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Flashcards covering Chapter 3 Negligence: Causation, including factual causation tests, divisible versus indivisible injuries, intervening acts (novus actus interveniens), and remoteness of damage rules.
Under the 'but for' test from Barnett, when is factual causation established or negated?
The test asks: but for the breach, would the harm have occurred? If yes, there is no causation.
What standard of proof governs the 'all or nothing' approach to causation, as illustrated by Hotson?
The claimant must prove causation on the balance of probabilities; in Hotson, a 25% chance was not enough.
How do Bonnington and Wilsher distinguish establishing causation in cases involving multiple causes?
Under Bonnington, only a material contribution is needed; under Wilsher, merely adding to the list of possible causes is not enough.
To what context is the 'material increase in risk' test from McGhee limited according to Sienkiewicz?
It is now limited to scientific uncertainty, such as cases of mesothelioma (Sienkiewicz).
What is the extent of liability for a later defendant in successive injuries under Performance Cars v Abraham?
The later defendant is liable only for the extra harm.
How are damages handled in divisible injury cases such as Holtby?
Damages are apportioned, meaning the claimant may need to sue everyone.
How does defendant liability operate in cases of indivisible injury?
Each defendant is liable in full, and the claimant recovers once only.
How does the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 operate between defendants regarding an indivisible injury?
It allows apportionment between defendants only (e.g., at £20,000 damages split 90/10, D1 can claim £2,000 from D2, or D2 can claim £18,000 from D1).
Do instinctive acts by third parties break the chain of causation (novus actus interveniens) according to Scott v Shepherd?
No, instinctive acts do not break the chain.
Under what condition do negligent third-party acts break the chain of causation?
Negligent acts break the chain only if unforeseeable (Knightley v Johns, but not Rouse v Squires).
When will reckless or intentional third-party acts fail to break the chain of causation?
While reckless or intentional acts are more likely to break it (Lamb), they do not break the chain if the defendant's duty was to guard against them (Stansbie v Troman).
When does negligent medical treatment break the chain of causation?
Negligent medical treatment rarely breaks the chain unless it is grossly negligent.
Under what standard does a claimant's own act break the chain of causation?
It breaks the chain only if entirely unreasonable (McKew yes, Wieland no); mere carelessness usually goes to contributory negligence, which is better for the claimant.
What rule on remoteness was established in Wagon Mound (No 1)?
Damage must be of a reasonably foreseeable kind.
Must the precise manner of harm be foreseeable under Hughes v Lord Advocate?
No, as long as the type of harm is foreseeable, the precise manner need not be (contrast Tremain v Pike regarding Weil's disease).
What principle governs the extent of recovery under the eggshell skull rule in Robinson v Post Office?
You must take your victim as you find them, meaning the full extent of the harm is recoverable.