2026 Midlands Case Law

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61 Terms

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Benetti v. Duffy (1930)

Negligence refers to a failure to behave with the level of care that someone of ordinary prudence would have exercised under the same circumstances that directly and proximately causes harm to another. Negligence usually consists of actions but can also involve the failure to act when there is some duty to act.

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Lynch v. Miller (1955)

The elements of negligence are the following: (i) the existence of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff(s); (ii) the defendant's breach of that duty; (iii) harm suffered by the plaintiff(s); and (iv) proof that the defendant's breach was the direct and proximate cause of the harm that the plaintiff suffered.

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Savage v. Jones (1980)

In a negligence case, a duty of care can arise in several circumstances. There is no exhaustive list, but the most common situations in which a defendant has a duty to act include: (i) the defendant created the risk which resulted in the plaintiff's harm; (ii) the defendant volunteered to protect the plaintiff from harm; (iii) the defendant knew or should have known that their conduct would cause harm to the plaintiff; and (iv) the business or voluntary relationship between the plaintiff and defendant creates a duty.

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Silberman v. Satterfield (1983)

The Midlands Electric Reliability Code provides the duty a public utility owes to the public, but it does not relieve a plaintiff of proving that the utility breached that duty and thereby caused the harm. Because Section 1.4 requires service and facilities that are "adequate" and "reasonable," it codifies a standard of reasonable care measured against the danger present. It does not impose liability without fault. Whether a utility met that standard on any given occasion is ordinarily a question for the jury.

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Terry v. Ko (1985)

Proving that the defendant owed a duty, or an admission from defendant that it owed a duty, is not enough to prevail in a negligence case. The plaintiff must also prove that the defendant breached their duty to the plaintiff. A defendant breaches a duty by failing to act reasonably in fulfilling or attempting to fulfill the duty.

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Leander v. Minzer (1990)

A defendant "fails to act reasonably" for the purposes of negligence liability if they have departed from the conduct expected of a reasonably prudent person acting under similar circumstances. The reasonableness test is an objective test—the specific abilities or traits of the defendant are irrelevant. Thus, even a person with low intelligence or who is chronically careless is held to the same standard as a more careful person or a person of higher intelligence.

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Faris v. Steinhauer (1991)

The test for whether a given precaution is required in order to constitute reasonable care involves comparing the burden of taking the precaution (B) against the probability that harm will occur absent the precaution (P) and the nature and extent of foreseeable damage or injury if the harm materializes (L). A defendant who fails to take a given precaution has violated its duty of care in any situation where B < P x L.

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Kim v. French (1993)

In deciding whether a defendant acted reasonably, the jury may take into consideration whether, prior to the plaintiff's injury, the defendant followed standards that are prevailing in the industry or complied with customs prevailing in the community. Although such industry standards and community customs are relevant, they are not necessarily dispositive.

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Iacomini v. Chapman (1999)

In assessing the relevance of a defendant's compliance with industry standards or community customs to whether the defendant acted reasonably, the jury should consider whether it was clear or should have been clear to the defendant that the defendant's conduct or the particular situation was not contemplated by those standards or customs. Compliance is not necessarily dispositive, and a defendant is not absolved from liability where the standards or customs did not contemplate the conduct or situation at issue.

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Pandya v. Schumock (2003)

A defendant's failure to follow its own internal policies and procedures may be used to support a claim for negligence. However, such evidence, although relevant, is not necessarily dispositive. Similarly, evidence that a defendant acted in accordance with its internal policies and procedures in a particular situation may be relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, evidence that a defendant acted reasonably.

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Adediji v. Adeite (2010)

It is well known that many activities involve certain predictable risks that are likely to arise during those activities. In determining whether an actor is to be excused for an error of judgment that occurs during a sudden emergency, the trier of fact must consider whether the emergency was of the sort that was predictable and thus could or should have been addressed by appropriate procedures or training.

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Hopson v. Dawson (2012)

Under rare circumstances, it is reasonable to take actions that involve a high degree of risk of serious harm to others. For example, although it ordinarily would be negligent (and reckless) to drive more than 20mph over the speed limit at night in the pouring rain, such conduct might be reasonable if the driver were carrying a desperately wounded friend to the hospital. There also may be situations where otherwise dangerous action may be better than no action at all, such as when a hiker without medical training finds a badly wounded person by the side of a remote trail and attempts to provide the sort of imperfect surgical aid that a layperson may give. The fact that an actor's conduct was not negligent after an emergency has arisen, however, does not preclude liability if the actor's own tortious conduct itself produced the emergency.

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Bomberger v. Kelly (2012)

Individuals having superior skill or knowledge are required to conduct themselves consistent with such superior capacity. In the practice of a trade or profession, the standard of care is the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that trade or profession in good standing in similar communities.

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Allen v. Neptune Underwater Expedition (2013)

Members of certain trades or professions may possess different levels of skill and knowledge. For example, professional scuba divers possess greater skill and knowledge than amateur scuba divers. Consistent with Bomberger v. Kelly (2012), the standard of care in the practice of a trade or profession is the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that trade or profession in good standing in similar communities. However, in trades and professions containing both professionals and amateurs, professionals shall be held to a higher standard than amateurs.

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Yanka v. Edwards Industries (1961)

Causation has two components: cause in fact (or direct cause) and proximate cause. To show cause in fact, the plaintiff must establish either that the plaintiff would not have been harmed "but-for" the defendant's conduct or that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Proximate cause requires showing that the particular harm suffered by the plaintiff was both a foreseeable result of the defendant's wrongful or unlawful conduct and of a type that could reasonably have been anticipated. In performing this analysis, the fact finder must first identify the particular risks that made the defendant's actions culpable and then determine whether the injury suffered is among those risks. The classic example involves a parent who hands a small child a loaded gun, which the child then drops on the plaintiff's foot. Although it was of course negligent for the parent to give the child a loaded gun, the risk that made the parent's actions culpable was that the gun might discharge and injure someone and the harm that the plaintiff actually suffered could equally have occurred had the gun been a toy or unloaded.

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Haug v. Kolb (1975)

The notion that a risk must be "foreseeable" for a defendant to have violated its duty of care does not require that the defendant be able to anticipate the target of the harm or the precise way the harm will occur. Instead, it requires only that the defendant should have foreseen the general type of risk that caused the harm.

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Jeff v. Wario's Toolkit (1974)

Absent some special rule to the contrary, a plaintiff in a civil case must establish all the elements of their claim by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., establish that all elements are more likely than not true).

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Guerra v. Guerrini-Maraldi (2002)

The fact finder may rely on both direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is testimony by a witness about what that witness personally did, saw, or heard. Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence from which the fact finder may infer that another fact is true. Neither type of evidence should be given categorically more weight than the other.

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Clement v. Mason (2015)

Although a defendant is not required to present evidence or offer an alternative theory of the case, if a defendant does so, the plaintiff may cross examine defense witnesses on the lack of corroborative evidence or otherwise note the defense's failure to offer evidence in support of its theory of the case. Such questions and comments do not imply that the burden of proof has shifted to the defense.

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Estate of Rory Behm v. Zamborini

Inc. (2017), The plaintiff brought a wrongful death suit against the defendant following a fatal collision involving the defendant's employee. The employee was cited for reckless driving, and the plaintiff alleged that—due to the citation—the defendant is necessarily liable for negligence. We disagree. A citation requires a law enforcement officer's finding of probable cause. Negligence requires a different burden: preponderance of the evidence. A citation may be relevant as to alleged negligence in certain instances, but a citation does not necessarily equate to negligence.

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Bennett v. O'Herin (2020)

A defendant pursuing an affirmative defense must establish all of the elements of its affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

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Purdue v. Waldie (1969)

The intervening and superseding causation doctrine relieves a defendant from liability when an independent and unforeseen event occurs between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's harm. The doctrine applies only when the intervening act was: (1) sufficient by itself to produce the plaintiff's harm; (2) not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant; and (3) not itself a direct result of the defendant's wrongful conduct. When those requirements are satisfied, the chain of proximate cause is broken, and the defendant is relieved of liability. Because intervening and superseding cause is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant who raises it.

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Carter v. Meyer (2017)

The defendant asks this Court to adopt the doctrine of "unavoidable accident" as an affirmative defense available to defendants facing a negligence claim. Essentially, the unavoidable accident doctrine is an argument by the defendant that, despite any negligence attributable to the defendant, any harm that was suffered was unavoidable. Through this holding, we adopt this doctrine. To succeed on this affirmative defense, the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the harm suffered by the plaintiff would have occurred even if there was zero negligence by the defendant.

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Zomerfeld v. Noto (2012)

Pursuant to MRE 104(a), when evaluating the admissibility of evidence, a trial court is permitted to rely on both admissible and inadmissible evidence. The use of underlying inadmissible evidence does not make that inadmissible evidence admissible. Instead, the Court is merely permitted to consider the underlying inadmissible evidence in order to assess the admissibility of the offered evidence. In a jury trial, the jury may not always be privy to the underlying facts used to determine what evidence is admissible, but the court may hear it. Previously upheld examples of this in Midlands include using character evidence to make a ruling on hearsay exceptions, using hearsay to make a ruling on character evidence, and using hearsay to decide whether an expert has adequate foundation to testify.

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Jung v. Lopez (2015)

Pursuant to MRE 104(a), courts may consider custodial documents, such as clerks' certifications or affidavits of recordkeepers, when determining the admissibility of other evidence without regard for the admissibility of the custodial document itself. The custodial document typically only addresses preliminary matters of admissibility and is not entered into evidence, and thus the Court is not bound by the rules of evidence when considering it. However, if a party wishes to enter the custodial document itself into evidence, the proper foundation must be laid to establish its admissibility.

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Thomas v. Davis (2001)

The purpose of the pleadings is to frame the issues for trial and permit the parties to frame their presentations accordingly. This latter function is especially important because Midlands, unlike most jurisdictions, does not permit the plaintiff to call rebuttal witnesses or the defendant to alter its decision about which witnesses to call after hearing the plaintiff's evidence. Accordingly, it is highly inappropriate for a party that has alleged or denied something in its complaint or answer to seek to prevent its adversary from presenting otherwise admissible evidence that relates to that thing by asserting that it is no longer interested in alleging or contesting that particular thing. Parties may, of course, choose which evidence they wish to present and which arguments they wish to emphasize, but the time for amending one's pleadings is well before the court convenes for purposes of trial.

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Karan v. Baboons

Inc. (2004), Even in cases in which the liability and damages phases have been bifurcated, a plaintiff still must establish "harm" in order to establish the defendant's liability on a negligence theory. At the same time, however, because the purpose of a threshold liability-only phase is to establish only the existence, rather than the extent, of the defendant's potential liability, trial judges should be especially vigilant in applying MRE 401 and 403 with respect to evidence that either does not relate or only marginally relates to questions at issue during such a phase.

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Herrera v. Olmsted (2005)

A factual allegation in a complaint that is admitted by the defendant in its answer should not be excluded at trial as irrelevant or moot if that information would be useful to the jury in evaluating other aspects of the case that remain in dispute.

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Kissner v. Polk Hospital (2005)

Stipulations are pretrial agreements between the parties that certain matters cannot be disputed at trial. Stipulations may be procedural (i.e., pre-numbering of exhibits) or substantive (i.e., agreement to a particular fact in the case). For example, if a stipulation states that a light was green, neither party may proffer or offer witness testimony asserting that the light was red. However, parties are only bound to the text of the stipulation. As another example, if parties stipulate to the pre-admission of an exhibit and nothing else, although the exhibit is in evidence (and cannot be excluded by objection), the parties have not stipulated that the content of the exhibit is correct, and either party may (but is not required to) contest the accuracy of the content of the pre-admitted exhibit. Conversely, if the parties stipulate that all information in an exhibit is true and accurate, neither party may contest the content of said exhibit.

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Greller v. Harish (2019)

Although the Midlands Rules of Evidence ("MRE") mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence, there are differences. As always, the MRE governs.

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Shakur v. Wallace (1994)

It is up to the fact finder to determine the credibility of each witness's testimony. A fact finder, whether jury or judge, may choose to credit all, some, or none of a witness's testimony and may credit one part of a witness's testimony without crediting others. At all times, the fact finder may consider the witness's interest in the outcome of the case. However, it is not appropriate for a testifying witness to determine the credibility or otherwise opine on the credibility of another witness. Such a determination or opinion by a testifying witness is not relevant under the MRE.

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Graham v. Duckworth (2024)

The Court's finding in Shakur v. Wallace (1994) should be narrowly construed. It specifically bars asking a testifying witness whether another witness is telling the truth or lying. It does not prevent related inquiries, such as asking whether another witness's testimony is inconsistent with the testifying witness's testimony or asking the testifying witness whether they are aware or unaware of any reason why another witness is telling the truth and / or lying. Moreover, nothing here bars an attorney asking a testifying witness whether they themselves lied or are lying.

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Filteau v. Wanek (1992)

The application of various rules of evidence sometimes turns on who made a particular statement. As long as the proponent of the statement produces evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a given person made a particular statement, the court must assume for purposes of assessing its admissibility that the statement was made by that person.

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Ginger v. Heisman (2015)

Emails or text messages are properly authenticated when the proponent has produced evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that would allow a reasonable jury to determine the author of the message. The fact that an email, text message, or other electronic communication is listed as coming from an address or number that is either known or purports to belong to a particular person is sufficient to lay the foundation that the communication was sent by the person in order to determine its admissibility, at least absent particularized reasons to believe that the communication may have been sent by someone else.

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Simpson v. Rose (1992)

A verbal act is a statement offered to establish something of independent legal significance or effect, rather than the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Statements which by their existence impose legal responsibilities and grant legal rights upon the parties thereto are verbal acts and are admissible as non-hearsay. For example, a contract executed by both parties would be admissible to establish the terms thereof.

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Farrant v. Westaway (1994)

Identification is a permissible non-hearsay purpose for a statement. Where a statement is not being used for the truth of the matter asserted but is instead being used to identify a particular object, the statement is being used for identification. For example, if a license plate is being used to identify a particular car, the statement on the license plate is admissible as non-hearsay.

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McDonald v. Parks (1995)

MRE 801(d)(2) governs statements "offered against an opposing party." This rule does not require the proponent of the evidence to offer the statement "against the party's interests" in order to qualify as an exemption to hearsay under MRE 801(d)(2)—that language is notably only found in MRE 804(b)(3). If the drafters of the MRE had wanted 801(d)(2) to only apply if the statement was "against the party's interest," they would have drafted the rule as such.

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Dolly v. Ringo (2010)

Unlike most other evidentiary rules, MRE 801(d)(2) may be invoked in only one direction. Under that rule, the plaintiff may offer statements by the defendant, and the defendant may offer statements by the plaintiff. But MRE 801(d)(2) does not permit the plaintiff to offer statements by the plaintiff or the defendant to offer statements by the defendant, even if the opposing party has already elicited out-of-court statements by the party during a preceding examination, subject to MRE 106.

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America's Best Cookie v. International House of Waffles (2011)

The Court recognizes that practices differ in other jurisdictions. But in Midlands, the definition of "hearsay" includes out-of-court statements by a witness who is on the stand or by another person who has or will be testifying in a particular trial.

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Kaplan v. Sikora (2013)

Pursuant to MRE 801(d)(2)(D), a statement that would otherwise be hearsay is admissible against a party if: (1) the declarant is the party's agent or employee; (2) the statement concerns a matter that is within the scope of the agency or employment relationship; and (3) the statement was made while the agency or employment relationship existed.

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Chambers v. By the Book Publishing

Ltd. (2015), The hearsay rule is only implicated where an out-of-court statement is being used for the truth of the matter asserted. If it only matters whether the out-of-court statement was made (not whether it was true), then the hearsay rule is not implicated.

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State v. B.F. De la Porta (2024)

Defendant offered statements of the investigating agent ("I know that you did this. You're a mastermind and this is exactly the type of job that you would pull . . . and now you're gonna be mine") to show bias in the investigation. The State objected to hearsay, arguing the "truth value"— that which the Defense wished the jury to infer from the statement—was that the Agent was out to get the Defendant and that was the purpose for which the Defense was entering it. Held: To be inadmissible as hearsay, an out-of-court statement must be (a) an assertion of fact (b) offered to establish the truth of that asserted fact. No part of the rule against hearsay concerns itself with the "truth value" of an out-of-court statement beyond the fact asserted in the statement. The statement here contains several assertions of fact—that the investigating agent knew the Defendant was involved; that the Defendant was a mastermind and that the heist was of the sort the Defendant would commit; and that the Defendant would be his. Because the Defense disputed these assertions, it cannot be reasonably argued that any part of the Agent's statement was offered to prove the truth of the matter(s) asserted. As such, the statement is definitionally not hearsay.

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Coburn Camera Crew v. Ellicott City (1989)

Though the Midlands Rules of Evidence regarding character evidence refer to "person" and "persons," the Court construes those terms as applying equally to companies, corporations, partnerships, and other legal entities. In other words, businesses sued for negligence or recklessness generally may not defend themselves on the grounds that they acted safely with respect to other situations and activities that are separate from the case at hand. Similarly, plaintiffs suing businesses generally may not introduce the businesses' prior bad practices to prove bad practice in the case at hand. Nothing in this rule, however, prevents parties from offering traits or instances of character for other purposes, such as those listed in MRE 404(b).

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Krent v. Lions

Inc. (2009), Occasionally, the defendant will seek to establish that another party is to blame by showing that third party's bad character. For example, in a murder trial, the defendant may try to introduce evidence that another suspect has a criminal record. Many legal scholars call this "reverse character evidence." Ordinarily, such evidence would be inadmissible because it is being used to show action in conformity therewith. However, we decline to say that reverse character evidence is automatically inadmissible. Because the person whose bad character is being introduced is not a party to the case and therefore not subject to criminal or civil penalties as a result of the trial, much of the justification behind MRE 404(a) does not apply to reverse character evidence. In our view, there are instances where it is appropriate to introduce this reverse character evidence and other instances where it may not be. Accordingly, we leave it to trial courts to resolve the admissibility of reverse character evidence by balancing its relevance against its prejudicial effect.

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Donnelly v. Caulder (2011)

MRE 609 does not categorically exclude evidence of a witness's prior criminal conviction punishable by less than one year of imprisonment, especially when the offense was a crime of dishonesty. Such evidence may still be admissible, subject to the MRE, on a case-by-case basis.

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Vir v. Londo Manufacturing Co. (2011)

Traditional principles of agency law provide that a corporation is generally charged with knowledge of any facts learned by its agents within the scope of their employment. This is especially true in circumstances in which the agent, in light of their role at and duties to the corporation, ought and would reasonably be expected to act upon those facts or communicate their knowledge of them to others at the corporation. This rule applies regardless of whether the agent did, in fact, communicate the information to others.

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McMahon v. Mohan (2019)

Pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation is legally responsible and liable for all acts of its employees and agents that occur within the scope of their employment.

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Davis v. Adams (1993)

Trial judges must ensure that any scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable. In determining reliability, judges should consider only the methods employed and the data relied upon, not the conclusions themselves. The proponent of the evidence has the burden of proving each section of MRE 702 by a preponderance of the evidence.

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Tarot Readers Association of Midlands v. Merrell Dow (1994)

In assessing reliability under MRE 702(c), judges should consider whether the theory or technique has been or can be tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, whether it has a known error rate, or whether it has gained widespread acceptance within the field. These factors, while relevant, are not necessarily dispositive. For example, lack of publication does not automatically foreclose admission; sometimes well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published. There is no definitive checklist. Judges must make such assessments based on the totality of the circumstances.

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Richards v. Mississippi BBQ (1997)

MRE 703 does not permit experts to testify or present a chart in a manner that simply summarizes inadmissible hearsay without first relating that hearsay to some specialized knowledge on the expert's part. The Court must distinguish experts relying on otherwise inadmissible hearsay to form scientific conclusions from conduits who merely repeat what they are told. The testimony of the former is admissible; that of the latter is not. At the same time, statements that would otherwise be admissible are not inadmissible simply because they are offered by or through an expert witness.

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Kane Software Co. v. Mars Investigations (1998)

Midlands does not permit parties to use their experts as weapons in a trial by ambush or unfair surprise. Expert reports that are exchanged prior to trial must contain a complete statement of all opinions the expert will testify to and the basis and reasons for them, the facts or data considered by the expert in forming their opinions, and the expert's qualifications. Experts are strictly prohibited from testifying on direct and redirect examination about any opinions or conclusions not stated in their report, and such testimony must be excluded upon a timely objection from opposing counsel. For example, an expert may not testify on direct or redirect examination that they formed a conclusion based on evidence that came out during trial that the expert did not previously review. However, if an expert is asked during cross examination about matters not contained in their report, the expert may freely answer the question as long as the answer is responsive. When an objection is made under Kane Software, the trial court should ask the party offering the expert testimony to refer the trial court to where the proposed testimony is contained or otherwise referenced in the expert's disclosure to ensure that the record is clear.

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Yu-Oh Industries v. Beckstein Alekri

Inc. (2000), Appellants argue that the trial court improperly excluded testimony from the defense expert on the basis that certain testimony amounted to "trial by ambush" under the precedent set by Kane Software Co. v. Mars Investigations (1998). Appellants admit that the defense expert was attempting to testify to certain underlying facts that were not expressly disclosed in the expert report and that such facts contributed to the expert's conclusions, but they argue that the conclusion itself was disclosed and thus it was unnecessary for every underlying detail to be disclosed. We hold that the Appellants' argument has merit. Experts should not be expected to include in their reports every basic scientific fact known to lay people and known realities that support their conclusion. Similarly, experts should not be expected to include in their reports every underlying fact from a specific document so long as the experts explicitly disclosed that they relied upon that document in forming their opinions and that document was made available to the other party through discovery. Such requirements would lead to expert reports that are hundreds, if not thousands, of pages long. For example, an accident reconstructionist need not explain Newton's laws of motion in their report. However, if an expert wishes to testify that they believe the indentations on a vehicle's door mean that the vehicle collided with a streetlamp at 45mph, then measurements, equations, and other relevant facts that form the basis for that specific conclusion must be disclosed in the expert's report. Reversed and remanded to the trial court for reconsideration consistent with this decision.

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Diamond Design Productions v. Fountain (2001)

Notwithstanding MRE 704, witnesses may not offer legal conclusions or legal interpretations. The determination of whether a person or entity has violated the law is the exclusive province of the fact finder—either the judge in a bench trial or the jury in a jury trial—and hearing a witness's views about the law will not "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" within the meaning of MRE 702. For example, in a murder trial, an expert witness (with the appropriate credentials and foundation) may testify to whether the defendant fired a gun or whether the gunshot was the medical cause of a victim's death. That same expert may also testify how the consequences of the gunshot (e.g., blood loss) caused the victim's death. However, regardless of credentials and foundation, that same expert may not testify to whether the defendant committed "murder" or whether the gunshot was the "proximate cause" of the victim's death.

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Winn v. Wu (2001)

On rare occasions, an expert may prepare an affidavit or other sworn statement in lieu of an expert report. In such instances, the lack of an expert report does not automatically prohibit the expert from testifying to their opinions and conclusions on direct or redirect examination. Instead, prior to trial, the court should determine whether the affidavit or sworn statement contains a complete statement of all opinions the expert will testify to and the basis and reasons for them, the facts or data considered by the expert in forming their opinions, and the expert's qualifications. If the affidavit meets these requirements, the expert shall be permitted to testify on direct or redirect examination about any opinions or conclusions stated or incorporated in their affidavit or sworn statement. Any such affidavit or sworn statement is still subject to Kane Software Co. v. Mars Investigations (1998) and Yu-Oh Industries v. Beckstein Alekri, Inc. (2000).

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Jeffries v. Polk County Police Department (2007)

Generally, law enforcement officers are not "experts" subject to MRE 702 or this Court's holding in Tarot Readers Association of Midlands v. Merrell Dow (1994) and its progeny. However, law enforcement officers may have specialized training, skills, and experience beyond the average citizen as contemplated in MRE 701 and may testify based on such specialized knowledge. Insofar as a law enforcement officer is asked to provide an opinion based on that officer's general training, skills, and experience as a law enforcement officer (e.g., whether the officer followed standard protocol in collecting evidence), the admissibility thresholds of MRE 702 and Tarot Readers do not apply. Rather, the admissibility of a law enforcement officer's non-expert opinion is subject to the standards of MRE 701 and any other applicable rule of evidence.

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Windbigler v. Vithala (2017)

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the forensic pathologist to testify to the cause and manner of death even though the pathologist was not tendered as an expert prior to providing her testimony. Unlike other jurisdictions, Midlands does not require a party to "tender an expert" before eliciting an expert opinion. Whether MRE 702 foundational requirements have been satisfied is an evidentiary determination that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

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Sheth v. Dean (2018)

The trial court properly permitted plaintiff's expert to testify. While plaintiff's expert had never previously testified as an expert at trial, the trial court correctly found that the expert's opinion still met all elements of MRE 702. An expert's opinion may be sufficiently reliable even if that expert has never testified in court before. On the other hand, the fact that an expert has testified many times at trial will not make an unreliable opinion admissible.

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Omnidirectional Solutions v. Little Bird Word LLC (2023)

It was never the intention of this Court for its holding in Tarot Readers Association of Midlands v. Merrell Dow (1994) and its progeny to create a rigid and unyielding standard for expert opinions. So long as the expert can sufficiently explain their expertise, training, and method for review, Tarot Readers Assoc. shall not be used by trial courts to prohibit otherwise credible and admissible opinions simply because there is not a known error rate or prior peer review of the expert's analysis. Such questions and potential challenges to credibility are better left to cross examination.

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Moore v. Campbell (2014)

Civil case arising from alleged assault. The plaintiff was called as a witness and testified fully on direct examination. On cross examination, however, the plaintiff failed to respond to some questions, purportedly because of a condition arising from the assault. Held: The judgment for the plaintiff must be reversed. The reason why the witness failed to respond to the questions on cross examination is immaterial. If a witness becomes unable or unwilling to respond to otherwise proper questions on cross examination, the trial court must strike the witness's testimony in its entirety.

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Nichols v. Varma (2015)

The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protected by both the United States and Midlands Constitutions is inapplicable to civil cases. A party who is still subject to a risk of prosecution may, of course, decline to testify. But, unlike in criminal cases, the fact finder in a civil case is permitted to draw an adverse inference from a person's decision not to testify or refusal to do so, and the opposing party is likewise free to comment on such failure.

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Davis v. HappyLand Toy Co. (2011)

In a wrongful death action, both the deceased and the surviving spouse (or, where applicable, personal representative) are considered "parties" for all evidentiary purposes. Accordingly, whenever the defendant offers statements of either the decedent or the spouse (or personal representative), such statements qualify under MRE 801(d)(2)(A) as "an opposing party's statement" and therefore are not hearsay. However, a surviving spouse in a wrongful death action is not a party for purposes of establishing "harm" or "injury." Thus, in a wrongful death action it is not relevant—and may often be overly prejudicial—that a surviving spouse suffered emotional distress, loss of financial support, or loss of companionship. Of course, evidence that is admissible for other purposes is not rendered inadmissible merely because it also happens to provide evidence that a surviving spouse suffered harm or injury.