The relationship between language and thought is a major topic in cognitive science and linguistics.
Two main perspectives:
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (SWH)
Universalism
Also known as linguistic relativity.
Two versions:
Strong Version (Linguistic Determinism):
Language entirely determines thought.
Individuals can only conceptualise ideas for which they have linguistic labels.
Language acts as a "cognitive prison", strictly limiting thoughts.
Example: Without a word for an emotion, colour, or concept, one cannot perceive or experience it.
Weak Version (Linguistic Relativity):
Language influences habitual patterns of thinking but does not entirely determine thought.
More empirical support.
The presence or absence of terms in a language may shape how easily individuals attend to certain distinctions (e.g., shades of colour).
Associated with Noam Chomsky.
The underlying cognitive structure of language is universal and biologically endowed.
Differences between languages are superficial.
All human languages share a deep structure reflecting a common cognitive architecture.
Cognition is largely independent of linguistic variation.
Provides empirical testing grounds for these theories.
Berlin and Kay (1969):
Identified a universal pattern in how languages develop colour terms.
Cultures with fewer colour terms still categorise colours around focal points (black, white, red, yellow).
Implies a universal aspect of colour cognition.
Winawer et al. (2007):
Russian speakers distinguish between light blue ("goluboy") and dark blue ("siniy").
Russian speakers were faster at discriminating colours across these categories than English speakers.
Supports linguistic relativity: distinct colour terms facilitate perceptual discrimination.
Gilbert et al. (2006):
Demonstrated a right visual field advantage in colour categorisation tasks.
Stimuli presented to the right visual field are more influenced by linguistic structures because language is processed in the left hemisphere.
Illustrates a neurocognitive basis for the SWH.
Spatial cognition varies across linguistic communities.
English speakers use egocentric references (e.g., "to my left").
Speakers of Kuuk Thaayorre (an Aboriginal language) use allocentric references based on cardinal directions (e.g., "to the north of the cup").
Levinson's research:
Speakers of allocentric languages are better at orienting themselves in unfamiliar environments.
Habitual linguistic practices influence non-linguistic cognitive abilities.
Provides strong evidence for linguistic relativity.
Demonstrates the automaticity of linguistic processing.
The Stroop task: Participants are slower to name the colour of the ink when it spells out a conflicting colour word (e.g., the word "red" written in blue ink).
Language processing is automatic.
Can disrupt cognitive control.
Aligns with the weak version of the SWH.
Language can influence the way we perceive gendered concepts.
Konishi (1993):
Grammatical gender affects perception and description.
German speakers (where "bridge" is feminine) described bridges as "elegant" or "graceful."
Spanish speakers (where "bridge" is masculine) used terms like "strong" and "sturdy."
Highlights the subtle influence of language structure on conceptual thought.
Verbal labels can distort visual memory.
Carmichael, Hogan, and Walter (1932):
Participants shown ambiguous images with verbal labels recalled the images in ways consistent with the labels.
Loftus and Palmer (1974):
Verb choice (e.g., "hit" vs. "smashed") in eyewitness testimony influenced participants' recollection of a car crash.
Included estimations of speed and false memories of broken glass.
Evidence that language can shape the encoding and retrieval of memories.
The verbal overshadowing effect: verbalising a visual memory interferes with accurate recall.
Fallshore and Schooler (1995):
Describing a perpetrator's face reduced recognition accuracy, particularly for same-race faces.
Due to a shift from configural (holistic) to featural (piecemeal) processing.
Lloyd-Jones et al. (2008):
Language can interfere with visual memory, especially when verbalisation disrupts naturally efficient memory processes.
Derived from classical economics.
Individuals make decisions by calculating and comparing the expected utility of each option.
Assumes rationality: choices should be consistent and aim to maximise gain or minimise loss.
People often violate these principles.
Example: Most people prefer a guaranteed £100 over a 50% chance at £200, even though the expected utility is the same. (bias towards guaranteed outcomes).
Developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Challenges rational decision-making assumptions.
Introduces reference points and loss aversion.
Individuals evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point rather than in absolute terms.
Losses have a greater psychological impact than gains of the same magnitude (loss aversion).
Framing effect: The same outcome can elicit different choices depending on whether it is presented as a gain or a loss.
Example: People are more likely to choose a treatment described as "saving 200 lives" than one described as "400 people will die," even though both outcomes are statistically identical.
Emotions play a pivotal role in decision-making.
Affective forecasting errors (Read & van Leeuwen, 1998):
People's inability to accurately predict their future emotional states and how these will affect decision-making.
Bower (1981):
Mood-congruent behaviour: when happy, individuals tend to make riskier decisions; when sad, they become more conservative.
Emotionally charged scenarios (e.g., the Trolley Problem) illustrate how emotional engagement affects moral reasoning.
When participants are required to push a man off a bridge to save five people, emotional centres in the brain (e.g., the amygdala) are activated, and people are less likely to choose the utilitarian option.
Emotion-based regions in the brain significantly influence decision-making.
Shiv et al. (2005):
Patients with damage to the amygdala made more optimal investment decisions than controls because they lacked the emotional fear response.
Patients with vmPFC (ventromedial prefrontal cortex) damage often make impulsive and maladaptive decisions.
Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis:
Emotional experiences create bodily markers that help guide future choices by attaching emotional significance to potential outcomes.
Emotional influences extend into consumer contexts.
Loss aversion is often exploited in marketing.
People prefer to avoid losses more than they enjoy equivalent gains, making the phrasing of offers crucial (e.g., “avoid a £20 surcharge” is more effective than “save £20”).
Sunk cost fallacy: Previous investments (time, money) influence decisions, even when the rational action would be to abandon the investment (Dawes et al., 1988).
Pepsi Paradox (McClure et al., 2004):
Blind taste tests showed no preference, but brand-labelled conditions triggered preferences for Coca-Cola.
Linked to PFC activity.
Highlights the influence of branding on consumer choice.
Cognitive dissonance also plays a role: post-purchase rationalisation helps reduce psychological discomfort, often enhancing consumer satisfaction.
Studies such as Strohmetz et al. (2002) showed that small gestures like offering sweets increased tipping, demonstrating how emotional reciprocity influences financial behaviour.
Emphasises the role of representational change and insight.
Gestalt psychologists (e.g., Köhler (1925)) believed problem-solving involves restructuring how a problem is mentally represented.
Insight occurs when a previously intractable problem suddenly becomes solvable, often experienced as an "Aha!" moment.
Barriers include:
Functional fixedness: Failing to see alternative uses for objects (e.g., using a matchbox as a candle holder).
Mental set: Prior experience leads to inflexible problem-solving strategies (e.g., Luchins’ water jug experiments).
Newell and Simon (1972):
Problem-solving is framed as searching through a problem space.
Defined by an initial state, goal state, and the set of rules for transforming one into the other.
Strategies include:
Means-end analysis: Identify the difference between current and goal states and take steps to reduce that difference.
Hill climbing: Make decisions that appear to move closer to the goal. Though intuitive, it may lead to suboptimal paths.
Progress monitoring: Track progress toward the goal and switch strategies if no progress is made (MacGregor et al., 2001).
Tasks like the Tower of Hanoi illustrate these strategies.
Planning-based strategies are associated with increased activity in the prefrontal cortex.
Individuals with PFC damage perform worse on such tasks, especially when optimal moves involve temporarily stepping away from the goal.
Analogies help solve new problems by applying solutions from structurally similar prior problems.
Gick and Holyoak: Participants were more likely to solve Duncker’s radiation problem if first exposed to a structurally similar scenario (e.g., a military fortress problem).
Analogical reasoning improves with expertise, as experts have more elaborate schemas to draw upon.
Brain imaging studies provide support for cognitive theories of problem-solving.
Goel & Grafman (1995): Individuals with PFC damage performed poorly on complex tasks like the Tower of Hanoi.
Kleibeuker et al. (2013): Adults exhibited greater activation in the lateral PFC compared to adolescents during problem-solving, indicating a developmental trajectory in planning ability.
Kounios et al. (2006): Used EEG and fMRI to show that neural activity before a problem was presented could predict whether it would be solved insightfully.
Experts and novices differ in their approach to problem-solving.
Experts rely on deep, structural knowledge of a domain and are more likely to categorise problems based on underlying principles.
Experts also use more efficient strategies, such as forward planning and chunking information.
Novices are more influenced by surface features and often resort to trial-and-error methods.
The lateral prefrontal cortex is crucial for planning and cognitive control.
The posterior middle temporal gyrus and anterior cingulate cortex are implicated in insight and strategy switching.
These regions support higher-level executive functions essential for flexible problem-solving.
Neuroimaging evidence suggests that successful problem-solving is associated with activity across a distributed network, particularly in the frontal and temporal lobes.