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Watts — Definition of Federalism
When government is organized across multiple tiers that combine shared rule with regional self-rule, with at least two governments having equal constitutional legal status.
Wheare — Federal Principle
When two or more governments are independent and coordinate within their own spheres, with neither subordinate to the other.
Wheare — Formal Autonomy
When each order has constitutionally guaranteed authority within its own sphere rather than powers delegated by another government.
Wheare — Canada as Quasi-Federal
When federal oversight such as reservation, disallowance, and federal appointment of provincial judges weakens full provincial independence.
Livingston — Sociological Definition of Federalism
When territorially concentrated social, economic, political, or cultural differences are expressed and protected through federal institutions.
Livingston — Common Instrumentalities of Federalism
When diversity is managed through institutions such as a written constitution, distribution of powers, constitutional interpretation, representation, dual citizenship, and a federal executive.
Federal Formula
When the central government governs matters common to all while subnational governments govern regionally distinct matters, with neither order subordinate.
Canada — Intrastate vs Interstate Federalism
When weak representation of provincial interests inside federal institutions leads Canada to rely heavily on bargaining between governments.
Five Models of Intergovernmental Relations
When governments move from acting separately toward greater interdependence: independent government, consultation, coordination, collaboration, and joint decision-making.
Canada's Intergovernmental Relations — Late 1800s
When governments mostly acted independently, with some consultation, under a largely exclusive division of powers.
Canada's Intergovernmental Relations — 1930s Onward
When governments increasingly coordinated and made decisions jointly, especially as cooperative federalism expanded after the Second World War.
Canada's Intergovernmental Relations — Mid-to-Late 1990s
When collaborative and executive federalism grew through direct bargaining and co-determination among federal, provincial, and territorial executives.
Canadian Federalism — Present Context
When federalism is shaped by leaders’ federal visions, territorialism, regional and brokerage parties, economic change, policy legacies, and major crises.
Legitimacy of Canadian Federalism — Forces For and Against
When tensions over spending power, Quebec autonomy, Indigenous self-government, and municipal autonomy affect support for the federal system.
Self-Rule
When each order exercises political authority autonomously within its own jurisdiction.
Shared Rule
When federal and regional governments are interdependent and work together in exercising political authority.
Four Institutions of Self-Rule and Shared Rule
When the balance between self-rule and shared rule is expressed through allocation of powers, fiscal federalism, intergovernmental relations, and the second chamber.
Dual / Exclusive Allocation of Powers
When each order receives separate, exclusive jurisdictions and acts independently within its own sphere.
Shared Allocation of Powers
When both orders have constitutional authority to act in the same policy area.
Shared and Integrated Allocation of Powers
When one order legislates while another implements, dividing authority across governing functions.
Canada — Dual Allocation of Powers
When federal and provincial powers are separately listed but their boundaries remain unclear enough to require judicial interpretation.
Canada — System of Intergovernmental Relations
When provincial interests are mainly advanced through direct federal-provincial bargaining in a weakly institutionalized system.
Canada — Second Chamber
When the Senate provides only weak shared rule and provincial governments have limited direct participation in federal decision-making.
Canada — Capacity for Institutional Change
When Canada adapts more easily through informal and incremental change than through major structural reform.
Division of Powers — Exclusivity
When each order has constitutionally protected areas of authority that the other order should not control.
Division of Powers — Concurrency
When both orders possess valid constitutional authority over the same broad subject.
Division of Powers — Overlap vs Conflict
When both governments legislate in the same area, overlap is not automatically invalid unless there is an actual jurisdictional conflict.
Division of Powers — Watertight Compartments
When federal and provincial jurisdictions are treated as strictly separate spheres with minimal overlap.
Division of Powers — Subsidiarity
When authority is exercised by the level of government best suited to deal effectively with the issue.
Clear Division of Powers — Certainty, Accountability, Limited Government
When jurisdictional boundaries are clear enough to make authority predictable, assign responsibility, and limit each government’s reach.
Clear Division vs Flexible Federalism
When strict boundaries provide certainty but flexible overlap provides greater adaptability.
Judicial Review — Federalism Framework
When courts decide whether legislation falls within the constitutional jurisdiction of the government that enacted it.
Constitution as an Incomplete Division of Powers
When constitutional categories are broad and imprecise, leaving courts to define their practical boundaries.
Interpretive Federalism
When judicial interpretation changes the practical balance of federal and provincial power without formally amending the Constitution.
Peace, Order and Good Government — Federal Authority
When Peace, Order and Good Government is used as a source of federal authority in division-of-powers disputes.
Property and Civil Rights — Provincial Authority
When provincial authority over economic and social relations within the province is grounded in property and civil rights.
Peace, Order and Good Government vs Property and Civil Rights
When the relative breadth of federal Peace, Order and Good Government and provincial property and civil rights affects centralization or decentralization.
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council — Decentralizing Interpretation
When Peace, Order and Good Government is interpreted narrowly and property and civil rights broadly, strengthening provincial autonomy.
Stare Decisis — Institutional Continuity
When courts follow earlier precedents, allowing past interpretations to continue shaping the division of powers.
Judicial Flexibility / Permissiveness
When courts allow substantial jurisdictional overlap instead of enforcing perfectly rigid boundaries.
Judicial Review — Workability vs Precision
When courts favour making federalism workable rather than drawing perfectly clean jurisdictional lines.
Formal Change vs Interpretive Change
When constitutional amendment changes the formal rules, while judicial interpretation changes how existing rules are understood.
Formal vs Informal Adaptation
When federalism changes through constitutional amendment, judicial interpretation, political practice, or intergovernmental agreements.
Jurisdiction vs Governing Capacity
When a government has constitutional authority but may lack enough financial or practical resources to exercise it effectively.
Formal Federalism vs Intergovernmental Relations
When the Constitution assigns authority but governments still need intergovernmental relations to manage overlap, interdependence, and conflict.
Executive Federalism — Accommodation Mechanism
When federal and provincial executives bargain directly to manage conflicts or interdependencies.
Institutional Adaptation
When federal arrangements evolve through courts, negotiations, agreements, or constitutional change as new issues emerge.
Brokerage Politics
When parties build broad coalitions across regional, linguistic, and economic cleavages to integrate competing interests.
Brokerage as Intrastate Federalism
When national parties represent regional interests inside the central government and reduce pressure for direct federal-provincial conflict.
Factionalism
When political groups emphasize grievances and differences rather than common ground, intensifying regional and federal conflict.
Brokerage vs Factionalism
When brokerage integrates territorial divisions while factionalism deepens them.
Party Integration vs Party Fragmentation
When integrated federal-provincial parties facilitate accommodation, while organizational separation weakens that role and increases interstate federalism.
Intrastate → Interstate Shift
When parties become less able to integrate regional interests internally, conflict shifts toward direct bargaining between governments.
Regionalism as a Federalism Driver
When distinct regional economic, political, and identity-based interests shape demands for autonomy and relations with Ottawa.
Economic Cleavages and Federalism
When regional economic differences produce different political interests and jurisdictional demands.
Party System as a Federalism Institution
When political parties help accommodate regional diversity and shape the performance and legitimacy of the federation.
Elite Accommodation
When political leaders negotiate and compromise across regional and social divisions to maintain stability.
Pluralism and Federalism
When multiple legitimate communities and interests coexist within one political system.
Populism and Federal Tension
When politics is framed as conflict between 'the people' and distant elites, challenging brokerage and elite accommodation.