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Why does European monetary integration matter for national fiscal policy?
• In the euro area, monetary policy is centralised at the ECB, while fiscal policy remains national.
• Fiscal decisions affect shared output and inflation, but national authorities cannot adjust their own interest rate or exchange rate.
• The Delors–Maastricht design therefore combines an independent ECB with common rules for national budgets.
Why did European countries move from exchange-rate coordination towards a common currency?
• Integrated economies affected one another through trade, capital movements and exchange-rate changes.
• National expansions could improve a country's terms of trade but worsen external balances, prompting devaluations and further instability.
• A common currency aimed to remove these recurring exchange-rate conflicts and uncertainty.
What were the main stages of European monetary and fiscal integration?
• Rome (1957) began policy consultation, while the end of Bretton Woods in 1971 increased exchange-rate instability.
• The currency snake (1972) and European Monetary System (1979) sought to limit exchange-rate fluctuations.
• The SGP (1997) preceded the euro (1999), followed by the ESM (2012), SURE and the RRF (2020), without a permanent central fiscal capacity.
What distinguishes joint EU borrowing from joint-and-several borrowing?
• Joint borrowing: the EU issues debt, but each member remains responsible for its agreed share.
• Joint-and-several borrowing: other members ultimately cover a member's unpaid obligations without recovering them from it.
• SURE and NextGenerationEU/RRF use joint borrowing, backed by EU-budget headroom and, for SURE, additional national guarantees.
Why is a permanent central fiscal capacity politically difficult to establish?
• Member states disagree over whether common support should express solidarity or mutual insurance.
• Countries with stronger public finances fear persistent transfers to states with higher debt and deficit tendencies.
• Temporary, conditional instruments are more acceptable than permanent risk sharing without prior risk reduction.
What are the main benefits and costs of a single currency?
• Benefits: no intra-area exchange-rate uncertainty or conversion costs, easier price comparison and stronger market competition.
• A credible common monetary policy can support price stability and lower financing uncertainty.
• Costs: loss of national monetary and exchange-rate stabilisation, putting greater pressure on national fiscal policy.
What is the Mundell–Fleming policy trilemma, and what does it imply for fiscal policy?
• A country can combine only two of free capital mobility, monetary autonomy and a fixed exchange rate.
• With free capital mobility and a fixed rate, it relinquishes independent monetary policy.
• Fiscal expansion is stronger under fixed rates because exchange-rate appreciation does not offset the demand stimulus.
In what sense is the euro a 'foreign currency' for individual member states?
• Governments cannot issue euros themselves or require the ECB to finance their deficits.
• They lose national control over seigniorage and an unconditional monetary lender of last resort.
• Capital can leave one member for another without a national exchange-rate adjustment, exposing sovereigns to liquidity crises.
How does De Grauwe's UK–Spain comparison illustrate monetary sovereignty?
• UK: investors selling gilts may sell pounds, but the country retains a central bank able, in extremis, to supply sterling liquidity.
• Spain: investors can move euros to another member, draining domestic liquidity without changing the euro exchange rate.
• Spain cannot compel the ECB to purchase its bonds, so market panic can threaten refinancing even if the shock is similar.
What is an optimum currency area, and which five criteria does Larch identify?
• An OCA is a group of economies for which the benefits of sharing a currency outweigh the costs of losing national monetary policy.
• Integration criteria: openness and capital mobility, plus similar business cycles and economic structures.
• Adjustment and protection criteria: flexible wages and prices, labour mobility, and risk sharing through fiscal transfers or insurance.
What functions do the optimum currency area criteria serve?
• Similar structures and integrated markets help reduce the frequency or asymmetry of country-specific shocks.
• Wage and price flexibility and labour mobility facilitate adjustment when shocks occur.
• Fiscal transfers or other risk-sharing instruments cushion shocks that local adjustment cannot absorb.
How do risk reduction and risk sharing interact in OCA theory?
• Risk reduction makes economies better able to adjust, through flexible markets, mobility and sound institutions.
• Risk sharing spreads the costs of shocks, for example through insurance, a common fiscal capacity or the ESM.
• They can substitute for or complement one another, but unconditional insurance may create moral hazard.
What are the convergence requirements for joining the euro, and how do they relate to OCA theory?
• Candidates need central-bank independence and price stability, judged against low-inflation member states.
• They also need exchange-rate stability, convergent long-term interest rates and sound public finances under treaty criteria.
• These nominal criteria approximate economic convergence but do not guarantee labour mobility, flexibility or common fiscal insurance.
Did the euro area meet the OCA criteria when it was created, and does it today?
• Initially, Larch's assessment was negative on all five criteria.
• Today openness/capital mobility is satisfied, while wage–price flexibility and labour mobility are only partly satisfied.
• Economic structures and cycles remain insufficiently aligned, and automatic cross-country fiscal risk sharing is still missing.
Why is cross-border labour mobility limited in the euro area?
• Workers face language barriers and different national labour-market institutions.
• Larch particularly stresses limited portability of accumulated pension rights across countries.
• Mobility has improved, but it cannot substitute for exchange-rate adjustment as effectively as in the US.
Why was the euro introduced despite not meeting the OCA criteria?
• European integration was also a political project, based on the belief that economic integration promotes unity and prosperity.
• Dynamic OCA reasoning predicted that the common currency would force reforms and increase convergence over time.
• Larch argues that the expected structural reforms and fiscal integration have remained insufficient.
How do the dynamic OCA and specialisation arguments differ?
• Dynamic OCA (Frankel–Rose): a common currency increases trade, bringing national business cycles closer together.
• Krugman's counterargument: integration encourages regional specialisation, potentially increasing asymmetric shocks.
• The euro area's persistent structural differences challenge the optimistic convergence prediction.
How do Eichengreen and Krugman differ in their assessment of European monetary union?
• Eichengreen warned of regional adjustment problems but argued that suitable common institutions could make monetary union work.
• Krugman was more sceptical because asymmetric shocks made the euro area a poor OCA.
• The distinction is whether institutional reform can compensate for the lack of OCA conditions.
How should De Grauwe's costs-and-benefits diagram of default or euro exit be interpreted?
• The horizontal axis measures the size of a negative shock, while default or exit becomes more attractive as the shock grows.
• Costs are taken as roughly fixed, while benefits are higher when markets already expect default than when they do not.
• For the same shock, the expected-default benefit curve can cross above costs, producing a bad equilibrium absent liquidity support.
How can sovereign debt crises become self-fulfilling in a monetary union?
• Fear of default raises sovereign risk premia and refinancing costs.
• Higher debt-service costs can make default rational even when the country could have repaid at lower rates.
• A credible liquidity backstop from a central bank or fiscal capacity can remove this bad equilibrium.
Why are unconditional liquidity support and the ESM imperfect substitutes for a central fiscal capacity?
• A central fiscal capacity can provide predictable transfers and lower the benefit of abandoning the currency after shocks.
• ESM lending usually involves conditions, which remain costly for the borrowing country.
• Unconditional ECB liquidity can limit panic but may create inflationary or moral-hazard costs for the whole currency area.
What is the sovereign–bank doom loop and how does it work in both directions?
• Sovereign to banks: domestic banks hold government bonds, so sovereign distress weakens bank balance sheets and funding.
• Banks to sovereign: banking crises trigger possible public rescues, increasing government debt and risk.
• Both channels reinforce each other and were acute during the euro-area debt crisis.
How does Banking Union respond to the doom loop, and what remains incomplete?
• Common ECB supervision and EU-level bank-resolution arrangements reduce purely national responsibility for bank failures.
• Bail-in mechanisms seek to impose losses on investors before taxpayers.
• Incomplete common deposit insurance and continued bank holdings of domestic sovereign debt preserve important vulnerabilities.
Why does Larch compare temporary EU financial support to helping a neighbour whose house is on fire?
• Neighbours help a burning house in a row because the fire could spread to their own homes.
• Similarly, countries may support a partner during an exceptional shock to prevent wider euro-area damage.
• They still resist repeated support unless the recipient reduces the risks that could generate future crises.
How does the RRF link solidarity or insurance to resilience?
• The RRF provided temporary common support after Covid-19 rather than a permanent euro-area fiscal budget.
• Payments are tied to reforms and investment intended to strengthen national resilience.
• This seeks to reconcile crisis-time risk sharing with creditor countries' demand for future risk reduction.
What is the central institutional weakness of the euro area identified in this chapter?
• Monetary policy is centralised, but national fiscal policies remain decentralised and constrained by common rules.
• Without a permanent central fiscal capacity, asymmetric shocks rely on domestic adjustment or ad hoc assistance.
• This gap between economic requirements and political willingness is a central limitation of monetary union.