SW

Study Notes – C. E. S. Franks, “The Parliament of Canada” (Introduction)

Page 1 – Context & Frank’s Point of Departure

  • Author & Credentials
    • C.E.S. (“Ned”) Franks – 35-year professor at Queen’s University, Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, prolific writer on legislatures, public administration, Indigenous self-government, sport, etc.
    • Recognized as one of Canada’s foremost parliamentary scholars.

  • Nature of the Extract
    • Introductory chapter to Frank’s 1987 book The Parliament of Canada.
    • Explores the key functions of Parliament and introduces the thematic argument of the book.
    • Stresses continuing relevance decades later.

  • Backdrop: “An Age of Reform”
    • Privy Council Office (1979) told the Royal Commission on Financial Management & Accountability that the previous 20 years had produced more change to governmental machinery and programs than any equivalent period in Canadian history.
    • Parliament experienced more reform in those 20 years than ever before—and reform momentum continued after 1979 (e.g., 1982 Special Procedure Committee, 1985-86 reforms).
    • Reform of the Senate has been a favourite political topic, subjected to numerous studies.
    • Frank’s notes both successes and failures; many reforms created unanticipated, undesirable consequences or generated unrealistic hopes, ultimately ending in public disillusionment.

  • Central Observation
    • Despite widespread criticism, the Canadian parliamentary system often performs better than detractors admit.
    • Frank’s plans to analyze barriers to reform and misguided past attempts by comparing Canada with Britain and the United States.

Page 2 – Goals, Obstacles & Comparative Frames

  • Purpose of the Book

    1. Not to add new reform proposals.

    2. To embed talk of Parliament and reform in its larger milieu: Canadian society, economy, political culture, and the stresses these create.

    3. To study already-implemented reforms, exposing obstacles, misdiagnoses, and overlooked strengths.

  • Persistent Reform Themes (since the 1960s)
    • Complaints: excessive partisanship, government domination, weak private members, inadequate committees, insufficient accountability, Senate problems.
    • Proposed “fixes” have barely changed, implying deeper structural/cultural issues.

  • British vs. Canadian House of Commons
    • Both have modernized, but Britain has gone farther in strengthening committees and loosening party discipline.
    • Comparative study reveals Canadian obstacles (culture, electoral rules, federalism, etc.) that pure procedural tinkering ignores.

  • Why the U.S. Model Misleads
    • Power in Washington is diffuse; no figures possess the combined authority of a Canadian PM + Cabinet.
    • U.S. President lacks the day-to-day scrutiny of Canada’s Question Period.
    • Elections, party cohesion, and policy outputs differ fundamentally.
    → Importing U.S. devices (e.g., powerful standing committees) without context risks a mismatch.

Page 3 – The Six Core Functions & Book Road-Map

  • Four Essential Functions of Parliament (Franks’ formulation)

    1. Make a government – confer legitimacy via elections.

    2. Make a government work – supply authority, statutes, and $$ appropriations.

    3. Make the government behave – watchdog/accountability.

    4. Make an alternative government – give the Opposition a platform and credibility as a future governing choice.

    • Legislative and policy work are mostly subtasks of Function 2.
    • Contrast: U.S. Congress plays almost no role in Functions 1 & 4, but dominates policy-making.

  • Two Additional Functions (often ignored)

    1. Recruit & train leaders – political apprenticeship ground.

    2. Political communication – articulate the public mind, ventilate grievances, educate society (Bagehot’s “expressive” role)

Page 4 – Three Foundational Arguments & The MP Problem

  • Argument 1: Reform Is About Power Purposes, Not Technique
    • Rhetoric paints reform as procedural efficiency; reality = choice about who wields power and for what ends.
    • Executive-centred system amplifies a collectivist voice (e.g., social programs, regional equity). Shifting to a purely parliament-centred model could weaken that collective capacity.

  • Argument 2: Adversarial vs. Consensual Modes
    Adversarial = Question Period, floor debates — exposes, challenges, dramatizes.
    Consensual = committee study — detailed, expert, cooperative.
    • Reformers over-idealize the consensual and vilify the adversarial, ignoring that each supplies virtues the other lacks.

  • Argument 3: The MP Capacity Crisis (Rooted Beyond Party Discipline)
    • Real source: electoral behavior, party structures, demography → House filled with amateur, short-term legislators.
    • Typical MP: little political experience pre-election, serves briefly, exits with few incentives to specialize.
    • Senate compares favorably (longer tenure, more experience).
    Manpower constraints undermine the cabinet talent pool, Opposition effectiveness, committee stability, quality of debate, procedural mastery, and Speaker performance.
    • Therefore, any viable reform must tackle recruitment, career paths, and incentives, not merely loosen the party whip.

Page 5 – Additional Systemic Stresses & Misplaced Reform Focus

  • Argument 4: Party Paradox
    • Inside Commons: parties exercise iron discipline and shape every MP's career stage.
    • Outside Commons: parties are weak, with poor membership roots and shallow policy engines.
    • Consequences: transient MPs, thin policy debate, reliance on leader-centric campaigns.

  • Argument 5: Triple-System Stress (Parliament, Cabinet, Bureaucracy)
    The growth of the state created a semi-autonomous bureaucracy; the classic two-part model (Parliament Government) is now a trio.
    • Ministers struggle to control departments; Parliament struggles to oversee Ministers.
    • Federal-provincial executive federalism channels high-stakes bargaining away from the Commons floor.

  • Argument 6: Media Filters & Public Understanding
    • Weak parties → The Media becomes the prime interpreter of politics.
    • Coverage skews to spectacle, conflict, “superficial & critical,” rarely conveying committee depth or policy nuance.
    • Result: public misunderstanding, difficulty mobilizing informed consent.

  • Final Argument: The System Works Better Than Its Reputation
    • Canadian Parliament shows growing pains, not death throes.
    • Many reforms target the easy (procedure, committees, Senate), whereas root causes lie in leadership recruitment, party vitality, media culture, and citizens’ expectations.
    • Over-focusing on institutions diverts the discussion from substantive policy content.

Page 6 – Cautions, Expectations & A Living Constitution

  • Imperfection Is Normal
    • Parliament legitimates power distribution in a society where government unavoidably helps some and harms others.
    • Citizens, moved by greed, anger, and idealism, naturally project intense emotions onto political institutions.

  • Need for Disciplined Critique
    • Some criticisms are valid (procedural flaws, structural misalignments).
    • Others stem from unreasonable expectations about what politics can achieve or from dislike of policy outcomes.
    • Reformers must separate soluble institutional problems from inevitabilities of human nature & democratic contention.

  • Parliament as a “Lively, Vital” Part of the Living Constitution
    • Not merely a backdrop for endless reform agendas.
    • Requires understanding, appreciation, and measured change, not perpetual over-hauling.

  • Key Take-Aways for Exam Revision

    1. Memorize Franks’ four essential + two supplemental parliamentary functions.

    2. Grasp the executive-centered vs. parliament-centered tension and its policy implications.

    3. Contrast adversarial and consensual modes, citing examples and strengths/weaknesses.

    4. Explain the MP manpower problem and why party discipline is a symptom, not a cause.

    5. Discuss the party paradox, bureaucratic growth, media influence, and why these complicate reform.

    6. Be ready to critique reform movements—successes, failures, unintended consequences—and to argue why Franks believes Parliament still “works” overall.

Overall Goals and Objectives of the Reading

This reading aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Canadian parliamentary system through C.E.S. Franks' perspective, moving beyond superficial criticisms and reform proposals. Its core objectives include:

  • Contextualizing Parliamentary Reform: To embed discussions of Parliament and its reforms within Canada's broader societal, economic, and political culture, recognizing the stresses these contexts create.

  • Analyzing Implemented Reforms: To critically examine past reforms, highlighting their obstacles, misdiagnoses, and often-overlooked strengths, rather than proposing new ones.

  • Challenging Misconceptions: To argue that the Canadian parliamentary system, despite widespread criticism, often performs better than its detractors admit, and that many reforms are misguided or have unintended consequences.

  • Identifying Root Causes of Challenges: To delve into deeper systemic issues such as the MP capacity crisis, the party paradox, the triple-system stress, and media influence, arguing these are more fundamental than procedural flaws.

  • Promoting Measured Critique: To encourage a disciplined approach to critique, distinguishing between soluble institutional problems and inherent complexities of governance and human nature, advocating for understanding and measured change rather than perpetual overhauling of what is a “lively, vital” part of the living constitution.