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Lindquist: Functions of public administration - three parts
This organization services the elected government by providing policy advice and delivering programs to citizens. A well-performing administration has three functions:
Managing people and aligning effort
Designing policy and delivering services
Promoting learning, scrutiny, and reform
Lindquist - Designing policy and delivering services
The public administration works alongside the government to consult citizens to inform policy design and service delivery.
Lindquist - Managing people and aligning effort
The public administration formally manages their own staffing and human resources. It self-monitors, while coordinating across departments and executive development.
Lindquist - Promoting learning, scrutiny, and reform
The public administration promotes innovation and reform, motivating systems of review and accountability.
Lindquist - Canada as a Westminster regime
Power is concentrated in the hands of a majority government led by a strong Prime Minister, whose principal sources of criticism are other levels of government, the opposition and the media.
Public service bargain
Employment depends on merit and competence rather than party affiliation. Officials provide independent, confidential advice and loyally implement the elected government’s decisions without frustrating its agenda. In exchange, they receive anonymity and protection from public political conflict. Ministers take public responsibility for departmental decisions.
Public interest contention: What is the Public Interest?
The purpose of public administration is to serve the public interest, but there's no single agreed definition because values can conflict. Elected politicians set priorities, but unelected public servants also shape decisions through advice, interpretation, and discretion. This creates debate over who should determine what serves the public interest?
Usefulness of defining the public interest: Abolitionist position
Rejects the ideas of a single overarching “public interest,” because individuals preferences cannot easily be reduced to one good. Government decisions are the result of competition between group and individual interests and their behaviour can be explained through incentives such as power, income and prestige.
Usefulness of defining the public interest: Preservationist position
Even if defining the “public interest” proves difficult, there exist collective goals that cannot be reduced to individual/group interests. Maintaining the “public interest” as an ethical standard serves to encourage public officials to consider the collective goals rather than prioritizing specific interests.
Usefulness of defining the public interest: Middle-ground position
The public interest is generally conceived as a pursuit that benefits society as a whole. Pursuing this idea, even if it’s not concretely defined, encourages government officials to think critically on their decisions, consider broader or competing interests/values, and justify their decisions on the basis of overall welfare. Hodgetts: the pursuit of the ideal may matter more than conclusively possessing it.
Public interest: Dominant value approach
A government official pursues the public interest by promoting particular principles or values. This creates two problems:
(1) affected individuals may weigh these values differently
(2) the selected values may conflict with the priorities of those who are democratically elected.
To address these issues, government officials should weigh competing values and be transparent with their value judgments to promote accountability.
Public interest: Procedural approach
The public interest is pursued through a fair decision-making process where everyone is given equal consideration and adequate information for meaningful participation. This approach has two limitations:
(1) defining a “fair” process requires a value judgement
(2) a fair process does not ensure fair outcomes.
Consequently, public policy should not be evaluated based on the decision-making process alone, rather it should consider policy outcomes as well.
Public interest: Consensualist approach
This approach considers the interests of those affected by policy-decisions(including future generations), not overlooking those who are underrepresented. It then identifies shared values among those affected and the rest of the community. Promoting these shared values allows policy to move forward even if interests within the community conflict.
Public interest: Cost-benefit approach
Officials define the public interest through weighing the expected benefits and costs, aiming to maximize net benefit. However, the measurement and assigning of value to things that aren’t monetary implicates normative values and cannot be done objectively.
Public interest: Langford
There is no single approach to the “public interest,” instead public officials must identify, weigh and reconcile their considerations. For example, officials must consider democratic values, affected individuals, policy alternatives and legal obligations and their trade-offs. Their decisions should not be influenced by their own preferences or private interests, rather decisions should be based on an objective judgement and a synthesis of an array of considerations.
Sources of political legitimacy: General context
Refers to factors that lead individuals to accept government authority as rightful. For example: democratic elections, government transparency and accountability, rule of law, and equal consideration and outcomes.
Skogstad: Input legitimacy
Processes through which citizens can meaningfully influence and contribute to political decisions, promoting acceptance of government authority. Things like democratic elections, consultation and public deliberation. Even if the policy is unpopular or the outcomes are unfavourable, the policy can still have input legitimacy because of the decision-making process.
Skogstad: Output legitimacy
Political authority is legitimized through the social acceptance of policy outcomes. Outcomes may be evaluated based on their promotion of common welfare, effective problem solving and distributive justice(though these standards may vary across societies and time).
Canadian Challenges: Skogstad Input vs output legitimacy
Input legitimacy is challenged by:
(1) citizen’s' growing desire for direct participation in the policy decision making process, challenging reliance on elected officials
(2) the growing influence of private actors and experts in government decisions who lack direct democratic accountability
Output legitimacy is challenged by globalization and international pressures that may limit government capacity:
(1) international financial markets (ex: interest and exchange rates)
(2) economic competition (ex: capacity for multinational companies to exit)
(3) international trade limits and agreements (ex: NAFTA or WTO).
Skogstad: State-centred political authority
Governing authority is centralized in the state and exercised by democratically elected representatives by citizens. The legitimacy of this authority after elections is upheld through the accountability of representatives to their constituents.
Canadian context: State-centred political authority
Canada’s Westminster system reflects state centered political authority through its concentration of executive power in the PM and their appointed cabinet. This promotes coherent and decisive executive action. They are accountable to Parliament, and the government must retain the confidence of the democratically elected House of Commons.
Skogstad: Expert authority
Specialized knowledge justifies the authority of individuals to produce desirable outcomes related to their specialization. People are increasingly more willing to let experts decide when the objectives and measurement of success is collectively agreed upon.
Canadian context: Expert authority
Canadian examples of Expert authority: (1) Food safety regulators and the Bank of Canada. These experts are hired by the public service and have additional legitimacy through accountability via their minister accordingly. (3) Court judges have legal expertise, impartiality and ability to deliver just outcomes. They lack democratic accountability.
Skogstad: Market/private authority
Non-state actors make authoritative rules or allocate public values with the explicit or implicit permission of government. Arrangements include professional self-regulation, industry standards, privatization, and reliance on market choices. Support may rest on expected efficiency or incentives that align private behaviour with public purposes. However, commercial success and private preferences do not automatically protect social justice or provide democratic accountability.
Canadian context: Market/private authority
Medical and legal professions exercise delegated power when their own associations regulate professional conduct. Agricultural supply management and private forest-certification schemes provide other examples of non-state actors governing activities with public consequences. Private delivery and public-private partnerships can also shift responsibility for services outside government departments. Such arrangements must be assessed for accountability and social outcomes, because benefits to producers or firms may differ from benefits to the wider community.
Skogstad: Popular authority
The people themselves are the ultimate source of legitimate power, and direct participation can justify collective decisions. Consultation, public deliberation, and referendums give citizens opportunities beyond choosing representatives at elections. Participation can bring relevant experience into policy-making and make decisions more acceptable. However, unequal organization can exclude some voices, and inclusive discussion does not necessarily produce agreement or a workable final decision.
Canadian context: Popular authority
The 1992 Charlottetown Accord referendum illustrates demands that citizens directly authorize major constitutional change. Public hearings, consultations, and participatory policy forums provide other ways for Canadians to contribute between elections. The requirement that governments retain the confidence of the elected House also connects executive power indirectly to the people. These mechanisms differ in how much influence they give participants, and participation should supplement accountable representative institutions rather than automatically replace them.
Skogstad on Canada
Elected government remains necessary for effective, coherent, and publicly accountable collective decisions, but its representative institutions need reform. Direct participation should be added to representative democracy to improve openness, deliberation, and citizens' influence. Specialists and private actors can contribute, while elected institutions retain responsibility for reconciling competing claims and making final decisions. Suggested institutional reforms include more proportional representation and looser party discipline. The goal is to strengthen both democratic authorization and effective, fair outcomes.
Politics-administration dichotomy: General context
An idealized division assigns policy choices to elected politicians and technical implementation to professional officials. Reformers used this distinction to defend competence and merit against patronage, corruption, and partisan interference. However, translating broad laws into specific decisions requires judgment about priorities, resources, and competing values. Administration therefore has political consequences even when officials remain nonpartisan, and the reading cautions against treating the historical reformers' arguments as a perfectly rigid separation.
Bureaucratic behaviour: Waldo
Administrative theory and practice embody a political philosophy rather than operating outside values. Five underlying questions concern the good society, criteria for collective action, who should rule, the division of state power, and centralization versus decentralization. Promoting scientific expertise, hierarchy, and efficiency answers those questions in particular ways. Efficiency itself is a value choice and can conflict with democratic commitments such as equality, participation, and representation. A useful theory must therefore examine administration's political role instead of assuming it away.
Bureaucratic behaviour: Allison
The bargaining model, or Model III, treats government action as the product of negotiations among executive actors with different organizational and personal priorities. No single participant can determine everything unilaterally, even when a president or prime minister is the strongest actor. Decisions reflect compromise and the relative power of participants within established decision channels. Implementation then creates further decisions shaped by implementers' interests and operating routines. An actor's institutional position helps explain the preferences they bring to these bargaining processes.
Bureaucratic behaviour: Wilson
Officials exercise discretion within a mix of incentives, including workload, peer expectations, professional norms, personal convictions, and clients' needs. Broad statutory goals often fail to specify what frontline workers should actually do. Rules and established routines can then substitute for clear goals by offering a low-risk guide to behaviour. Organizational culture reinforces shared understandings of the mission and how work should be done. Successful performance depends partly on clear tasks and appropriate autonomy, but public managers face political constraints over their missions, personnel, and resources.
Bureaucratic behaviour: Seidman
Organizational structure distributes political power as well as administrative tasks. A program's location affects its authority, resources, priority, and relationships with elected institutions and organized interests. Overlapping jurisdictions may survive because they benefit powerful actors, as in the US banking example where multiple regulators give regulated firms greater choice. Programs can also suffer when their host agency regards them as peripheral to its main mission. Reorganization therefore changes influence and can provoke resistance from officials, legislators, and private contractors who benefit from existing arrangements.
Bureaucratic legitimacy: Long
A workforce reflecting society's diversity may help make unelected administrative power more responsive to the population. In the American case, this argument went so far as to suggest that officials could represent interests neglected by a socially narrow legislature. Passive representation concerns the workforce's composition, while active representation concerns whether the interests and values of represented groups influence administrative action. Demographic similarity alone does not establish that policies serve those groups. The link between composition, behaviour, and outcomes requires evidence rather than an assumption that all members of a group share identical views.
Bureaucratic dilemma
Officials are expected to act entrepreneurially and improve results while facing political controls, procedural obligations, and extensive scrutiny. They can be held responsible for performance without having enough authority over staffing, budgets, or work methods to change it. Greater exposure to blame can also encourage caution rather than innovation. For example, a manager told to shorten processing times may still need approvals to hire staff or alter procedures, leaving responsibility greater than practical control.
Canada: Types of government departments
Three functional categories distinguish substantive portfolios, shared administrative support, and coordination across government. Line departments, such as Health or National Defence, administer particular policy sectors and deliver or oversee relevant programs. Common service departments provide goods or services to other public bodies, such as procurement and accommodation. Central agencies coordinate priorities, scrutinize proposals, establish government-wide policies, and monitor management, with the main public-service bodies being PCO, Finance, and TBS. PMO is often grouped with the centre but is a partisan political office rather than a formal public-service central agency.
Line departments versus government
Sectoral organizations possess detailed knowledge and delivery capacity, while the centre sets overall priorities and controls important approval processes. This allows officials in departments to experience extensive central oversight even when leaders struggle to implement their agenda. Filtering a proposal or setting a target does not itself provide all the information, personnel, and operational control required for delivery. Government-wide results therefore depend on cooperation and coordination across organizations with different responsibilities and perspectives.
Craft & Wilson: Division of labour at the centre
PCO supports the prime minister and cabinet, coordinates priorities, and challenges policy proposals. Finance develops economic and fiscal analysis, the budget, and funding allocations for new initiatives. TBS advises Treasury Board ministers on management rules, implementation details, and spending authority. PMO supplies partisan political advice and coordination, drawing influence from its relationship with the prime minister rather than formal authority to act in the prime minister's place. These roles overlap, so the shorthand of policy, budgets, rules, and political advice describes different emphases rather than exclusive jurisdictions.
Craft & Wilson: Privy Council Office
This nonpartisan central body supports the prime minister, relevant portfolio ministers, cabinet, and cabinet committees. Its three main roles are supplying advice, supporting cabinet decision-making and the government's agenda, and fostering a capable, accountable permanent administration. The Clerk heads the organization and also serves as cabinet secretary and head of the public service. Analysts challenge departmental proposals, coordinate consultation, and prepare authoritative advice for the prime minister. Their work must be sensitive to political circumstances while remaining distinct from partisan advice supplied by PMO.
Craft & Wilson: Fiscal framework
The government's overall financial plan links economic forecasts, expected revenue, expenditures, and borrowing requirements. Finance develops this analysis and uses it to advise on the budget and the resources available for initiatives. The Minister of Finance filters spending requests in close collaboration with the prime minister, who sets priorities and can reject proposals. A budget commitment establishes funding direction but does not by itself complete every legal and administrative approval needed to spend. Parliamentary authorization and Treasury Board requirements remain distinct parts of the process.
Craft & Wilson: Treasury Board Secretariat
Officials support a cabinet committee responsible for government management, expenditure approval, the employer role, and regulatory approval. They develop management policies and scrutinize departmental proposals for implementation, value for money, and risk. After a proposal receives policy approval and funding, they advise the committee's ministers on whether to grant the necessary spending authority and conditions. They also coordinate the Estimates process through which government seeks appropriations from Parliament. The supporting bureaucracy provides analysis, while ministers make formal approvals, and Finance leads budget allocation.
Craft & Wilson: Cabinet
The prime minister and ministers form the collective political executive and determine the government's overall direction. Collective responsibility means ministers must publicly support agreed decisions or leave their positions, although private disagreement can occur. Through the relevant constitutional and statutory processes, this body approves policy and many regulations and senior appointments. Its confidential deliberations allow discussion while presenting a common position publicly. Policy approval is distinct from parliamentary appropriations and the detailed spending authority considered by Treasury Board.
Craft & Wilson: Cabinet decision-making in theory
A proposal commonly develops through work among a minister, departmental officials, relevant stakeholders, and other affected departments. Officials prepare a memorandum sponsored and approved by the responsible minister or ministers. Central agencies scrutinize its policy fit, costs, implementation, and consultation before it reaches collective deliberation. A relevant committee can examine the proposal before final confirmation, with the prime minister directing the process and seeking a common decision. This is a coordinated process for policy authority, while funding and spending approvals require additional steps.
Craft & Wilson: Cabinet decision-making in practice
The prime minister's preferences strongly shape committee structures, the flow of advice, and where important discussion occurs. PMO and PCO influence which proposals advance, how they are coordinated, and the options presented. Political and nonpartisan advice can be supplied separately, allowing the leader to consider both perspectives. Formal collective processes therefore coexist with strong central leadership and informal bargaining. Central influence still depends on information, cooperation, and work elsewhere in government, so controlling the agenda does not ensure effortless delivery.
Craft & Halligan's advisory units: Public service
Career officials in departments and central agencies traditionally supplied the main internal source of policy analysis and recommendations. Their expertise, continuity, and nonpartisan role support frank advice and institutional memory. They also coordinate proposals and help ministers assess research produced elsewhere. Their advisory dominance and analytical capacity have weakened unevenly across Westminster systems, rather than disappearing uniformly from every organization or policy field.
Craft & Halligan's advisory units: Partisan ministerial advisers
Politically appointed staff provide analysis and support from the perspective of a minister's or government's priorities and commitments. Their work can cover policy options, stakeholder reactions, political feasibility, and coordination, as well as communications. Their growing numbers and influence strengthen political direction within advisory systems and raise questions about the boundary with nonpartisan officials. However, a legitimate separate channel of political advice is not automatically the same as improper interference with professional analysis. Their influence varies with institutional arrangements and the executive actors they serve.
Craft & Halligan's advisory units: External consultants
Governments purchase analysis or management expertise from actors outside their permanent workforce. Such contracts can supply specialist knowledge, respond quickly, or substitute for internal capacity that has been lost. Commercial and client relationships can affect incentives, so purchasing advice does not itself establish independence, quality, or value. Increased spending also does not by itself prove greater policy influence, and governments still need the capacity to assess and use the advice they buy.
Craft & Halligan's advisory units: Commissions of inquiry
Governments establish focused investigations to examine difficult policy questions, crises, or failures and make recommendations. Royal commissions can draw on specialist research, public testimony, and sustained attention beyond routine departmental work. Their recommendations can inform decisions and public debate without binding the government to adopt them. Their use declined across the Westminster cases examined as governments increasingly preferred other political or managerial mechanisms, although they continued to be used occasionally.
Craft & Halligan's advisory units: Special advisory bodies
Designated organizations add expertise, analysis, or oversight in particular areas, often with public funding and some distance from routine departmental advice. They may have statutory independence and an ongoing mandate, so they are not necessarily temporary panels. Examples include the former National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy and independent fiscal oversight institutions. The Parliamentary Budget Officer adds analytical capacity for Parliament, illustrating that new capacity does not necessarily advise the executive itself. Their establishment, redesign, or abolition depends on legal arrangements, political priorities, and the kind of advice sought.
Location and context of advice: General
An advisory system consists of interacting actors and organizations that supply recommendations to policy-makers. Understanding it requires examining where advice originates, who controls it, what kind of work it contains, and whether decision-makers use it. Advice can include research, proposal development, consultation, managing political processes, and evaluation. Institutional proximity alone does not establish influence because content, timing, government priorities, and credibility also matter. The relevant unit of analysis is therefore the relationship among suppliers, intermediaries, and users, rather than one adviser in isolation.
Trends in advice: Deinstitutionalization
Established advisory organizations or practices lose their settled role, become less durable, or cease operating. This is broader than the permanent bureaucracy losing its former dominance, since commissions and independent advisory bodies can also decline or be abolished. Management-focused reforms, expenditure restraint, and changing political preferences can erode established analytical capacity while other sources become more firmly embedded. The pattern differs across countries and units in its speed, intensity, and sequence, so overall growth in advice can coexist with the weakening of particular institutions.
Trends in advice: Externalization
Recommendations increasingly come from beyond the traditional permanent bureaucracy, including academics, consultants, think tanks, advocacy organizations, and political staff. Some of these actors remain inside government, while others operate outside it. This shift overlaps with but differs from politicization, which concerns greater political control and responsiveness. More available sources do not guarantee equal access or influence, because government actors continue to filter advice according to credibility, relevance, and their own institutional needs.
Trends in advice: From 'speaking truth to power' to 'sense-making'
The classic image has professional officials providing candid analysis directly to political leaders, including unwelcome conclusions. A more distributed system also requires officials to interpret, connect, and broker competing claims from many sources. Their work includes helping decision-makers understand disagreements, assess evidence, and coordinate knowledge across influential actors. This expands the advisory role rather than removing the need for frankness, professional judgment, or independence.
Craft: Political staff as coordinators
Appointed advisers help connect policy work across executive actors rather than only offering electoral or communications advice. Coordination seeks to reduce duplication and inconsistency, minimize bureaucratic and political conflict, agree on priorities, and promote a whole-government perspective. Staff can work within their own minister's office or across offices, departments, and outside organizations. Their access to leaders and relationships with other actors are resources that can help secure information, cooperation, and agreement. These functions vary with the distribution of executive power and can involve both partisan judgments and administrative or technical work.
Elgie’s executive models: Monocratic
Power is concentrated in the prime minister or president, who dominates the government’s policy direction. Political staff coordinate across government to advance the leader’s agenda. Coordination can happen through direct instructions down the hierarchy or through advisers working with other ministers and their offices.
Elgie’s executive models: Collective/Cabinet
Significant decisions are made jointly by a small group, such as cabinet, without any single member dominating. Power and resources are shared among the participants. Political staff help their offices exchange information, negotiate, and prepare for or carry out joint decisions.
Elgie’s executive models: Ministerial
Individual ministers exercise substantial control over policy within their own departments. Political staff mainly coordinate work within their minister’s area of responsibility. Major issues requiring agreement across departments can also involve coordination with other ministers and the prime minister.
Elgie’s executive models: Bureaucratic
Unelected officials in departments and agencies dominate policymaking. Bureaucrats control the resources and expertise that shape decisions, while elected politicians have a limited decision-making role. Political staff consequently have little or no role in coordinating policy.
Elgie’s executive models: Shared
Two or three individuals have joint and equal responsibility for policymaking. Power is concentrated within this small group, with no single participant dominating the others. Their political staff help coordinate between their offices and support the agreements needed to make decisions.
Elgie’s executive models: Segmented
Policymaking is divided into separate sectors, with actors largely controlling their own areas and little coordination across sectors. Political staff mainly coordinate within the particular sector their minister oversees. Government policy therefore develops through relatively separate areas of decision-making.
Present externalization of policy advice
Doberstein tested source credibility through a randomized survey experiment with 258 BC government policy analysts assessing research on minimum wages and income splitting. Groups read the same research summaries with either correct or reassigned source labels, isolating the effect of attribution. Academic labels generally improved perceived credibility, while think-tank and advocacy labels were treated differently depending partly on their ideological reputations. The findings show that a growing supply of outside research passes through credibility filters rather than an arena where all sources carry equal weight. They measure perceptions in this setting, not the research's actual quality or its direct influence on final government decisions.
Traditional public administration
Politics and administration are separated, where goals are determined by the elected and only secondarily refined by technical. The role of the administration was to deliver public value by designing and implementing politically defined objectives. Efficiency was the dominating value, and citizens were seen as clients, voters and constituents.
Traditional public administration in practice
Administration was more deeply enmeshed in politics than idealized and government agencies were prone to failure.
Traditional public administration - Context
Formed in the late 1900s as a response to industrialization, urbanization, the rise of modern corporations, faith in science, belief in progress, and concern over major market failures. Successes in WWI, the great depression and WWII strengthened support for this form of administration and trust in the government as an agent for the good of all.
New Public Management
Public administration managers are urged to “steer,” free to determine objectives and how to implement them. Goods and services are delivered through markets and competition by government imposed regulation, taxes, subsidies, insurances etc. Citizens are seen as customers.
New Public Management in practice
Managers were held responsible for achieving outcomes, but weren’t given enough freedom to decide how to achieve them.
New Public Management - Context
Dominant approach throughout the 1980s and 1990s in response to concerns of government failures, a belief in efficacy and efficiency of markets and economic rationality, and a movement towards decentralization and privatization.
New Public Governance
Citizens, citizenship and democracy are central to this approach. Citizens are given an active role in deliberative problem-solving, becoming co-creators with the government in determining and developing public value. Public service acts to guide deliberation and delivery, while promoting effectiveness, capacity and accountability.
New Public Governance - Context
Formed in response to increasingly diverse and complex issues: natural disasters, failures of large parts of the economy, unevenly effective health care and educational systems, stagnant middle class, deepening inequality and bankrupt communities.
Traditional vs NPM vs NPG - Definition of public value
Traditional: Determined by the elected or technical experts NPM: Determined by the elected or aggregated individual preferences that are supported by evidence NPG: Determined through inclusive dialogue and deliberation, while informed by evidence and democratic and constitutional values
Traditional vs NPM vs NPG - Role of politics & citizens
Traditional: To elect governors who determine policy objectives. Citizens vote. NPM: To elect governors who determine policy objectives and empower administrative managers and administration to use market tools. Citizens are customers to governors. NPG: Promote “public work” through which policy objectives are formed via dialogue and deliberation. Citizens actively engage in dialogue, become co-creators of public value and goods.
Traditional vs NPM vs NPG - Role of Public Administration
Traditional: “Rowing,” designing and implementing in accordance to politically defined objectives NPM: “Steering,” determining objectives and leading service delivery through market tools and utilizing markets, business and non-profit organizations NPG: Create public value to ensure what the public cares about the most is addressed effectively, and what is determined as good is put into place
Traditional vs NPM vs NPG - Objectives
Traditional: Political provided goals with implementation managed by public servants who are monitored through bureaucratic and elected officials oversight. NPM: Politically provided goals where administrative managers manage inputs and outputs to support the economy and responsiveness to consumers. NPG: Create public value to address effectively what the public cares about the most and implement public value
Traditional vs NPM vs NPG - Valued & Mechanisms
Traditional: Efficiency. Administer programs through centralized hierarchical public agencies NPM: + Effectiveness. Create mechanisms and incentive structures to achieve objectives through use of markets NPG: + democratic and constitutional values. Pursuing practical solutions supporting cross-sector collaborations and engaging citizens to achieve objectives.
Canada’s Westminster bargain
Strengthen. This arrangement relies heavily on unwritten conventions, cabinet government and a hierarchical bureaucracy. Internal advice and deliberation are largely confidential. Permanent officials provide loyal, independent and nonpartisan advice while implementing elected leaders’ decisions. In exchange, ministers provide anonymity and accept public responsibility. The institution is traditionally understood as having no separate public identity from the government of the day.
Why is the Westminster bargain failing? Savoie’s diagnosis
The anonymity aspect of the Westminster system has dwindled, as the Canadian civil service has taken on a persona distinct from the government of the day. Examples: Reports on the state of the public service by the cabinet secretary implicating a normative position on the needs and health of their national institution Formed an association of federal government managers association (APEX) public voicing their concerns on the government Access to information Act 2005 enabling media, opposition parties,and Canadians to access knowledge on issues public servants are working on, policy positions they support – anything tax payers paid for them to do Ministers are becoming increasingly more likely to identify public servants to deflect criticism from themselves
Interpretation Act
Does not prevent a minister from issuing directions to a deputy ministry, though it allows a deputy minister to exercise the minister’s power without instruction. By law, ministers cannot issue specific directions on financial regularity and probity; economy, efficiency and effectiveness; financial management systems for departmental programs and public property.
Why is the Westminster bargain failing? Aucoin’s diagnosis
Strengthen. Two competing reform ideas place different demands on permanent officials. Public choice favours stronger political control through the PMO, central agencies and partisan staff because bureaucrats are seen as having too much power. Managerialism favours decentralization, fewer administrative constraints and greater discretion for those delivering services. Together, these ideas encourage centralized political direction alongside decentralized administrative management.
Trends in public administration: General Canadian context
Strengthen. Successive approaches operate as layers rather than completely replacing one another. Officials must respect hierarchy and serve ministers while also meeting performance targets and collaborating with outsiders. Each reform adds obligations without removing all earlier requirements. Published results, transparency and wider participation also expose employees more directly to scrutiny, complicating their responsibilities.
Savoie’s solution
Accountability should follow actual decision-making authority. Deputy ministers should publicly explain and justify decisions within their legally assigned responsibilities before parliamentary committees. They remain accountable to their ministers; committees cannot instruct, reward, or punish them. Ministers can overrule deputies, but should document their intervention and accept responsibility for that decision. Clear rules for committee questioning should protect public servants from partisan attacks and preserve their political neutrality.
New Political Governance
A corrupt form of politicization to the extent that governments seek to use and misuse, even abuse, the public service in the administration of public resources and the conduct of public business to better secure their partisan advantage over their competitors
A double-edged sword of non partisan public service
The shift away from patronage to merit based hiring allowed for permanent bureaucrats to accumulate continuous experience and knowledge as public servants. In the 1970s, the emergence of New Public Management sought to reaffirm the power of the democratically elected over the bureaucracy. Consequently, elected officials became increasingly suspicious of self-interested permanent public servants, replacing them with persons more politically compatible.
Four Features of New Public Governance
Governing as a continuous campaign
Political Staff as a "third force"
Personal Politicization of Senior Appointments
Public Servants expected to be "promiscuously partisan"
New Public Governance: Governing as a continuous campaign
Power is centralized in the Prime Minister, allowing them to dominate the cabinet to their partisan advantage. Governing and campaigning become intertwined, as public servants responsible for implementing the decisions of cabinet become part of a partisan agenda.
New Public Governance: Political Staff as a "third force"
Prime Ministers are more likely to be influenced by advice from their political staff who are oriented towards promoting and protecting the Prime Minister, framing the impartiality and authority of public servants as obstacles to effective political management.
New Public Governance: Personal Politicization of Senior Appointments
Prime ministers' appointment of top-ranking public servants are influenced by loyalty to the prime minister, even if it requires them to act partisan, rather than a commitment to impartiality or merit.
New Public Governance: Public Servants expected to be "promiscuously partisan"
As the anonymity of public servants dissipates, Prime Ministers and their political advisors are becoming increasingly expectant of public servants to be supportive of the government's agenda in relation to stake holders, citizens, media, consolations, service delivery etc.
What caused the politicization of Public Servants? 24/7 media ecosystem demands instant response
The emergence of a 24/7 mass media that rewards tabloid journalism incentivizes governments to control public perceptions, pressuring public servants to participate in partisan media management by misrepresenting, or withholding government information.
What caused the politicization of Public Servants? Increasing demand for transparency and risks of information leaks
An increasing demand for government transparency and risk of information and communication leaks has incentivized governments to keep their operations "tightly controlled," pressuring public servants to avoid leaving paper trails and record-keeping, and restrict what's made public.
What caused the politicization of Public Servants? The audit explosion: more watchdogs, more critical reports
The proliferation of external audit and review agencies, holding a high degree of political legitimacy as impartial agents, incentivizes governments to utilize their public servants to manage the media in countering negative assessments.
What caused the politicization of Public Servants? More competitors for Government Advice
In response to an increasing competition in the political marketplace, public servants are pressured to interact with these groups in a manner that advances or defends the merits of the government's interest. Rather than acting as a representative of the government who explains and implements government decisions, they act as supporters or defenders of the government's agenda.
What caused the politicization of Public Servants? A more polarized electorate
Declining citizen deference and trust in political authority, has motivated a decline and partisanship and political engagement, incentivizing parties to intensify polarization. Consequently, impartial critiques or challenges from public servants are seen as actions of partisanship, pressuring them to demonstrate political loyalty.
Politicization (Cooper)
“the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service”
Politicizing Behaviour (Aucoin)
Political influence in the staffing of the public service as a function of partisan patronage or cronyism; patronage or pork-barreling in the award and distribution of government projects, grants, contribution, and contracts; politicization of the content of public-service communications to the media and the public, including government advertising; or positive or negative comments on matters of government policy or behavior to the media, legislative committees, or various attentive publics.
When is politicization of the Public Service most likely?
A change in government
A government facing weak opposition
A government ideological distrust of the bureaucracy
Periods of high public distrust in the bureaucracy
When is politicization of the Public Service most likely? A change in government
Having just worked for the previous government, newly elected governments may be increasingly skeptical of the public service's willingness to provide loyalty to the new government. Longer periods of rule may lead the newly elected party to associated the public service with the agenda of the previous government
When is politicization of the Public Service most likely? A government facing weak opposition
High levels of competition between parties may lead governments to discount their own futures, incentivizing them to nominate public servants who are politically aligned with their beliefs. At the same time, a lack of competition leaves little incentive to refrain from politicizing the bureaucracy.
When is politicization of the Public Service most likely? A government ideological distrust of the bureaucracy
Right leaning governments who push for less government involvement are often less trusting of public servants.
When is politicization of the Public Service most likely? Periods of high public distrust in the bureaucracy
During periods of heightened distrust toward the bureaucracy, permanent officials may be viewed as inefficient, self-interested or too powerful. This encourages governments to assert greater control by replacing officials with people believed to be more responsive to their political priorities.