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Give me the 4 inviolable Parameters of the PL System
1. First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
2. Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
3. Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
4. Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes.
In Veterans, was it held that the 20% allocation for partylist seats were mandatory?
No:
HELD: NO, the 20% allocation found in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling. The Constitution conveys the message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. Exercising its discretion, Congress deemed it necessary to obtain at least 2% of the total votes to be entitled to a PL seat. The Court’s task is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process.
Describe the Ang Bagong Bayani doctrine?
FACTS: COMELEC allowed 154 parties, including major political parties, to join the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners (Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna) questioned this, arguing that the system was meant only for marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
ISSUES: Is the party-list system exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations?
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the party-list system is intended primarily for the marginalized and underrepresented. While political parties may join, they must genuinely represent these sectors. The Court remanded the case to COMELEC to re-evaluate the 154 groups using specific guidelines.
What did BANAT v. Comelec change?
DOCTRINE: Overturned the latter portion of the Veterans formula for additional seats.
Presented the following steps for determining the allocation of seats:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering a sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Can you describe the formaula used within BANAT
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer
be included because they have already been allocated. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System less the
guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for the rounding off of fractional seats.
Doctrine in case of Atong?
DOCTRINE:
★ Abandonment of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT criteria:
○ The Court ruled that the party-list system is not exclusive to sectoral
parties or organizations representing the “marginalized and
underrepresented.”
○ The Party-List System Act (R.A. No. 7941) allows national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations to participate; not just those for
marginalized sectors.
★ The Party-List System Act (RA 7941) does not require national & regional
parties/organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors.
○ National and regional parties need not represent marginalized sectors.
○ Only sectoral parties (labor, peasants, urban poor, etc.) are required to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
Doctrine in Abang Lingkod Party List v COMELEC
DOCTRINE:
★ Sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer
required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e., proof of activities
that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent.
Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector.
Give me the doctrine of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v COMELEC
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC erred in denying the partylist application of Ang Ladlad
HELD: YES, the COMELEC erred in denying the application. First, the religious basis was a grave violation of the non-establishment clause under Art. III, Sec 5 of the Constitution. The legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC can advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Second, regarding public morals, the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize
homosexual conduct, and the respondents have not even explained what societal ills are being prevented by Ang Ladlad’s application denial. Mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
When considering the basis for classifications under equal protection, the asserted state interest (moral disapproval of an unpopular minority) is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. COMELEC’s differentiation furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
On the rights to freedom of expression and association, these have been violated by the COMELEC as Ang Ladlad has been prevented from exercising them. The COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
The Court recognized the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. However, the ponencia emphasized that the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills, particularly in view of the Yogyakarta Principles which do not bind the Philippines.
Finally, Ang Ladlad did not make untruthful statements as to its constituency and has complied with the requirements under the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus, the COMELEC was directed to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for PL accreditation.
What is the immunity provision in the Constitution?
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
How does People v Jalosjos clarify the immunity provisions? For doctrine?
DOCTRINE:
★ Membership in Congress does not exempt an accused who is validly
incarcerated from statutes and rules applicable to incarcerated persons in
general.
★ Election to public office is not a reasonable classification that provides immunity
from the ordinary restraints of the criminal justice system, nor does it create a
special class for purposes of law enforcement.
★ The constitutional privilege from arrest does not apply to convictions for serious,
non-bailable offenses.
Give me the case of Jalosjos
FACTS: Romeo G. Jalosjos, a full-fledged member of Congress, filed a motion seeking permission to fully discharge his duties as a legislator, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings. Jalosjos had been convicted in the first instance of two
counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, and was confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction was pending appeal.
ISSUES: W/N membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules whichapply to validly incarcerated persons in general?
HELD: NO, the Court held that membership in Congress does not exempt an accused who is validly incarcerated from statutes and rules applicable to incarcerated persons in general
Interesting bit actually:
Electorate's Awareness: When the voters re-elected the accused-appellant, they did so with full awareness that his freedom of action was limited by his detention. Furthermore, confinement pending appeal is not removal, and he remains a Congressman unless expelled, but he must operate within the constraints of his detention.
Give me case of Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
DOCTRINE:
★ Privileged Speech grants immunity to legislators from being held liable (civilly or criminally) for statements, speeches, or debates made ONLY in the performance of their legislative duties.
FACTS: Congressman Bartolome Cabangbang published an open letter to the President alleging military plans for a coup and naming several individuals as “tools” of the planners, though possibly unwitting ones. The named individuals sued him for damages, but Cabangbang moved to dismiss the case, claiming his statements were privileged under the constitutional protection for legislative speech.
ISSUES: W/N the open letter falls within the purview of the privileged speech in Congress?
HELD: NO.
“Speech or debate therein” pertains to utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
The publication in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session. In thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty.
Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
DOCTRINE:
★ An [Assemblyman]/[Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] may not achieve the practical effect of appearing as counsel before an administrative body by acquiring a nominal financial interest and invoking intervention. Upholding such an “intervention” would effectively render the constitutional prohibition nugatory because a member could always secure minimal interest and thereby “intervene” to influence administrative proceedings.
FACTS: An election for eleven IPI directors occurred on May 14, 1979. The Puyat Group was declared elected and would control the board. The Acero Group challenged the election in the SEC (SEC Case No. 1747) alleging improper vote counting. Assemblyman Fernandez had orally offered to appear as counsel for Acero but ceased after petitioner objections citing constitutional prohibitions on Assemblymen appearing before administrative bodies. Subsequently, Fernandez acquired ten IPI shares for P200.00, with the deed of sale notarized on May 30, 1979; on May 31, 1979 he filed a motion to intervene in the SEC Case as a stockholder claiming legal interest. The SEC granted him leave to intervene on July 17, 1979, prompting the petitioners to file the instant case.
ISSUES: W/N the Assemblyman's intervention indirectly violated Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, prohibiting appearances as counsel before any administrative body?
HELD: YES. The Court found that the Assemblyman's intervention constituted an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body, " which was interpreted as a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The Court arrived at this conclusion based on the following circumstances:
1. His motion to intervene, after withdrawing from his initial intention to appear as counsel for ACERO, was seen as an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
2. The interest he acquired was minimal, consisting of a mere ₱200.00 worth of ten shares of stock.
3. He acquired these shares after the fact, meaning the purchase occurred after the contested election of Directors and after the quo warranto suit had already been filed before the SEC.
The Court reasoned that to uphold this intervention would render the constitutional provision ineffective, as it would allow an Assemblyman to influence an administrative body merely by acquiring a minimal participation in the client's "interest" and then claiming the right to intervene. Therefore, the Court enforced the principle that "That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection"
Give me the case of Liban v Gordon doctrine?
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
DOCTRINE:
★ Prohibition against holding dual office of members of Congress in any other
government-owned agencies to uphold the separation of powers, avoid conflicts of interest, and ensure legislative independence and full-time service to the people. == But note, they can still head other things
FACTS: Petitioners, officers of the Chapter, claimed that Senator Richard Gordon forfeited his Senate seat when he accepted the chairmanship of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), arguing that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation under the Constitution. Gordon countered that the petitioners lacked legal standing, the PNRC is not a government entity, and that he had long served as its chairman even before his election to the Senate
NOTE: Doesn’t mean this applies to every outside office
PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
The PNRC is a member of the National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement). In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous to be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts. The PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict.