ethics test 2

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34 Terms

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Hedonism

Holds that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good, and pain is the sole intrinsic bad.


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Sensory Pleasure

Physical, bodily experiences of pleasure (e.g., eating delicious food, getting a massage). It is localized in the body and temporary

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Attitudinal Pleasure

A mental state or attitude of enjoyment, satisfaction, or taking pleasure in something (e.g., feeling pleased that your team won). It does not require a physical sensation

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John Stuart Mill’s Higher/Lower Pleasures

distinguishes between physical (lower) pleasures and intellectual/mental (higher) pleasures. He argues that intellectual pleasures (art, philosophy, reading) are higher in quality and far superior to mere sensory gratification

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Desire-Satisfaction Theories of Well-Being

Holds that your life goes well for you to the extent that your desires/preferences are fulfilled. Something is good for you if and only if you desire it and that desire is satisfied

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Objective List Theories of Well-Being

Holds that certain things are objectively good for a person (e.g., knowledge, friendship, health, virtue, autonomy) regardless of whether the person desires them or experiences pleasure from them

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Fred Feldman’s View

Desert-Adjusted Veridical Attitudinal Hedonism, uses examples like two individuals experiencing pleasure—one taking pleasure in a genuine accomplishment and another taking pleasure in a cruel or malicious act—to demonstrate why pleasure must be adjusted for moral desert and truth (veridicality)

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Veridical Attitudinal Hedonism

Pleasure adds to well-being only if the belief underlying the pleasure is true (i.e., taking pleasure in reality, not illusions)

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Desert-Adjusted

The value of pleasure depends on whether the pleasure is deserved. Pleasure taken in good or noble things increases well-being, while pleasure taken in evil, undeserved, or cruel things (e.g., taking pleasure in someone else's suffering) reduces or adds no intrinsic value to a life

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Human Teleology

 Aristotle views nature as teleological (everything has an end, purpose, or function—a telos). The unique telos (function) of humans is rational activity (acting in accordance with reason).

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Eudaimonia

 Often translated as "flourishing," "happiness," or "the good life." It is the ultimate end (telos) of human existence.

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Achieving Eudaimonia

We achieve eudaimonia by performing our human function well—which means living a life of virtuous rational activity over a complete lifetime

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The Virtuous Person

Desires the good, reasons correctly, and easily/gladly does the right action without internal conflict

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The Continent Person

Knows what is right and acts rightly, but has to overcome internal conflicting desires/temptations

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The Incontinent Person (Akrasia)

Knows what is right and knows what they should do, but yields to temptation and acts wrongly due to weakness of will

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The Vicious Person

Has corrupt desires and wrong moral reasoning; acts badly without regret because they believe their bad actions are good

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Virtuous Soul

virtue is a state of character (hexis) concerned with choice, lying in a mean between extremes

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Virtue is More Than Just Acting a Certain Way

For a virtue ethicist, performing a right action isn't enough to make someone virtuous. The action must be done knowingly, chosen for its own sake, and done from a firm and stable character state

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Doctrine of the Golden Mean

Moral virtue is an intermediate state between two vices—one of excess and one of deficiency.

Example: Courage is the mean between Cowardice (deficiency of confidence/excess of fear) and Rashness (excess of confidence)


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Phronesis (Practical Wisdom)

 The intellectual virtue that allows a person to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous in specific, real-world situations, enabling them to find "the mean" in practice

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Philosophy as the Highest Activity

Aristotle concludes in Nicomachean Ethics (Book X) that theoretical contemplation (philosophical activity) is the highest, most pleasant, and most complete form of human virtuous activity because it engages our highest faculty—pure reason

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Consequentialism

An ethical framework holding that the moral rightness of an action depends solely on its outcomes/consequences

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Hedonic View of Happiness

Defining happiness purely in terms of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain

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Sentience

The capacity to experience feelings, sensations, and subjective states (like pain and pleasure). In ethics, sentience is often considered the threshold for moral considerability (e.g., in Bentham/Mill's utilitarianism)

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The Situationist Objection to Virtue Ethics

A critique from modern empirical psychology arguing that human behavior is determined far more by situational factors (e.g., being in a hurry, finding a dime) than by stable internal personality traits or "virtues." Situationists argue that robust Aristotelian virtues do not actually exist in human psychology

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Narrow Hedonism

Assumes pleasure and pain are distinct kinds of experiences. Parfit rejects this because various pleasures (e.g., drinking when thirsty, reading King Lear, knowing your child is happy) share no common sensory quality

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Preference-Hedonism

Defines pleasure and pain by our desires. An experience is more pleasant if it is preferred at the time.

Example (Freud): Freud refused pain-killing drugs near the end of his life so he could think clearly in torment rather than feel confused euphoria. Preference-Hedonism holds that his life went better because it went as he preferred


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Unrestricted Desire-Fulfilment Theory

Claims that fulfilling any of your desires throughout life makes your life go better. Parfit rejects this using the Stranger on a Train example: if you wish for a sick stranger to be cured and they later are without your knowledge, this does not plausibly make your life go better.

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Success Theory

Appeals only to preferences about your own life. Unlike Preference-Hedonism, it counts preferences about events you cannot introspectively perceive.

Example (Deception & Parenting): If you strongly desire not to be deceived, or desire to be a successful parent, your life goes worse if you are deceived or if your children fail due to your mistakes—even if you never find out or if it happens after your death


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Objective List Theories

Holds that certain things are intrinsically good (e.g., knowledge, rational activity, moral goodness, awareness of beauty) or bad (e.g., being deceived, manipulated, enjoying sadistic pleasure) regardless of whether a person wants them or experiences pleasure from them

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Summative Theories

  • Add up the total net sum of all local desire-fulfilments minus unfulfilled desires over a lifetime.

    • The Addiction Counter-Example: An addict who wakes up each morning with a strong desire for an injection (which is satisfied) would have a massive sum of satisfied local desires. Summative theories imply addiction makes life better, which Parfit considers absurd.

    • The "Repugnant" Life Counter-Example: A 50-year life of extremely high quality vs. an indefinitely long life that is barely worth living. A Summative theory implies the indefinitely long life of trivial pleasures is better simply because the satisfied desires accumulate endlessly.


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Global Theories

Appeal only to desires about some part of one's life considered as a whole, or about one's whole life. Because people globally prefer not to be addicted and prefer a high-quality life, Global Theories yield the correct, intuitive conclusions

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Parfit’s Composite Conclusion

  • Pure Hedonism fails because pleasure derived from trivial or bad things lacks true value.

  • Pure Objective List theory fails because objective goods (knowledge, beauty, virtue) without any enjoyment or desire for them have little to no value for the individual.

  • The Composite View: What makes a life go best is a combination of both—engaging in objectively valuable activities (knowledge, love, beauty, rational activity) and strongly wanting/enjoying being engaged in them


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Virtue ethics

not a mechanical formula for telling people what to do. Instead, it guides action by improving our practical reasoning and character over time. It acknowledges that moral life is dynamic and requires continuous personal effort, self-reflection, and growth