CHAPTER 5: THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION, NUCLEAR STRATEGY, AND NUCLEAR WAR
NUCLEAR REVOLUTION, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA
Nuclear weapons had shifted the balance b/w offense and defence
States build nuclear weapons in order to deter another state from using nuclear weapons against them
Deterring threat through the possession and credible intention to use nuclear weapons is therefore the bedrock of nuclear deterrence
Actions taken to increase the credibility of one’s own nuclear forces
Security dilemma can lead to highly destabilising strategic scenarios as rival nuclear armed states vie for superiority and military advantage and credibility through nuclear arms race
Can begin to spiral leads to costly and destabilizing nuclear arms race
Misperception and fear lead 2 players to build nuclear weapons and to keep building more nuclear weapons when the best mutual outcome is for no one to build them
Example→ Cold War (US vs Soviet)
Nuclear arms race is also about the types aSpeech by President Kennedy on the Cuba Missile Crisis:and capabilities of different nuclear systems
MAD
Stability in nuclear relationships can be achieve through mutual vulnerability to a nuclear attack
It can never be beneficial to launch a nuclear first strike against an opponent bc they will be able to retaliate with their nuclear weapons in a second nuclear strike that will destroy the attacker
No rational actor would choose to use nuclear weapons first or initiate nuclear war
Condition where any move to strike first with nuclear weapons to achieve a debilitating attack on an opponent will be suicidal
Best way to ensure nuclear stability is to make sure both sides are vulnerable to nuclear attack
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972→ prohibited the deployment of a range of anti-ballistic missile defences by both sides
Defences complicate any retaliatory strike and could undermine MAD
Threat of nuclear retaliation has to be credible
3 challenges of MAD
Rationality → MAD assumes that all actors are rational; not all actors are rational in certain circumstances; often a claim made against rogue states and certainly against non-state actors such as terrorists
Accidents→ possibility of miscalculation or accidents; no guarantee that these will not occur especially if nuclear weapons spread to new actors; safe and secure command and control of nuclear forces remains
Morality
Adversaries willing to engage in low-level operations bc they believe this falls well below the threshold for nuclear retaliation→ stability-instability paradox
NUCLEAR POSTURE AND NUCLEAR TARGETING
Nuclear postures→ thinking and strategy that underpins the utility and role of nuclear weapons for any one state
Minimum deterrence | Limited deterrence | Maximum deterrence | |
Doctrine | Deter a nuclear attack on your own country | Deter all types of threats to your national security | Seek strategic advantage and nuclear superiority; nuclear war fighting |
Delivery vehicles/stockpile | A small number of survivable delivery vehicles Relatively high yield nuclear weapons/accuracy desirable but not essential A limited nuclear stockpile | Small warhead stockpile and a survivable nuclear force A mixture of nuclear weapon yields with high accuracy | A nuclear triad and a large number of different nuclear delivery vehicles A mixture of tactical and strategic nuclear warheads High yield nuclear weapons with accuracy and penetration capability |
Alert status | Nuclear forces not on high alert they may be de-targeted and warheads and delivery vehicles might be demated | A small number of nuclear forces on alert ready to retaliate quickly if necessary | Nuclear forces on high alert deployed globally, able to unleash overwhelming strike if necessary Nuclear weapons could be launched on warning before an adversaries attack has happened |
Declaratory policy | Nuclear weapons only ever used to respond to a nuclear attack. A policy of no first nuclear use | Nuclear weapons may be used in certain extreme circumstances | All options are on the table Nuclear weapons might be used preemptively if necessary |
Targeting | Soft targets and counter value | Some counterforce, some counter value | All |
Examples | China, North Korea | Uk, France, India, Pakistan, Israel | US, Russia |
Different nuclear posture require different nuclear capabilities and this is reflected in the types of targets that they are intended to hit
Targeting enemy forces and targeting enemy public
Targeting enemy forces is more aggressive bc attacking enemy forces could be part of a disarming first strike
Counter -force | Counter-value | |
Type of target | Military forces, military installations, air force bases, command headquarters, ICBM, launch sites, submarine pens | Large population centres, cities, urban areas, civilian infrastructure |
Weapons requirements | High accuracy, ability to penetrate defences, possible high yield, possibly large numbers per target High level of penetration Targets maybe hardened against attack Ground burst explosion | Basic nuclear weapons, small numbers, not necessarily high yield Small % of penetration is ok/accuracy is not essential Targets are unlikely to be well protected Airburst explosion needed |
Strengthens | Avoids civilian pop centres Potentially limits war to military forces | Only needs crude weapons to be effective Compatible with policy of minimum retaliatory nuclear deterrence |
Weaknesses | Requires very advanced nuclear weaponry | Raises questions about the morality and legality of deliberately targeting civilians with nuclear weapons Raises questions of credibility |
NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL
Mechanisms and processes to manage the safety and security and use of nuclear weapons→ nuclear command and control C2 OR NC2
Also can be command control and communications→ C3 OR NC3
Central paradox of nuclear C2 as tension b/w safety and security of nuclear weapons
Problem → measures designed to increase the safety and security of nuclear weapons in order to prevent unwarranted use often results in a decrease in ability to authorise and use nuclear weapons
Unauthorised | Accidental | Protect against decapitation/inability to Use |
Nuclear forces should be as secure and well protected as possible. Delegating authority over nuclear forces increases the risk of an unauthorised use Nuclear use must always be kept under strict civilian | Nuclear forces should be as safe as possible Keeping weapons on high alert increases the chance that accidents will happen Nuclear weapons should only be useable following a positive command from relevant authority | Nuclear forces must not be vulnerable to a surprise first strike Forces therefore need to be kept on high alert and authority to use them potentially delegated to military commanders Nuclear use may have to be automated to some degree to be credible |
As long as nuclear weapons exist there will always be a chance of accidents/ unauthorised use of an accidental nuclear war
Permissive Action Links (PALs) → they cannot be detonated without the proper authorisation
Two-person rule → at least 2 people should participate in every phase of the process of delivering a nuclear weapon from the laboratory to it final military use
One-point safe → a nuclear device that will not produce a nuclear yield if there is a single conventional explosion on the core
More nations that acquire nuclear weapons → likely to increase the chances of deliberate or accidental incident involving nuclear warheads
Pressure on nuclear command and control→ is the credibility of nuclear weapons should they ever be used
Biggest challenge → how to control nuclear weapons and their associated support systems to ensure they are always ready to be used
Who should control weapons
Civilian control→ level of accountability and increases threshold of nuclear use; response could be slower and make vulnerable to first strike
Military control → swift response; risk of unauthorised use by rogue commander and undermine ability to control a nuclear exchange
ESCALATION, BRINKMANSHIP, NEAR MISSES, AND NUCLEAR WAR
Nuclear brinkmanship → seeking to coerce/compel an adversary through increasingly danger risk taking through both threatening rhetoric and actions to ramp up tensions to the brink of conflict
Escalation→ possibility that dispute or minor conflict b/w nuclear armed adversaries will lead to the use of nuclear weapons
Nuclear war can never be won
Overconfidence is a major concern
THE ORIGINS OF OVERKILL
The article explores how the U.S. developed a nuclear strategy that emphasized “overkill”—the ability to destroy the Soviet Union multiple times over.
Overkill emerged due to political, military, and technological factors during the early Cold War.
U.S. nuclear planning evolved from limited atomic strikes to a doctrine of massive retaliation.
The article focuses on the decision-making processes within the U.S. government and military that led to nuclear overkill.
After World War II, the U.S. was the only nuclear power and initially viewed atomic bombs as a means of maintaining strategic superiority.
The Soviet Union’s successful test of an atomic bomb in 1949 challenged U.S. dominance and changed military planning.
The National Security Council (NSC-68) in 1950 recommended a massive military buildup, including nuclear stockpiling, to counter Soviet expansion.
The U.S. developed the hydrogen bomb (H-bomb) in 1952, dramatically increasing the destructive power of nuclear weapons.
The Cold War intensified, and military planners began thinking in terms of total nuclear war rather than limited use.
Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the U.S. adopted the strategy of massive retaliation—using overwhelming nuclear force in response to any Soviet aggression.
This policy, outlined in Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s speeches, was meant to deter Soviet attacks by ensuring mutual destruction.
The U.S. rapidly increased its nuclear stockpile beyond what was needed for deterrence.
Air Force and Strategic Air Command (SAC) pushed for larger arsenals, believing that nuclear superiority was necessary for security.
The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) expanded the ability to launch nuclear attacks from multiple platforms.
The concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) emerged, where both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had the capability to annihilate each other multiple times over.
Advances in missile technology allowed for more efficient and destructive nuclear strikes.
The military-industrial complex and inter-service rivalries contributed to the buildup:
The Air Force, Army, and Navy competed for funding, leading to excessive nuclear force planning.
The RAND Corporation and other think tanks promoted deterrence theories that justified large stockpiles.
Strategic Air Command (SAC), led by General Curtis LeMay, advocated for a preemptive nuclear strike capability.
Bureaucratic momentum and political fears of being seen as “weak on defense” led to continuous stockpiling.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, critics argued that overkill did not enhance security and increased the risk of accidental war.
President John F. Kennedy introduced the Flexible Response strategy, allowing for proportional retaliation instead of automatic massive retaliation.
Overkill made deterrence unstable, as both sides sought second-strike capabilities to survive a first strike.
Arms control efforts, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), aimed to curb excessive nuclear stockpiling.
Overkill resulted from Cold War fears, technological advancements, and bureaucratic interests.
The U.S. and Soviet Union accumulated enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world many times over.
The concept of nuclear overkill influenced military strategy for decades and remains a key discussion in arms control debates.
While overkill was meant to ensure deterrence, it also increased global tensions and the risks of miscalculation.
The legacy of nuclear overkill continues to shape discussions on disarmament, deterrence, and strategic stability today.
SPEECH BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Soviet bombs in Cuba → second strike capability against Western Hemisphere
JFK→ asked for surveillance to step up
New missile sites indicate two distinct types of installation
Medium range ballistic missiles → able to carry nuclear warhead for 1,000
Each missile is capable of striking DC, Panama Canal, Mexico City
Additional sites appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles → can travel twice as far and strike major cities in the Western Hemisphere
Jet bombers → carry nuclear weapons and are being uncrated
Presence of offensive weapons → threat to peace and security of all Americans + defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947
Contradictions actions of Soviet spokespersons
Soviet had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation
Makes clear that it was planned for months
Soviet government → the missiles and weapons in Cuba are for defensive purposes
No need for Soviet government to shift its weapons
Soviet has powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need for new sites
This statement was false
US or world community can tolerate depictions and offensive threats
Nuclear weapons are so destructive; ballistic missiles are swift → any sudden change in there use or deployment can be regarded as a threat to peace
Soviet and US recognize this fact have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care
Never upsetting status quo that these weapons will not be used
US has no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system on their people
Missiles in Cuba already add to a clear and present danger
Nations of Latin America had never been subjected to nuclear threat→ threat of communists missiles
Is an unjustified change in the status quo by the Soviets→ cannot be accepted by the US
1930s → aggressive conduct leads to war
We must prevent the use of these missiles and secure withdraw or elimination
Further action required and may only be the beginning
We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth
Actions that will be taken immediately
Halt this offensive buildup, strict quarantine on all offensive military in equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated
All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back → will be extended if needed
Not denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948
Direct the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba & its military buildup
Regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the US, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union
Has reinforced our based at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel + ordered additional military units to be on standby alert basis
Immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American states → consider this threat to hemispheric security to involve articles 6 & 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action
UN Charter allows for regional security arrangements
Under Charter of UN→ asking that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace; resolution call for prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba under supervisions of UN before quarantine can be lifted
Called upon Chairman Krushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations b/w our 2 nations
Cals him to further abandon course of world domination and join in effort to end perilous arms race and transform the history of man
States he has the opportunity to move the world back for the abyss of destruction- turning back to government’s own words (USSR) there is no need to station missiles outside its own territory and withdrawing weapons from Cuba
Have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in fair and effective disarmament treaty
Prepared to discuss proposal for removal of tensions on both sides + possibilities of independent Cuba, free determine to its own destiny
Have no wish to war with Soviet- we are peaceful who desire to live in peace with all other peoples
Difficult to settle in an atmosphere of intimidation
Any hostile move anywhere in the world against safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed will be met by whatever action needed
Says words directly to Cuban people → there land is under foreign domination and there leader no longer Cuban leader inspired by Cuban ideals
They are puppets and agencies of international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americans- turning it to the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war- the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil
These new weapons are not in your interest; they contribute nothing to the peace and well-being of Cuba and only undermine it
States US doesn’t wish to cause suffering or impose a system on them
States we know there lives and land are being used as pawn by those who deny your freedom
In the past Cuban people have risen and thrown out tyrants who destroyed their liberty
Greatest danger of all would be doing nothing
Path we have chosen is full of hazards; cost of freedom is always high but American have always paid it
One path we shall never choose is surrender or submission
Goal is of vindication of right not peace at the expense of freedom but both peace and freedom in this hemisphere and around the world