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Collective action
R=B*P-C, rational to cooperate R>0, B=benefit to individual, P=probability of individual being decisive, C=cost of participating
D
Selective incentive, idiosyncratic reasoning, e.g. satisfaction of voting
Downs - seletive incentives
can motivate people to vote, but are not enough to incentivise individuals to be well informed in their voting as chances of being decisive are low
Condorcet Jury Theorem
Voters do not need to be well-informed for the majority to return the right answer, given voters have a greater chance of being right than wrong, and some voters come to their deciison independently
General theory of rationality assumptions
Morgenstern and Neumann, desire satisfaction, completeness, transivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, continuity
Expected utility theory and cardinal utility
utility x probability, general solution from phil
Decision theory - type of choice model
Steele, the intentional attitudes and choice of a single person or agent, e.g. expected utility
Social choice theory
Steele, models a group of agents who must reconcile their attitudes in order to act as a single agent with shared attitudes, e.g. electoral system
Game theory
Steele, strategic interations amoungst individuals
Critisisms of expected utility theory
descriptive challenge (doesn’t include how people act and what they care about), unfalsifiable - can always add more detail, reductionalist critique - social arrangements shape individual decisions, not the other way around
Framing effects
if framing affects choices - transivity and independence of irrelevant choices is violated - Kahneman and Tversky argue yes