Lesser known thinkers who may be on the exam- Philosophy

Daniel Dennett - Metaphysics free will

Daniel Dennett – Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting

“People fear that if determinism is true, then our choices aren’t really ours—that we’re just puppets of causality. But what we want when we want free will is not magic, not some mysterious ability to have done otherwise no matter the circumstances, but the power to decide our futures in a meaningful way—based on who we are, what we value, and what reasons we can consider. If our decisions stem from our values and beliefs—even if those are themselves shaped by prior causes—then we still have the kind of freedom that matters.”

Dennett challenges the idea that we need some kind of ultimate, uncaused control to have freedom. In his chapter "Sphexishness," he uses the example of the Sphex wasp, which seems to act intelligently but repeats its actions in rigid, mechanical ways. Unlike the wasp, Dennett says, humans are responsive to reasons—we can change our minds, learn, and plan. This ability gives us "elbow room"—a meaningful kind of freedom—even in a deterministic world.

Peter van Inwagen - Metaphysics free will

Peter van Inwagen

“If determinism is true, then our actions are simply the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But none of us has control over the past, nor over the laws of nature. So we cannot have control over the consequences of those things—which includes our present actions. That means if determinism is true, then no one really has free will.”

Van Inwagen explores whether it’s possible to reconcile determinism with human freedom. While he sometimes presents arguments for compatibilism, he is best known for the “Consequence Argument,” which strongly suggests that free will and determinism are not compatible. He also uses the idea of promises to explore freedom: we make and keep promises voluntarily, and this seems to require real control. But if determinism is true, he asks, are we truly free to make or break a promise?

Bernard Williams - Metaphysics free will

Williams was interested in how messy real human life actually is. He thought that morality is often more complicated than simple rules like “good actions deserve praise” and “bad actions deserve blame.”

Williams asked an uncomfortable question: What if much of what we praise or blame people for depends on luck?

Usually, we think morality depends on choice:

·       If you choose to do something wrong, you are blameworthy.

·       If you choose to do something good, you deserve praise.

 

This assumes that human beings control their actions and can be judged fairly for them. But Williams points out that many important parts of our lives are not chosen:

·       the family we are born into

·       our personality and temperament

·       the situations we face

·       the consequences of our actions

 

If these things shape what we do, then moral responsibility becomes more complicated. This is what Williams calls moral luck: the idea that factors outside our control affect how we are morally judged. His theory matters because it forces us to rethink a major assumption in ethics: Can we really hold people fully responsible if luck plays such a big role in what they become and what happens to them? This idea connects to bigger philosophical debates about freedom, choice, and responsibility questions we will continue to explore later.

 

What is Moral Luck?

Moral luck is the idea that factors beyond our control can affect how morally blameworthy or praiseworthy we are judged to be. This creates a tension:

·       We usually believe people should only be judged for what they control.

·       But in practice, outcomes matter — even when luck shaped them.

 

The Four Types of Moral Luck

·       Resultant Luck - Luck in how things turn out. Example: Two people act the same way, but only one causes harm.

·       Circumstantial Luck - Luck in the situations we find ourselves in. Example: Some people face extreme moral tests; others never do.

·       Constitutive Luck - Luck in the kind of person you are (character, personality, temperament). Example: Being naturally patient, impulsive, kind, or angry.

·       Causal Luck - Luck in the chain of events that shaped you before you acted (upbringing, environment, past experiences).

 

Edmund Gettier - epistemology

The Gettier objection is a critical challenge within epistemology, particularly concerning the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). Edmund Gettier introduced this objection in his seminal paper "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" by presenting scenarios where individuals possess justified true beliefs that fall short of constituting knowledge. These counterexamples reveal instances where luck or coincidence plays a significant role, leading to beliefs that are both justified and true but fail to align with our intuitive understanding of knowledge.

The Gettier problem underscores the limitations of the JTB model and raises fundamental questions about the nature of knowledge. It has spurred extensive debate and prompted philosophers to reconsider their conceptualizations of knowledge and epistemic justification. Scholars have proposed alternative theories, such as reliabilism and virtue epistemology, to address the deficiencies of the JTB framework and provide a more comprehensive account of knowledge acquisition. The Gettier objection continues to stimulate scholarly inquiry and serves as a catalyst for refining our understanding of epistemology.

 

Key Points:

-        Gettier objection challenges the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief.

-        Counterexamples presented by Gettier illustrate instances where justified true beliefs do not constitute knowledge due to fortuitous circumstances.

-        The objection highlights the limitations of the JTB model and prompts reevaluation of theories of knowledge.

-     Alternative theories, including reliabilism and virtue epistemology, offer new perspectives on knowledge acquisition.

-        The Gettier problem remains a central focus of debate and inquiry within epistemology, shaping contemporary discussions on the nature of knowledge.

Plato - epistemology

To know something, according to Plato’s Tripartite requires three necessary conditions all be present:

1.     That we have a belief or proposition - A belief is a subjective attitude that a proposition is true or a state of affairs is the case. A subjective attitude is a mental state of having some stance, take, or opinion about something. In epistemology, philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be either true or false.

2.     That the belief we hold is true - Truth is the property of being in accord with fact or reality. In everyday language, truth is typically ascribed to things that aim to represent reality or otherwise correspond to it.

3.     The there is justification for the belief being true - In simple terms, this is the collection of reasons that provide good ground to prove that the truth of the belief actual does accord with reality.  The standard of this justification is often what leads to philosophers disagreeing on whether something is ‘known’ or not.

Plato reported on what Socrates said: When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the truth about it, but had no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge.

S (subject) knows that P (proposition) if and only if:

1.     S believes that P

2.     P is true

3.     S is Justified in believing that P