Judith Thompson, “The Trolley Problem”

1. Trolley Driver Case  

   - In this scenario, a trolley is headed toward five people tied to the tracks. The trolley driver can switch the trolley to a track with one person.  

   - The dilemma is whether the driver should actively switch the trolley, sacrificing one to save five.

2. Transplant Case  

   - In this case, a doctor has five patients who need organ transplants. A healthy person walks into the hospital, and the doctor could kill that person to harvest their organs, saving the five patients.  

   - The dilemma explores whether it's morally permissible to actively kill one person to save five.

3. Two Principles  

   - Principle 1: Killing one is worse than letting five die. This principle is supported in the Trolley Driver case, where it may be seen as worse to actively cause harm (killing one person) than to let five people die by inaction.

   - Principle 2: Killing five is worse than killing one. This principle is put to the test in the Transplant case, where actively killing one person to save five may be seen as morally worse.

4. Bystander Case (pressure on Principle 1)  

   - The bystander scenario involves a person who can push someone in front of a trolley to save five people. It pressures Principle 1 because some argue that pushing someone is more morally culpable than just letting five people die, even though it results in the same outcome (saving five).

5. Transplant Case and Principle 2  

   - Thompson changes the Transplant case by having the doctor actively kill the healthy person for their organs. This challenges Principle 2, as it raises the question whether killing five (who would die without organs) is morally worse than killing one for the sake of saving five.

6. “Using as a Means” and the Loop Version of Bystander  

   - "Using as a means" refers to treating someone solely as a tool to achieve an end. In the Loop version of the Bystander case, the bystander must make a decision that treats the person in front of the trolley as a mere tool to save others. This case complicates the moral calculus by raising issues of dehumanization and intentional harm.

7. Distributive Exemption  

   - This exemption involves a situation where an action (e.g., sacrificing one to save many) is permissible if the burden or harm is distributed across a group rather than focused on a single individual. It examines whether it’s morally acceptable to sacrifice one for the sake of many if the sacrifice is spread out.

8. Bridge Version of Bystander and Mayor Example (Distributive Exemption Test)  

   - In the Bridge version, a person must decide whether to sacrifice a larger number of people on the tracks to save many others. The Mayor case involves a decision to allocate resources to save more lives but at a moral cost. These cases fail the Distributive Exemption test because the burden of harm isn’t evenly distributed.

John Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?”

1. Taurek’s Main Example (The Drug Case)  

   - In the Drug case, one person has a life-saving drug, and several people need it. The question is whether we should prioritize saving the larger number of people or treat each individual equally, regardless of the numbers.

2. Version of the Drug Case Involving David  

   - David, in this version, owns the drug. Taurek argues that David's decision should not depend on the numbers because each individual life is equally valuable. His point is that moral obligations can’t simply be overridden by a numerical advantage.

3. Overriding Moral Obligations  

   - Taurek argues that moral obligations to individuals are not dependent on numerical outcomes. Even if more lives are at stake, one should not ignore the obligation to help each person.

4. Drug Case in Which David Owns the Drug  

   - Taurek’s point here is that David’s moral obligations still do not change simply because he owns the drug. He argues that ownership does not give one the moral right to disregard the lives of others, and the right to decide is not determined by how many people need it.

5. How Taurek Thinks We Should Decide in the Drug Case  

   - Taurek suggests that we should treat each individual as having equal moral worth, and thus the numbers should not count in moral decision-making. We should prioritize helping people based on fairness, not just efficiency.

Christopher Kutz, “Moral Accountability and Collective Action”

1. Individual Difference and Control Principles  

   - These principles are difficult to apply in collective cases because individuals in a group may not have direct control over the harm caused by the group. Collective action problems make it hard to assign moral responsibility to a single individual.

2. Dresden Example  

   - The Dresden bombing during WWII is used to discuss how moral accountability in collective action cases is complex. The main point is that individuals may be complicit in collective actions, but it’s difficult to assign blame when the individual’s role is so indirect.

3. Kutz’s Complicity Principle  

   - Kutz's Complicity Principle suggests that individuals can be morally responsible for harms caused in collective action situations, but only if they knowingly and voluntarily participate in the harm.

4. Determining Individual Accountability in Collective Harm  

   - Kutz argues that individual accountability in collective harm cases should be based on control over the action and knowledge of the harm being caused. Intentions play a key role in determining responsibility, as individuals who intend to cause harm are more morally responsible than those who act unknowingly or without intent.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault”

1. Sinnott-Armstrong’s Central Claim  

   - Sinnott-Armstrong argues that individuals are not morally responsible for collective harms unless their actions directly contribute to the harm in a significant way. He challenges the idea that every individual has a moral duty to prevent large-scale harms like pollution or global warming.

2. Pouring-Cyanide-into-a-River Case vs. Wasteful Driving  

   - The cyanide case is a clear example of harm, whereas wasteful driving (e.g., driving an extra mile to a less convenient parking spot) is less directly harmful. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that individual actions, like wasteful driving, don't create enough harm to be morally culpable in the same way as more direct actions.

3. Moral Principles (Harm, Contribution, Gas)  

   - Sinnott-Armstrong considers several principles:

     - Harm principle: Focuses on direct harm caused.

     - Contribution principle: Emphasizes individual contributions to harm.

     - Gas principle: Relates to the way many individuals contribute to environmental damage.  

     - He thinks these principles are unhelpful in showing the wrongfulness of wasteful driving because the harm is too diffuse and the individual contribution is minimal.

4. Obligation Beyond Wasteful Driving  

   - Sinnott-Armstrong argues that while we may not have an obligation to refrain from actions like wasteful driving, we do have an obligation to avoid engaging in activities that contribute to serious, large-scale harms, such as participating in environmentally harmful industries.

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 Shelly Kagan, “Do I Make a Difference?”

1. Collective Action Problems and Consequentialism  

   - Collective action problems (e.g., pollution, voting) challenge consequentialism because individual actions seem too small to make a difference in large-scale outcomes, but collectively, they have significant consequences. Kagan argues that consequentialism can still address these cases by recognizing the cumulative effects of individual actions.

2. Triggering vs. Imperceptible Difference Cases  

   - Triggering cases involve actions where one person’s decision causes a significant, noticeable change (e.g., pushing a lever to save lives).  

   - Imperceptible difference cases involve actions where one person's contribution seems too small to make any noticeable impact (e.g., voting in an election where no one person’s vote is decisive).

3. Chicken Case (Triggering or Imperceptible Difference)  

   - The Chicken case is a triggering case because it involves a clear decision that affects a group of people. Kagan suggests we can still make moral decisions even in such triggering cases, despite the seeming insignificance of each individual action.

4. Parfit’s Harmless Torturers (Imperceptible Harm Case)  

   - In imperceptible harm cases, Kagan argues that consequentialism can still address the moral value of actions. In Parfit’s example, the fact that no one person’s action causes significant harm doesn’t mean they aren’t still morally responsible for contributing to a larger wrong.

 Julia Nefsky, “How You Can Help, Without Making a Difference”

1. Collective Impact Cases  

   - These cases involve actions where an individual’s contribution doesn’t seem to make a noticeable difference but is part of a collective effort that can have a significant impact (e.g., voting or donating money).

2. Assumption Nefsky Rejects  

   - Nefsky rejects the assumption that you must make a perceptible difference in order to have a moral reason to act. She argues that we can help without needing to make a measurable difference.

3. Nefsky’s Definition of “Helping”  

   - Nefsky defines "helping" as acting in a way that supports a moral