complete and exclusive)
Restatement §216: Consistent Additional Terms (Admissibility)
Consistent additional terms are allowed unless the agreement is completely integrated. It is not completely integrated if the omitted term was agreed for separate consideration or would naturally be left out (UCC 2-20 comment 3: if the term would certainly have been included, exclude it)
Thompson v. Libbey
If a written agreement is complete and unambiguous, the law presumes it contains the entire agreement between the parties.
Oral evidence cannot be used to show a writing is incomplete or to add written terms, as this would cause a he say/she say issue that the parole evidence rule attempts to stop.
Collateral Agreements
Separate from the main contract, so the rule does not apply for these agreements (Lee v. Seagram: terms for family shareholders would naturally be in a separate agreement from the business sale)
Merger Clause
States that the writing is the complete and final agreement. It is strong evidence of complete integration but not conclusive.
Parole Evidence Does Not Bar
Evidence of fraud
Duress
Mistake
Illegality
Lack of consideration
Evidence to interpret ambiguous terms
Evidence of later modifications
Evidence that a condition to the K taking effect was not met
Collateral Agreements
UCC 1-303: Interpretation through Course of Dealing, Usage of Trade and Course of Performance
Contracts can be interpreted through:
Course of dealing: the parties’ previous conduct that establishes a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct
Usage of Trade: any practice or method of dealing having such regularity that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question
Course of performance: evidence that one party repeatedly performed the contract in question in a particular way, and the other party accepted such performance even though they had the opportunity to object to it (refers to K in question)
Priority express terms
Priority Order: express terms, course of performance, course of dealing, usage of trade
Restatement §201: Whose Meaning Prevails
If both parties meant the same thing, that controls. If they meant different things, one party’s meaning wins only if that party did not know of the other’s meaning and the other party knew (or had reason to know) of theirs. Otherwise there may be no mutual assent.
Restatement §202: Rules in Aid of Interpretation
Read in light of all circumstances; read the writing as a whole; common words get their usual meaning and technical terms their technical meaning; course of performance gets the great weight
Restatement §203: Standards of Preference for Ambiguous Writing
Prefer meanings that give effect to all terms; specific over general; negotiated over standardized terms
Priority Order: express terms, course of performance, course of dealing, usage of trade
Restatement §206 / §207: Interpretation favors Who?
206: Ambiguity is read against the drafter
207: Prefer the meaning that serves the public interest
Angus Chemical v. Glendora
A right of way easement option allowed for the construction, maintanence, and replacement of a pipeline. The original 12 inch pipeline was leaking so Angus built a 16 inch replacement pipeline in 2012, abondoning the 12 inch pipeline after cleaning and capping it. Glendora objects abandoning of pipeline as “replacing” term in contract did not mean it should have been completely abandoned.
The court found the term “replace“ to be ambiguous in this context as it could mean either substituting or replacing the old pipeline. This is an issue of material fact which meant the previous summary judgement ruling for Angus was improper
PG&E v. GW Thomas Drayage
GW Thomas was contracted to replace a turbine cover for PG&E under the indemnity clause covering property damage. During the work, the turbine cover fell and damaged PG&E’s turbine, PG&E then sues for 25k in repair costs. GW Thomas says indemnity clause only applies to 3rd party property.
To decide whether a K is ambigous, the court must first consider relevant extrinsic evidence of what the parties intended. Language of indemnity clause could have been reasonably susceptible to GW Thomas interpretation.
If the wording is clear and unambiguous than nothing else to do. However, If unambiguous, Look at not just words but words with context and circumstances in mind.
Here, the indemnity clause (indemnity from ALL LOSS) was clear and unambiguous so extrinsic evidence should not be allowed.
Warranty of Title
The seller promises to pass good title. UCC 2-312 also warrants that the goods are free of liens and encumbrances the buyer did not know about and, for a merchant seller, free of infringement claims.
Express Quality Warranty
Created by statement of fact, a description, a promise, a description, a promise about the goods, or a sample or model. It need not be written or intended as a warranty, but it must be part of the basis of the bargain (something that could have played a party in the buyer’s decision). Reliance is presumed unless the seller proves otherwise.
Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Goods must do their ordinary job. This warranty applies only when the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind (UCC 2-314)
Merchantable goods pass without objection in the trade, are fit for their ordinary purposes, are adequately packaged and labeled, and match any promises on the label.
Implied quality warranties are created by the legislature to fulfill the buyer’s typical expectation concerning the items purchased.
Implied Warranty of Fitness (For a Particular Purpose)
Arises when the seller knows the buyer’s special use (eg. boots for climbing mount everest) and the buyer relies on the seller (UCC 2-315).
Unlike merchantability, this warranty can come from any seller, not just a merchant, and the buyer must actually rely on the seller’s skill or judgment to pick suitable goods.
Seller Defenses to Warranty
Parole evidence rule against express warranties
disclaimers of implied warranties
buyer’s failure to find obvious defects when the buyer examined the goods or refused to examine them (UCC 2-316)
Warranty Disclaimer Rules (UCC 2-316)
To disclaim merchantability, the disclaimer must mention “merchantability” and, if written, be conspicuous.
To disclaim fitness, it must be in writing and conspicuous.
“As is” or “with all faults” disclaims all implied warranties.
A disclaimer cannot contradict an express warranty. Course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade can also exclude implied warranties.
Original Statute of Frauds
executor promising to pay the estate’s debt
promisor agrees personally to guarantee the debts of another person
promises made in consideration of marriage
sale of an interest in land
Statute of Frauds: What Must Be In Writing
Marriage
Year (Cannot possible be performed in a year)
Land sales or interests (title, fixed term leases, a right to use the land of another owner)
Executor
Goods (UCC: 500 or more)
Surety (guarantee of another’s debt)
Statute of Frauds: Sufficient Writing (Common Law)
Any writing signed by the party being sued that:
a) identifies the subject matter
b) shows a contract was made or offered; and
c) states the essential terms with reasonable certainty
Any symbol made or adopted with an intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as that of the signer
Statute of Frauds: Sufficient Writing (UCC 2-201)
A writing is not insufficient because it omits or misstates a term, but the contract is enforceable only up to the extent stated
must be signed: signed includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing
Statute of Frauds: Multiple Writings
Restrictive View: Allowed if the signed writing refers to the unsigned one or they are attached
Liberal View: Allowed if all clearly concern the same transaction
Statute of Frauds: Modifications
If the original contract was within the State of Frauds, the modification must be written. If the modification newly brings it within the Statute of Frauds, it must be written.
Statute of Frauds Exceptions
Restitution
Partial Performance
Goods: Performance of sale of goods, goods for which payment has been made or received and accepted, custom ordered goods
Admissions: a party who admits the promise in court cannot raise the statute of frauds
Merchant Confirmation (UCC 2-201): between merchants, a written confirmation sent within a reasonable time that is received will satisfy the SOF unless recipient gives written notice of objection (party receiving must know of contents).
Promissory Estoppel
Statute of Frauds Exceptions: Goods
(UCC 2-201): an oral contract is enforceable for goods already paid for and accepted, goods received and accepted or custom made goods where the seller has begun production
Statute of Frauds Exceptions: Merchant Confirmation
(UCC 2-201): between merchants, a written confirmation sent within a reasonable time satisfies the SOF unless the recipient objects in writing. The objection must be written and sent within 10 days after the confirmation is received. Failing to object only removes the SOF defense; the contract must still be proved.
Mutual Mistake
No contract if both parties share a mistaken assumption that materially affects the deal, unless the harmed party bore the risk.
Types: mutual mistake (both parties wrong about a basic assumption, Restatement §152)
Types: unilateral mistake (one party wrong; the contract is voidable only if enforcing it would be unconscionable or the other party knew or had reason to know of the mistake or caused it, Restatement
Raffles v. Wichelhaus
Mutual Misunderstanding: Ambiguity in contract regarding identity of ship delivering cotton. No consensus on this term meant that there was no binding contract. Both parties didn’t know which “pearless ship” the other party wanted/was referring to.
Lenawee County v. Messerly
Mutual Mistake: Even though all parties misunderstood the house as being income generating because they didn’t know of septic issue, “as is” clause allocated risk of loss to Picked. Therefore they must assume the risk in this case of the proeprty being uninhabitable because of the sewage issue.
Vokes v. Arthur Murray
Regular puffery (saying you have the best dance studio in the state) is fine and not fraudulent misrepresentation.
The constant barrage of puffery is an exception which could be viewed as misrepresentation. The specific issue here is that Arthur Murray was the only one int he agreement who could objectively judge whether Vokes was a good dancer or not. Vokes did not have the ability to assess her own dancing ability therefore if the studio tells her she’s good then she can take it as a fact and saying she’s good when she is not can be classified as fradulent misrepresentation. Therefore the contract can be rescinded.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
A false assertion of fact (or active concealment) that is material or intended to induce assent, made knowingly or recklessly, with justifiable reliance by the other party. The contract is voidable by the misled party.
Silence is generally not misrepresentation, but a duty to disclose can arise when disclosure is needed to prevent a mistake about a basic assumption and nondisclosure would be contrary to good faith, when there is a fiduciary or confidential relationship, or when half-truth would mislead.
Intentional Fraud v. Innocent Misrepresentation
A fraudulent misrepresentation is made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, and it makes the contract voidable. An innocent but material misrepresentation is a false statement made without that knowledge, but one likely to induce a reasonable person to agree: if the other party justifiable relied on it, the contract is still voidable (rescission)
Cousineau v. Walker
Cousineau boughy property for its gravel, but upon trying to remove gravel, he found that the property had significantly less gravel then advertised.
Misrepresentation in this case meant that Cousineau didn’t feel that he had to check the gravel amount because the sellers had already done so. While somewhat irresponsible, his actions were not irrational or in bad faith so he is allowed to recover.
A buyer of land can’t recover if their acts in faiing to discover defects are wholly irrational, preposterous or in bad faith. The misrepresentation here was also material because they heavily influenced the buyer’s decision to purchase the property.
Stambovsky v. Ackerly
Equity permits rescission of a contract where the condition created by the seller materially impairs the value of the contract and is unlikely to be discovered by a prudent purchaser.
In this case, it was impossible for the home buyer to determine whether the house as haunted or not if he performed an ordinary inspection of property or due diligence.
The defendant fostered the home’s reputation for being haunted by releasing public statements and promotions which materially impaired the property’s value and resaleability. The defendant took advantage of buyer’s ignorance of house’ reputation when selling home, making the contract inequitable meaning hte contract can be invalidated.
Zippysack v. Ontel
The contract was valid because Ontel had the chance to bargain for 120k but, at the time, bargained for 80k meaning they relinquished their rights to produce more units after preliminary settlement. Because of this, it is not unconscionable for contract to be performed.
Totem Marine v. Alyeska
Duress is applicable here because Alyeska deliberately withheld payment of acknowledged debt, knowing that Totem had no choice but to accept an inadequate sum in settlement of debt because of Totem’s pending bankruptcy.
They also knew that Totem had no other way to meet its pressing debts other than accepting immediate cash.
Totem involuntary accepted an inadequate settlement because of a desperate situation.
Odorizzi v. Bloomfield
Undue Influece: School officials did apply excessive pressure by visiting Odorizzi’s apartment and insisting he resign (without consulting an attorney) while also emphasizing the embarrassment of the situation publicly if he didn’t resign.
Odorizzi was in weakened state because of arrest and lack of sleep (he didn’t sleep for 40 hours)
Bennett v. Hayes
Defendant brings car for repair work. No written estimate provided. After completing initial repair, repair shop says additional work needed because car is inoperable. The defendant says go ahead with the work and a price of $200 is agreed to for the additional work (though no written estimate received) but D was billed $500 for the work.
The plaintif violated the law by failing to provide the defendant with a written estimate. Plaintiff’s equitable relief argument was denied because he failed to provide a reasonable value for his services.
Illegality (Restatement 178)
A promise to do something illegal, or a contract that violates a statute or public policy, is generally unenforceable (Restatement 178). Illegality covers violations of public policy and criminal acts.