§ actus reus / mens rea - for a person to be found guilty of a criminal offence he or she must have committed an illegal act (actus reus) and had the required “state of mind” (mens rea) for the criminal offence

- Benjamin Libet’s consciousness experiments

o brain activity (unconscious readiness potential) responsible for actions appears to occur 300 – 400 ms before conscious awareness of decision to act

o conscious “will” to act appears to be a non-casual by product

- some examples in science

o seems to demonstrate that people not as free as they think

o and that in these situations, while feeling free people appear in fact to be casually constrained to some degree

o a lot of caution needed in drawing inferences

o major histocompatibility complex (MHC)

§ MHC genes connected to immune system responses

§ Women subconsciously detect indirectly via smell a potential mate in MCH

§ Statistic evidence of significant behavioural outcomes based on this detection

o Toxoplasma gondii (cat litter disease)

§ A parasitic protozoan with cats as primary hosts but present in all known mammal populations

· Widespread

· Approximately one third of all humans are infected with parasite

§ Noted modified human behaviours

· Elevates dopamine levels in most people

· Beneficial for people with ADHD

· Detrimental in schizophrenia

· Increase in risky behaviour

· Slower reaction times

· May be linked to depression and increase risk of suicide

- Framing effect

o Surgeons make different judgements after being given statistic information`about survival outcomes for patients after lung cancer surgery framed in two ways

§ One month survival rate is 90% vs 10% mortality rate in first month

- Two ways to set up determinism

o Physicalist

§ Every event in the universe is determined by a prior cause or set of causes

§ These causes are governed by universal, physical laws

§ We – human beings – are physical things in the universe (our actions are events in the universe)

§ Therefore, all our actions have physical causes (are casually determined)

§ Every event is in principle predictable

o Theistic

§ Version 1

· God foreordains everything in the universe – every event in the universe is determined in advance by God

· We – humans – are things in the universe (our actions are events in the universe)

· Therefore, all our actions are determined by God

§ Version 2

· God is omniscient – that is god knows everything including what events will occur in the future

· All events including human actions are known by God all at once

· Therefore, there is only one determinate history the one known by God (all events are determined)

- Main ways to ground freewill

o It appears as if we make free choice/genuine decisions and deliberate

o We hold people responsible for at least some of their actions

§ Praise/blame people for certain actions

- Crucial metaphysical distinction: Possible is actual is necessity outside of this are impossible

- 3 main options/responses to free will problem

o Hard determinism – strict determinism (version of incompatibilism)

o Libertarianism – self determinism (version of incompatibilism)

o Compatibilism – soft determinism (compromise)

- Determinism

o The state of the world at a given time casually determines some future state

§ given some fixed state of the world, subsequent states are inevitable

· the past determines the future

o casual determinism in general

§ initial conditions + casual laws determines all subsequent states

· implies predictability

· if we knew everything about the actual state of this world at a time and all of the casual laws governing it we could predict all future states

- hard determinism coming from casual determinism

o all future states fixed by past states

§ initial conditions + casual laws determine all subsequent states

o all events including acts of choosing are made necessary by past states

§ so – no free will

· nothing is free from being casually fixed (determined)

- indeterminism as a possible objection to casual determinism

o claim: at least some events aren’t casually fixed by events

§ supported by contemporary quantum physics

§ instead of sufficient reasons/causes for an event to have merely probabilistic causation

o casual determinism = outcome by initial state/set of conditions

o Quanta level = outcome 1 or outcome 2 by initial state/set of conditions

§ Both outcomes can happen unless someone observes them

o Uncertainty over how to understand indeterminacy

§ Even if indeterminacy applies at the quantum level it may not apply at macro level

§ Also freewill requires that we cause our actions not that they’re undetermined

- Key problems for indeterminism

o if the event of our lives (acts of deciding and choosing) are indeterministic than our actions seem to be random

o but if our actions are random, how can we be held responsible for them?

- Determinism true or false?

o If true it leads to freewill

§ If this is true it leads to compatibilism

§ If this is false it leads to hard determinism

o If false it leads to libertarianism

- Libertarianism (self determinism)

o Key claims:

§ Strict determinism is false

§ Humans have freewill (at least sometimes)

§ Freewill isn’t compatible with determinism

o Some rely on indeterminism

o Others are nondeterministic causation

- Event causation vs agent causation

o Based on the distinction between events and actions

o Events = simple physical occurrences

§ Determined by prior events

o Actions = events intentionally performed by agents

§ Not fully determined by prior events

§ Agents can act at least partially independent of prior causes

o Event causation (domino effect): one event leads to other events

o Agent causation: a person / agent who has freewill capacity for actions leads to actions which leads to further events/actions

- Two basic ways to have freewill in this sense (libertarianism)

o Humans are foundationally special in having some aspect outside of physical causality

o Universal causality isn’t true in physical realm – somehow we and perhaps some other things can operate independent of casual necessity (prior states and events)

§ Allows for agent causation

- Key test of freewill

o An action that arises from freewill is one where the agent could have done otherwise

§ There is no particular history to unfold

§ There are genuine possibilities (real options)

o A decision can actually set possible futures

- General reasons in favour of libertarianism

o Phenomenological evidence

§ We “feel” free etc.

o Assignment of moral responsibility

o Originality/invention/innovation

o Determinism itself isn’t proven

- The conditions for legit praise and blame

o One) Must be an act of the self (subjective)

§ A must choose to do X rather than Y

o Two) A must choose to do X and do X because the choosing not because externally constrained or compelled

o Three) Must be free from environmental hereditary etc. influences

§ Obviously, can’t remove ourselves from all influence

§ But we need to be able to free ourselves from their complete influence

· At least temporary at the moment of willing or choosing

- Bottom line for libertarians

o The “self” is something more than or is something over and above the complete physical makeup

§ When people act for or by themselves they act independent of all of what casually led them to that position

§ And we can act out of character and independent of our circumstance

- Problems for libertarians

o To say that our actions are up to us seems to go against our everyday judgements about influences in our lives especially the influence that led to diminished responsibility

§ Can agent causation be entirely independent of event causation?

o Libertarianism seems to require the notion of there being a self as an agent

§ Is this legitimate metaphysical addition?

§ Our discussion in the philosophy of personal identity will suggest serious problems

o Looks to require something akin to miracles ie event to occur independent of prior causes and so outside of the casual nexus (web or network of causes)

§ This seems to imply that we could never have any complete explanation of why people do what they choose to do

§ And makes us seem to be god-like creatures

- Compatibilism/Soft Determinism

o Key claims

§ General determinism is true

§ Humans have a kind of freedom (of some significant sort and at least sometimes)

§ Having this kind of freedom is compatible with the truth of determinism

o Key motivations

§ Seems not possible to escape the basic truth of determinism especially universal causality

§ Seems not reasonable to deny human freedom even if how we understand freedom requires modification to accommodate the first motivation

o Traditional compatibilism

§ All events and actions are determined by prior causes

BUT

§ We are free when we can act on the (pre-determined) choices we make without external interference/constraint

· Some add inner compulsion

o AJ Ayer

§ Wrong to contrast freedom with causality

§ Rather contrast freedom with constraint

§ Only not free when the causes lead to compulsion or constraint

§ Free when we’re free to do what we want or will do

· Even if we’re caused to want or will as we do

o The challenge of compatibilism

§ CRUCIAL issue becomes whether freedom in this sense – essentially freedom of action or freedom to do what one wants or chooses to do is sufficient for a suitably robust notion of freewill

§ Freedom = freedom to do what one wants or chooses

· Not free absolutely ie still caused to want or choose as one does

o Casually determined to be made (beliefs, desires, personality etc.) such that one will want or chooses as one does

· Still just one determinate future – not metaphysically open which future will occur

§ Free choice when not constrained or compelled to follow that chosen path

o Could have done otherwise test

§ Compatibilists understand could’ve done otherwise only hypothetically

· That’s we could do otherwise but only if we had different desires, wishes, motivations etc.

· Free if we could act on those different desires without constraint or compulsion

o Crucial problem for traditional compatibilism

§ What if someone is free to act as she wants or chooses but us clearly and significantly affected by some internal conditions? Ex. Pathological delusion

· Normally we don’t hold such people responsible for their actions

· And given that wouldn’t say they’re properly free

o External vs internal cases

§ How do we decide between a cause that’s internal to us (so doesn’t undermine freedom to act) and an external constraint or compulsion that does undermine freedom

· Gun pointed at your head? Embedded biases? Pressure from parents? Part of your personality or character?

- Side notes on predictability

o Actual predictability decreases with complexity

§ Difficult for us to understand complexity beyond the very simplest of systems

· Double pendulum

· But lack of understanding isn’t lack of causal determinism

- Traditional hard determinism

o All events are causally determined – including our acts of decision – making and choosing

o Freewill – the sense we have that we are free – is an illusion

§ Arises as a consequence of ignorance or lack of awareness of causes

- Hard determinism

o The determinism is hard, strong or strict in that it denies freewill

o Not that we don’t choose/deliberate but that we are casually led(determined) to choose or make the decisions we do

o Not that were not responsible for our decisions and actions but more like the way a bee is responsible for a bee sting

o Hard determinism shouldn’t simply identify with fatalism

§ Fatalism = the view that all events are necessary and so preestablished

§ History unfolds in just one way

· No matter what we decide or do (destiny)

· No matter what happens prior to event

§ Resign oneself to this preestablished future

o Causation and the principle of sufficient reason

§ Necessary and sufficient conditions

· A is necessary condition for B

o For B to occur A must occur

· A is a sufficient condition for B

o If A occurs B is guaranteed to occur

o Causation characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions

§ Necessarily all events require a cause

§ The act of will – the act of deliberate decision – is an event so necessarily requires a cause/s

§ A particular prior cause (or set of causes) is sufficient for any event includes acts of will

o An act of freewill would have to have no prior cause

§ Would have to be an originating cause

§ A first cause

§ There can be no such things

· So no (genuine) freewill

o Examples

§ Ball rolling across a billiard table

§ Chair catching on fire

§ In each case we think that events happen because or a prior cause

· Sufficient reason for it occurring

§ Dog example:

· A dog takes a shoe out of a closet and chews on it

o What sense is the dog responsible?

o Is it merely casually led to do this?

· Hard determinist – whatever it does we never find any event that doesn’t have a prior cause

o Law of causality is universal

§ Dog cant somehow step outside of casuality just because we cant see th4e causes doesn’t mean theyre no there

· Hidden causes are still causes

· Complexity doesn’t imply mystery

· And even if we think the dog could’ve done otherwise its still because of some prior cause

- Recall basic compatibilist position

o A person can have freedom of action without freedom of the will

§ We’re free when we’re free to act on our desires etc even if we’re causally led to have these desires

§ But many aren’t happy with this

· Seems to make dogs free

- Deep self version

o Not simply that we act on our desires but that we’ve some part of us – the deep self – that is in control of our desires

§ Susan wolf – responsible agents are those for whom it is not just that their actions are within the control of their wills but also that case that their wills are within the control of their selves in some deeper sense

o Deep self compatibilism ex harry Frankfurt

§ Actions can be free but not simply by there being no constraint (or actions) or compulsions

§ Rather free when we act on desires that we choose to have or identify with

· Ie authentic desires

§ Have the capacity to cultivate a self that is somehow up to us = authentic self

o Accords with certain intuitions about ourselves

§ Ex manias/ phobias and hypnotized and brainwashed people

· in these people the will is severed from the deep self

o also accords with our intuitions re lack of responsibility in ex infants nonhuman animals

§ don’t have an authentic self

o fits with our rejection of hard determinism – that we’re not in anyway in our control of what we do

§ allows us to hold that some actions are caused by us at least in some way

o fits with the way we understand ourselves when we have competing desires

o also allows us to enhance our capacity for freedom

o also, potential problem for deep self compatibilism

§ in what sense are we choosing desires or choosing how we want to be?

§ Are we just caused to select the desires we want to have?

§ Or to cultivate the kind of self we want to be?

- General problem for compatibilism

o Are determinism and freedom really compatible?

§ Determinism’s truth implies that there is only one determinate future

§ But how can we be held responsible for seemingly inevitable outcomes of inevitable decisions – or inevitable wills?

- The consequence argument (peter van Inwagen)

o 1. If we’ve no power X then we also have no power over the future necessary consequence of X

o 2. We’ve no power over the past and laws of nature

o 3. And our future actions are the necessary consequences of past and laws of nature

o Therefore

o 4. We’ve no power over our future actions

o 5. In order to be responsible for our future actions we must have power over our future actions

o Therefore

o 6. We aren’t responsible for our future actions

- What then of human beings?

o We think that casual determinism applies to balls, chairs and (likely) dogs – so why not humans?

o How can our actions be somehow outside of casuality?

o Hard determinist answer = they can’t

- Determinism and willpower

o Murder example

§ Casually led to commit a murder but at the last moments wills not to kill

· His will overrides the casual determinates

§ What of this?

· Isn’t this what leads us to praise and blame?

§ Hard determinist

· Whatever he does, he does for a reason

· Reasons have causes

· Cannot be that causes arise on their own without any connection to past events (as prior causes)

- Ignorance of causes

o We cant identify all of the underlying causes in our apparent deliberate decisions

o And when we cant see them we feel free of them

o Its this feeling that creates the illusion of freewill

- What of moral responsibility

o Hard determinist deny genuine moral responsibility

§ No genuine actions and so no genuine responsibility

§ We assign responsibility more out of convention or habit

o Libertarians often characterize freedom in terms of responsibility

§ Freewill grounded in distinction between proper and improper assignment of moral responsibility

· An act is free if and only if its legit to assign praise and blame

- Daniel dennett’s distinction

o Making decisions vs having decisions occur in us

o Can we be said to be responsible for decisions (merely) occur in us?

o To accept compatibilism is to have different understanding of freedom

§ Being free isn’t like libertarian freewill

§ Rather freedom constraint or compulsion

o And compatibilists think this is what we care about anyway

- Conclusions

o Hard determinism denies any real kind of freedom and responsibility

o Libertarianism seems to make it a mystery how freedom can arise

o Compatibilism tries to cut between the two but not clear it succeeds

o

- Determinism – theory that the future is fixed by the past

- Incompatibilism – freewill can only exist if determinism is false, we must choose between accepting determinism or freewill. We can’t consistently believe in both.

- Libertarianism – the future isn’t determined by the past agents have special casual powers that give them control over undetermined actions, having these causal powers allows agents to have freewill

- Indeterminism – not all events are causally determined by events in the past. The past has only limited influences on the future the future us therefore not fixed by the past and the future us therefore not determined

- Hard determinism – future is casually determined by the past since determinism isn’t compatible with freewill, hard determinists conclude that freewill is an illusion

- Compatibilism – we can have freewill even if there is only one future. Determinism is compatible with freewill and responsibility

- Deep-self compatibilism – we are free as long as we act on desires we truly wish to act on

- Traditional compatibilism – we are free as long as we can do what we want to do without being constrained by outside forces

- The case for hard determinism

o Argues that true freedom requires control over the future and since we lack this control we should accept that were not free

- How is the past able to exercise such a powerful influence over the future?

o Respond to this by pointing to causality – past causes the future and this causal link determines what the future looks like

§ Domino effect

§ One event (cause) triggers a second event (effect) which in turn causes a new effect and so on

o The cause of an event happens prior to the effect

o Once the cause has happened, the effect has to happen as well causes are sufficient conditions for bringing about their effects

- Principle of sufficient reason – claims that anything that happens does so for a definite reason

Defense for hard determinism:

1. All events have causes

2. All actions are events

3. All caused events are determined by the past

Therefore:

4. All our actions are determined by the past

5. If all our actions are determined by the past, then we’ve no power to act other than we do indeed act

6. If we have no power to act other than we in fact do act, then we have no freewill

Therefore:

7. We have no free will

Argument against hard determinism

1. If hard determinism is true than we have no freewill

2. If we have no freewill that we are not responsible for our actions

3. If we are responsible for our actions

Therefore, hard determinism is false

This argument follows hypothetical syllogism and modus tollens

- Determinism leads to hard determinism

- Indeterminism makes it impossible to explain how we can perform free and responsible actions

- Compatibilism – claims a determined future is compatible with freewill

o Thomas hobbes, john locke, David hume, defended early versions of this

- Traditional compatibilism two conditions for freedom

o The action is caused by the will of the agent

o The action is performed without constraints

o This is the common sensical theory of freedom

- Deep – self compatibilism

o Harry G. Frankfurt

o The idea that actions that are determined by the past can be free but our will is genuinely free only if we act on desires that we have chosen and that we identify with – authentic desires – desires we truly want to act on

- Objection to compatibilism

o Consequence argument – claims that determinism isn’t compatible with moral responsibility

§ Argument for incompatibilism

§ Peter van Inwagen

Consequence argument

1. No on has power over the past and the laws of nature

2. Our future actions are the necessary consequences of the past and laws of nature

3. If we have no power over X then we also have no power over the future necessary consequences of X

Therefore

4. We have no power over our future actions

5. In order to be responsible for our actions we must have power over our future actions

Therefore

6. We aren’t responsible for our future actions

- Premises of one and two are very plausible: we have no power to change the past as long as we accept determinism

- Premises three – transfer of powerlessness principle

o If one has no control over given situation S and if S is necessarily leads to P then it seems to follow that no one has power over P

o If we accept this principle then premise three of the argument seems to hold

- principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) – it is necessary condition for freedom and responsibility to have the power to act other than we in fact have acted

o if we agree that PAP is necessary for moral responsibility then we embrace the position of incompatibilism

o if we accept incompatibilism we have to give up on freewill or else we need to explain how an indeterminist world can lead to freedom and responsibility

- the case of libertarianism

o libertarianism is a branch of indeterminism that holds the future is open and we have the power to shape it

o event causation – process of one event causing another

§ first event causes the second event which causes the third event and so on

§ physical events are determined to take place

o agent causation – agents have the power to cause something without being subject to casual determination

- problems for libertarianism

o we act as agents we are a matter of metaphysical necessity fully responsible for what we do but difficult to reconcile with how we assign moral responsibility in day-to-day life

o event causation can’t undermine the freedom to choose but seems unscientific and dogmatic because of medical research suggests that biomedical events in our brains make it impossible to preform certain acts

o introduces too much metaphysical baggage

§ quite a loaded philosophical theory: introduces agent and event causation – questions is whether it might not be better to avoid commitment to these entities

o agents can cause actions to take place without there being prior causes that prompt the agents to perform the actions

§ if there are no prior causes how can there be any explanation of why the agents did what they did?

Note