A Dilemma for Error Theorists

Moral Fictionalism vs Moral Abolitionism

Overview

• Claire Herbert discusses the implications of moral error theory, particularly in the context of the ‘Now What’ Problem—what should error theorists do with moral judgments that they now deem false?

• The paper examines two proposed solutions: moral fictionalism and moral abolitionism.

Key Terms

• Moral Error Theory: All moral judgments are false; objective moral values do not exist (Mackie, 1977).

• Moral Fictionalism: Morality is treated as a useful fiction; society continues to act as if moral values exist despite knowing they do not.

• Moral Abolitionism: The recommendation to eliminate moral language and judgments if objective moral values are believed to not exist.

The Dilemma for Moral Error Theorists

• After denying objective morality, error theorists face the question of whether to still act as if it exists or to discard moral discourse entirely.

• The Now What Problem: Questions what moral error theorists should do with their moral beliefs post-conviction that they are false.

Section I: Understanding Moral Error Theory

• Mackie's claim: There are no objective values (1977); all our past moral assertions are false.

• Error theorists assert that while society behaves as if objective morality exists, in reality, they are mistaken.

• The paper posits that the discussion centers on what error theorists should do with the moral judgments deemed incorrect.

Section II: Discussion of Moral Fictionalism

• Motivations Behind Fictionalism:

• Argues that pretending morality exists can prevent temptation and create societal benefits, as seen through benefit-cost analyses of morality.

• Fictionalists maintain that despite understanding morality as fiction, they still derive benefits from adhering to it as if it were true.

• Critique of Fictionalism:

• For morality to guide actions, belief in its existence is necessary; without belief, the motivation is lost.

• Counterexamples show that one cannot be motivated by something they outright deny exists (e.g., belief in Father Christmas).

• Moral commands only effectively instruct behavior if the individual believes in them.

• Joyce's assertion that fictional rules motivate as leverage may overlook the deeper psychological mechanics of motivation.

Section III: Advocacy for Moral Abolitionism

• The paper promotes a mild form of moral abolitionism, suggesting that eliminating moral language and judgment wouldn’t lead to drastic societal consequences.

• Abolitionists hold that if morality does not exist, conceptualizing and discussing it should cease, paralleling the rationalization behind discarding non-existent concepts like Phlogiston.

Addressing Concerns about Abolitionism

• Common Objections:

• A prevalent fear is that the absence of morality will lead to selfishness and societal collapse. The paper refutes this by emphasizing that humans possess various non-selfish motivations for behavior.

• Individuals can still act altruistically based on self-interest, empathy, and a desire for social cooperation, irrespective of moral obligations.

• Personal Ethics:

• Personal ethical frameworks can exist outside of objective morality. Abolitionists can establish personal codes or ethical habits that help govern behavior.

Conclusion

• The investigation articulates that while fictionalism posits benefits to preserving moral discussions, these benefits are contingent upon belief.

• Herbert argues for moral abolitionism as a more grounded solution, asserting it doesn’t inherently diminish societal function or ethical behavior. Instead, it opens the scope for a society operating on non-moral reasons and empathy without being constrained by objective moral values.