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Envy-free
No one values someone else's allocation more
than his/her own.
Equitable
Everyone gets the same fraction of the total value
(according to their own tastes).
Divide & Choose procedure
1 person (the Divider) splits
the objects into 2 piles, each of which he values at 50% of the
total. (Assume that it divides evenly.) Then the other person
(the Chooser) picks her favorite pile, and the Divider gets the
other pile.
Moving Knife procedure
the Divider starts with 2 piles, each
of which he values at 50%. Then he gradually rearranges
them, maintaining his 50% value for each pile, until he
reaches a split where the Chooser also values each pile equally.
The Adjusted Winner Procedure
is envy free, equitable,
and efficient for 2 people
Theorem (The "Life Isn't Fair" Theorem)
When there are more than 2 people, it is possible that no split is
envy free, equitable, and efficient, even if items are divisible. (We
can always get at least 2 of the 3 properties.)
The Shapley Value
each pays the average of his MC across
all possible ways of ordering people.
The Shapley value also works for
more than 2 people
sharing benefits rather than sharing costs