Indigenous Organized Groups & Gangs CRIM 412

South American cocaine 'cartels'

Large Colombian and Mexican trafficking networks organize production, financing, transport and wholesale cocaine markets across borders.

What cartel means commercially

A coalition of nominally independent sellers aims to reduce competition, pool resources, control supply and maintain profitable prices.

Medellín and Cali cartel organization

Both used international trafficking partnerships; the Cali operation also used franchising-like cells and regional managers for coordinated distribution.

Cartels and Canadian supply

Colombian cocaine networks historically supplied Canadian wholesalers; Canada was both a retail market and an international transit point.

Cartels: hierarchy mixed with networks

Even powerful cartels rely on independent producers, contractors, transport specialists, enforcement and money-laundering intermediaries.

Vietnamese criminal groups in Canada

Schneider describes early protection rackets and robberies followed by complex cannabis cultivation and interstate or international distribution networks.

Vietnamese OCA division of labour

Cannabis enterprises used different specialists for acquiring, equipping and tending grow locations, financing and distribution.

Vietnamese OCA and broader alliances

Some networks cooperated with motorcycle gangs and other groups that supplied complementary distribution channels.

Ethnicity and organized crime: caution

Classifying groups by ethnic origin does not mean ethnicity itself causes crime; socioeconomic forces and actual organizational ties must be examined.

Two distinct Indigenous OC settings (Schneider)

Central Canada: border smuggling and contraband tobacco; Prairie provinces: urban street gangs tied to inequality and larger OCA markets.

Akwesasne location advantage

The Mohawk community straddles Canada–US borders and policing jurisdictions, creating routes and local knowledge for smuggling.

Akwesasne: historical grievance

Some involvement was framed against perceived long-term government exploitation, the Oka Crisis and challenges to Mohawk sovereignty.

Akwesasne: socio-economic strain

Limited legitimate work and economic opportunities increased incentives for participation in highly profitable contraband markets.

Akwesasne: market incentives

Differences in tobacco taxes and retail prices made untaxed or smuggled cigarettes attractive to buyers and suppliers.

Akwesasne: local and outside participants

Knowledgeable local facilitators and runners from nearby Canadian communities connected supply to customers.

Mohawk Warrior Society: important distinction

Schneider discusses allegations involving some members and leaders; the whole society should not automatically be labelled a criminal organization.

Tobacco company involvement in 1990s smuggling

Major manufacturers exported large volumes to the US market, some of which were diverted and smuggled back into Canada.

Cigarette-market evolution

Smuggling of diverted legitimate products changed after policy/tax shifts; illicit domestic manufacturing later became a major supply source.

Akwesasne: sovereignty interpretation

Some participants presented tobacco trade and border movement as issues of self-government rather than ordinary criminal conduct.

Prairie Indigenous street gang examples

Indian Posse, Manitoba Warriors, Native Syndicate, and Redd Alert are examples discussed in course materials.

Prairie gangs and bigger OCAs

Street-level operations may obtain drugs or work as subcontractors for established groups, including outlaw motorcycle gangs.

Street gangs vs. Mafia-style OCA

Street gangs tend to be more fluid and visible, with territory, youth identity and public violence; traditional OCAs often seek long-term market control.

Colonial model

Colonial displacement, destruction of self-governance, discrimination and ongoing structural inequality contribute to present marginalization and criminal risk.

Intergenerational/historical trauma

Harm from residential schools, family separation and other colonial practices can affect later generations through disrupted relationships and unmet needs.

Critical race theory

Racism and unequal treatment can be built into institutions, including policing and criminal justice, rather than only individual prejudice.

Applied: strain theory and gang recruitment

When young people face blocked legitimate routes to income or status and join drug markets, strain theory explains the pressure; see Topic 2 for the general theory.

Macro risk factors in gang involvement

Structural poverty, housing insecurity, unequal schools, underfunded services and colonial inequalities.

Meso risk factors in gang involvement

Neighbourhood disinvestment, missing youth spaces, weak support systems and distrust of local institutions.

Micro risk factors in gang involvement

Family disruption, trauma, peers or relatives in gangs, and personal searches for identity, belonging, money or safety.

Agency and structural risk

Social conditions limit perceived options, but individuals still make choices; neither pure determinism nor blaming ethnicity explains gangs.

Gangs exploit existing vulnerabilities

Gangs capitalize on poverty, exclusion, unmet social needs and lack of protection rather than creating those historical conditions.

Comack et al. (2013): main argument

Winnipeg street gangs operate as drug businesses: they find customers, divide labour, control distribution, earn profits and expand, while exploiting vulnerable youth and communities.

Main income source in Comack chapter

Drug selling, including changing marijuana and cocaine/crack markets, is a central source of gang revenue.

Comack: market evolution

Drug businesses adapted to products, distribution methods, and communication technologies, including crack lines and mobile phones.

Comack: youth as an exploited sales force

Children and teenagers take frontline selling risks such as arrest and violence, while leaders retain most profits; youth may receive only food, clothes, shelter or small payments.

Comack: wholesale versus retail profit

A supplier divides drugs into smaller portions and passes them to several street sellers; profit and risk are distributed unequally.

Comack: prison as gang 'head office' and deterrence problem

Custody can promote networking, recruitment, criminal skills, status, drug sales and coordination outside; it may therefore strengthen rather than deter gang involvement.

Prison as illegal market

Scarce contraband such as drugs or tobacco can command higher prices inside prison; gang members may organize supply and distribution.

Comack: expansion onto reserves

Drug gangs extended markets to First Nations communities; prison transfers and personal networks sometimes unintentionally helped expansion.

Comack: 'creative destruction'

Gang entrepreneurship expands sales and destroys community welfare, often victimizing other Indigenous people already harmed by dispossession.

Comack: violence as a calculated business tool

Threats and force enforce debts, protect drugs and reputation, and deter rivals; leaders may instead buy out a competitor if that better protects profits.

BC gangs vs. stereotypical street-gang model

Many BC groups are mobile, fluid, multi-ethnic and highly profit-oriented, recruiting across social classes rather than relying on one ethnicity, visible signs, initiation or fixed turf.

BC organized crime and global markets

Pacific ports, rail links, maritime shipping and international trafficking networks link BC criminals to overseas supply chains.

BC's entrepreneurial alliances

Former rivals may cooperate if profitable; partnerships and roles adapt to particular criminal opportunities.

Evolution into an OCA

A street-level gang develops more sophisticated supply chains, larger markets and continuing criminal structure over time.

Subcontracting by an OCA

A powerful crime association supplies, finances, protects or directs smaller street gangs to handle high-risk tasks.

Red Scorpions and Wolfpack example

Course notes describe the Red Scorpions and later Wolfpack alliances as examples of evolving drug networks and cooperation across groups.

BC gang conflict examples

Wolfpack, Brothers Keepers and UN Gang illustrate shifting alliances and violent competition; understand the relationships, not minute event dates.

CFSEU-BC

Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit of British Columbia: integrated police unit focused on high-risk organized crime and gang violence.

Intelligence cycle / analyst role

Collect, collate, analyze and explain information to identify threats, connections, patterns and operational priorities.

Tactical intelligence analysis

Shorter-term, targeted analysis to understand an individual, cell or immediate operation and inform interventions.

Strategic intelligence analysis

Broad long-term picture of networks, evolving markets and threats that helps agencies prioritize resources and disruption strategies.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

Information gathered from publicly accessible sources, including online material and social media, to support investigations.

Human intelligence (HUMINT)

Information from people and confidential informants, distinguished from publicly available OSINT and databases.

Why BC OC leadership may be hard to reach

Higher-level actors can be insulated by middle-level associates and street gangs doing visible, high-risk work.

BC organized crime's 'playbook'

Violence, international access, influence and organizational reputation/branding can combine to increase power and profit.

Applied: tactical vs. strategic intelligence

Mapping future risks across BC is strategic analysis; examining one gang cell's next move to guide immediate action is tactical analysis.

Applied: police transfer gang member who makes prison contacts

Comack's prison head-office effect; incarceration can strengthen and spread networks.

Applied: gang recruits youth needing safety and belonging

Structural and micro-level vulnerabilities interacting with differential association and gang exploitation.