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210 Terms

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Cross-Conveyance Theory

·       Issue → Does pooling transfer mineral ownership between owners or merely create agreement to share production? (x)

(x)

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Cross-conveyance theory (minority, potentially Texas) →

Pooling gives each mineral owner an undivided interest in minerals throughout pooled unit.

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Contractual theory (majority) →

Owners keep original mineral interests but agree to share production and royalties.

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Why it matters → May affect bankruptcy, mineral transfers, and approvals for tribal lands. (x)

(x)

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Exception →

·       Parties may expressly state pooling is only a contractual agreement to share benefits and burdens.

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NPRI (freestanding royalty) →

Nonparticipating royalty interest carved out of mineral estate giving owner a share of production

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Rule →

·       Neither lessor nor lessee can pool NPRI owner's interest without consent.

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Pooling mineral estate does not automatically pool

NPRI

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·       NPRI owner may:

o   Ratify → Agree to pooling and receive proportionate share of pooled production.

o   Do not ratify → Receive full NPRI royalty from wells on land burdened by NPRI.

→ Agree to pooling and receive proportionate share of pooled production.

→ Receive full NPRI royalty from wells on land burdened by NPRI.

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Example — Two 40-Acre Tracts

·       Two adjacent 40-acre tracts → One burdened by 1/16 NPRI.

·       Mineral owner leases for 1/8 royalty → Lessee receives 7/8; lessor's 1/8 includes 1/16 owed to NPRI owner.

·       State requires 80-acre unit → Lessee pools both tracts.

Is NPRI automatically pooled?

·       → No. NPRI owner must ratify.

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Exam Rule — Location of Well

·       Well on NPRI land →

·       Well outside NPRI land →

Do not ratify → Receive full NPRI royalty.

Ratify → Receive pooled royalty share instead of nothing.

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NPRI Ratification Example

·       Facts → Tract A has 1/16 NPRI covering 80 acres, pooled into 320-acre unit. Producing well drilled on Tract A.

·       Issue → Should NPRI owner ratify?

Option 1 — Ratify

·       Receives pooled share → 1/16 × 80/320 = 1/64.

 


Option 2 — Do Not Ratify

·       Receives full royalty because well is on NPRI land → 1/16 × 80/80 = 1/16.


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Result →

Do not ratify because 1/16 is greater than 1/64.

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Why consent is required →

·       NPRI owner did not sign lease and lacks executive right to lease minerals.

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·       Practical problem → NPRI owners may be difficult to locate, making ratification harder. (x)

(x)

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NPRI — 20,000-Acre Ranch Example

·       Facts → Three family groups own mineral interests throughout 20,000-acre ranch, with varying percentages (50/50/0, one-third each, etc.).

·       Oil company leases from all three using similar terms → May be treated as community lease.

·       Problem → Small NPRIs scattered throughout ranch, including land far from producing wells.

·       NPRI owners:

o   Well on their land →

o   Well elsewhere →

→ Do not ratify → Full NPRI royalty.

→ Ratify → Pooled royalty share instead of nothing.

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Problem for lessee →

·       Some ratify while others refuse, potentially increasing royalty obligations.

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NPRI owners ratified lease →

·       Demanded royalties from production throughout ranch.

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·       Lessee argued → Ratifying owners accepted all terms, including ownership-allocation limitations.

·       Example → Family owning 0% under producing tract may receive no royalty under applicable allocation.

·       Result → Dispute went to court. (x)

(x)

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Exam Takeaways

Well on NPRI land →

Well outside NPRI land →

→ Do not ratify.

→ Ratify.

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Oil companies may seek ratification before drilling →

Lessee may demand title evidence →

→ Greater negotiating leverage.

→ NPRI claimant must establish interest supporting claim.

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Retained acreage clauses

→ May limit royalty claims by dividing original lease into separate leases.

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Royalty valuation →


→ Lessors seek additional money rather than lease cancellation.

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Commonly litigated issue → Meaning of market value in royalty clauses.

·       Identical leases with identical royalty fractions and production volumes may generate different royalty payments because of differences in royalty clause language. (x)

(x)

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Interchangeable terms:

·       Market value = ·      

Amount realized

market price.


= contract price = proceeds

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·       Oil is measured directly →

·       Gas is measured indirectly →

→ Oil is a liquid that can be physically measured using tanks or meters.

→ Natural gas expands and contracts depending on temperature and pressure. Measuring devices account for pressure, temperature, and flow rate.

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Most royalty underpayment litigation involves

involves natural gas

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·       Undermeasurement →

Recording less oil or gas than was actually produced, resulting in lower royalty payments.

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·       Regulatory capture →

→ Concern that regulatory agencies begin favoring the interests of the industry they are supposed to regulate.

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Gas Purchase Contract

Agreement between the lessee (oil and gas company) and

·       the purchaser of production (PoP).

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Purchaser may be the pipeline company itself or

·       a third-party purchaser (e.g., a power plant) that uses the pipeline solely to transport the purchased gas.

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The amount of royalty owed under an oil and gas lease may depend on

the gas purchase contract.

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Royalty Clauses

Texas AAPL Royalty Clause

Standard oil royalty clause:

3.     The royalties to be paid by lessee are (a) on oil … 1/8 of the oil produced and saved from the leased premises, the same to be delivered at the wells to the credit of the lessor in the pipeline to which the wells may be connected, or in the absence of a pipeline connection to the transporter receiving lessee’s oil and at the same price received by lessee.

 

Standard gas royalty clause:

·       Gas produced from the leased premises and sold or used off the premises → 1/8 of market value at the well.

·       Gas sold at the well → 1/8 of the amount realized from the sale. (x)

(x)

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Bifurcated royalty clause →

Royalty clause providing two different methods of calculating royalties depending on where the gas is sold.

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Ex: Gas is worth $8,000 at the wellhead but sells for $10,000 off the premises → Lessor receives 1/8 of $8,000 ($1,000), not 1/8 of $10,000. (x)

(x)

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Natural gas requires more processing than oil before transportation and sale.

Getting gas up to specification:

·       Dehydration → Removal of water.

·       Removal of impurities → Hydrogen sulfide (H₂S), other liquids, and particulates.

·       Compression → Allows gas to flow through pipelines.

·       Temperature adjustment → Maintains appropriate transportation conditions.

·       Addition of odorants, where necessary → Allows detection of gas leaks. (x)

(x)

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Natural gas becomes more valuable as it is

processed and transported closer to potential buyers.

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Work-Back Method

Determines the value of gas at the wellhead by subtracting

appropriate processing and transportation costs from the downstream arm’s-length sale price.

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Ex: Gas is produced in Alaska, liquefied, transported to Japan, regasified, and sold. (x)

(x)

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→ To determine its value at the wellhead in Alaska, start with the sale price in Japan (arm’s-length sale price) and subtract

applicable processing and transportation costs.

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Market Value Royalty Litigation

Majority Rule — Texas (Vela)

Market value →

·       Open market price at the time of production, regardless of the contract price.

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Proceeds →

·       Amount the lessee actually receives from selling the gas, subject to the implied covenant to market.

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Minority Rule — Oklahoma (Tara)

Market value =

·       Contract price, provided the contract was negotiated:

o   In good faith.

o   At the best available price and terms.

o   At arm’s length (or its equivalent).

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Otherwise, the contract price does not necessarily establish

market value

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Arm’s-length transaction →

·       Independent parties negotiating in their own economic interests.

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o   Ex: Exxon sells gas to an unrelated company. Both negotiate to obtain the best deal for themselves. (x)

(x)

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Affiliated transaction (non-arm’s-length) →

·       Transaction between companies sharing ownership or control, creating the potential for artificially low prices that reduce royalty payments.

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Exam → Professor will specify whether a transaction is at arm’s length. (x)

(x)

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Texas vs. Oklahoma Hypothetical

Lessee enters into a 20-year contract to sell gas for $2 per unit. Ten years later, the market price increases to $5 per unit.

Texas (Vela):

·       Market value royalty →

·       Proceeds royalty →

Oklahoma (Tara):

- Market value royalty →

Calculate royalty using $5.

Calculate royalty using $2, assuming the lessee satisfied its implied covenant to market.

Calculate royalty using $2, provided the Tara requirements were satisfied.

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Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc. (Tex. 2001)

Facts:

·       Lease contained a bifurcated royalty clause.

·       Gas was sold off the premises under a long-term contract.

·       Contract price was higher than the current market price.

·       Lessors wanted royalties based on the higher contract price.

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Holding:

·       Lessors were entitled to market value, not the higher contract price.

·       Implied covenant to market cannot override express lease terms.

·       Reaffirmed the Vela rule.

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Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co. (5th Cir. 1984)

·       Reaffirmed the Vela rule using

a different rationale.

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Gas purchase contracts are

·       executory contracts (contracts under which parties have continuing obligations).

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o   Lessee must deliver gas.

o   Purchaser must pay for gas. (x)

(x)

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Gas is not actually sold until it is

produced

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Therefore, market value is determined

·       at the time of production, not at the time of contracting.

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Risk of Being the Middleman (Vela Rule)

Lessee receives a fixed contract price but pays royalties based on

current market value

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·       Market price rises →

·       Market price falls →

Lessee pays more in royalties.

Lessee pays less in royalties.

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Ex: Lessee (oil co) signs a long-term contract to sell gas for $100. The lease requires a 1/4 market value royalty.

·       Market price rises to $200 → Lessee still receives $100 but pays $50 in royalties.

·       Market price falls to $40 → Lessee still receives $100 but pays only $10 in royalties. (x)

(x)

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This occurs because royalties are based on what the gas is currently worth, not

what the lessee actually receives.

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Market Value Royalty Hypothetical (Calculation)

Lessee enters into a 20-year contract to sell gas for $0.50 per Mcf (1,000 cubic feet of natural gas). The contract was negotiated in good faith, at arm’s length, and at the best available price and terms. Ten years later, the market price increases to $1.00 per Mcf. The lease provides for a 1/8 market value royalty.

·       Texas (Vela) → $1.00 × 1/8 = $0.125 in royalties per Mcf.

·       Oklahoma (Tara) → $0.50 × 1/8 = $0.0625 in royalties per Mcf. (x)

(x)

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Exam trap → Oklahoma uses the contract price only if the contract satisfies the Tara requirements. (x)

(x)

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Implied Covenant to Market

General Rule

Use this implied covenant when representing a lessor who is losing royalties because the lessee is not properly marketing oil or gas.

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Lessee must act as a reasonably prudent operator (RPO) by:

·       Diligently searching for a market.

·       Selling production within a reasonable time (time component).

·       Obtaining a reasonable price (price component, where applicable).

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Time Component

Lessee unreasonably delays selling gas → Lessor is not

receiving production royalties.

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Ex: Lessee drills a productive gas well but keeps it shut in (not producing) despite an available market. Even if the lease permits the well to be shut in, the lessor may sue for breach of the implied covenant to market within a reasonable time. (x)

(x)

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Price Component

Lessee sells gas at an unreasonably low price →

Lessor receives lower royalties.

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Ex: Lessee sells gas at a substantially lower price than comparable operators without justification → May breach the implied covenant to market at a reasonable price. (x)

(x)

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Courts consider four comparable sales factors to determine whether the lessee obtained a reasonable price:

Time, Quality, Quantity, Availability of Market

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·       Time →

·       Quality →

·       Quantity →

o   Ex: Lessee sells gas to a purchaser for $2 per Mcf instead of $3 because the purchaser buys in bulk. Although the lessor receives lower proceeds royalties, the lower price may be justified by the bulk discount.


→ When the transaction occurred.

→ Purity of gas and amount of processing required.

→ Volume of gas purchased.

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Availability of market →

·       Availability of pipelines and purchasers.

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A lower sales price does not automatically establish a breach because

these four factors may justify price differences.

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Split Views of Royalty Clause (Texas vs. Oklahoma)

Texas (Vela):


Oklahoma (Tara):


·       Courts prioritize the express language of the lease.

·       Implied covenant to market at a reasonable price applies only to proceeds (amount realized) royalties.


&


·       Courts consider express terms, implied covenants, and industry custom.

·       Implied covenant to market at a reasonable price applies to both market value and proceeds royalties.

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Implied Covenant to Market

Texas

Oklahoma

Time component

Both royalty types

Both royalty types

Price component (market value)

No

Yes

Price component (proceeds)

Yes

Yes

(x)

(x)

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Remember → Texas excludes only the price component for market value royalties. The lessee still has a duty to

market production within a reasonable time.

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Implied Covenant to Market Hypothetical

Lessee drills a gas well and receives two offers from potential purchasers:

·       Purchaser A offers $2 per Mcf.

·       Purchaser B offers $4 per Mcf.

Both purchasers offer identical terms, but the lessee accepts Purchaser A’s offer without justification. The lease requires a 1/8 royalty.

Texas (Vela):

·       Market value royalty →

·       Proceeds royalty →


Oklahoma (Tara):

·       Market value royalty →

·       Proceeds royalty →

Lessor receives 1/8 of $4. Cannot sue for breach of the price component because royalties are already based on market value.


Lessor receives 1/8 of $2. Can sue for breach of the price component because the lessee unreasonably accepted a lower price.


Lessee cannot rely on the $2 contract price under Tara because the lessee failed to obtain the best available price. Lessor can sue for breach of the price component.

Lessor receives 1/8 of $2. Can sue for breach of the price component because the lessee unreasonably accepted a lower price.

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Time component (both jurisdictions):

- If the lessee instead rejects both offers and unreasonably keeps the well shut in, the lessor can

sue for breach of the implied covenant to market within a reasonable time, regardless of the royalty type.

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Contracting Around Implied Covenants

- Some states (e.g., Ohio) allow parties to expressly disclaim implied covenants

in the lease

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Take-or-Pay Clause

Provision in a gas purchase contract requiring the purchaser to take an agreed quantity of gas or pay an agreed amount even if the purchaser does

not take the gas

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Payments for gas that is not taken are called

take or pay payments

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Protects the lessee by guaranteeing

·       a predictable income stream.

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Dedication of Production

Dedication →

Committing production from a particular oil and gas lease to a particular purchaser or pipeline.

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All production covered by the dedication must be sold to

that purchaser

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Lessee cannot simply sell the dedicated gas to

another purchaser

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Make-Up Gas

Gas the purchaser previously paid for, at least partially, but

did not take

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Purchaser has the right, but not the obligation, to

·       take the gas later within a specified period.

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Take-or-Pay Hypothetical (Potential Exam Question)

A (lessee) enters into a gas purchase contract to sell $200 worth of natural gas to B (purchaser). The contract contains a 25% take-or-pay clause. However, B’s pipeline is at full capacity and cannot take the gas.

Question: What is B’s take-or-pay payment?

·       $200 × 25% = $50.

·       B must pay A $50 even though B does not receive any gas.

·       If B takes the gas later (make-up gas) → B pays the remaining $150 based on the original contract price.

·       If B never takes the gas → B loses the $50.

Exam → Professor may provide two of the following three variables and ask you to calculate the third:

·       Total contract value.

·       Take-or-pay percentage.

·       Take-or-pay payment.

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Formula →

Total contract value × Take-or-pay percentage = Take-or-pay payment.

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Royalty on Take-or-Pay Payments

Issue → Is the lessor entitled to a royalty share of take-or-pay payments or settlement payments made to eliminate take-or-pay obligations?

·       Federal, Texas, and Oklahoma →

·       Louisiana and Arkansas →

No. Royalties are owed on actual production. If no gas is produced, no royalty is owed.

Yes. Cooperative venture approach (lessor and lessee share financial benefits arising from the oil and gas lease).

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Ex: Pipeline pays the lessee $100,000 to eliminate its take-or-pay obligations. The lease provides for a 1/8 royalty.

·       Texas and Oklahoma →

·       Louisiana and Arkansas →

Lessor receives $0 because no gas was produced.

Lessor receives $12,500 ($100,000 × 1/8).

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Exam → Know the jurisdictional split, particularly Louisiana and Arkansas. (x)

(x)

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Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

LNG trains → Facilities that liquefy

·       natural gas so it can be transported by ship.

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Although take-or-pay litigation was common in the 1980s, take-or-pay provisions are reappearing in

·       LNG contracts.

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Free Market Terms Other Than Direct Price

A gas purchaser may provide the lessee with additional payments or benefits beyond the actual purchase price of the gas (e.g., signing bonuses, supply bonuses, and gifts).

Ex: A pipeline company pays the lessee:

·       $100,000 for natural gas.

·       $20,000 as a signing bonus for entering into the gas purchase contract.

The lease provides for a 1/8 royalty. The lessor receives 1/8 of the $100,000 but also demands 1/8 of the $20,000 signing bonus.

Issue → Is the signing bonus royalty-bearing (is the lessor entitled to a royalty share of the additional payment received by the lessee)?

Exam → Focus on whether the additional payment or benefit is directly related to production. (x)

(x)

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RPO standard →

What an operator knowledgeable about the petroleum business would do under the same or similar circumstances, taking into account the interests of both the lessee and lessor.

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Each specific implied covenant is an application of the

RPO standard

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Four elements of the RPO standard:

Competence, Good faith, Due diligence, Due Regard

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·       Competence →

·       Good faith →

·       Due diligence →

·       Due regard →

Possess the knowledge and skills expected of an operator in the petroleum industry.

Act honestly and fairly.

Take reasonable and timely steps to fulfill obligations.

Consider the rights and interests of the lessor.

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The overarching implied covenant is the obligation to

act as a reasonably prudent operator

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Four specific implied covenants arise from this standard:

1.     Implied covenant to market production.

o   Market within a reasonable time.

o   Market at a reasonable price (where applicable).

2.     Implied covenant to develop the premises.

o   Drill an initial or test well.

o   Reasonably develop the leased premises.

o   Further explore the leased premises (recognized in certain jurisdictions).

3.     Implied covenant to protect the leasehold from drainage.

4.     Implied covenant to prudently manage and administer the lease.

o   Follow standard oilfield practices.

o   Comply with environmental, state, federal, and tribal regulations.

o   Avoid creating environmental hazards.

o   Professor calls this the “don’t be an oilfield slob” covenant.