actus reus

key cases

Larsonneur 1933

situational liability

Defendant left England to go to Ireland and was brought against her will back to the UK, then arrested and convicted for being in the UK beyond her right to remain

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland

distinguishing an act from an omission

Doctor stopping to give life support is not the same as a lethal injection causing a victim to die.

“failure to continue what you have previously done is not to do anything positive”

“simply allowing patient to die of their pre-existing condition, whereas an interloper switching off the machine would be conduct that cannot be categorised as an omission”

patient no longer had any interests in life-sustaining treatment because it was invasive and did not benefit him. The doctors no longer owed him a duty to continue that treatment

lawful to discontinue treatment where it no longer benefits the patient, even if this leads to the patient’s death. Factors relevant to the patient’s interests include:

• The sanctity of life (which is not absolute);

• The patient’s diagnosis and likelihood of improvement or recovery;

• The invasiveness of the treatment;

• The patient’s level of awareness of the world;

• Any ascertainable wishes the patient expressed beforehand.

Dytham 1979

statutory duty to act, and duties fo law enforcement

FACTS: defendant was a police officer. He stood by whilst a bouncer kicked a man to death. He was charged with the offence of misconduct in a public officer. He argued that the offence could not be committed by an omission as it specifically requires misconduct.

RULING: offence of misconduct in a public offence can be committed by an omission. The defendant's conviction was upheld

Pittwood 1902

contractual duty to act

FACTS: defendant’s job was to operate a level crossing on the railway track. He left the gate lifted up while he went on his lunch break. While he was gone, a horse and cart passed through the gate. A train hit the horse and cart, killing the driver. The defendant was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter. He appealed his conviction. He argued that it was not possible to commit manslaughter by omission, nor to rely on a contractual duty to act

RULING: Court upheld the conviction. The contractual duty to act put the defendant under a criminal duty to act.

RATIO: This was partially because the contractual duty was for the public’s benefit

R v Gibbins and Proctor 1919

parent-child duty ot act

FACTS: appellants were convicted of murdering a seven-year-old girl in their care after they allowed her to starve to death. Gibbins was the girl’s father, while Proctor was his mistress. The couple lived together with Gibbins’ children. Proctor hated the girl, and had a history of abusing her. Gibbins gave money to Proctor to look after his children, and claimed that he thought the child was looked after. Gibbins appealed his conviction for murder, arguing that he could only be guilty of manslaughter.

RULING: upheld the conviction.

RATIO: Gibbins had to be aware of the girl’s condition since he lived in the same house. The jury had clearly inferred that he chose to ignore the girl’s condition due to his infatuation with Proctor. This was sufficient to conclude that Gibbins intended to cause the girl grievous bodily harm, which completed the mens rea of murder.

compare with R v Stone and Dobinson on basis of ‘living in the same home’

R v Hood

spousal duty to act

FACTS: defendant’s wife was injured in a fall. She suffered from osteoporosis and brittle bone disease. The defendant was his wife’s sole carer, but he failed to get her medical attention for several weeks. By this point, the wife’s condition had deteriorated and she died in hospital. defendant was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter and sentenced to four years in prison. He appealed his sentence arguing she was able to care for herself so he couldn’t be fully responsible for her death.

RULING: agreed that the defendant was not wholly responsible for his wife’s death and that four years was therefore excessive

R v Instan 1893

voluntarily assumed duty to act

FACTS: defendant lived with her aunt, who provided the defendant financial support. For the last ten days of the aunt’s life, she suffered from a disease which stopped her from moving. She was unable to get help for herself. The defendant failed to get help for her aunt. She also failed to provide her food, and informed no one of her condition. She had the opportunity to provide help, and during that time took in food deliveries paid for with the aunt’s money. The aunt died as a result. defendant was charged with gross negligence manslaughter. She argued that she was not guilty of this offence. This was because she owed her aunt no duty to feed her or get help.

RULING: defendant was convicted. The court held that she did owe her aunt a duty of care at the very least to feed her.

RATIO: not every moral obligation leads to a legal duty, but all legal duties are based on a moral duty. The duty in this case appears to have arisen out of a combination of these factors:

• The defendant was the only one who knew of the aunt’s condition and so was the only one who could help;

• The defendant had a family relationship with the aunt, lived with her and had been supported by her;

• The food which the defendant took delivery of was paid for by the aunt and intended at least partly for her consumption.

R v Nicholls 1874

voluntarily assumed duty to act (taking care of infant)

FACTS: defendant was a grandmother who took her granddaughter into her home to care for her after the child's mother died. The child subsequently died as a result of neglect. 

RULING: trial judge (Brett J) directed the jury that if a person voluntarily undertakes the care of a helpless person (due to infancy, mental illness, or other vulnerability), there is a legal duty to provide necessities of lifeR

R v Evans (Gemma) 2009

voluntary assumed duty to act, not always imposed for blood-siblings/familial relationships

FACTS: mother failed to summon help for daughter who collapsed from taking heroin given by half-sister

RULING: older half-sister not held to be under DoC simply because of blood relationshipR

R v Stone and Dobison 1977

voluntarily assumed duty to act

• FACTS: sister living with appellants and suffered from anorexia, appellants did nothing to help her despite neighbours’ requests. sister eventually found dead, naked, dirty and in appalling condition. appellants convicted of manslaughter and appealed

• RULING: appeal dismissed

• RATIO: when assuming duty of care for the sister, court took into account that appellants undertook voluntary duty of care when she moved in, solidified by the fact that appellants were aware of her poor condition and didn’t summon help nor raise awareness despite a social worker regularly visiting

  • in CoA: appellants claimed that there was no single authority establishes that a duty of care arises after victim becomes helpless in one’s home

  • Geoffrey Rivlin (judge):

    • legal duty owed since appellants had taken it upon themselves to provide/assist in providing the deceased’s basic needs (appellant’s mistress would wash her) and that she’d occupied a room in the house

Opposing ruling by Bibbings:

no duty to act, shouldn’t have been convicted, conviction was political response to public outrage, previous ruling also assumed that it was a woman’s responsibility to care in the household and ignored patriarchal dynamics which may’ve stopped mistress from getting more help

• majority’s grounds unsupported by authority, so not qualified reasoning, duties were not legally imposed

• no statute imposes liability for mature adult capable of taking care of themself

• analysed authorities the majority cited and critiqued that

  • in Smith, helpless cohabiting adult siblings held to have been owed no DoC unless there was a specific legal obligation for it

  • in Instan, some promise or agreement to take on care is required, which wasn’t present

• no previous cases hold that attempting to help someone creates a duty of care

  • Good Samaritan rescuer?

• no basis for treating the deceased’s eventual inability to care for herself as a factor creating a duty, whether or not the appellants knew of it

Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner

continuing act

FACTS: D drove onto police officer’s foot, after being informed and told to drive off, he said ‘f off you can wait’ and only drove off after numerous demands to.defendant was convicted of assaulting a police officer (under a now-defunct statutory provision). He appealed his conviction. The defendant argued that he lacked the mens rea because he did not intend to touch the constable at the time he drove over the foot.

RULING: upheld the defendant’s conviction

RATIO: continuing act, and at some point during this continuing act (when he said f off you can wait) he intended to maintain pressure to the constable’s footR

no need for the defendant to have the mens rea of an offence from the outset of the actus reus. So long as the actus reus has yet to be completed, it is possible to superimpose a later mens rea to complete the offenc

R v Miller 1983

duty to act when D creates the danger, coincidence of AR + MR

FACTS: D in someone else’s home and fell asleep, his cigarette started a fire as he was sleeping. when he woke up and noticed the fire, he went to another room instead of trying to put it out. convicted of arson and appealed

RULING: appeal dismissed

RATIO:

• even though MR and AR didn’t occur exactly at the same time, treated as a continuing act (see Fagan)

• question is: did a physical act cause the fire? if not, merely a bystander. if yes, court must consider actor’s state of mind

• while D didn’t intend to start the fire, his recklessness in not putting it out and moving to another room constituted the actus reus and mens tea

R v Robinson-Pierre

state of affairs, strict liability

FACTS: dog owner kept his dangerous dog locked in his house. police entered with search warrant and were attacked by the dog indoors, and chased out onto the pavement. dog owner charged under statute (Dangerous Dogs Act) because dog was dangerously out of control in a public place and caused injury. case appealed

RULING: appeal upheld

RATIO

• the statute creates an offence of strict liability and does not require proof of mens rea. but strict liability does not mean absolute liability in all circumstances: criminal liability to arise where the prohibited state of affairs was wholly the result of the deliberate act of a third party, without any causal contribution by the owner or a person in charge of the dog

• Parliament did not intend owners to be liable regardless of their ability to control the dog. The structure of the Act implied a requirement for some act or omission by the defendant which made a more than minimal contribution to the dog being dangerously out of control in a public place

  • might have been open to a properly directed jury to find that the appellant contributed by failing to attempt to control the dog once it escaped, the appellant had not been directed to meet that case and had not given evidence in response

R v Elvin

strict liability, state of affairs

Dangerous Dogs Act, failing to keep a dangerous dog under control in a public place is an offence of strict liability