Philosophy: The Visible and Truth, Cartesian Doubt, Berkeley's Immaterialism, and the Problem of Universals

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Comprehensive vocabulary flashcards based on the lecture series covering the problem of perception and representation, Cartesian methodical doubt, Berkeley's immaterialism, and the dispute of universals.

Last updated 6:46 PM on 10/12/26
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28 Terms

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Appearance (Apparence)

That which presents itself to perception; it is not necessarily false, but can become deceptive when taken for the totality of reality.

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Representation (Représentation)

The manner in which an object is made present to a subject, notably through a perception, an image, or an idea.

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Opinion

A belief held to be true without sufficient knowledge of its causes or foundations.

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Intelligible (Intelligible)

That which reason can grasp beyond sensible appearances, notably ideas, principles, and stable structures of reality.

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Mediate / Immediate (Médiat / immédiat)

The immediate is that which appears given without an intermediary; the mediate is that which becomes accessible through a frame, sign, representation, or reasoning.

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Believing / Knowing (Croire / savoir)

Believing consists in holding an assertion to be true; knowing requires being able to justify what one affirms with grounded reasons.

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Persuading / Convincing (Persuader / convaincre)

Persuading consists of obtaining assent by acting on habits or affects; convincing requires reasons capable of being recognized and debated.

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The Idea of the Good (L'idée du Bien)

In Plato's allegory of the cave in La République, the principle symbolized by the sun that makes truth and intelligence possible.

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Methodical Doubt (Doute méthodique)

Descartes' voluntary examination of beliefs that suspends assent to anything that can be called into doubt in order to search for certainty.

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Senses (Sens)

The faculties through which we receive sensible data, notably through sight, hearing, and touch.

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Indubitable

That which resists every reason to doubt and can thereby satisfy the Cartesian demand for absolute certainty.

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Suspension of Judgment (Suspension du jugement)

The act of provisionally refraining from affirming or denying as long as reasons remain insufficient.

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True / Probable / Certain (Vrai / probable / certain)

The true corresponds to what is; the probable possesses favorable reasons without excluding doubt; the certain resists doubt under the Cartesian standard.

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Origin / Foundation (Origine / fondement)

The origin indicates where a belief comes from, whereas the foundation designates what justifies it; arising from the senses does not make a belief absolutely founded.

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Cartesian Rule of Prudence

The principle to never trust entirely those who have deceived us once, which prevents occasional sensory errors from allowing the senses to serve as an absolute guarantee of truth.

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Argument from Madness (L’examen de la folie)

Descartes' consideration of the insane ('insensés') who are mistaken even about their own bodies; an example he sets aside because philosophical doubt must proceed by reasons and not delirium.

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Immaterialism (Immatérialisme)

Berkeley's doctrine that denies a material substance independent of any mind, without denying sensible reality.

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Idea (Idée, in Berkeley's philosophy)

Immediately perceived, passive content (such as color, sound, heat, or resistance) whose existence consists in being perceived by a mind.

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Mind (Esprit, in Berkeley's philosophy)

An active being that perceives, wills, imagines, and remembers; it is not itself a sensible idea.

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Sensible Thing (Chose sensible)

A stable and ordered collection of perceived qualities united under a single name, such as an apple.

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Ideal / Real (Idéal / réel)

The ideal pertains to an idea or a model, whereas the real exists effectively; for Berkeley, a sensible idea can be real.

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Objective / Subjective / Intersubjective

The subjective depends on a subject; the objective holds independently of a subject's preferences; the intersubjective is shareable among subjects.

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Universal (Universel)

That which can be affirmed of multiple individuals, such as affirming 'man' of Socrates, Plato, and Alcibiades.

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Particular (Particulier)

A determinate being, case, or part of a whole to which a universal term can be attributed.

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Predication (Prédication)

The act of attributing a predicate to a subject, such as stating that Socrates is a man.

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Ontology (Ontologie)

The branch of philosophy that examines what exists and the different modes of being.

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Dispute of Universals (La querelle des universaux)

The philosophical problem arising from the gap between the singularity of beings and the generality of words, questioning whether the universal exists in things, in the mind, or only in language.

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Universal / General / Particular / Singular

The universal can be affirmed of all individuals of a class; the general holds for several; the particular designates a determinate part of a set; the singular refers to a single individual.