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AI Spotlight: Prompt Injection Attacks
Crafted input that manipulates an LLM to bypass controls or change its output.
Large Language Model.
Bypass protections or manipulate generated output.
Yes, including protected context or application data.
Yes, such as command injection in an AI-integrated application.
A model-level bypass alone may not receive a CVE.
Foundational system, application system, and user prompts.
The LLM service provider.
Guide model output and establish provider guardrails.
The application developer or system integrator.
Guide model behavior for a specific application.
The person interacting with the AI application.
The user prompt.
Both are sometimes called system prompts, causing ambiguity.
The application system prompt.
User-supplied prompt content.
Combining and normalizing prompt content.
Splitting text into tokens, such as words, subwords, or characters.
A numeric vector representation of token meaning.
Weights token relationships and helps resolve references or ambiguity.
Adding context from history, memories, RAG, or MCP agent data.
Retrieval Augmented Generation.
Model Context Protocol.
Applying instructions or restrictions to generated content.
Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback.
Bias and harmful or unwanted generated content.
The next output token.
Filters, formats, or moderates generated output.
It can alter tokenization, embeddings, and attention.
Direct and indirect prompt injection.
Attacker-controlled instructions submitted directly to the model.
Attacker instructions embedded in outside content later read by the model.
Chatbots or API requests.
Webpages, files, retrieved documents, or logs.
LLM output is often nondeterministic.
Different models and implementations apply different controls.
tiktoken.
tiktoken.encoding_for_model().
Changing spelling or characters to change how a model processes a phrase.
The SEC504 practice game for learning prompt injection techniques.
goprompt
Five.
The Turnstile.
A straightforward request testing a model’s behavior or restrictions.
To learn its capabilities and constraints.
Human-in-the-Loop.
The Elevator Door.
Misspellings, leetspeak, and breaking up tokens with punctuation or spaces.
Removing or changing prompt parts to identify what triggers controls.
Substituting numbers or symbols for letters.
Floor 42 Access.
Reframing a rejected request to induce a different response.
Fictional, educational, or claimed misunderstandings.
The Entry Door.
Requesting a different output format to alter model behavior.
Markdown, HTML, JSON, or program code.
The Workstation.
Using a fictional persona or scenario to change model output.
Do Anything Now.
gopromptalt
Uses a random seed and disables hints.
Multi-turn manipulation and Unicode smuggling.
They may stop working when providers update defenses.
Foundational or application system prompts.
RAG documents or AI-agent context.
An application may execute untrusted code generated by the model.
Vanna.ai.
Executing LLM-generated Python without sufficient validation.
Database schema information.
SQL.
Python.
Treat model-generated code as untrusted.
The attacker plants instructions in data the model retrieves later.
Embedded instructions can bias an AI resume evaluator.
Place hidden instruction text in HTML content.
Hides text visually while leaving it in the content.
User-Agent.
An AI log analyst to classify an attack as harmless.
-H
The service description field.
Treating untrusted data as model instructions.
No; additional controls are required.
Later prompt material may have greater influence.
To reduce effects of recency bias.
To distinguish external data from instructions.
A second model reviews the first model’s output for security concerns.
Cisco Foundation-sec-8b.
Run generated Python in a constrained environment.
A human reviews or approves AI-assisted results or actions.
To validate AI threat assessments, including false negatives.
To support threat hunting and investigation.
Structured prompts, access controls, multi-chain checks, HITL, and logging.