choices week 3

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43 Terms

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What is expected utility theory (EUT)?

A normative model: choose the option with the highest probability-weighted utility of final outcomes.

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How does prospect theory differ from EUT?

Choices depend on gains and losses relative to a reference point, with nonlinear value and probability weighting.

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What is risk aversion?

Preferring a certain outcome to a gamble with an equal or higher expected monetary value.

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What is risk seeking?

Preferring a gamble over a certain outcome, even when the gamble has comparable expected value.

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What did Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find for gains?

Most preferred a sure gain of 3,000 over an 80% chance of 4,000: 80% chose certainty.

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What did Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find for losses?

Most preferred an 80% chance of losing 4,000 over a sure loss of 3,000: 92% chose the gamble.

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What is the reflection effect?

Risk preferences often reverse between gains and losses: risk aversion for gains, risk seeking for losses.

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What is reference dependence?

An outcome is valued as a gain or loss relative to a reference point, not simply as final wealth.

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What is a reference point?

The baseline against which an outcome is judged, such as the status quo or an expectation.

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What is diminishing sensitivity?

Each additional unit of gain or loss has a smaller subjective impact as its magnitude grows.

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How is the prospect-theory value function shaped?

S-shaped: concave for gains, convex for losses, and usually steeper for losses.

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Why does a concave value function encourage risk aversion for gains?

The subjective value of a sure gain can exceed the probability-weighted value of a larger uncertain gain.

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Why does a convex value function encourage risk seeking for losses?

A certain loss can feel worse than a gamble that might avoid the loss entirely.

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What is loss aversion?

An equivalent loss generally has a larger psychological impact than a gain.

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How does loss aversion appear on the value-function graph?

The curve is steeper below the reference point (losses) than above it (gains).

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What is probability weighting?
People transform objective probabilities into subjective decision weights rather than treating them linearly.
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What is the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes?
High-probability gains: risk averse; high-probability losses: risk seeking; low-probability gains: risk seeking; low-probability losses: risk averse.
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Why can low-probability gains produce risk seeking?
Overweighting a small chance of a large gain makes a gamble attractive, as in lotteries.
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Why can low-probability losses produce risk aversion?
Overweighting a small chance of a large loss makes certainty or protection attractive, as in insurance.
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What is a framing effect?
Different descriptions of equivalent outcomes change choices despite unchanged objective consequences.
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What is gain framing versus loss framing?
Gain frames emphasise positive outcomes; loss frames emphasise negative outcomes or costs of inaction.
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What was the Asian disease problem?
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) framed equivalent programmes as lives saved or lives lost.
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What were choices in the Asian disease gain frame?
72% chose the certain programme saving 200 of 600 lives; 28% chose the risky programme.
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What were choices in the Asian disease loss frame?
78% chose the risky programme; 22% chose the certain programme where 400 of 600 die.
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Why does the Asian disease result challenge rational-choice consistency?
Equivalent outcomes yielded reversed preferences when described as gains versus losses.
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What is description invariance?
A rationality principle: preferences should not change when equivalent options are redescribed.
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What is the certainty effect?
Certain outcomes can receive disproportionate weight compared with merely probable outcomes.
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What is cancellation in prospect theory?
People may disregard components shared by options, focusing on the features that differ.
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What is the isolation effect?
Different decompositions of the same prospects can change which features are attended to and chosen.
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What is preference reversal?
A person’s ranking of options changes across elicitation methods or equivalent presentations.
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explanations of preference reversals

compatibility hypothesis = highlights compatible attributes and pricing draws attention to money whereas choosing between gambles can emphasise probability

evaluability hypothesis = some attributes are easier to judge when options are compared side by side than when evaluated separately

= expertise and feedback can improve decision consistency

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What did the reading say about choice overload?
More options may increase decision difficulty and reduce satisfaction or willingness to choose.
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What is the attraction or decoy effect?
Adding an inferior third option can increase preference for the option that dominates it.
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What is the compromise effect?
Adding an extreme option can make a middle option appear more attractive.
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What is the anchoring effect in choice?
An initial number or reference value can bias later judgments or valuations.
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What did Rothman and Salovey (1997) propose about health framing?
Gain frames may suit prevention behaviours; loss frames may suit detection behaviours.
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Why might gain frames help prevention behaviours?
Prevention is often perceived as relatively safe, so highlighting benefits encourages the safer action.
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Why might loss frames help detection behaviours?
Detection can feel risky because it may reveal illness, so stressing costs of inaction may motivate testing.
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What did Rothman et al. (1993) find in the sunscreen study?
Gain-framed messages encouraged sunscreen requests; the lecture reports roughly twice as many requests among women.
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What did Banks et al. (1995) find for mammography messages?
Loss framing increased uptake of mammography; lecture notes report 11% higher at 6 months and 15% at 12 months.
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What are key limitations and strengths of prospect theory and framing research?

Effects vary with context, emotions and individual differences; many experiments use hypothetical choices, limiting generalisation

explains framing, loss aversion, probability weighting and many departures from expected utility theory & has applications to finance, medicine, public policy

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ambiguity aversion vs ignorance aversion

ambiguity aversion = disliking choices when the probabilities are unknown

ignorance aversion = avoiding choices in areas where we believe we lack knowledge

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framing of acts/contingencies/outcomes

acts = how the available actions or choices are presented

contingencies = how probabilities and conditions are presented

outcomes = whether consequences are perceived as gains or losses