Topics in INR Exam 2

What is the guiding question & answer of Baum and Groeling’s research?

• How does the public learn about FP events?

• Reality constrains how much leaders can shape public opinion, and reality changes over time

Why does PO sometimes follow elite rhetoric and other times follow events on the ground (Baum and Groeling)?

1) reality-driven models

• public opinion responds to objective indicators (e.g. casualties in war, war success/failure

2) elite cue or framing models

• public opinion follows elite discourse

• media transmit elite debate

• rally effects depend on elite consensus

what is the elasticity of reality? and how does it change over the course of a conflict? (Baum and Groeling)

elasticity of reality - elites’ ability to frame events in a way that diverge from objective conditions & still shape public opinion

• early in a conflict:

  • reality is “elastic”

  • elites have an informational advantage

  • public beliefs are weakly formed

  • framing strongly shapes opinion

• ovetime:

  • elasticity collapses

  • public accumulates information

  • prior beliefs harden

  • rhetoric matters less; events matter more

What are Baum and Groeling’s expectations/hypotheses?

• H1: Elite rhetoric influences PO beyond the rally period - but its marginal effect recedes over time

• H2: Objective indicators (e.g. casualties) become more influential after the initial rally, but their marginal effect eventually declines as well

• H3: Reality eventually asserts itself: overtime, the effect of rhetoric declines more than the effect of reality in shaping public support for war

• H4: Elasticity varies by partisanship

• H5: A major change in facts on the ground can create new elasticity

Explain Baum and Groeling’ research design.

• conduct an observational/correlational study

• examine the relationship between NYT coverage of casualties, actual casualties, and monthly public support for conflict

• Relationship between presidential attention to Iraq & support for conflict, by partisanship 

• Survey data on beliefs about war, by partisanship

What does it mean when R₂=C₂?

The impact of reality on public opinion is equal to the impact of communication/elite rhetoric on public opinion

How do we know how long it takes to get to t₂?

We do not know. It is a theoretical, abstract point

What does the darkest grey section of the figure represent?

The period of time when (and degree to which) reality has a greater impact on public opinion than communication/elite rhetoric

Why do both R and C go to zero at t₃?

After a long period of time, the public’s opinion solidifies and hardens.

Why does the elasticity of reality decrease over time?

• elite rhetoric is going down because media coverage increases (so there is a growing effect of reality)

• also because people’s opinions harden over time

At the start of a crisis, does elasticity of reality decrease more quickly for NPP or PP?

it decreases more quickly for NPP because they are more inclined to be skeptical of president and seek out additional/other information

When there is a major change in the facts on the ground of a crisis, what happens to the elasticity of reality?

the elasticity of reality gets bigger/begins to increase again

What are the main takeaways of Baum and Groeling’s research?

• the public is most responsive to elite framing early in a conflict (or, when there is a large information gap between the public and elites)

  • “elasticity is largest when the public has little information on a topic

• Presidential copartisans are more likely to sustain this influence, where the effect on non-copartisans erodes more quickly

• a shift in the facts “on the ground” may reopen the elasticity, especially for copartisans

explain the two ways that elite messages can shape FP? and how do they provide the basis for Guisinger and Saunder’s research?

1) informational logic - elite messages can shape PO by conveying information about a policy

• elites provide policy relevant facts

• citizens update based on new information

• messenger identity is less important

2) partisan shortcut logic - elite messages can shape PO because the identity (partisanship) of the speaker is a heuristic

• information filtered through partisan lens

• messenger dominates message

Guisinger and Saunders view these as conditional rather than competing

What is Guisinger and Saunder’s concern with past research?

• there are many studies that examine when and how elite messages shape PO on FP issues

• However, these studies use a policy question as a background in their survey, and don’t care much about the characteristics of the policy

• Guisinger and Saunders believe this creates a big problem with external validity - which policy you are asking respondents about will shape when and how elite messaging shapes PO

What are the two variables that Guisinger and Saunders believe affect how elite messages shape PO?

• partisan polarization

• non-agreement with expert opinion

Explain the partisan polarization dimension of Guisinger & Saunders research

• partisan polarization refers to the degree to which disagreement is divided along partisan lines

  • if polarization is high → attitudes are already filtered through partisanship

  • if polarization is low → informational updating is more feasible

Explain the non-agreement with expert opinion dimension of Guisinger & Saunders research

• this refers to the share of the public not already aligned with expert opinion

  • including both people who disagree with expert opinion & people who respond “don’t know”

• this matters because:

  • if most people already agree, there is little room for movement

  • if many people are unaligned, persuasion is possible

What are Guisinger & Saunders’ expectations/hypotheses?

• when non-agreement is high (aka preexisting agreement with elites is low) and partisan polarization is low, information dominates messenger idenitty, and messages from all actors may move opinion

• when pre-existing partisan polarization is high, elite messages will increase polarization; only copartisan endorsements matter

why doesn’t expert consensus guarantee informational effects (Guisinger and Saunders)?

• even if experts agree

  • elite discourse may still be noisy

  • counter voices exist

  • issue framing history matters

  • party reputations evolve

• thus what matters is not elite agreement per se, but the public’s current distribution of opinion

What is Guisinger and Saunders’ research design?

• 9 survey experiments that are very similar, except on different topics

• for each survey:

  • control

  • R message

  • D message

  • non-partisan message

What is the guiding question & answer for Baum & Potter’s research?

• What domestic conditions allow for the public to learn about FP?

• Whistleblowers/opposition parties & information transmission (media access)

Explain the role of opposition parties in relation to Baum and Potter’s research.

• leaders want to hide FP failures

• Audience costs require

  • independent elites

  • incentives to expose leader blunders

• Opposition parties:

  • benefit electorally from revealing failures

  • act as whistleblowersx

• More opposition parties —> more credibility; in multiparty systems:

  • more ideological alternatives

  • greater elite discord

  • more policy frames in media (higher quality information)

  • more credible electoral alternatives for voters

• This increases

  • the likelihood that failures are exposed

  • the likelihood that voters punish leaders

What do Baum & Potter mean by ENPP?

the effective number of ENPP refers to the number of political parties in a political system that actually hold seats in legislature

Why is a system with more than two political parties more likely to engage that public than a system with two political parties? (Baum & Potter)

a multiparty system gives political elites more incentives to engage with the policy system, increasing policy discussion in media

How does “media access” differ from “media freedom”? Why do Potter and Baum focus on “media access”?

• media freedom refers to whether a country has press freedom and can spread the news without government intervention

• media access refers to the amount of the public that can access the media through television, radio, etc.

• Potter and Baum focus on media access because most democracies have press freedom, but they vary in how much of the public has access to media technologies

• Without media access:

  • whistleblowing does not reach the public

  • leaders cannot control information

  • electoral sanctions become hollow

Why do Baum and Potter use the likelihood of reciprocation from another state targeted by the initiator state as their DV, and how does it relate to public constraint on foreign policy?

• they use MID reciprocation because it allows them to go one step up on the game tree so they can actually view leaders’ credibility. Leaders avoid actions that lead to audience costs if they actually expect they would have to pay them, so we can’t look at audience costs directly

• It relates to public constraint on FP because if a country believes that a leader’s threat is credible, and the public would impose audience costs, they are less likely to reciprocate threats

What relationships do Baum and Potter expect between media access, ENPP, and reciprocation?

• when high ENPP states get to high media access, the probability of reciprocation tends to zero

• when low ENPP states get to high media access, the probability of reciprocation only slightly declines

Potter and Baum run a robustness check using a different set of observations in order to address a concern about the internal validity of their baseline analysis. What is this concern, and what is their answer?

What is Hyde and Saunders’ guiding question and answer?

• How does regime type shape a leader’s ability and incentive to use domestic constraint to obtain international outcomes

• Answer

  • malleable constraints framwork

  • governments have an institutionally defined default level of domestic audience constraint

  • this is generally higher in democracies

  • but leaders maintain some agency and can strategically increase their exposure to or insulation from domestic audience costs

What was the original idea in the study of regime type and IR

• domestic politics are irrelevant to IR outcomes

Explain the first generation of research into regime type and IR

• democracy dummy - regimes can be divided into democracies and autocracies

• the regimes primarily differ on constraint and the democratic advantage

• focused on strategic actions by democratic leaders to limit/increase constraint

• tended to treat system level factors (things that are true for the whole world) as background

Explain the second generation of research into regime type and IR

• challenges sharp divide between autocracies and democracies

• greater focus on how international factors moderate the effects of regime type

If democrats and autocrats can sometimes behave similarly, does regime type still matter? (Hyde and Saunders)

• Yes, but not because constraints are fixed

• Regime type matter because:

  • institutions have set default levels of constraint

  • leaders have agency within institutional boundaries

  • the costs of adjustment differ systematically across regimes

What are the two dimensions of constraint in Hyde and Saunders research?

• Structural (Institutional) Constraint

• Strategic Constraint

Explain the dimension of structural constraint (Hyde and Saunders)

• Regime type defines a default constraint level

  • default level of domestic exposure

  • upper and lower limits of movement

• Democracies:

  • larger, more heterogenous audiences

  • institutionalized monitoring

  • regularized accountability

• Autocracies

  • smaller, elite audiences

  • greater insulation

• Democracies have an advantage

  • greater default exposure

  • institutionalized accountability

Explain the dimension of strategic constraint (Hyde and Saunders)

Agency Space

• leaders can move vertically:

  • they can increase exposure (tie hands)

  • or increase insulation (avoid constraint)

• but movement:

  • has costs

  • and is bounded by institutions

• examples:

  • democratic insulation via secrecy

  • autocratic exposure via limited protest tolerance

key theoretical contributions: constraint is malleable, but within regime-defined boundaries

Explain the two types of agency costs (Hyde and Saunders)

1) ex ante costs (before the event)

• repression

• coalition building

• information control

• side payments

2) ex post risks (after the event)

• democracies

  • electoral reform

• autocracies

  • coup

  • violent overthrow

  • regime collapse

The magnitude and nature of agency costs differ fundamentally based on regime type. This explains why:

• autocrats don’t frequently increase exposure

• democrats can manuever repeatedly

What are the agency costs that Hyde and Saunder’s describe?

• the price leaders pay to become more exposed to domestic audience constraints

what do Hyde and Saunders mean when they say democratic institutions are plastic?

• democratic institutions:

  • bend without breaking

  • have mechanisms for peaceful power transition

  • allow leadership turnover without regime change

  • permit coalition reshuffling

• autocratic institutions

  • are more brittle

  • suffer from a high risk of regime destabilization

  • exposure may trigger unwanted institutional change

So even if both regimes can move within agency space, democracies can do so more frequently, and with lower systemic risk

What are examples of strategic shifts in Hyde and Saunder’s research?

• manipulating information flows: transparency in policy decisions, media coverage, policy debate

• surveillance of elite or public

• arrests or intimidation of cristics

• autocracies:

  • strengthen party institutions

  • relax coup-proofing, give military more operational autonomy

  • allow broader groups of elites to participate in decision making

• democracies:

  • manage issue salience

  • choose policies with lower domestic costs

  • build legislative coaltions

Weiss (2014)

Strategic Shift in Autocracies

• Chinese leaders strategically allow nationalist protests in FP disputes to:

  • signal resolve internationally

  • increase bargaining leverage

  • tie their hands

Naoi (2015)

Strategic Shift in Democracies

• Democratic leaders can build legislature coalitions for trade liberalization, even when protectionist interests appear strong, through:

  • side payments

  • policy compensation (subsidies, budget allocations, concessions)

  • coalition bargaining inside legislatures

• As a result, domestic constraints are malleable, not fixed

Milner & Tingly (2015)

Strategic Shift in Democracies

Puzzle: Why do US Presidents choose some FP tools over others?

• Presidents have most freedom with policies that have few domestic costs and low ideological conflict (e.g. military conflict)

• They have less influence in policies with clear winners and losers (e.g. trade, foreign aid)

• they are also constrained when issues are highly polarized (e.g immigration), or Congress is likely to intervene because the policy is materially or ideologically salient

In essence, different tools carry different levels of domestic audience constraint

Baum & Potter (2015)

Structural Constraint in Democracies

Weeks (2014)

Structural Constraint in Autocracies

• this was the piece that argued that some autocracies (e.g single party states, military regimes, and dynastic monarchies) can still generate domestic audience costs