Contract formation

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123 Terms

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What governs contracts for services vs. contracts for goods?
Services (and contracts generally) = Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which is persuasive authority, not binding law. Goods (movable, tangible items) = UCC Article 2, an enacted statute that is binding in adopting states.
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What is the difference between the Restatement (Second) and UCC Article 2 as sources of law?
The Restatement is persuasive, not binding, and states general principles (offer, acceptance, consideration, defenses, remedies). UCC Article 2 is an enacted statute (binding where adopted) with more flexible, pragmatic rules: gap-fillers, liberal formation standards and good faith obligations.
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What does R2d § 17 provide?
A contract requires a bargain in which there is (1) mutual assent (offer + acceptance) and (2) consideration (something of legal value exchanged).
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What are the four necessary elements of a contract?
(1) Mutual assent (offer + acceptance), (2) consideration, (3) capacity, (4) a legal purpose that does not violate public policy.
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What is a unilateral contract?
A promise in exchange for an act or forbearance (performance). It is accepted by completing the performance. Once performance begins, an option contract is created and the offer can't be revoked for a reasonable time.
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What is a bilateral contract?
A promise in exchange for a promise. It is accepted by a return promise.
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What is the difference between a unilateral and a bilateral contract?
Unilateral = promise for performance; accepted by performing, and beginning performance creates an option contract. Bilateral = promise for a promise; accepted by a return promise, and beginning performance is NOT acceptance (you perform at your own peril).
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Is a gratuitous promise with no bargained-for exchange enforceable?
No. A promise that lacks a bargain for exchange is not supported by consideration (see Kirksey v. Kirksey: widow invited to live on land and later turned out; no bargain, so unenforceable).
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What was the old common law test for consideration?
The Benefit-Detriment Test: did the exchange produce a benefit to the promisor OR a detriment to the promisee? If yes, there was consideration and the contract was enforceable.
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What is the modern test for consideration under R2d § 71?
The Bargain-for-Exchange Test: a performance or return promise is bargained for if the promisor seeks it in exchange for his promise and the promisee gives it in exchange for that promise. The parties do not have to bargain over the terms.
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What is the difference between the benefit-detriment test and the bargain-for-exchange test?
Benefit-detriment (old common law) asks only whether there was a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. Bargain-for-exchange (modern, R2d § 71) asks whether each side's promise or performance was sought and given in exchange for the other's ("this in exchange for that").
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What does R2d § 71 provide?
Consideration must be bargained for and given in exchange: quid pro quo, "this in exchange for that." A performance or return promise must be sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.
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Can giving up a legal right be consideration?
Yes. Forbearance of a legal right (e.g., not drinking or smoking, or not seeking a job with a competitor you have a right to work for) is valid consideration (see Hamer v. Sidway; Langer v. Superior Steel Corp.).
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What steps should you follow to decide whether a promise is supported by a bargained-for exchange?
(1) Identify the promise. (2) Ask whether there was a bargain for exchange. (3) Apply § 71: did the promisor seek something, and did the promisee give something in exchange? (4) Argue Kirksey for no bargain; argue Hamer for forbearance = consideration.
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What was the traditional effect of a seal, and what is the modern rule?
Traditionally a sealed promise was enforceable regardless of consideration, because the seal was a formal substitute for consideration/intent. Most states have abolished the special effect of seals, so courts require a real bargain or reliance (see In re Greene).
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Does a party's motive for entering a bargain affect whether there is consideration?
No. Motives play no role in the adequacy of consideration; the court only looks for an exchange of value (see Thomas v. Thomas: carrying out a deceased person's wishes did not matter).
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What does R2d § 79 provide?
There is no requirement of "equivalence in the values exchanged." If a bargain exists, courts won't inquire into adequacy, equivalence or mutuality; they only require that the consideration be sufficient (see Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities; Browning v. Johnson).
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What is the difference between adequate and sufficient consideration?
Adequate = the value exchanged is equal or fair in an economic sense (a "good bargain"). Sufficient = what was exchanged has some legal value, even if tiny or disproportionate. Courts require only sufficiency (R2d § 79).
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Does consideration have to be novel or economically adequate to be valid?
No. Consideration does not require novelty or adequacy to be valid (see Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities).
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What is a moral obligation, and is it consideration?
A promise given in return for a past good deed. Generally it is NOT consideration because there is no bargain, unless there was a preexisting legal obligation (see Mills v. Wyman: a father's promise to pay for his adult son's care was unenforceable).
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Promise for Benefit Received (the Material Benefit Rule)

a promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received can be binding, even though not bargained for, to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if the benefit was material and flowed directly to the promisor (see Webb v. McGowin).

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What are the limits on enforcing a promise under the material benefit rule (R2d § 86)?
(1) The promise is binding only to the extent needed to prevent unjust enrichment. (2) It is not binding if the benefit was given as a gift, or if the promisor was not actually enriched.
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What is the difference between Mills v. Wyman and Webb v. McGowin?
Mills: a father's promise to pay for his adult son's care was not enforceable, because the moral obligation conferred no material benefit on the promisor. Webb: a promise to pay a worker who saved the promisor's life was enforceable, because the material benefit flowed directly to the promisor (R2d § 86).
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What steps should you follow to decide whether a material past benefit supports a promise?
(1) Is there a material past benefit? (2) Was a promise made? (3) Was that promise accepted? If all three = consideration (R2d § 86).
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What is the preexisting duty rule?
A promise to do something one is already legally obligated to do is not consideration. So a modification of a binding contract needs new and independent consideration to be enforceable (see Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico; William Levine & Co. v. Blumenthal).
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What does R2d § 89(a) provide?
A promise modifying a contract that is not fully performed is binding, without new consideration, if it is (1) made voluntarily, (2) before full performance, (3) in response to unanticipated circumstances, and (4) fair and equitable (see Angel v. Murray).
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What are the exceptions to the preexisting duty rule for contract modifications?
(1) R2d § 89(a): a voluntary modification, before full performance, in response to unanticipated circumstances, that is fair and equitable (see Angel v. Murray). (2) UCC § 2-209(1): a goods contract may be modified without consideration if made in good faith.
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What is the "hold-up" problem in contract modifications?
When a party already bound to perform demands more money mid-performance. A modification extracted by coercion is unenforceable because performing an existing duty is not consideration (see Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico: sailors demanded higher wages mid-voyage).
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A tenant asks a landlord to accept reduced rent during an economic downturn and the landlord agrees. Can the landlord later sue for the full rent under the strict preexisting duty rule?
Yes. Under the strict preexisting duty rule, the promise to accept less rent is unenforceable because the tenant gave no new consideration (see William Levine & Co. v. Blumenthal).
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What does UCC § 2-209(1) provide?
An agreement modifying a contract for the sale of goods needs no consideration to be binding, as long as it is made in good faith. It abolishes the strict preexisting duty rule for goods.
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What is the difference between modifying a services contract and modifying a goods contract?
Services (common law): a modification needs new consideration, or must satisfy R2d § 89(a) (voluntary, before full performance, unanticipated circumstances, fair and equitable). Goods: under UCC § 2-209(1), no consideration is needed if the modification is made in good faith.
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A garbage collector asks a city for more money because the number of households unexpectedly increased, and the city agrees. Is the modification enforceable?
Yes. It was voluntary, made before full performance, in response to unanticipated circumstances, and fair and equitable under R2d § 89(a). The reasoning mirrors UCC § 2-209 (see Angel v. Murray).
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What is mutuality of obligation?
Each party must owe the other a duty to perform. No mutuality = no consideration = no contract.
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What is an illusory promise?
A promise that leaves performance entirely at the promisor's discretion, so they could choose to perform or not without breaching. If one party's promise is illusory, there is no enforceable obligation and the other side's promise is unenforceable too (see Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. F.G. Walker Co.).
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What does UCC § 2-306 provide?
Output and requirements contracts are enforceable if the quantity is measured by good faith. This prevents them from being treated as illusory promises.
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What is the difference between a requirements contract and an output contract?
Requirements contract = the buyer's needs set the quantity the buyer must buy from the seller. Output contract = the seller's production sets the quantity the buyer must buy. Both are enforceable if measured by good faith (UCC § 2-306).
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How do courts save an exclusive dealing agreement from being illusory?
They imply a promise to use efforts: best efforts in the goods world (requirements/output contracts) and reasonable efforts for exclusive services agreements. That implied promise supplies consideration and mutuality, even if unstated (see Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon).
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What does R2d § 228 provide?
Satisfaction as a Condition: where practicable, whether a party is "satisfied" is judged by a reasonable person standard, not subjective whim.
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Is a promise conditioned on one party's "satisfaction" illusory?
No. The promisor is bound by an implied duty of good faith and reasonableness in deciding whether it is satisfied, so there is no "free way out" (see Omni Group Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank).
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What is promissory estoppel?
A substitute for consideration: a promise that induces reasonable, foreseeable reliance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing it. It protects the reliance interest.
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What does R2d § 90 provide?
A promise is binding if (1) the promisor should reasonably expect it to induce action or forbearance, (2) it does induce such action or forbearance, and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing it (see Ricketts v. Scothorn).
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What are the three elements of promissory estoppel?
(1) The promisor should reasonably expect the promise to induce action or forbearance, (2) it actually induces that reliance, and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement (R2d § 90).
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What facts should make you consider applying promissory estoppel?
A promise that looks like a gift or otherwise lacks bargained-for consideration, followed by the promisee's reasonable, foreseeable, detrimental reliance (e.g., quitting a job because of a promised payment; see Ricketts v. Scothorn).
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A grandfather gives his granddaughter a promissory note so she won't have to work, and she quits her job. There is no bargain. Can she enforce the note?
Yes, under promissory estoppel. Even though the promise looks like a gift, she reasonably and foreseeably relied on it by quitting, and injustice can be avoided only by enforcement (R2d § 90; see Ricketts v. Scothorn).
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What is mutual assent?
Mutual understanding between the parties on the terms of a contract, established by an offer and an acceptance.
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What is the objective test for mutual assent?
Mutual assent exists if a reasonable person would conclude, from the parties' outward words and conduct and the context, that both intended to be bound. Undisclosed intentions don't matter (see Lucy v. Zehmer; Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co.).
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What steps should you follow when analyzing mutual assent?
(1) Would a reasonable person think this was an offer? Was it clear, definite and explicit? (2) Would a reasonable person think the offer was accepted? Was the mode of acceptance valid?
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A party signs an agreement to sell his farm while drinking and later says he was joking. Is there a contract?
Yes, if his outward words and acts would lead a reasonable person to believe he was serious. A party's undisclosed intention to joke is irrelevant (see Lucy v. Zehmer).
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What does UCC § 2-204 provide?
A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties recognizing a contract. It can be valid even if the moment it was made is uncertain, and it doesn't fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended to contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for a remedy.
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What does R2d § 20 provide?
Effect of Misunderstanding: there is no mutual assent if the parties attach materially different meanings to their words and neither knows or has reason to know the other's meaning. If one party knows or has reason to know the other's meaning and the other doesn't, the innocent party's meaning controls (see Raffles v. Wichelhaus).
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What is the difference between a misunderstanding and a mistake?
Misunderstanding = the parties attach different meanings to an ambiguous term, so there is no mutual assent (a formation problem; R2d § 20; see Raffles v. Wichelhaus). Mistake = a shared or one-sided wrong belief about a fact at formation, which is a defense that makes the contract voidable.
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Two parties contract for cotton arriving on the ship "Peerless," but two ships have that name and each party means a different one, unaware of the other's meaning. Is there a contract?
No. The parties attached different meanings to an essential term and neither knew the other's meaning, so there was no meeting of the minds (R2d § 20; see Raffles v. Wichelhaus).
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What does R2d § 201 provide? Whose Meaning Prevails:

if the parties attach the same meaning to a term, it controls. If they attach different meanings, the meaning of the party who did not know (or had no reason to know) of the other's meaning prevails when the other party knew (or had reason to know) the first party's meaning. Otherwise neither is bound by the other's meaning.

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What is an implied-in-fact contract?
A contract formed from the parties' conduct and communications rather than express words or a writing, judged by the reasonable person test (see Wrench, LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.).
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What is the difference between an implied-in-fact contract and an implied-in-law (quasi) contract?
Implied-in-fact = a real contract shown by the parties' conduct demonstrating mutual assent. Implied-in-law / quasi-contract = not a contract at all; a court awards recovery to prevent unjust enrichment when there is no actual agreement.
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Can a contract arise from pitching an idea to a company that later uses it?
Yes. An implied-in-fact contract may form when the parties' conduct shows mutual assent and an expectation of payment for use of the idea (see Wrench, LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.).
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What does R2d § 24 provide?
An offer is a manifestation of willingness to enter a bargain that justifies the other party in understanding that his assent will conclude the deal.
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What does R2d § 26 provide?
Preliminary Negotiations: a communication is not an offer if the person knows or should know that the sender does not intend to conclude a bargain without further assent. Comment b: a communication clearly directed to one person that invites acceptance may be an offer.
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What makes a communication an offer rather than an invitation to negotiate?
It must be clear, definite and explicit, and leave nothing open for negotiation, so a reasonable recipient would believe assent concludes the deal (see Southworth v. Oliver).
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What are the general rules about advertisements, jokes and negotiations as offers?
Generally they are NOT offers (see Lonergan v. Scolnick; Leonard v. Pepsico). Exception: an advertisement is an offer if it is clear, definite and explicit and leaves nothing open for negotiation, e.g., "first come, first served" (see Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store).
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A store advertises "1 fur coat, $1, first come, first served," then refuses to sell to the first man in line, saying the offer was only for women. Is there a binding offer?
Yes. The ad was clear, definite and explicit and left nothing open for negotiation, so it was an offer, and the store couldn't add undisclosed conditions (see Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store).
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A seller sends a detailed letter laying out price and terms for selling land, but later says he only meant to invite negotiation. Is it an offer?
Yes, likely. Under the objective test, clear, detailed and definite language can be an offer to a reasonable recipient, even if the sender claims otherwise (see Southworth v. Oliver).
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A TV commercial jokingly offers a fighter jet for 7 million Pepsi Points. Is it an offer?
No. A reasonable person would not take it seriously; an offer must show serious intent through explicit, limiting language (see Leonard v. Pepsico).
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What are the three modes of acceptance?
(1) Performance (unilateral), (2) promise (bilateral), (3) silence or conduct, such as exercising dominion (R2d § 69).
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What is the mirror image rule?
Old common law rule: an acceptance must match the exact terms of the offer. Any variation is not an acceptance but a counteroffer.
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What is the difference between the mirror image rule and the UCC approach to acceptance?
Mirror image (common law): any variation = counteroffer. UCC: acceptance by any reasonable means, including performance (§ 2-206), and a contract can form even if the acceptance adds or changes terms (§ 2-207).
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What does R2d § 50 provide?
Acceptance is a manifestation of assent to the offer's terms, made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer. Acceptance by performance requires at least part performance or tender; acceptance by promise requires completing every act essential to making the promise.
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What does UCC § 2-206(1)(a) provide?
An offer may be accepted in any reasonable manner, unless the offer limits the mode of acceptance, in which case that mode must be followed (see La Salle National Bank v. Mel Vega).
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What happens if an offer specifies a required mode of acceptance and the offeree uses a different one?
There is no binding contract; acceptance must occur in the required manner (see La Salle National Bank v. Mel Vega: the contract required the seller's formal written acceptance, which never happened).
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What does R2d § 54 provide?
If an offer invites acceptance only by performance, the offeree need not notify the offeror unless the offer asks for notice. But if the offeree knows the offeror can't reasonably learn of the performance, the offeror's duty is discharged unless the offeree makes reasonable efforts to notify, the offeror learns of it in time, or the offeror waived notice.
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What does R2d § 56 provide?
Acceptance by promise requires the offeree to exercise reasonable diligence to notify the offeror, or the offeror must receive the acceptance in time, unless the offer says otherwise or § 69 applies (see Hendricks v. Behee).
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When is an acceptance by promise effective if the offeree signs but never communicates the acceptance?
It is not effective until communicated to the offeror, unless the offeror dispenses with that requirement (see Hendricks v. Behee).
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What does UCC § 2-206(1)(b) provide?
An order for goods to be shipped can be accepted by a promise to ship or by shipping conforming or non-conforming goods. But shipping non-conforming goods with a notice that they are offered as an accommodation is NOT an acceptance; it is a counteroffer (see Corinthian Pharmaceutical Systems v. Lederle Laboratories).
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Under UCC § 2-206(1)(b), which seller responses to an order are acceptances?
Promise to ship = acceptance. Shipping conforming goods = acceptance. Shipping non-conforming goods without an accommodation notice = acceptance (and a breach). Shipping non-conforming goods with an accommodation notice = NOT acceptance, a counteroffer.
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A buyer orders vaccine at a set price, and the seller ships part of the order at a higher price with a note calling it an "accommodation." Is the buyer's order accepted?
No. Shipment of non-conforming goods with an accommodation notice is a counteroffer, not an acceptance (UCC § 2-206(1)(b); see Corinthian Pharmaceutical Systems v. Lederle Laboratories).
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Are order acknowledgments, tracking numbers or invoices acceptances?
No, not unless they show clear language of intent to be bound. They are just confirmations of the offer.
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What does R2d § 53 provide?
An offer inviting acceptance by performance can be accepted by performing, without notice, unless the offer requires notice. But if the offeree performs while making clear it does not intend to accept, there is no acceptance.
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Does beginning performance count as acceptance?
Yes, unless the offer specifies that only completed performance is acceptance (see Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green: loading trucks and driving to the job site was acceptance before the homeowner tried to revoke).
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Can someone accept a reward offer they did not know about when they performed?
No. An offeree can't accept an offer it has no knowledge of; it must act with the intent to accept (see Glover v. Jewish War Veterans).
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Are reward offers an exception to the rule that advertisements aren't offers?
Yes, if they are clear, definite, specific and sufficiently limited (see Glover v. Jewish War Veterans).
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What does R2d § 69 provide?
Silence or conduct can be acceptance only in limited situations: e.g., the offeree knowingly takes the benefit of offered services, the parties agreed silence would count, or prior dealings make silence a reasonable sign of assent (see Russell v. Texas Co.; Ammons v. Wilson & Co.).
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When can silence or conduct be treated as acceptance?
When the offeror is reasonably led to believe the offeree's act or silence is acceptance: the offeree knowingly accepts benefits, agrees that silence counts, or has a history in which silence worked as assent (R2d § 69; see Russell v. Texas Co.; Ammons v. Wilson & Co.).
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A homeowner tells a telemarketer that any future call means the company agrees to pay him for his "listening services," and the company calls again. Is there a contract?
No. One party can't impose a contract by declaring that the other's ordinary conduct counts as acceptance; the company never manifested assent and there was no bargained-for exchange (see Schreiber v. Olan Mills).
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What is a mixed (unilateral/bilateral) offer, and how is it accepted?
An offer that allows acceptance by either a promise or performance. It is accepted by a promise or by beginning performance; mere preparation is not acceptance. Under R2d § 32, when it's unclear which the offeror wants, assume both are acceptable.
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What is the default rule on revoking offers?
Offers are normally revocable. The offeror controls the offer and may revoke at any time before acceptance, even if it said the offer would stay open, unless it is an option contract or another irrevocability doctrine applies (see Dickinson v. Dodds).
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What does R2d § 36 provide?
The offeree's power of acceptance ends by: (1) rejection or counteroffer, (2) lapse of time, (3) revocation by the offeror (direct, § 42, or indirect, § 43), or (4) death or incapacity of the offeror or offeree.
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What are the exceptions to the general rule that offers are revocable?
(1) Option contracts supported by consideration (R2d § 25). (2) Firm offers by merchants under UCC § 2-205. (3) Part performance of a unilateral offer, which creates an option (R2d § 45).
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What does R2d § 25 provide?
An option contract is a promise that meets the requirements for forming a contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer. It is a separate promise supported by consideration.
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Does a counter-proposal terminate the offeree's power to accept an option contract?
No. Negotiation has no effect on an option contract; the offeree can still accept on the original terms (see Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Westside Investment Corp.). For a mere offer, a counter-proposal may be a counteroffer that kills it.
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What does UCC § 2-205 provide?
Firm Offers: a merchant's signed written offer that assures it will be held open is irrevocable for the stated time (or a reasonable time), up to 3 months, without consideration.
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What is the difference between an option contract and a firm offer?
An option contract needs consideration and can apply to any contract. A firm offer (UCC § 2-205) needs no consideration, but is limited to goods, requires a signed writing by a merchant, and caps irrevocability at 3 months.
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A merchant signs a written offer to sell 500 brake pads and promises to keep it open for 60 days, but the buyer pays nothing for the promise. Can the merchant revoke it? Why?
No. It is a firm offer under UCC § 2-205: in writing, signed by a merchant, and expressly held open. It is irrevocable for 60 days even without consideration.
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What does R2d § 45 provide?
Option Contract Created by Part Performance or Tender: if an offer can be accepted only by performance, an option contract is created once the offeree begins performing, and the offeror can't revoke while performance is underway (see Marchiondo v. Scheck; Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green).
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What is the difference between preparation and performance for a unilateral offer?
Beginning performance creates an option contract that blocks revocation (R2d § 45). Mere preparation to perform does not.
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What does R2d § 42 provide?
An offeree's power of acceptance ends when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of intent not to enter into the contract (direct revocation). The offeror must communicate it.
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What does R2d § 43 provide?
Indirect revocation: the power of acceptance ends when the offeror takes definite action inconsistent with intent to contract and the offeree gets reliable information of it (see Dickinson v. Dodds).
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What is the difference between direct and indirect revocation?
Direct (R2d § 42): the offeror itself tells the offeree it is revoking. Indirect (R2d § 43): the offeror acts inconsistently (e.g., sells the item to someone else) and the offeree learns of it from a reliable source.
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An offer says it is open until Friday. On Wednesday, the offeree hears from a reliable friend that the offeror already sold the item to someone else. Can the offeree still accept?
No. The offer was indirectly revoked: the offeror acted inconsistently with intent to contract and the offeree learned of it reliably (R2d § 43; see Dickinson v. Dodds).
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When does acceptance become effective under the mailbox rule?
When it is properly dispatched (posted), even if it never reaches the offeror, for non-instantaneous communications (R2d § 63; see Adams v. Lindsell).
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What does R2d § 63 provide?
The Mailbox Rule: for non-instantaneous communication, an acceptance is complete and the contract binding when the acceptance is properly dispatched, even if the offeror never receives it. Exception: acceptance under an option contract is not effective until received.