metaphysics exam 3

you can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stages

quine

View of physical objects extended in time via temporal parts rather than mysterious, unchanging inner essences

quine

Every physical object that is not sub-atomic is, according to physics, made up of spatially separated parts

quine

Objects indistinguishable from one another should be construed as identical for that discourse

quine

 The idea of external objects arises from an error of identification

hume

Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance

hume

A thing is identical with itself and nothing else, not even its identical twin

quine

identity is complete, definable/eliminable, uniquely determined, and universal

quine

Hume was puzzled. Identity seems like a relation, but it does not relate things pairwise as a relation should.

quine

Locke’s view implies we can remember everything that happened to us - which is absurd

Perry

Being destroyed and replicated is about as good as normal survival

parfit

the reductionist view (a person is what has experiences, but the subject of experiences is a separately existing entity) is true

parfit

there is a difference between numerical identity and exact similarity

parfit

Rejects that duplicate people are two in number

ehring

Shared consciousness, common body, and lack of causal independence do not require the existence of more than one person

ehring

Case of time travelling to talk to younger self shows the failure of shared consciousness for an extended period and the existence of more than one body, are not separately or jointly sufficient for personal non-identity

ehring

Can be shown false that being p-related is necessary for being stages of the same person

ehring

What matters in survival is mental continuity and connectedness

lewis

successive mental states should be interconnected by bonds of similarity and lawful causal dependence

lewis

Personal identity may be a matter of degree because personhood is a matter of degree, even though identity is not

lewis

The trouble with overlap is that it leads to overpopulation

lewis

I-relation: the relation that holds between the several stages of a single continuant person

lewis

R-relation: definite relation of mental continuity and connectedness among person-stages in mind as the relation that matters in survival

lewis

Tensed identity: a derivative relation among constituents which is induced by identity among stages

lewis