AA

Week 5

CHAPTER 5: THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION, NUCLEAR STRATEGY, AND NUCLEAR WAR


NUCLEAR REVOLUTION, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA

  • Nuclear weapons had shifted the balance b/w offense and defence 

  • States build nuclear weapons in order to deter another state from using nuclear weapons against them 

  • Deterring threat through the possession and credible intention to use nuclear weapons is therefore the bedrock of nuclear deterrence

  • Actions taken to increase the credibility of one’s own nuclear forces 

  • Security dilemma can lead to highly destabilising strategic scenarios as rival nuclear armed states vie for superiority and military advantage and credibility through nuclear arms race

  • Can begin to spiral leads to costly and destabilizing nuclear arms race

  • Misperception and fear lead 2 players to build nuclear weapons and to keep building more nuclear weapons when the best mutual outcome is for no one to build them 

    • Example→ Cold War (US vs Soviet)

  • Nuclear arms race is also about the types aSpeech by President Kennedy on the Cuba Missile Crisis:and capabilities of different nuclear systems


MAD

  • Stability in nuclear relationships can be achieve through mutual vulnerability to a nuclear attack

  • It can never be beneficial to launch a nuclear first strike against an opponent bc they will be able to retaliate with their nuclear weapons in a second nuclear strike that will destroy the attacker

  • No rational actor would choose to use nuclear weapons first or initiate nuclear war

  • Condition where any move to strike first with nuclear weapons to achieve a debilitating attack on an opponent will be suicidal 

  • Best way to ensure nuclear stability is to make sure both sides are vulnerable to nuclear attack 

  • Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972→ prohibited the deployment of a range of anti-ballistic missile defences by both sides 

  • Defences complicate any retaliatory strike and could undermine MAD

  • Threat of nuclear retaliation has to be credible

  • 3 challenges of MAD 

    • Rationality → MAD assumes that all actors are rational; not all actors are rational in certain circumstances; often a claim made against rogue states and certainly against non-state actors such as terrorists 

    • Accidents→ possibility of miscalculation or accidents; no guarantee that these will not occur especially if nuclear weapons spread to new actors; safe and secure command and control of nuclear forces remains

    • Morality

  • Adversaries willing to engage in low-level operations bc they believe this falls well below the threshold for nuclear retaliation→ stability-instability paradox


NUCLEAR POSTURE AND NUCLEAR TARGETING  

  • Nuclear postures→ thinking and strategy that underpins the utility and role of nuclear weapons for any one state 

Minimum deterrence

Limited deterrence

Maximum deterrence 

Doctrine

Deter a nuclear attack on your own country

Deter all types of threats to your national security 

Seek strategic advantage and nuclear superiority; nuclear war fighting 

Delivery vehicles/stockpile

A small number of survivable delivery vehicles 


Relatively high yield nuclear weapons/accuracy desirable but not essential 


A limited nuclear stockpile 

Small warhead stockpile and a survivable nuclear force 


A mixture of nuclear weapon yields with high accuracy 

A nuclear triad and a large number of different nuclear delivery vehicles


A mixture of tactical and strategic nuclear warheads


High yield nuclear weapons with accuracy and penetration capability  

Alert status 

Nuclear forces not on high alert they may be de-targeted and warheads and delivery vehicles might be demated 

A small number of nuclear forces on alert ready to retaliate quickly if necessary 

Nuclear forces on high alert deployed globally, able to unleash overwhelming strike if necessary


Nuclear weapons could be launched on warning before an adversaries attack has happened 

Declaratory policy

Nuclear weapons only ever used to respond to a nuclear attack. 


A policy of no first nuclear use 

Nuclear weapons may be used in certain extreme circumstances 

All options are on the table


Nuclear weapons might be used preemptively if necessary 

Targeting

Soft targets and counter value

Some counterforce, some counter value

All

Examples 

China, North Korea 

Uk, France, India, Pakistan, Israel

US, Russia 


  • Different nuclear posture require different nuclear capabilities and this is reflected in the types of targets that they are intended to hit

    • Targeting enemy forces and targeting enemy public 

  • Targeting enemy forces is more aggressive bc attacking enemy forces could be part of a disarming first strike 

Counter -force 

Counter-value 

Type of target 

Military forces, military installations, air force bases, command headquarters, ICBM, launch sites, submarine pens 

Large population centres, cities, urban areas, civilian infrastructure 

Weapons requirements 

High accuracy, ability to penetrate defences, possible high yield, possibly large numbers per target


High level of penetration Targets maybe hardened against attack 

Ground burst explosion

Basic nuclear weapons, small numbers, not necessarily high yield 


Small % of penetration is ok/accuracy is not essential 


Targets are unlikely to be well protected 


Airburst explosion needed 

Strengthens 

Avoids civilian pop centres

Potentially limits war to military forces 

Only needs crude weapons to be effective 


Compatible with policy of minimum retaliatory nuclear deterrence 

Weaknesses 

Requires very advanced nuclear weaponry 

Raises questions about the morality and legality of deliberately targeting civilians with nuclear weapons


Raises questions of credibility 



NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL 

  • Mechanisms and processes to manage the safety and security and use of nuclear weapons→ nuclear command and control C2 OR NC2 

  • Also can be command control and communications→ C3 OR NC3

  • Central paradox of nuclear C2 as tension b/w safety and security of nuclear weapons 

  • Problem → measures designed to increase the safety and security of nuclear weapons in order to prevent unwarranted use often results in a decrease in ability to authorise and use nuclear weapons

Unauthorised 

Accidental

Protect against decapitation/inability to Use 

Nuclear forces should be as secure and well protected as possible.


Delegating authority over nuclear forces increases the risk of an unauthorised use


Nuclear use must always be kept under strict civilian  

Nuclear forces should be as safe as possible


Keeping weapons on high alert increases the chance that accidents will happen 


Nuclear weapons should only be useable following a positive command from relevant authority 

Nuclear forces must not be vulnerable to a surprise first strike


Forces therefore need to be kept on high alert and authority to use them potentially delegated to military commanders


Nuclear use may have to be automated to some degree to be credible 

  • As long as nuclear weapons exist there will always be a chance of accidents/ unauthorised use of an accidental nuclear war 

  • Permissive Action Links (PALs) → they cannot be detonated without the proper authorisation

  • Two-person rule → at least 2 people should participate in every phase of the process of delivering a nuclear weapon from the laboratory to it final military use

  • One-point safe → a nuclear device that will not produce a nuclear yield if there is a single conventional explosion on the core

  • More nations that acquire nuclear weapons → likely to increase the chances of deliberate or accidental incident involving nuclear warheads 

  • Pressure on nuclear command and control→ is the credibility of nuclear weapons should they ever be used 

  • Biggest challenge → how to control nuclear weapons and their associated support systems to ensure they are always ready to be used 

  • Who should control weapons

    • Civilian control→ level of accountability and increases threshold of nuclear use; response could be slower and make vulnerable to first strike 

    • Military control → swift response; risk of unauthorised use by rogue commander and undermine ability to control a nuclear exchange


ESCALATION, BRINKMANSHIP, NEAR MISSES, AND NUCLEAR WAR

  • Nuclear brinkmanship → seeking to coerce/compel an adversary through increasingly danger risk taking through both threatening rhetoric and actions to ramp up tensions to the brink of conflict

  • Escalation→ possibility that dispute or minor conflict b/w nuclear armed adversaries will lead to the use of nuclear weapons

  • Nuclear war can never be won

  • Overconfidence is a major concern 


THE ORIGINS OF OVERKILL

Introduction & Context

  • The article explores how the U.S. developed a nuclear strategy that emphasized “overkill”—the ability to destroy the Soviet Union multiple times over.

  • Overkill emerged due to political, military, and technological factors during the early Cold War.

  • U.S. nuclear planning evolved from limited atomic strikes to a doctrine of massive retaliation.

  • The article focuses on the decision-making processes within the U.S. government and military that led to nuclear overkill.


Early Cold War Nuclear Thinking (1945–1950s)

  • After World War II, the U.S. was the only nuclear power and initially viewed atomic bombs as a means of maintaining strategic superiority.

  • The Soviet Union’s successful test of an atomic bomb in 1949 challenged U.S. dominance and changed military planning.

  • The National Security Council (NSC-68) in 1950 recommended a massive military buildup, including nuclear stockpiling, to counter Soviet expansion.

  • The U.S. developed the hydrogen bomb (H-bomb) in 1952, dramatically increasing the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

  • The Cold War intensified, and military planners began thinking in terms of total nuclear war rather than limited use.

The Rise of Overkill Doctrine

  • Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the U.S. adopted the strategy of massive retaliation—using overwhelming nuclear force in response to any Soviet aggression.

  • This policy, outlined in Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s speeches, was meant to deter Soviet attacks by ensuring mutual destruction.

  • The U.S. rapidly increased its nuclear stockpile beyond what was needed for deterrence.

  • Air Force and Strategic Air Command (SAC) pushed for larger arsenals, believing that nuclear superiority was necessary for security.

  • The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) expanded the ability to launch nuclear attacks from multiple platforms.

  • The concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) emerged, where both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had the capability to annihilate each other multiple times over.

Technological & Bureaucratic Drivers of Overkill

  • Advances in missile technology allowed for more efficient and destructive nuclear strikes.

  • The military-industrial complex and inter-service rivalries contributed to the buildup:

    • The Air Force, Army, and Navy competed for funding, leading to excessive nuclear force planning.

    • The RAND Corporation and other think tanks promoted deterrence theories that justified large stockpiles.

  • Strategic Air Command (SAC), led by General Curtis LeMay, advocated for a preemptive nuclear strike capability.

  • Bureaucratic momentum and political fears of being seen as “weak on defense” led to continuous stockpiling.

Shifts in Strategy & Criticism of Overkill

  • By the late 1950s and early 1960s, critics argued that overkill did not enhance security and increased the risk of accidental war.

  • President John F. Kennedy introduced the Flexible Response strategy, allowing for proportional retaliation instead of automatic massive retaliation.

  • Overkill made deterrence unstable, as both sides sought second-strike capabilities to survive a first strike.

  • Arms control efforts, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), aimed to curb excessive nuclear stockpiling.

Conclusion & Legacy

  • Overkill resulted from Cold War fears, technological advancements, and bureaucratic interests.

  • The U.S. and Soviet Union accumulated enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world many times over.

  • The concept of nuclear overkill influenced military strategy for decades and remains a key discussion in arms control debates.

  • While overkill was meant to ensure deterrence, it also increased global tensions and the risks of miscalculation.

  • The legacy of nuclear overkill continues to shape discussions on disarmament, deterrence, and strategic stability today.


SPEECH BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS  

  • Soviet bombs in Cuba → second strike capability against Western Hemisphere 

  • JFK→ asked for surveillance to step up 

    • New missile sites indicate two distinct types of installation

    • Medium range ballistic missiles → able to carry nuclear warhead for 1,000 

    • Each missile is capable of striking DC, Panama Canal, Mexico City

    • Additional sites appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles →  can travel twice as far and strike major cities in the Western Hemisphere

    • Jet bombers → carry nuclear weapons and are being uncrated

  • Presence of offensive weapons → threat to peace and security of all Americans + defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947

  • Contradictions actions of Soviet spokespersons

    • Soviet had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation

  • Makes clear that it was planned for months 

  • Soviet government → the missiles and weapons in Cuba are for defensive purposes

    • No need for Soviet government to shift its weapons

    • Soviet has powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need for new sites

    • This statement was false 

  • US or world community can tolerate depictions and offensive threats 

  • Nuclear weapons are so destructive; ballistic missiles are swift → any sudden change in there use or deployment can be regarded as a threat to peace

  • Soviet and US recognize this fact have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care

  • Never upsetting status quo that these weapons will not be used

  • US has no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system on their people

  • Missiles in Cuba already add to a clear and present danger

  • Nations of Latin America had never been subjected to nuclear threat→ threat of communists missiles

  • Is an unjustified change in the status quo by the Soviets→ cannot be accepted by the US

  • 1930s → aggressive conduct leads to war

  • We must prevent the use of these missiles and secure withdraw or elimination

  • Further action required and may only be the beginning 

    • We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth 

  • Actions that will be taken immediately

    • Halt this offensive buildup, strict quarantine on all offensive military in equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated 

    • All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back → will be extended if needed 

    • Not denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948

    • Direct the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba & its military buildup 

    • Regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the US, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union

    • Has reinforced our based at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel + ordered additional military units to be on standby alert basis

    • Immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American states → consider this threat to hemispheric security to involve articles 6 & 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action

      • UN Charter allows for regional security arrangements

  • Under Charter of UN→ asking that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace; resolution call for prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba under supervisions of UN before quarantine can be lifted 

  • Called upon Chairman Krushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations b/w our 2 nations

  • Cals him to further abandon course of world domination and join in effort to end perilous arms race and transform the history of man

  • States he has the opportunity to move the world back for the abyss of destruction- turning back to government’s own words (USSR) there is no need to station missiles outside its own territory and withdrawing weapons from Cuba

  • Have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in fair and effective disarmament treaty

  • Prepared to discuss proposal for removal of tensions on both sides + possibilities of independent Cuba, free determine to its own destiny 

  • Have no wish to war with Soviet- we are peaceful who desire to live in peace with all other peoples

  • Difficult to settle in an atmosphere of intimidation 

  • Any hostile move anywhere in the world against safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed will be met by whatever action needed

  • Says words directly to Cuban people → there land is under foreign domination and there leader no longer Cuban leader inspired by Cuban ideals

    • They are puppets and agencies of international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americans- turning it to the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war- the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil

    • These new weapons are not in your interest; they contribute nothing to the peace and well-being of Cuba and only undermine it 

    • States US doesn’t wish to cause suffering or impose a system on them

    • States we know there lives and land are being used as pawn by those who deny your freedom

  • In the past Cuban people have risen and thrown out tyrants who destroyed their liberty 

  • Greatest danger of all would be doing nothing 

  • Path we have chosen is full of hazards; cost of freedom is always high but American have always paid it 

  • One path we shall never choose is surrender or submission

  • Goal is of vindication of right not peace at the expense of freedom but both peace and freedom in this hemisphere and around the world