Mind and Reality: The Problem of Qualia

The Problem of Qualia

• Key Concepts in Mind and Reality
  • Challenges to Scientific Naturalism regarding the mind and experience.
  • Important thoughts experiments:
  • The Chinese Room (Searle)
  • Mary's Thought Experiment (Jackson)

The Chinese Room Thought Experiment (John Searle)

• Scenario: A person inside a room receives symbols through a slot, follows instructions from a manual to respond in Mandarin.
• Claim: The individual inside does not understand Mandarin despite appearing to have a conversation.
• Conclusion: This model fails to capture the essence of understanding or thinking.

Responses to the Chinese Room

• Response 1: The Systems Reply
  • The entire system (the room, the manual, and the person) understands, not just the person.
• Response 2: The Robot Reply
  • Suggests a physical embodiment (robot) could lead to genuine understanding.
• Response 3: The Simulator Reply
  • If we replicate neuronal functions artificially, would that entity be capable of thought?

The Knowledge Argument (Frank Jackson)

• Scenario: Mary lives in a black and white room, learns all physical facts about color without ever experiencing it.
• Key Question: What knowledge does she gain when she first sees color?
• Conclusion: Mary learns new non-physical facts about color, indicating that physical knowledge alone is insufficient.
• Definition of Qualia: The singular experience of sensations (e.g., perceptions of colors).

Epiphenomenalism

• Jackson's Stance: Qualia are not physical; they are side-effects or by-products of mental states.
  • Definition: "Epiphenomenon" = causally inert by-product.
  • Historical perspectives:
  • Huxley (1874): Mental events as unproductive as a steam whistle.
  • James (1879): Mental states don't affect the brain like a shadow.

Objections to the Knowledge Argument

• Critics argue that if qualia are epiphenomena, how can they lead to beliefs about their own existence?
• Jackson eventually acknowledged some criticisms, while other epiphenomenalists, like Keith Campbell, disagreed.

David Lewis on Knowledge Types

• Two Knowledge Types:
  • Propositional Knowledge (“Knowledge That”): Knowledge that can be articulated, written, or shared.
  • Non-propositional Knowledge (“Knowledge How”): Skills learned through experience, e.g., riding a bike.
• Application to Mary: Gains non-propositional knowledge (i.e., the ability to discriminate colors) when she experiences color firsthand.

Conclusion and Reflection on Thought Experiments

• Caution against drawing definitive conclusions from thought experiments.
• The distinction between propositional knowledge and experiential understanding suggests a complexity in what constitutes knowledge and experience beyond mere facts.
• Final Reflection: Experiential knowledge might elude definitive articulation through language, reinforcing that there is more to understanding than purely logical or factual knowledge.