Bortolotti et al. (2015)
Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik Case
Authors: Lisa Bortolotti, Matthew R. Broome, Matteo Mameli
Received: 1 September 2013 / Accepted: 17 November 2013 / Published online: 19 December 2013
Journal: Neuroethics (2014)
Key Question: What factors should be considered when attributing criminal responsibility in severe crimes?
Focus on the Breivik case and the rationale behind attributing responsibility for his actions.
Challenges the idea that psychiatric symptoms or diagnoses can automatically imply criminal insanity.
Argues that delusional beliefs, while often a focus in determining legal responsibility, may not be necessary or sufficient for establishing criminal insanity.
Background of the Breivik Case:
In July 2011, Anders Breivik committed mass murder, killing 77 people in Norway.
In August 2012, sentenced to 21 years in prison.
Initial Psychiatric Evaluation:
Conducted by Torgeir Husby and Synne Sørheim, diagnosed Breivik with paranoid schizophrenia.
Described his beliefs as bizarre delusions, such as claiming to be the leader of a non-existent Knights Templar organization.
Consequences of Diagnosis:
If psychosis was confirmed, Breivik would be deemed criminally insane and not responsible for his actions.
Norwegian Law states that individuals cannot be held responsible if they are psychotic at the time of the crime.
Psychosis includes hallucinations, delusions, and bizarre behaviors.
Revised Psych Evaluation:
Conducted by Agnar Aspaas and Terje Tørrissen, who rejected the schizophrenia diagnosis.
Diagnosed Breivik with narcissistic personality disorder with pathological lying.
Previous assessment's conclusion overturned based on different interpretations of Breivik's behavior.
Case of David Copeland:
Known for the London Nail Bombings.
Experts divided over whether to classify his condition as schizophrenia or personality disorder.
Copeland was convicted of murder despite psychiatric evaluations indicating severe schizophrenia.
McNaughton Rules in English Law:
Specifies criteria for not holding individuals responsible due to mental illness.
Requires proof that the individual did not know the act’s nature or that it was wrong.
Diminished responsibility defense applies under certain conditions, involving significant impairment.
Influence of Public Opinion:
Concerns that high-profile cases like Breivik’s can influence psychiatric evaluations and legal decisions.
Psychiatrists face pressures from public and media, leading to potential biases in assessments.
Potential Mistakes and Misinterpretations:
First assessment criticized for lack of contextual understanding of Breivik's claims linked to right-wing ideologies.
Public pressure possibly swayed the trajectory of his diagnoses and the outcomes of assessments.
Establishing Responsibility Connections:
Need for clarity on how psychiatric conditions impair decision-making relevant to criminal actions.
Neuroscience advances improve understanding of decision-making deficits but are limited in assessing past behavior.
Evaluation of Breivik's Beliefs:
Assessment of Breivik’s delusions crucially impacted judgments of his responsibility.
His beliefs about his role in society were extreme yet shared by certain extremist groups, highlighting the importance of social context in determining delusions.
Bipolar View:
Public sentiment often vacillates between the belief that outrageous crimes necessitate mental illness and a desire for punitive justice.
This duality complicates interpretations of mental illness in legal contexts.
Broader Reflections on Responsibility:
Breivik's case reveals the complexities of attributing moral and legal responsibility to those with psychiatric disorders.
Suggests that legal frameworks need to account for the nuances of individual cases instead of relying solely on diagnoses.
Need for Nuanced Evaluation:
Simplistic assumptions that psychiatric symptoms correlate directly with moral responsibility must be challenged.
Understanding the mental state of an individual requires attention to unique circumstances and behaviors, not just the diagnosis.
Future Directions:
Call for developing a more nuanced understanding of the relationships between psychiatric conditions and criminal responsibility outcomes, particularly regarding delusions.
Support from the Wellcome Trust Small Grant in Ethics & Society for the project "Moral Responsibility and Psychopathology."
Article distributed under Creative Commons Attribution License, allowing reuse with proper citation.
Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik Case
Authors: Lisa Bortolotti, Matthew R. Broome, Matteo Mameli
Received: 1 September 2013 / Accepted: 17 November 2013 / Published online: 19 December 2013
Journal: Neuroethics (2014)
Key Question: What factors should be considered when attributing criminal responsibility in severe crimes?
Focus on the Breivik case and the rationale behind attributing responsibility for his actions.
Challenges the idea that psychiatric symptoms or diagnoses can automatically imply criminal insanity.
Argues that delusional beliefs, while often a focus in determining legal responsibility, may not be necessary or sufficient for establishing criminal insanity.
Background of the Breivik Case:
In July 2011, Anders Breivik committed mass murder, killing 77 people in Norway.
In August 2012, sentenced to 21 years in prison.
Initial Psychiatric Evaluation:
Conducted by Torgeir Husby and Synne Sørheim, diagnosed Breivik with paranoid schizophrenia.
Described his beliefs as bizarre delusions, such as claiming to be the leader of a non-existent Knights Templar organization.
Consequences of Diagnosis:
If psychosis was confirmed, Breivik would be deemed criminally insane and not responsible for his actions.
Norwegian Law states that individuals cannot be held responsible if they are psychotic at the time of the crime.
Psychosis includes hallucinations, delusions, and bizarre behaviors.
Revised Psych Evaluation:
Conducted by Agnar Aspaas and Terje Tørrissen, who rejected the schizophrenia diagnosis.
Diagnosed Breivik with narcissistic personality disorder with pathological lying.
Previous assessment's conclusion overturned based on different interpretations of Breivik's behavior.
Case of David Copeland:
Known for the London Nail Bombings.
Experts divided over whether to classify his condition as schizophrenia or personality disorder.
Copeland was convicted of murder despite psychiatric evaluations indicating severe schizophrenia.
McNaughton Rules in English Law:
Specifies criteria for not holding individuals responsible due to mental illness.
Requires proof that the individual did not know the act’s nature or that it was wrong.
Diminished responsibility defense applies under certain conditions, involving significant impairment.
Influence of Public Opinion:
Concerns that high-profile cases like Breivik’s can influence psychiatric evaluations and legal decisions.
Psychiatrists face pressures from public and media, leading to potential biases in assessments.
Potential Mistakes and Misinterpretations:
First assessment criticized for lack of contextual understanding of Breivik's claims linked to right-wing ideologies.
Public pressure possibly swayed the trajectory of his diagnoses and the outcomes of assessments.
Establishing Responsibility Connections:
Need for clarity on how psychiatric conditions impair decision-making relevant to criminal actions.
Neuroscience advances improve understanding of decision-making deficits but are limited in assessing past behavior.
Evaluation of Breivik's Beliefs:
Assessment of Breivik’s delusions crucially impacted judgments of his responsibility.
His beliefs about his role in society were extreme yet shared by certain extremist groups, highlighting the importance of social context in determining delusions.
Bipolar View:
Public sentiment often vacillates between the belief that outrageous crimes necessitate mental illness and a desire for punitive justice.
This duality complicates interpretations of mental illness in legal contexts.
Broader Reflections on Responsibility:
Breivik's case reveals the complexities of attributing moral and legal responsibility to those with psychiatric disorders.
Suggests that legal frameworks need to account for the nuances of individual cases instead of relying solely on diagnoses.
Need for Nuanced Evaluation:
Simplistic assumptions that psychiatric symptoms correlate directly with moral responsibility must be challenged.
Understanding the mental state of an individual requires attention to unique circumstances and behaviors, not just the diagnosis.
Future Directions:
Call for developing a more nuanced understanding of the relationships between psychiatric conditions and criminal responsibility outcomes, particularly regarding delusions.
Support from the Wellcome Trust Small Grant in Ethics & Society for the project "Moral Responsibility and Psychopathology."
Article distributed under Creative Commons Attribution License, allowing reuse with proper citation.